WORD AGAINST WORD
Shakespearean Utterance

JAMES R. SIEMON
Word against Word offers a new approach to Shakespearean drama—in particular Shakespeare's Richard II—through an extended engagement with the Bakhtinian concept of art as a form of social utterance. The book is the first to explore this central Bakhtinian conception and its associated notions of social accent, dialogism, and heteroglossia in the context of drama and of Shakespeare studies.

James R. Siemon begins by examining the variety of accents, discourses, and behaviors that competed for the social space of early modern England. He surveys Shakespeare and his contemporaries, including dramatists, poets, and other writers, in order to document early modern attitudes toward the implications of sociolinguistic behavior in a heteroglot environment. While ranging broadly, the book takes Richard II as an exemplary instance of Bakhtinian utterance, showing the play to be, despite its apparent thematic and formal unities, an arena marked by struggles among competing groups and orientations, with their socially defined languages and assumptions. The figure of Shakespeare's King Richard emerges as a revealing example of a form of subjectivity constructed amid the demands of conflicting voices.

Taking his lead from V. N. Vološinov's stress on the social implications of formal elements of utterance, Siemon argues for the utility of formal analysis in historical

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Word against Word: Shakespearean Utterance
by James R. Siemon
WORD AGAINST WORD

Shakespearean Utterance

JAMES R. SIEMON

University of Massachusetts Press   Amberst and Boston
For Alexandra, Johanna, Rosalie, Anna, and Julia
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This book represents a moment in a continuing dialogue with many interlocutors. I owe much more than I can say to the critical judgment and enthusiastic support of readers and commentators, some of whom invited and/or responded to early versions of the argument, some of whom read evolving chapters, some of whom read everything. Among those able readers and discussants, several stand out for truly remarkable generosity. William Carroll, Diana Henderson, and Emily Bartels were invaluable. Each went way beyond the calls of collegiality and friendship to give the entire manuscript the benefit of thorough reading, copious correction, and vigorous response. Jean Howard read almost as much and provided thoughtful guidance at crucial stages of composition. Barbara Mowat contributed time, energy, and critical acuity to aid research in manuscript sources and invited me to the Folger Library to lecture on Bakhtin and Shakespeare when the combination was still very new in my own mind.

Others provided encouragement and helpful responses at crucial moments. Alessandro Serpieri responded to an earlier form of chapter 2 in an intellectually stimulating seminar for the International Shakespeare Association in Stratford-upon-Avon; and Russ McDonald helped refine a portion of it for his collection of essays, *Shakespeare Re-read: The Texts*.
in New Contexts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). Lynda Boose solicited an early version of chapter 3 for a conference on enclosure at the University of Glasgow; Richard Burt and John Michael Archer furthered its development in their edited collection, Enclosure Acts: Sexuality, Property, and Culture in Early Modern England (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). Robert Weimann invited a first effort at the argument of chapter 5 for the Weimar Shakespeare Tage, and Gunther Klötz edited an early draft for Shakespeare Jahrbuch (Ost) 126 (1990). I am grateful to Cornell University Press and Shakespeare Jahrbuch for permission to publish this material in altered form. Ronald Knowles asked me to discuss carnival and Shakespeare at the University of Reading History and Literature Conference; Richard Helgerson and Robert Weimann both gave trenchant responses to drafts of the resulting chapter. Arthur Kinney offered generous encouragement when I first approached him with the idea for the book, and two remarkably insightful readers for the University of Massachusetts Press, Keir Elam and David Harris Sacks, argued strongly on behalf of the completed manuscript, while usefully detailing its wrong turns and misstatements along with its strengths. Boston University supported my work with substantial grants for research, travel, and publication.

Finally, my principal debt is to those five sustaining and challenging interlocutors named in the dedication. In large measure, whatever I have to say responds to their voices.

James R. Siemon
Boston, Massachusetts
ABBREVIATIONS
Frequently Cited Works of the Bakhtin Circle and Shakespeare

M. M. Bakhtin

V. N. Volosinov
DiL  "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art (Concerning Sociological Poetics)." In Freudianism: A Critical Sketch.
Abbreviations

P. N. Medvedev


**William Shakespeare**


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WORD AGAINST WORD
Reacting to enormously influential twentieth-century models of interpretation, M. M. Bakhtin lodged a double refusal and offered an alternative. Resisting both “enclosure in a text” and the abstractions of structure and dialectic, he claimed to “hear voices in everything and dialogic relationships among them” (SG 169). At some point during the time I was reading the Bakhtin circle’s powerful accounts of the ubiquity of voices and relationships while teaching Shakespeare, I came to recognize this interest in, this sometimes passionate fear and love of, voices as more than merely an abstract position, an effect of employment, or an automatism of habitus. It is a vocation: what I do, want to do, and cannot help but do. I too hear voices and their relations everywhere. The Bakhtin circle gave me ways to think about it. Even when I disagree, and I often do, the challenges posed by their arguments and the language in which those arguments are constructed speak to me. This book attempts to talk back, to articulate an encounter between two major, and plural, vocal constellations—the voices that are called “Bakhtin” and those called “Shakespeare.” At a time when academic study of Shakespeare has been dominated by tendencies either to look up toward what Stephen Greenblatt calls the “privileged visibility” of the powerful or to look down toward the victims of early modern power and hierarchy, this book
proposes what I take to be a Bakhtinian alternative—listening around.

After Bakhtin, it is hard not to hear an echo of something not said in that phrase: “listening around” carries traces of other voices, suggesting the promiscuity of sleeping around or the jocularity of fooling around. I suspect Bakhtin might welcome these resonances (I know I do) as half-serious loopholes for ambiguous association between high academic discourse and the practical life of language, where one is never very far from needs and desires and never for a second outside the give and take of what others have said or might say, or beyond the risk of laughter. While no one would ever confuse this book with easy listening, listening around does not sound strenuous enough, either, to support currently dominant tones of advocacy. That is fine with me, too. This book will not rescue anyone from present oppression or right the wrongs of history. But figures as diverse as Donna Haraway, John Guillory, and Jean-François Lyotard have suggested the usefulness of attending to phrasal dynamics and diversity in a world where any conceivable or defensible agency, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued, is tied to the definition of zones of contact and conflict. Contact and conflict are what Bakhtin is about.

This book takes off from the Bakhtin circle’s radically inclusive notion of “utterance,” which understands any signifying practice as an intersection of conflict(s) and contact(s). It focuses on a domain that is at once familiar and distant: the “sociolingual interorientation” of Shakespearean drama (MPL 122). Richard II provides an organizing center for the larger argument, but I do not offer a complete reading of the play, or a full literary history, or an exhaustive historical contextualization, or a history of production and reproduction, although close reading, literary history, historical contextualization, and production history are constituents of what I am doing. Other texts would have worked, but Richard II offers a counterintuitive site around which to test the usefulness of the concept of utterance: a text that falls outside the usual Bakhtinian interests, neither novel, prose, comic, nor in any obvious sense heteroglot. The goal is to take the Bakhtinian image of the writer as “dramaturge,” as a voice orchestrating voices amid a context dense with other voices, more seriously than Bakhtin himself takes it and to
examine a literary form he notoriously neglected—and by no means an easy case of that form, either.⁷

I

The path toward understanding Shakespeare and Bakhtinian notions of utterance in light of one another has been significantly facilitated by developments in recent Shakespeare scholarship. To students of Shakespeare, much of what the Bakhtin circle has to say will seem recognizable, if different in emphasis or in practical implication. These differences of emphasis and implication appear even in relation to recent studies that offer explicitly Bakhtinian readings of Shakespeare or Renaissance drama.⁸ Readers exposed to new historicism, cultural materialism, materialist feminism, and other recent forms of sociopolitical intervention will understand V. N. Volоšинов’s claim that “The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs” (*MPL* 10) as well as the corollary to this claim: the work of art is a “powerful condenser of unarticulated social evaluations” (*DiL* 107).⁹ Where and how critical thinking and practice ought to go from this starting point is another matter, and that is what this book is about. The choice to focus on a work by Shakespeare has other, less professional, motives. To an unusual degree Shakespeare has retained or even increased in market value in the early twenty-first century, and opinions about the latest cultural appropriations of that value are remarkably widespread.¹⁰ This has its good side for an academic Shakespearean, since as long as one talks about Shakespeare, there are more people to talk to (as Žižek says about popular culture).¹¹ This phenomenon has another side to it, however. In a transnational world where the English language has achieved a working dominance that may sometimes superficially resemble unity, the works of Shakespeare have a special status. Of course, this status can be expressed in old-fashioned, anglophone nationalist and culturalist forms, as in Prince Charles’s 1991 Shakespeare Birthday Lecture proclaiming: “Shakespeare’s message is the universal, timeless one, yet clad in the garments of his time. He is not our poet, but the world’s. Yet his roots are ours, his language ours, his culture ours.”¹² More subtly, the plays are at once marketable for their generalized theatrical appeal to “everyone,”
while also offering degrees of challenge to “anyone’s” nonnative (and non-Elizabethan) appropriation, so that they may function as one measure of inclusion and differentiation. Around the globe or across town, to know some Shakespeare is to signal that one knows something of value. Perhaps uniquely constructed by form and history to serve certain social purposes of our own historical moment, the plays and language of Shakespeare have been given wide-ranging roles in marking everything from individual membership in the neoconservative’s list of the culturally aware to national (or civic) “modernity” for purposes of inclusion in various forms of the public sphere (whether the European community or the media elite). Less grandly, Shakespeare is employed to test adolescents for the socially constructed capability often called “intelligence.” Whether employed as the ultimate pedagogical challenge to the individual student or as the measure of communal participation in (or rejection of) modernity—as in the perennial story of the small town that, either from its rusticity or its suburban ideological isolation, bans *Romeo and Juliet*—the works of Shakespeare provide means to define cultural hierarchies and degrees of participation in or exclusion from larger social collectivities.

Within these two current contexts defined by professional criticism and by the appropriation of Shakespeare according to social and national divisions and hierarchies, to read Shakespeare as I propose is at once familiar and different. While it would be no surprise to find another study linking Shakespeare’s works to social specificities of their day, the importance of formal aspects of language usage will make my reading differ from much recent contextual criticism. Conversely, while an interest in the subtleties of Shakespearean textuality might seem congenial to a sense of Shakespeare’s “genius,” concern for the role and density of specific sociolinguistic contexts in the constitution of textual form and meaning will make my reading differ from those emphasizing text-intrinsic achievements of formal construction.

Why Bakhtin and why *Richard II*? Why invoke the Bakhtin circle to read Shakespeare and why increase the difficulty of reading Bakhtin by invoking this play? Why struggle with Bakhtinian formulations about text, voice, and society if the target of attention is specific, and why read Shakespeare if the interpretive purpose is general? If Shakespeare, then
why a highly stylized play that is not as popular as some and not as prosaic or carnivalesque as others, a tragical history play and not a comedy or a comical history? Why Bakhtin and not Dollimore or Greenblatt? Why Shakespeare, not Dostoevsky? Why Richard II and not Henry IV? Or even Hamlet?

The encounter between Bakhtinian thematics and Richard II has a lot to offer. First of all, it works. It has often been observed that the play insistently raises issues about the consuming interest of the Bakhtin circle: the intersection of multiple languages and ideologies. Secondly, it does not work easily. Richard II is about as far as possible from the texts privileged by Bakhtin and his most distinguished followers. It is not a novel in genre, prose in medium, or carnivalistic in tone. If the notion of utterance is to support claims for its usefulness as a model for considering all signifying practices, from the simplest expression or sensation to the most complex work of art, then such a test case makes sense: measurement of adequacy demands the possibility of failure and the recognition of limitations.

Richard II has long been recognized as raising issues for two lines of critical analysis—pragmatics and historicism—that are near-neighbors to approaches pursued in this book. It has often been claimed that the play is “about” language and language use, and its thematic concerns with the social dimensions of meaning and especially with problems of subject construction and verbal interaction amid constraints and divisions have occasioned attention from Samuel Taylor Coleridge to James L. Calderwood, Joseph A. Porter, Terence Hawkes, Wolfgang Iser, Harry Berger, Jr., and David Kastan. Its importance to historical considerations of politics and ideology has been immense for expositors as diverse as Ernst Kantorowicz, E. M. W. Tillyard, Allan Bloom, Leonard Tennenhouse, and David Norbrook. King Richard’s inability to recognize a world outside of “divine right ideology,” as Ivo Kamps compactly puts it, instances Shakespeare’s understanding of “the operations, the possibilities and the limitations of ideology” in a highly developed, even Althusserian sense. As Christopher Pye has argued, if ever a play lent itself to Stephen Greenblatt’s concerns with privileged visibility and the mastery of subversion, then surely this play about a king who tends to subvert his own power is it.
As a history play, furthermore, *Richard II* offers a particularly interesting focus. Despite obvious constraints arising from an early modern attentiveness to possible associations between the dead and the living, by virtue of their strongly antigeneric tendency to mix high and low, tragic and comic, the romantic and the historiographic, early history plays are, in Graham Holderness’s characterization, prone to betray obvious interaction among “varied and possibly antagonistic ideologies.” Moreover, history plays exhibit the heteroglot effect that Michel de Certeau sees as characterizing historical narrative in general as it constructs a past in and for a present: “[W]hatever the new understanding of the past holds to be irrelevant—shards created by the selection of materials, remainders left aside by an explication—comes back, despite everything on the edges of discourse or in its rifts and crannies: ‘resistances,’ ‘survivals,’ or delays discreetly perturb the pretty order of a line of ‘progress’ or a system of interpretation. These are the lapses in the syntax constructed by the law’ of a place. Therein they symbolize a return of the repressed, that is, a return of what, at a given moment, has become unthinkable in order for a new identity to become thinkable.” Finally, as Susan Bennett observes, history plays rearrange the known and knowable in hypothetical ways that, working with the pressures and influences of the already known, accentuate the propensities of academic historiography: “Unlike History, the history play can perform the discourses of the past as fantasies, posing characters and events in the realm of ‘what if?’ This is clearly a productive site for the articulation of the past in/as the present.”

*Richard II* also offers a useful site for considering issues that are introduced, but left underdeveloped by the Bakhtin circle. For three examples, I think of Bakhtin’s notion of “reduced laughter,” Vološinov’s concern with the larger “power system” (*MPL* 90) within which individual utterance takes shape, and Vološinov’s contention that the close attention fostered by formal analysis could be turned to use in nonaesthetic contexts.

II

With their initial publications in the 1920s, the Bakhtin circle initiated an extraordinarily wide-ranging dialogue that continues to enlist interlocutors despite the death of its most influential member, M. M. Bakhtin, in 1975. Under intense political pressure and at great personal
cost, the principal members of the circle—Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Valentin N. Vološinov, and Pavel N. Medvedev—wrote about literature, popular culture, philosophy, aesthetic criticism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and linguistics, engaging in debate with dominant trends of twentieth-century European social and aesthetic thought. While each member of the circle employs different terms and arguments to argue with his chosen interlocutors, whether these be representative forms of idealism, romantic subjectivism, traditional literary history, early Marxism, Formalism, structuralism, or Freudianism, and while the writings of Bakhtin himself show marked shifts in emphasis during his remarkably long and productive life, the writings as a whole display many broad continuities. There are enormous differences in style and form in the works associated with the various authors of the circle, but one can see how the notion of a single authorship could arise.24 Ideas, phrases, even entire sentences, sometimes recur in publications appearing under different names, ostensibly devoted to vastly differing topics, and separated by as many as fifty years.25 This book is not intended to be a systematic or exhaustive study of Bakhtinian thinking. I do propose to sketch the main outlines of one aspect of that thinking—the concept of utterance—and to explore the usefulness of that notion and a cluster of its subtending ideas—dialogism, heteroglossia, behavioral ideology, evaluative intonation, power system or field, varidirectional contexts, and theme—as developed and variously articulated.

The notion of utterance as the basic analytical unit in the Bakhtinian “trans-” or metalinguistic consideration of language and behavior first appears in the writings of V. N. Vološinov in the latter half of the 1920s; it last appears in M. M. Bakhtin’s essay, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences,” in 1975.26 From beginning to end, its scope remains extremely broad, providing a conceptual schema intended to link everything from the most highly developed forms of cultural production, whether the work of art or the technical treatise, to the most basic forms of human existence: it is used as the model for understanding verbal productions as elaborate and lengthy as novels or subverbal gestures and monosyllables—“the minimum,” as Bakhtin terms it, “to which one can respond, [with] which one can agree or disagree.”27 In 1929 Vološinov, arguing for a “dialogic” (MPL 102) understanding of language and art
against the claims of romantic subjectivism, high Formalism, and early sociological method, insists: “Life begins only at the point where utterance crosses utterance, i.e., where verbal interaction begins, be it not even ‘face-to-face’ verbal interaction, but the mediated, literary variety” (MPL 145). In 1975 Bakhtin, championing a “dialogical” conception of textuality in the human sciences against the claims of Hegelian dialectics or structuralist codes, asserts: “The text lives only by coming into contact with another text (with context). Only at the point of this contact between texts does a light flash, illuminating both the posterior and anterior, joining a given text to a dialogue. We emphasize that this contact is a dialogic contact between texts (utterances) and not a mechanical contact of ‘oppositions,’ which is possible only within a single text (and not between a text and context)” (SG 162). Whatever differences divide these two utterances, the understanding of “text” and “life” as similarly constituted by “dialogical” interactions of multiple “utterances” remains. There is much else that remains, but these terms provide a starting point.

Voloshinov’s first extant publication, “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art [or Poetry]” (1926), announces its project as the analysis of the work of poetic art neither as a romantic effusion of the individual subjectivity, nor as the closed literary world of formal device and innovation, but as a form of “aesthetic communication” understood to be a “variety of the social” without being reducible to any other form of communication such as those which are normative in political, juridical, or moral fields (DiL 96–98). To this end, Voloshinov proposes that the “poetic utterance” be approached as functioning within the field of literature but also as structured according to a model provided by “utterances in the speech of everyday life and behavior”: “for in such speech are already embedded the bases, the potentialities of artistic form. Moreover, the social essence of verbal discourse stands out here in sharper relief and the connection between an utterance and the surrounding social milieu lends itself more easily to analysis” (DiL 98). This proposal constitutes an alternative to then dominant approaches to verbal art. Instead of following romantic subjectivism in looking for expressions of creative individuality, instead of following early sociological method in reducing art to a footnote on the economics of the market, instead of following
Formalism's focus on strategic deployment of literary devices, or structuralism's quest for the coded, systematic aspects of its logic, the analyst is urged to consider art in light of humble family ties to ordinary communication. In a witty pun, Vološinov marks his distance from structuralist thinking by asserting that concrete discourse is the password to understanding the work of art, employing a Russian term—parol—to invert the values assumed in the structuralist langue/parole opposition (DiL 101). Vološinov makes the everyday verbal exchange primary rather than transitory and inconsequential.

Concrete everyday discourse exhibits a number of conceptually messy, but extremely important, characteristics that, Vološinov claims, are basic to all signifying activity but that are occluded by approaches that take expression, material interest, literariness, or structure for their master terms. Above all, concrete discourse has the nature of "dialogue." This means more than having the quality of speech and much more than being spoken between copresent interlocutors. Indeed, consciousness, sensation, human life itself, are said to be shot through with forms of interaction that render even apparently nonverbal activity (what Vološinov calls "behavioral ideology") best understood according to the models provided by the functioning of the word in dialogue exchange. These pervasive dialogical relations need not be instantiated among co-present speakers, but they are always understood as if arising among socially constructed interlocutors, whether they be understood as proximate speakers or as the "addressee," that social representative with whom we discourse in our thoughts. Furthermore, concrete discourse is much more than words.

Each utterance has the nature of an "enthymeme," in that it implies, indeed depends upon, much more than is literally said: it always rests upon assumed stances and positions, shared (or disputed) value judgments. Surprisingly, these evaluative orientations are most sensitively registered in form, as "evaluative accentuation" or "intonation," rather than as content (MPL 21). Thus, any instance of concrete discourse is never purely originary, since it inevitably employs the terms and phrasings of others, comes cast in pre-existing generic forms (speech or behavioral "genres"), answers previous statements, anticipates responses, and is for-
mally marked with acceptance and rejections of recognizable shadings of group style and deportment. And the field of responses it embodies, anticipates, and awakens is riven by conflict.

Crucially, concrete discourse exists within and among various competing languages that constitute an atmosphere of “heteroglossia.” No matter how apparently unified a linguistic community may be by a common lexicon and grammar, not everyone speaks the same language, even when, paradoxically, they deploy the same terms, employ the same syntax, or appear to say the same things. Dictionary significance may reflect an official interpretation of a word—its “meaning”—but different users make use of that word with different “themes” as they implement it in the circumstantial historical contexts of actual utterances. Quite apart from obvious competition among dialects or jargons, such divisions as class, age, gender, and affiliation turn one and the same word into a site of differing and contesting themes, as speakers appropriate and use it from within their places in the social “power system” (*MPL* 90), inclining usage against or toward other speakers of the same, ostensibly unitary, language. Neither Bakhtin nor Vološinov is primarily interested in features of dialect or jargon that might reify and externalize social definitions and differentiations, but in the angles of intersection whereby allegiances and orientations intersect with one another in the close proximity of a shared—and contested—linguistic space of heteroglossia. Modeling communication in such a way obviously complicates simple notions of contextualization with the recognition that any utterance exists in “varidirectional contexts” (*MPL* 80). Anticipating some of the arguments in Derrida’s quarrels with J. L. Austin, Vološinov writes: “There are as many meanings of a word as there are contexts of its usage” (*MPL* 79).

These, in rough outline, are some basic continuities in the Bakhtin circle’s thinking on utterance and its constituent elements. Different nuances, implications, and relations to the understandings of language available to Shakespeare and his contemporaries remain to be determined. The remainder of this introduction suggests broad terms of analysis, which the book goes on to develop and distinguish. The intention is to suggest possible sites of engagement rather than to claim identity.
III

There are striking affinities between certain Shakespearean speeches that ground identity in the act of communication and Bakhtinian pronouncements on sociolinguistic interaction. This might not be surprising, since Bakhtin and Shakespeare share classical traditions and humanist commonplaces that derived from them, but there is more to be said. Ulysses’s lines to Achilles on identity from Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida echo the Tusculan Disputations and such sixteenth-century rhetoricians as Thomas Wilson, who claims that “none can knowe either what thei are, or what thei haue, without the gift of utterance.”

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{no man is the lord of anything,} \\
\text{Though in and of him there be much consisting,} \\
\text{Till he communicate his parts to others;} \\
\text{Nor doth he of himself know them for aught} \\
\text{Till he behold them formed in the applause} \\
\text{Where they’re extended; who, like an arch, reverb’rate} \\
\text{The voice again. (TC 3.3.116–22)}
\end{align*}
\]

Compare Bakhtin’s assertions in his 1961 notes toward reworking his Dostoevsky book:

\[To be means to communicate. \ldots To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another. (PDP 287)\]

Both passages oppose a conception of selfhood as determining or as determined by the isolated individual. Far from being an independent, self-contained “sovereign” or “lord” possessing a stable personal identity, the individual is constituted only in the two-sided act of reflection or reverberation with “others” or “another.” However, it would be untrue to the imperatives of utterance to take the resemblance of these statements as pure agreement rather than as constituting an arena of significant intersection.

A related utterance of Vološinov’s helps to bring out the salient point. In rejecting binary opposition between “the social” and “the individual,” Vološinov maintains:

\[The individual, as possessor of the contents of his own consciousness, as author of his own thoughts, as the personality responsible for his thoughts and feel-\]
ings—such an individual is a purely socioideological phenomenon. Therefore, the content of the “individual” psyche is by its very nature just as social as is ideology, and the very degree of consciousness of one's individuality and its inner rights and privileges is ideological, historical, and wholly conditioned by sociological factors. Every sign as sign is social, and this is no less true for the inner sign than for the outer sign. (MPL 34)

The concept of individuality itself is subject to important historical determinants, but Vološinov also insists that the thoughts or emotions any individual lays claim to are themselves first formed in the ongoing activities and structures of social life that enable all signifying practice—even experience and thought—by providing signs that may be appropriated by the one who thinks, speaks, or writes.⁴⁴ No matter how lonely the thinker, the thoughts themselves, and even the recognition that one is “thinking” are products of a social process.⁴⁵ The subsequent life of those thoughts or experiences is also significantly shaped by the institutional framework of their generation:

A thought that as yet exists only in the context of my consciousness, without embodiment in the context of a discipline constituting some unified ideological system, remains a dim, unprocessed thought. But that thought had come into existence in my consciousness already with an orientation toward an ideological system, and it itself had been engendered by the ideological signs that I had absorbed earlier. We repeat, there is no qualitative difference here in any fundamental sense. Cognition with respect to books and to other people’s words and cognition inside one’s head belong to the same sphere of reality, and such differences as do exist between the head and the book do not affect the content of cognition. (MPL 33–34)

This formulation raises a significant element of difference by which to measure the degree of agreement between the Bakhtinian and Shakespearean parallels: despite their resemblance in terminology, despite the fact that each author would be understandable to the other, each insight is articulated in a language that is actually different from that of the other by virtue of its historical-institutional origins and affiliations.

True, both reject sovereign self-sufficiency as illusory, but they posit differing alternatives for this false consciousness. In the Shakespearean passage, the normative alternative to isolation is clearly derived from the Renaissance court, where as Norbert Elias, Daniel Javitch, and Frank
Listening Around / Talking Back

Whigham have shown, to be is to be seen to be, or to be seen to be capable of doing. Thus, the normative human condition, the implied alternative to false isolation, is articulated in an available vocabulary that has a history within an ideological system which pre-exists the utterance in question. For Ulysses to exist is to win group acclaim in applause: the values of factional politics that underlie this assessment are of a time and place. That time and place might have similarities with Cicero’s Rome or Bakhtin’s Russian exile, but the differences are important. For Bakhtin’s pronouncement, the valid form of social relations appears as an existential meeting of fully authentic individuals. To say that one must be “for another” is to employ language from twentieth-century philosophizing, whether of Jean-Paul Sartre or, as elsewhere in this 1961 writing, sounding the note of Martin Buber in referring to I/thou relations or to the “deepest communion” that Dostoevsky uncovers in the “very being of man” (PDP 287). Here, too, the language employed betrays its place within an ideological system that has given shape to the insight itself. Besides being materially impossible, for Bakhtin to be applauded would be the very opposite of the intensely intimate engagement which is here posited as normative; yet even this norm is defined in terms of a larger, European movement. Nor are the important differences between Shakespeare’s utterance and Bakhtin’s only these.

What divides these utterances is not merely the difference between a character in an early modern play uttering a speech penned by a popular Elizabethan dramatist who would place him amid courtly attitudes and the philosophical author-critic writing from lonely post–World War II Russian exile and agonizing over European existentialism and Dostoevskyan art. There is also the difference of fields for which the two writers pen their words. Shakespeare writes as a first-generation professional playwright-sharer in an emerging public entertainment industry that was engaged in commodifying earlier discursive practices and vocabularies for the popular stage, turning “serious” matters of philosophy, emotion, and morality into salable forms of irony, ambiguity, and spectacle and turning the politics of a rarified courtly existence into an idiom capable of communicating insights for common lives. In these contexts, the identifiable ethical/philosophical content of what Ulysses
has to say, like so much else of the ostensibly serious matter in *Troilus* and *Cressida*, is heavily marked by the ironies attending its implementation: his self-promoting treatment of philosophical thinking resembles that of the play in general, which scarcely tempers its pervasive cynicism in exposing every flight into idealism or even into abstraction as compromised by less exalted, or at least confused, motives. This passage does not occur, in other words, within a work where Ulysses’ proposed “truth” concerning the jointly constituted nature of identity is anything more than, anything more “true” than, merely another rhetorical device for duping others. In fact, virtually the same use is made of a similar identity pronouncement in *Julius Caesar*, when Cassius employs a truism about the eye seeing itself only by reflection in order to pursue his self-evident (and self-remarked) manipulation of his own interlocutor precisely as Ulysses would manipulate Achilles. By contrast, Bakhtin writes within a tradition of high philosophical and ethical criticism: the truths of his proof texts are proposed as truths of the very largest sort. To call his discourse self-interested, manipulative, self-ironizing, or “theatrical” would be to attack its claim upon the reader; Bakhtin does not hesitate to invoke Christ for authority, nor does he avoid the philosophical critic’s field-specific duty to argue abstractly, even when he attacks abstraction itself. These field-specific differences between their utterances, whatever the similarity of terms the two writers employ, raise related issues of evaluative orientation and accentuation.

The writings of Shakespeare and Bakhtin stress the importance of form and circumstance in determining what an utterance means. Again, given their familiarity with classical rhetoric, this might not seem surprising, but in fact, the stress on circumstance and the peculiar nature of their thinking about form leaves more to be said about these similarities. Bakhtin claims that our everyday immersion in concrete utterance turns each of us into a close reader in listening, while also making us resemble, potentially, at least, sophisticated artists in speaking:

We very sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another person’s practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips. (*PDP* 201)
Shakespeare’s recognition of formal artistry in everyday practices of interpretation and communication is articulated as early as *King John* and as late as *The Winter’s Tale.*

The capacities of “practical everyday discourse” to forward strategic advantage are clearly announced by the Bastard of *King John,* who pins his hopes for prestige not on the security of inherited land but on his skill in observing and exploiting the volatile power that resides in utterance itself. As a “mounting spirit,” he offers a coolly distant analysis of the highly ritualized forms of exchange employed by “worshipful society” in its “dialogue of compliment” (*KJ* 1.1.201–45), and he defines a program for himself. Rather than subject himself to the officially sanctioned limits of identity, he will observe and adapt himself in manner and disposition to the promptings of situated opportunity:

For he is but a bastard to the time
That doth not smack of observation.
And so am I—whether I smack or no,
And not alone in habit and device,
Exterior form, outward accoutrement,
But from the inward motion—to deliver
Sweet, sweet, sweet poison for the age’s tooth.
(*KJ* 1.1.207–13)

This program of self-advancement does not mean simply saying the right things. As he envisions it, success demands attention to social implications in matters of form. Thus, for example, he imagines himself affecting the fortunes of himself and others by strategically misspeaking:

Well, now can I make any Joan a lady.
“Good e’en, Sir Richard!”—“God-a-mercy, fellow!”—
And if his name be George, I’ll call him Peter,
For new-made honor doth forget men’s names;
’Tis too respective and too sociable
For your conversion.
(*KJ* 1.1.184–89)

He does not intend to say what the speech situation, as it might be constructed abstractly from either speech act theory or from Renaissance
rhetorics and conduct manuals, might seem to demand. He will neither observe the prescribed demands for “Taffeta phrases, silken terms precise,” nor worry about the “prosperity” that “lies in the ear / Of him that hears” (LLL 5.2.407; 850–51). Instead, he anticipates his utterance will be “successful” precisely by violating forms, norms, and expectations. In the complex alchemy of social exchange, his calculated violations of customary usage will, in effect, create his own autonomy by creating the (false) sense of his indifference to calculation.55 His claims contradict those of such Renaissance rhetorics as John Hoskins’s Directions for Speech and Style which maintains, “Careless speech doth not only discredit the personage of the speaker but it doth discredit the opinion of his reason and judgment, it discrediteth the truth, force, and uniformity of the matter and substance.”56 By virtue of its circumstantiality, within its situation, according to the social positions of its speaker, listeners, and objects, according to its manner of delivery, his utterance can belie Hoskins’s truism.57 Powerful enough to transform “any Joan” into a lady, its crass manipulation of effects for dubious ends counters routine Renaissance claims concerning the superior power of eloquence and the ethical benevolence of persuasiveness.58

Such antirhetorical, yet rhetorical, exploitation does not exhaust Shakespeare’s suggestions regarding the function of form in concrete discursive practices. A stress on the primacy of form appears compactly illustrated when Leontes characterizes the “petty brands” that may contradict overt semantic sense:

Praise her but for this her without-door form,
Which on my faith deserves high speech, and straight
The shrug, the hum or ha, these petty brands
That calumny doth use—O, I am out,
That mercy does, for calumny will sear
Virtue itself—these shrugs, these hums, and ha’s,
When you have said she’s goodly, come between
Ere you can say she’s honest.
(WT 2.1.70–77)

The slightest shrug, a barely audible hum or intake of breath, a silent pause between praise of female fairness and the expected mention of
chaste virtue may serve as a “come between,” a sign to countermand the sense of an utterance concerning “goodliness” or “virtue.” Thus may any “lady” become a “Joan.” Lovers and jealous husbands frequently embody the tendency to scrutinize form, whether of language or of gesture, for its implications, even for its contradiction of lexical-grammatical sense. But relations between individuals do not constitute a sufficient field in which to consider such phenomena. In fact, consideration opens onto a far wider social context in which every aspect of human existence appears permeated with semiotic implications that are by no means merely personal or voluntary.

Each real life utterance, according to Vološinov, has the nature of an enthymeme, conveying more about the assumed values that underlie it than it says in so many words. The traces of these assumptions common to group affiliations and oppositions are to be found preeminently in such features as tone, delivery, and organization. Even the most fundamental values of a given social group are not normally matters for discussion but rather go without saying, as the shapers and organizers of discourse and, most clearly, its intonations. Such formal aspects of utterance and, above all, those quasiphysical elements of language implementation—pacing, hesitation, accent, and intonation—are “interindividual” (MPL 22) in construction and significance. As such, they evidence the “social multiaccentuality” which marks all signifying activity with traces of social affiliation, division, and hierarchy (MPL 23).

Leontes’ accusations against Hermione pointedly register this class and group dimension of form, articulated in contemporary terms of place, degree, and manner. Addressing her, Leontes hesitates, and this momentary “come between” suggests implications for social relations that extend far beyond the couple immediately involved:

O thou thing!
Which I’ll not call a creature of thy place,
Lest barbarism, making me the precedent,
Should a like language use to all degrees
And mannerly distinction leave out
Betwixt the prince and beggar.
(WT 2.1.83–88)
Leontes stops himself from using the name he might employ; instead he calls her a “thing.” Yet the unspoken term remains uncertain: is he about to invoke her queenly status and call her a “royal dame,” or is he about to surpass his own previous brutality and label her not just “adulteress,” but “whore”? In the discursive space where he might say either “whore” or “dame,” names that might denote Hermione’s “place” in the ideological frameworks of gender distinction or of state hierarchy, Leontes inserts the otherwise most neutral of Anglo-Saxon substantives. Obviously, the dictionary neutrality of that name is utterly compromised by its employment in this context and to her, his wife and queen, but this hesitation to say “whore” conveys more than personal hostility. Leontes’ pause registers deference to the principle of hierarchy that he calls “mannerly distinction” and that he opposes to a “barbarism” which would level “all degrees” by employing a “like language” to all. The distinction of gender, in which female chastity is a primary marker, is mapped onto that of male status: the hesitation that stops his particular utterance before the categories of dame and whore can be confounded preserves a general social structure that grounds absolute discrimination: “Betwixt . . . prince and beggar.” Leontes will later go so far as to call Hermione a “bed-swerver,” but even then he holds back, hesitating lest he confound social distinction by employing terms belonging to common usage: “she’s / A bed-swerver, even as bad as those / That vulgars give bold’st titles” (2.1.93–95). It is not that he does not know alternatives for what he says; his circumlocutionary comparatives (“even as bad as”) are means to avoid articulating an insult in a language that belongs to another, diametrically opposed, social stratum—the “vulgars.” Leontes selects terms, chooses a language, to maintain the distance of royalty from the “vulgars,” even as he asserts a behavioral affinity that ties the actions of his own wife and Queen to their (dis)order. Her actions make her one of them, and because they have creatures like her, they have a word for her kind, even if Leontes cannot bring himself to use it.

In this intersection of terminologies and usages that are provisionally divided according to their appropriateness to different social categories, Bakhtin would recognize the “heteroglossia” that he finds most clearly embodied in the novel but also finds in the “internal stratifica-
tion present in every language at any given moment of its historical existence.” As most broadly defined, heteroglossia is founded upon divisions: “The internal stratification of any single national language into social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour (each day has its slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases)” (DI 262–63).

The most familiar Shakespearean evocation of heteroglot division occurs in Prince Hal’s account of his time learning the terms, rituals, and customary uses of the tavern workers:

They take it already upon their salvation that, though I be but Prince of Wales, yet I am the king of courtesy, and tell me flatly I am no proud Jack like Falstaff, but a Corinthian, a lad of mettle, a good boy—by the Lord, so they call me!—and when I am King of England I shall command all the good lads in Eastcheap. They call drinking deep “dyeing scarlet”; and when you breathe in your watering they cry “hem!” and bid you “play it off.” To conclude, I am so good a proficient in one quarter of an hour that I can drink with any tinker in his own language during my life. (1H4 2.4.8–19)

Here some words used by tavern laborers are treated as new in themselves, even to a fellow Eastcheap habitué like Poins. Hal feels compelled to translate “dyeing scarlet” to mean “drinking deep,” while “Corinthian” is deployed amid a line of similar phrases—“a lad of mettle, a good boy”—as if it would also be unfamiliar. In similar fashion, the grunted “hem” (while drinking or urinating) is explained as if it were unfamiliar outside the worker subculture. Despite sharing the same English tongue (they are not represented as rural or provincial) and the same physical tavern space with Hal and the other guests, the workers speak their “own language.” However, this passage points beyond a simple divisions of group-specific jargons within a language community toward specifically dialogized and social aspects of heteroglossia.

It is not merely that different groups speak, think, and behave differently. In truth, no group really has its “own” discourse in the clear-cut sense suggested by Bakhtin’s or Hal’s passages. Utterances are formed in “inter-orientation.” Groups compete (and form alliances) with one
another, interacting and being shaped within linguistic territory that overlaps. Bakhtin describes this universal "dialogism" as a "tension-filled interaction":

The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of any discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse. On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction. Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virgin and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the object. Concrete historical human discourse does not have this privilege: it can deviate from such inter-orientation only on a conditional basis and only to a certain degree. (DI 279)

No utterance is formed, articulated, or received outside the atmosphere of what has already been said—and has thus already been claimed by others for themselves. Bakhtin is not here writing about allusion or intertextuality. He refers rather to a more complex process that also includes an anticipatory sense of reception as well as an awareness of what has been said in the past. Any word "encounters an alien word not only in the object itself: every word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates" (DI 280). As this reference to "alien" words suggests, the tension-filled atmosphere of utterance formation and implementation is permeated with struggle and competition. Perhaps most disturbingly, the "alien" is not fully other (nor fully integral in itself) but implicated in and with, present in, whatever one does or says. Or does not do or say. In its full context, the interorientation of social heteroglossia is not reducible to the I/thou exchange, nor to the simple class warfare of us against them, nor even to the "frank and free" parody or the shouts of opinionated difference in the public square that Bakhtin sometimes associates with carnival. Instead, it constitutes a complicated, finally unmasterable, but provisionally useful horizon of analysis. To varying degrees and in specific historical forms, social heteroglossia permeates all signifying practice, including even seemingly opposed procedures: quoting as well as avoiding reference, mocking as well as invoking, jealously appropriating as well as humbly deferring. In a real if disturbing sense,
it is there even when being vehemently denied or ignored in the monologue of the political tyrant or literary purist. Nor are the fields upon which interlocution plays level. Not all words and uses are “created” equal.

When Volosinov writes about what Bakhtin calls dialogized social heteroglossia, he emphasizes the “enormous significance” of the “hierarchical factor” or “class struggle” in determining forms taken by utterance (MPL 21–23). But class or status does not simply coincide with different language (or sign-using) communities, since “various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle” (MPL 23). The contending interests of hierarchy and domination among groups and strata produce “social multiaccentuality” (MPL 23) within any signifying practice, but dominant groups tend to deny this fact by striving to impart “a supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccentual” (MPL 23). Keeping this heteroglot aspect of discourse in mind changes one’s sense of Hal’s venture below stairs.

In Hal’s speech one might notice not the odd terms that belong to the tavern workers but the language that the underskinkers are said to share with the royal visitor, language that Hal appears to mark in special ways in order to register (or produce) a difference between their diction and what is presumptively taken to be unmarked, standard usage. By the inflections he gives to indirect quotations, Hal represents the discourse of the workers while conveying his sense of the absurdity in their appropriation of vocabulary from religion, manners, honor, and social distinction. Swearing “upon their salvation,” the drawers are said to utter an absurd evaluation that ranks Hal’s heir-apparent status as “but” insignificant compared to his entitlement among them as “king of courtesy.” The title “king of courtesy” is apparently meant to sound in his recounting like their ridiculous misappropriation of mannerly values (and of the powers to confer distinction) vastly beyond their station. Like heroes of pamphlet literature, the workers are represented as employing the courtly language of “courtesy,” while embodying values and manners that are decidedly noncourtly. For fine manners, delicate
language, elevated title, and wealthy accoutrement, they substitute a sociability compounded of tavern companionship, offhandedly pious ejaculation, professed antipathy to “proud” distinctions of birth or title, and a bluff sincerity that dares to speak “flatly” even to the Prince of Wales. Their standards of good companionship, self-reliance, sincerity, and stout-hearted courage are unhesitatingly recorded in their attempts to compliment Hal by including him among them as a “good boy” and to offer him their martial allegiance as “good lads”—as if either compliment could matter to Windsor if uttered by Eastcheap.

It is apparently fine for Hal to swear “by the Lord,” but amusingly typical of the drawers to “take it . . . upon their salvation.” It is absurd for them to confuse the status of royalty with that of the good boy; but it is all right for royalty to equate the minor league respectability of apprentices just beginning their long way towards citizenship with the legendary (and legally proscribed) shiftlessness of itinerant tinkers, as Hal does when he claims that he “can drink with any tinker in his own language.”68 The drawers are represented by Hal as naturally making errors of judgment when they presume to appropriate the socially distant language of courtesy; he, by contrast, presumes to have learned their language “in one quarter of an hour.”

And what might be the role of anticipated response in shaping this utterance? There is little question that Hal is represented as assuming that his remarks will be greeted by Poins with what Volosinov calls “choral support” (DiL 102). Yet, it is far from clear what Hal’s new learning means when Hal subsequently enacts its implications by mistreating one of the drawers. The abuse of the puny drawer, Francis, prompts Poins to ask, “But hark ye, what cunning match have you made with this jest of the drawer? Come, what’s the issue?” (1H4 2.4.89–91). Besides opacity, there is also the problem raised by the fact that Hal’s utterance itself constitutes only a portion of the playwright’s own utterance. One might ask, as Volosinov asks of the authors and the characters he examines, Just whose “evaluative purview” (MPL 156) is embodied in Hal’s words? The play represents Hal representing and measurably misrepresenting the language and values of the drawers, before he stops making sense and spins off into the contemporary “literary” genre that John Eliot calls the “fantasticall Rapsody of dialogisme,” badgering Francis in
words that have continued to exercise symbolic violence on interpreters ever since: “Why then, your brown bastard is your only drink; for look you, Francis, your white canvas doublet will sully. In Barbary, sir, it cannot come to so much” (*H4* 2.4.73–76).69 This exhibition of power through confusion might remind one of the Bastard’s self-constituting linguistic acts, but it should remind us forcibly that although the play in some senses addresses the day and audience for which Shakespeare wrote, yet in some stage of its production—certainly with the first Folio—it also addresses the emerging ideological field of dramatic literature. Working self-consciously upon the dramatic and literary genre of king-meets-commoner, the play is also the product of an author who self-consciously proclaims the eternal value of verbal art (as in Sonnet 55). How might one address these complicated issues from the perspective of the Bakhtin circle?

The problem of who is speaking when a character speaks is, Vološinov claims, related to problems potentially raised in any concrete utterance by a single speaker. The particular case that he studies most intently is that posed by interaction between author and character in reported speech in prose fiction, as later Bakhtin will concentrate on novel and novelistic discourse. Vološinov, however, uses reported speech as a means to understand features of dialogue itself, to examine how the forms of reported speech “reflect basic and constant tendencies in the active reception of other speakers’ speech” (*MPL* 117). Thus, the problem of the interface between author and character appears as a version of the problem of sociolinguistic interaction, a site upon which to formulate hypotheses and investigate the “history of word in word” (*MPL* 158). That history is at once riddled with difference and also subject to generic continuities. If the ground is tricky and the dangers of simplification enormous, these are the risks of any border zone, and for Vološinov that is where the action lies. Nor does the difficulty posed by temporal distance in the case of a literary work absolutely differ in kind from issues raised by practical communication and interpretation.

Utterance, and especially literary utterance, registers at least two temporal perspectives. Certain of its abstract aspects are “reproducible and self-identical in all instances of repetition” (*MPL* 100), but these matters of linguistic and lexical continuity (“meaning”) are in tension
with the nonrepeatable aspects of significance that are labeled “theme”—that is, “the expression of the concrete, historical situation that engendered the utterance” (MPL 99). The extreme form of this emphasis on the localized, historical nature of theme denies the possibility that any utterance can ever be repeated or that any two utterances could ever have the same significance. In its strictest sense, the principle of nonrepeatability holds even when the speaker speaking and the words spoken are exactly the same, since the “concrete historical situation” will have changed, if only in “microscopic dimensions.” Therefore, the theme of an utterance is “individual and unreproducible, just as the utterance itself is individual and unreproducible” (MPL 99). This insistence on unreproducibility comes close to certain strands in Derrida. Resembling the Derrida who argues that there is nothing but context in the speech act, Vološinov goes beyond maintaining that “Multiplicity of meanings is the constitutive feature of word” (MPL 101) to proclaim that “The meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context. In fact, there are as many meanings for a word as there are contexts of its usage” (MPL 79). Yet there is something more than relativism, meaninglessness, or the tragedy of (mis)communication in this fact.

Instead of despair at the distance and multiplicity separating speaker from hearer, author from audience, “classic” text from modern interpreter, Vološinov and Bakhtin find the necessary historical room for growth and development. From the situation of the simple utterance and its ability to arouse response despite differences in circumstance and interlocutors they derive consolation on a grand scale. Vološinov writes of individual interlocutors:

Meaning does not reside in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound complex. It is like an electric spark that occurs only when two different terminals are hooked together. Those who ignore theme (which is accessible only to active, responsive understanding) and who, in attempting to define the meaning of a word, approach its lower, stable, self-identical limit, want, in effect, to turn on a light bulb after having switched off the current. Only the current of verbal intercourse endows a word with the light of meaning. (MPL 102–3)
To struggle with theme, to ask of the past utterance or of the present interlocutor the questions that we have for them, no matter how “different” from the questions they may have had in mind, is to maintain what Bakhtin grandly calls the “chain of speech communion” (SG 100) or the connection Volosinov likens more humbly to an electrical circuit. It is true, as Volosinov asserts, that this labor is inescapable anyway, since one cannot exist outside the network(s) of communication and remain human; attempts to escape speech or the genres of sociolinguistic behavior amount only to another form of (verbally constituted) response. But conscious awareness of what one does, as Pierre Bourdieu has argued, no matter how limited and determined, differs dramatically from simply doing what comes doxically.72

From this perspective, if we need Shakespeare, as evidenced by our investments in performance, appreciation, and study, as well as by our witting and unwitting reiterations of Shakespearean words, attitudes, and situations, then Shakespeare also needs us. This is not an injunction to keep classic texts somehow “alive”—like Frankenstein’s monster—with heroic interventions of will or high voltage jolts of clever packaging for bored audiences or terrified undergraduates. Rather, our “counter words” (MPL 102), our continuing responses to Shakespeare tell us things about ourselves, about Shakespeare, and even about our divisions from one another. We respond, we reenact, we resist, according to group identities, institutional and ideological positions, our sundered or “shared” postmodern culture, in which density and rapidity of communication make something “shared” even out of what is radically maldistributed, since we share some awareness of differences in wealth and privilege that divide haves from have-nots. Shakespeare and the things we have made of and from his work register our ideological engagements with one another. Literary works or ideas may be dead, as Volosinov writes, “without living, evaluative perception,” but those that do survive exert a powerful influence upon the tone of our everyday “behavioral ideology,” the “atmosphere of unsystematized and unfixed inner and outer speech which endows our every instance of behavior and action and our every ‘conscious’ state with meaning” (MPL 91).73 The work that
Introduction continues to be read, quoted, performed, studied, appropriated, reinterpreted, unwittingly lived or actively rejected, must have something to engage us, even if that something is, for some, only its crystallization of institutional values that have used it for a monument. The work that lives has a shaping effect on our ways to feel and think, our categories of emotion and perception, values, dispositions, borderlines of contention and rejection. There are things to be learned here—in both directions.

Touchstone comments usefully on responsive understanding in lines that recall Ovid, while also lending, through a kind of misappropriation, a shape to his own behavioral ideology:

I am here with thee and thy goats, as the most capricious poet, honest Ovid, was among the Goths.

**Jaques** (aside) O knowledge ill-inhabited, worse than Jove in a thatched house!

**Touchstone** When a man's verses cannot be understood, nor a man's good wit seconded with the forward child, understanding, it strikes a man more dead than a great reckoning in a little room. Truly, I would the gods had made thee poetical.

**Audrey** I do not know what “poetical” is. Is it honest in deed and word? Is it a true thing?

**Touchstone** No, truly; for the truest poetry is the most feigning, and lovers are given to poetry, and what they swear in poetry may be said as lovers they do feign. (*AYLI 3.3.5–20*)

Here, it is not merely the idea of the utterance being kept alive in “states unborn and accents yet unknown” (*JC 3.1.114*) that is important, but the way that Ovid is translated into Touchstone's own terms and rendered as a spokesman for a way of life and language. “Honest” Ovid is, as Touchstone's punning reveals, a euphemism for the dishonest (i.e., unchaste and “poetical”) seducer, who is consumed, like the speaker of the *Amores*, with feigning—in the double sense of the word: faining and feigning, desiring and deceiving. The complexity of the textual Ovid appears misshapen in this evocation, but the pun keeps “Ovid” alive by “understanding” his utterance. Touchstone encourages laughter by simple distortion, but his utterance is partially true: Ovidian poetry is rife with intense desire and deception while being, nevertheless, like
Shakespeare’s or Donne’s verses, ironical about its own seducer-speakers. There is also a joke on contemporary satirical discourse that assessed poetry as overly eroticized: Touchstone’s quip about making Audrey “poetical” is a ridiculous echo of this polemic. Thus, Touchstone’s jokes might help one measure both “Ovid” and “poetry” as they addressed at least some members of the historically constituted audience of the 1590s. Similarly, the fact that John of Gaunt’s intensely ideological “sceptered isle” speech (R2 2.1.40–68) could have ever been a “standard elocution exercise” speaks volumes about England in “the patriotic 1940s.”

But “Ovid” is not just translated into Touchstone’s own terms. The onstage audience at whom these lines are aimed is divided and Touchstone’s utterance comes prepackaged in generic forms: On the one hand, Audrey prompts Touchstone to modify his conversational you forms into a poetical thee and thou; on the other, Jaques prompts his latinate punning on caper (a male goat) in references to the “capricious poet” among goats/Goths and his bawdy pun doubling “wit,” the crowning glory of the learned, with “wit,” the sexual organ. His speech genres here appear double as well, belonging to poetic eroticism and contemporary anti-erotic verse satire. But listening around Touchstone’s lines, one might also hear in the haunting references to a “great reckoning in a little room,” echoes of still other social languages. His terms belong both to proverbial practical wisdom and to a specifically theological language referring to the virgin birth. That would be ironic enough given his sexual purposes, if that were all, and would resemble a cultural readiness, evident in early modern ballads, to employ high abstraction to articulate practical advice even in questionable contexts. However, in the theater his lines also echo a specific and highly popular dramatic text, Marlowe’s Jew of Malta, in which that religious language had recently been appropriated to make imperious declarations about material and commercial success. Thereby the “dead shepherd” elsewhere sentimentally remembered in As You Like It (3.5.81–82) as the lyricist of love at first sight is reanimated through an echo of his own most grotesquely exploitive stage character, and this just when Touchstone attempts seduction. Still others have heard specific reference to Marlowe’s assassination in Touchstone’s line, a topical association implicating the professional rivalries among period writers described by Patrick Cheyney, but there is also
a sense that ties Touchstone’s phrasing to a broader social conflict and quite another theatrical context. The inflammatory anti-alien discourse that marked the late 1580s and early 1590s, and that played a role in the construction of Marlowe’s Barabas, also employed similar phrasing. Whether on stage in Robert Wilson’s Three Ladies of London (1581) or in the streets in the anonymous Dutch Church Libel (1593), foreigners are charged with putting Englishmen out of their homes by their readiness to “dwell in a little roome and to pay much rent.” Considered as utterance, Touchstone’s lines are not just polysemous or ironic, but dialogical, constituting an arena where theology struggles with economy, materialist Machiavellianism with aesthetics, gossip about current events with continuing national prejudice, bawdy seduction with learned wit, satire with love poetry, and lyric with history.

But Touchstone is a fool; As You Like It is comedy, and perhaps more generically open to the give and take of ordinary associations, predisposed to mix commoners and kings, rustics like Audrey and courtiers like Jaques. Consider a more self-consciously ponderous instance of concern with utterance and history in a tragedy of kings. In Richard III, the ill-fated Prince Edward idealistically insists that “truth” will live from age to age, even without being encoded in institutional records. The fact that Julius Caesar built the Tower of London will persist through the ages even without written records:

But say, my lord, it were not registered,
Methinks the truth should live from age to age,
As 'twere retailed to all posterity,
Even to the general all-ending day.

This proclamation prompts Richard’s response and a subsequent exchange:

Richard [aside] So wise so young, they say, do never live long.

Prince What say you, uncle?

Richard I say, without characters fame lives long.
[Aside.] Thus, like the formal Vice, Iniquity,
I moralize two meanings in one word. (R3 3.1.75–83)

From one perspective, Richard’s, faith in an ongoing dialogue linking speaker to speaker and age to age in the unbroken conveyance of an unchanging truth may be easily belied by the self-interested machina-
tions of speakers like Richard. Such conscious equivocation is not the whole story. Reaching beyond its origins in the pointed, double-dealing ambidexterity generic to the speech of the theatrical vice figure, Richard's response also illustrates the volatility of utterance: various meanings, many themes in the Bakhtinian sense, may reside in any one word, and they may well contradict one another.

The threat to truth embodied in Richard's rhetorical manipulations may be taken to stand not only for individualized self-interest, as in Touchstone's misappropriations of Ovid to seduce Audrey, but also for the group or communal interests that always localize and particularize any "history," interpreting, reinterpreting, revising according to the needs of here and now—turning it, in fact, into "utterance." Richard seems to reiterate exactly Edward's point—the truth will persist without written "characters"—while nevertheless making this truism his own utterance by adding his "I say" to its repetition; his speech echoes yet another truisms, however, that typifies the dangerous values of courtly aristocratic competition that the play examines. "They say," he says beneath his breath, that being thoughtful beyond one's years puts one in mortal danger.83 This may be both a proverb of general human application and a principle of early modern medicine, but spoken in this court among these courtiers, it carries particularly ominous weight. The play repeatedly exposes the false security that characters derive from presumed agreements concerning abstract principles.83 Richard's duplicitous manner of speaking exemplifies his own faith in the individual discursive capacity to prevent truth even in the guise of providing truth. Yet the point of the exchange, surely, is not simply the inadequacy of the Prince's aphorism nor the "truth" of Richard's cynical appropriation of it. Nor can one say that the play exactly confirms the Prince's point unequivocally, either, since the oral reports upon which Shakespeare's main source, More's History of Richard III, may have been based only reached the playwright in written form, which was itself in doubt in Shakespeare's day, while the play only survives to us today because it is written.84 Nor is Richard wrong to say that Edward will not live long, or that thoughtfulness in the courtly world of the Yorks and Lancasters is risky; characters like Clarence and Hastings think themselves right into Richard's plots. Nor is the choice of the word "retail" in the Prince's
grand pronouncement immune to de-idealizing associations with competitive commercial and intellectual transactions. Instead of trying to determine the "meaning," the single winner or loser in this exchange with regard to abstract questions about fame’s endurance or the value of written record, one might more usefully note the density of its "themes" and the range of "articulations" connecting it to the social orders that gave and give it utterance. So considered, it may resemble Touchstone’s remarks on Ovid or Cassius’s and Brutus’s observations on their "lofty scene" in animating values that are still significant for us. Four hundred years after the play’s initial performances and more than five hundred years after the events it depicts, this passage constitutes a site where faith in the common voice encounters the manipulative artistry of politically rhetorical spin. Ian McKellen’s recent film of Richard III suggests that this encounter of values continues to resonate even in a world no longer monarchical (or Stalinist); the concerns of our (mis)information age complete Shakespeare’s utterance in new ways, adding meanings and emphases, beyond authorial conceiving.

Thus, although the themes of this utterance, of any utterance, must always be different from moment to moment, place to place, and speaker to speaker, making a jest of the most earnest hermeneutic efforts, the circuits of significance may still fire, and sometimes, even bring light—if, and as long as, the work speaks to elements of our behavioral ideology: "In each period of its historical existence, a work must enter into close association with the changing behavioral ideology, become permeated with it, and draw new sustenance from it. Only to the degree that a work can enter into that kind of integral, organic association with the behavioral ideology of a given period is it viable for that period (and of course, for a given social group)" (MPL 91). This is not some utopian vision of the ongoing life of the public sphere, less still of Bakhtin’s own rhapsodic "homecoming festival" of communication consummated in the very longue durée of "great time" when every meaning will have achieved its articulation (SG 170); instead, Voloshinov imagines momentary intersections and coalitions amid manifold "difference," as "meaning . . . is subsumed under theme and torn apart by theme’s living contradictions so as to return in the shape of a new meaning with a fixity and self-identity only for the while, just as it had before" (MPL 106).
What we live, how we live, gives us ears to hear, or not; and as they and we change, “Shakespeare” changes too.89 “Shakespeare” is a node in an ongoing process that extends before and after the writer(s) who set down the words of Shakespeare:

Semantic phenomena can exist in concealed form, potentially, and be revealed only in semantic cultural contexts of subsequent epochs that are favorable for such disclosure. The semantic treasures Shakespeare embedded in his works were created and collected through the centuries and even millennia: they lay hidden in the language, and not only in the literary language, but also in those strata of the popular language that before Shakespeare’s time had not entered literature, in the diverse genres and forms of speech communication, in the forms of a mighty national culture (primarily carnival forms) that were shaped through millennia, in theater-spectacle genres (mystery plays, farces, and so forth), in plots whose roots go back to prehistoric antiquity, and, finally, in forms of thinking. (SG 45)90

This book fosters no illusion that our themes are, in any simple sense, Shakespeare’s themes (or Bakhtin’s themes). I do believe that there are meaningful proportionalities and overlaps, sites and interests that continue to tie us socially and ideologically.91 The history of sociopolitical responses to Richard II, whether in the England of 1681, or 1738, or the late 1980s, or in post-Soviet Czechoslovakia, or in the American South of the 1870s, suggests that much at least.92 I do not believe that one could ever truly define what Shakespeare’s works meant or mean “locally,” no matter how thick our description, but it is possible to analyze aspects of (mis)understanding or (mis)appropriation in productive ways. The fact that the California audience for a 1954 television Richard II could respond deeply to the play and yet be ignorant of the king’s deposition and death, facts known to virtually anyone entering the London theater in the 1590s, may tell us things about the play as well as about the 1950s TV audience (and reviewers’ attitudes toward that audience), and in the process add to the meaning of the play as an utterance.93 The best to be hoped for from this “negotiated engagement” with the past would hardly be a magisterial explanation, and it would not lessen the force of Judith Butler’s—Bakhtinian—claim that “the equivocality of the utterance means that it might not always mean in the same way, that its meaning might be turned or derailed in some significant way and, most
importantly, that the very words that seek to injure might well miss their mark and produce an effect counter to the one intended."94 One may grant the force of John Foxe’s despair at the limits of historical narrative—“To express every minute of matter in every story occurent, what story-writer in all the world is able to perform it?”—yet attempts at localization and recovery, no matter how incapable of finalization, are by no means trivial and without meaning—for us, certainly—but also for “Shakespeare.”95

When, for example, American undergraduates read Richard II they know that Richard’s description of Bolingbroke’s “courtship to the common people” is hostile, but they are often unsure how to react to the behavior he describes:

Ourself and Bushy
Obser’d his courtship to the common people,
How he did seem to dive into their hearts
With humble and familiar courtesy;
What reverence he did throw away on slaves
Wooing poor craftsmen with the craft of smiles
And patient underbearing of his fortune,
As ’twere to banish their affects with him.
Off goes his bonnet to an oyster-wench;
A brace of draymen bid God speed him well,
And had the tribute of his supple knee,
With “Thanks, my countrymen, my loving friends”—
As were our England in reversion his,
And he our subjects’ next degree in hope. (R2.1.4.23–36)

The Elizabethan name for the behavior here anatomized is recognizable, since “popularity” almost translates across the ages. What gets misrecognized, what is hidden by the assumed familiarity with the term and its associated behavior are changes in fundamental evaluation from an early modern monarchy to postmodern democracy. A familiar term needs to be defamiliarized.

Historically, the prevailing early modern emphasis can be indexed in polemical and satirical evocations of “popular” behavior. The anonymous An Excellent Discourse upon the now present estate of France (1592) claims that the arch-villain, the Duke of Guise, had one distinctive qual-
ity "most proper to his purposes, and that was a kind of facility, gentleness, and popularitie, the inseparable companions of ambition. To the end to ouersway the mightie of the realm, hee stooped to the inferiors: from one end of the street to an other he wolde go with cap in hand, saluting either with heade, hande, or word euen the meanest."96 This widely accepted Elizabethan "theme" appears in Guilpin's *Skialethia* (1598), where similar terms describe the evil ambition of a Machiavellian villain, perhaps the Earl of Essex:

For when great Foelix passing through the street,
Vayleth his cap to each one he doth meet,
And when no broome-man that will pray for him,
Shall haue lesse truage then his bonnets brim,
Who would not thinke him perfect curtesie?
Or the honny-suckle of humilitie?
The deuill he is as soone: he is the deuill,
Brightly accoustred to bemist his euill:
Like a Swarrtrutters hose his puffe thoughts swell,
With yeastie ambition: Signior Machiauell
Taught him this mumming trick, with curtesie
T'entrench himselfe in popularitie. (*Satire* 1, 63-74).97

Yet, despite such historical evidence for a widespread agreement about a behavioral genre and its significance, many modern students and readers have registered a nagging sense that something positive emerges from Bolingbroke's representation in spite of Richard's hostility. Are such responses ahistorical, are they "wrong"?

This is where analysis continues to matter, since to take the "theme" of Richard's passage as univocal would be itself too limited, not only on text intrinsic grounds but on the basis of other contemporary utterances. The Homilies may disapprove of "The restless ambitious . . . [who] do seek the aid, and help of the ignorant multitude," but other languages were available. Compare John Hayward's account of Richard II (1599) for instance:

[Bolingbroke] was very courteous and familiar respectiuely towards all men, whereby hee procured great reputation and regarde, especially with those of the meaner sort: for high humilities take such deepe roote in the mindes of the multitude, that they are more strongly drawn by vnprofitable curtesies then by churlish benefits.
[T]he Duke for his part was not negligent to uncover the head, to bowe the body, to stretch forth the hand to euery meane person, and to use all other complements of popular behaviour: wherewith the mindes of the common multitude are much delighted and drawn; taking that to bee courtesie, which the seuerer sort accompt abasement.\textsuperscript{98}

Hayward’s Tacitean political language leaves loopholes, openings for a different assessment of “popular” behavior as useful. Perhaps it is mistakeable for “courtesie” by the “multitude,” but it is not the “abasement” that the “severer sort” take it to be. Hayward specifies that similarly ingratiating deportment led to Bolingbroke’s later political success, since “neither did the continuance of his raigne bring him to a proude port and stately esteeming of himselfe, but in his latter years he remained so gentle & faire in carriage, that therbychiefely he did weare out the hatred that was borne him, for the death of King Richard” (4).\textsuperscript{99} Some posthumous appreciations of Essex are less qualified about popularity; so a 1603 verse praises him:

Renowned Essex, as he past the streets,
Woulde vaile his bonnett to an oyster wife,
And with a kinde of humble congie greete
The vulgar sorte that did admire his life:
And now sith he hath spent his livinge breath,
They will not cease yet to lament his death.\textsuperscript{100}

Here, the writer openly joins the “vulgar sorte” in admiring Essex’s behavior as “humble” and by attributing pride to Sir Walter Raleigh and his faction.\textsuperscript{101}

So the sociolinguistic environment of Richard’s utterance might include at least these languages of moralistic anti-Machiavellianism, Tacitean utility, and factional resentment. But one other important sociolinguistic context needs recognition. The advice attributed to Lord Burghley for his son Robert Cecil recommends exactly the behavior denigrated by Richard:

Towards thy superiors be humble yet generous; with thy equals familiar yet respective; towards inferiors show much humility and some familiarity, as to bow thy body, stretch forth thy hand, and to uncover thy head, and suchlike
popular compliments. The first prepares a way to advancement; the second makes thee known for a man well-bred; the third gains a good report which once gotten may be safely kept, for high humilities take such root in the minds of the multitude, as they are more easlier won by unprofitable courtesies than churlish benefits. Yet do I advise thee not to affect nor neglect popularity too much. Seek not to be E. and shun to be R. 102

Not too much to be affected nor too little to be neglected, measured pursuit of popularity is here recommended in terms of proper “humility.” This positive assessment complicates any single sense of contemporary context for Richard’s utterance. Where does this leave us?

Heard against such a range of varied languages, generic behaviors, and evaluations, formal aspects of Richard’s own utterance take on heightened accentuation. One might notice the contempt for the “common people” in his reductive designation “slaves.” His grossly inadequate understanding of the situation articulates itself in terms of an individual’s “craft of smiles” wooing “craftsman” rather than in terms of the broader “hope” of the commons. His factional inflections are registered in that his legitimate fear is immediately abandoned on trivial grounds raised by the snide youths and nobodies that notoriously serve him in absence of aged councilors. 103 The foolishness of their airy dismissal of Bolingbroke—”Well, he is gone; and with him go these thoughts”—is compounded by Richard’s unconsidered, snap decision, expressed in terms of “farm[ing] our royal realm,” a phrase with powerfully negative hot-button properties. 104

Considerations of utterance—Richard’s contempt for the commons, his inability to concentrate on serious problems, his trust in an isolated faction, his failure to see that “popular” behavior might also be taken by powerful figures as practical, his hasty adoption of notoriously disastrous policies—all affect the sense and relative value of Bolingbroke’s behavior as represented. If one cannot rule out the possibility that Bolingbroke’s behavior signifies evil ambition, one also cannot eliminate its associations with “humble” commonality or practical “humility.” In fact, the next play of the tetralogy provides a slightly different evaluation of the situation, with Henry remembering his own “humility” and attributing “popularity” to Richard, who is recalled as having grown “a companion to the common streets” and having “Enfeoffed himself to popularity” (1H4
3.2.51–69). Whatever Henry’s confusions about himself, when Sir Robert Naunton engages in a similarly retrospective look at the popular behavior of another monarch, Elizabeth herself, his positive account obviously struggles with a surviving negative sense that makes him fearful lest he offend her memory:

the plausibilitie of her Comportment, and (as I would say without offence) the prodigall distribution of her grace to all sorts of Subjects, for I believe no Prince living, that was so tender of honor and so exactly stood for the preservation of Soveraigntie was so great a Courtier of the people, yea of the Commons and that stooped and declined lowe in presenting her person to the publique view as she passed in her Progresse and perambulations, and in her ejaculations of her prayers on the people.105

In sum, Shakespeare’s early modern audiences may have heard contrasting and overlapping themes in Richard’s lines, and some of those themes can be measurably related to and differentiated from our own. That is where this book begins.

IV

The chapters that follow begin by engaging certain elements of interactive utterance as they appear in early modern English texts. Chapter 1 explores some of the centripetal (homogenizing, hierarchizing) and centrifugal (dispersing, denormatizing) aspects of Shakespeare’s sociolinguistic environment. It may be true that “The late sixteenth-century was the most inventive period in the history of English . . . Poets, playwrights, and prose writers began to explore new styles, new ways to express complex ideas and to capture in writing the rhythms of English speech,” but as Joseph M. Williams points out, the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries also saw not only the first English rhetorics, grammars, spelling books and English-to-English dictionaries, but the establishment in public discourse of the idea that “sociolinguistic behavior” could threaten established order and mores.106

Chapter 2 argues for the usefulness of certain formalist, close reading skills in examining nonaesthetic textual material. In particular, it places a document that has been enlisted as “historical evidence” by new historicist scholarship in the context of social heteroglossia. Chapter 3
locates linguistic and dramatic elements from *Richard II* and some of Shakespeare’s other history plays amid debates over agrarian change that were raging with particular intensity during the middle 1590s, years that saw the publication of *Richard II* and the widespread failure of harvests. The language of these debates is related both to temporally local and to longer-term developments in discourse concerning property and possession, matters of crucial import for the identity considerations which follow in the next chapter. Chapter 4 examines dramatic character and subject construction in *Richard II*, topics familiar in critical discourse concerning the play’s putative development of “individualism” in theme and protagonist, in order to put the subject where the Bakhtin circle found the individual: in the highly-charged social space among utterances and languages.107 Chapter 5 examines the play against the backdrop of the tonality of elegy and lamentation that exercised a general predominance in the literature of the Tudor period, while relating it to particular developments in the love poetry of the 1590s. As Diana Henderson points out, *Richard II* might be called a “lyrical history play” with profound connection to the ambivalent recollection that is widely articulated in the love poetry of the period.108 Chapter 6 reconsiders carnival, the one Bakhtinian concept to gain wide currency in studies of Renaissance drama and culture, and argues for a less polarized view of social relations as manifested in theater and such “popular” phenomena as the ballad.
Bakhtin claims that “great discoveries” are “made possible by the specific conditions of specific epochs, but they never die or lose their value along with the epochs that gave them birth” (PDP 35). The Shakespearean understanding of human action and utterance constitutes a discovery with continuing relevance, but this “discovery” is not Shakespeare’s alone nor does it assume Shakespearean shape independently of specific conditions. One important condition is the state of inherited and living opinion; the following pages examine elements of that opinion in Shakespeare’s early modern contemporaries.

Certainly, some sixteenth-century writers considered literature in relation to situated, concrete utterance. Ben Jonson restates a period commonplace associating oratory with poetry: “The Poet is the nearest Borderer upon the Orator, and expresseth all his vertues, though he be tyed more to numbers; is his equall in ornament, and above him in his strengths.” Jonson further defines the resources of the “Poeticall nature” in terms of contemporary discursive practices: “Hee must have Civil prudence, and Eloquence, & that whole; not taken up by snatches, or peeces, in Sentences, or remnants, when he will handle businesse, or carry
Counsells, as if he came then out of the Declamors Gallerie, or Shadowe, but furnish'd out of the body of the State, which commonly is the Schoole of men." In fact, understanding writing as a form of speech led to widespread classifying of both as "utterance." Roger Ascham's Scholemaster refers to "utterance either by pen or taulke," and George Puttenham's Arte refers to "good utterance be it by mouth or by writing."

Perhaps the most extended English equation of speech and writing as "utterance" appears in Puttenham, who presumes poems to "speak" and asserts continuities between the languages of life, especially language at court, and the language of art. Most importantly, Puttenham evaluates the complex situational dimensions of all human practices according to the demands of "decencie." His definition of the practices of art and life according to their approximation of "seemlyness" seeks to avoid the rules and precepts defined by classical accounts of decorum. It begins with the unexceptional premise that "decencies are of sundrie sorts, according to the many circumstances accompanying our writing, speech or behauiour," but, as if this proliferation of kinds did not raise enough problems, he also adds—in contrast to the classical rhetoricians' general lack of interest in the subject—the physical factor of vocalization in intonation and accent: "so as in the very sound or voice of him that speaketh, there is a decencie that becommeth, and an vndecencie that misbecometh vs" (264–65). The full complexity of Puttenham's situated, interactive view of language and behavior is perhaps best summed up in an observation that registers the potentially infinite "vari-directional" contexts of human practice: "By reason of the sundry circumstances, that mans affaires are as it were wrapt in, this [decencie] comes to be very much alterable and subiect to varietie, in so much as our speach asketh one maner of decencie, in respect of the person who speaks: another of his to whom it is spoken: another of whom we speake: another of what we speake, and in what place and time and to what purpose. And as it is of speach, so of al other our behauiours" (263–64). If such a complex, interactive, sense of art, life, and language were taken seriously, how might one prescribe, or even know, the right thing to say or do? And given such a fully contextualized conception of speech and action, what can be said about individual identity?
Obviously it becomes difficult to conceive of the individual speaking subject in terms of a self-possessed oratorical mastery staged for an applauding audience, the way identity appears in the self-dramatization that Achilles is urged to exercise in “communicat[ing] his parts to others.” Puttenham’s speaker-agent is a “subiect to varietie” rather than a sovereign monologist communicating his or her own parts. A similar vision of utterance as “wpret in” the changing, interactive circumstances of “mans affaires” appears compactly rendered in Richard II by the lines given John of Gaunt to explain the surprising agreement of the historical Gaunt to the banishment of his own son. After Gaunt’s own tongue had contributed its assenting “party-verdict” to the sentence, Richard demands that he explain his tears. Gaunt replies:

You urg’d me as a judge, but I had rather
You would have bid me argue like a father.
O, had it been a stranger, not my child,
To smooth his fault I should have been more mild.
A partial slander sought I to avoid,
And in the sentence my own life destroy’d.
Alas, I look’d when some of you should say
I was too strict to make mine own away;
But you gave leave to my unwilling tongue
Against my will to do myself this wrong. (R2 1.3.237–46)

Gaunt represents his assent as an utterance amid utterances, spoken and unspoken. His agreement responded to demands posed by a particular discourse that cast the problem of his son in judicial rather than familial terms. He anticipated that the responses of his interlocutors would be determined by two different sets of values. “Some” would adhere to an ideology of merit and be quick to denounce family favoritism; others would allow a primary allegiance to the family-solidarity values of feudal chivalry. Thus, his utterance is caught in a dense intersection of values and discourses that exceeds in its complexity the typical accounts of circumstances by rhetoricians like Thomas Wilson, who imagines that considerations of “tyme, the place, the man for whome we speake, the man against whom we speake, the matter whereof we speake, and the judges before whom we speake” can all be consciously addressed and successfully subsumed under a speaker’s intention to “wynne the chiefe hearers good willes.”
 Appropriately, Gaunt protests that the words of his mouth were not finally his own, but conditional responses to a situation over which he had little control. This interdiscursive nightmare parallels Bakhtin's recognitions that there is no “simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular ‘own’ language” and that utterances are doubly bound, formed “in an atmosphere of the already spoken” and “determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word” (DI 280). Gaunt’s situation is more complicated, less controllable than that suggested in humanist accounts of the demands of decorum or of the opportunities for commonplace. Even such claims about discursive belatedness as Robert Burton’s assertion that “we can say nothing but what hath been said” suggest scant parallel with the sense of self-displacement conveyed in Gaunt’s situation, where even personal pronouns convey the determining role of the audience: “you gave leave to my unwilling tongue.” The tone of despair here also contrasts with the confident mastery expressed in Cicero’s evocation of the multiple perspectives bearing upon forensic utterance: “In my own person and with perfect impartiality I play three characters—myself, my opponent and the arbitrator. In this way I gain the advantage of reflecting first on what to say and saying it later.”

Given the complexity of sociolinguistic interaction that Puttenham describes and that Shakespeare represents in this case, how might one ever hope to say (or do) the right thing—and at the right time? Revealingly, the answer for Puttenham does not lie in laboring to master principles and precepts. Instead of a “rable of scholastical precepts which be tedious,” Puttenham offers to provide examples of “matters historical” to cultivate the reader’s “discretion.” These examples constitute “a glasse to looke vpon and behold the euents of time, and more exactly to skan the trueth of euery case that shall happen in the affaires of man” (264). Two examples urged by Puttenham upon those who would be “discreet” are particularly relevant.

Puttenham introduces incidents involving Sir Andrew Flamock and Henry VIII with a general observation that although certain words or actions may seem “indecent” in themselves, true decency arises from a total situation. The flatulent Flamock may have committed an “vnman-
nerly act” by responding with “a rappe nothing faintly” to the royal trumpet marking Henry’s arrival at Greenwich, but Flamock wittily saves the moment. Flamock’s witticism—“your Maiesty blew one blast for the keeper and I another for his man”—redeems his indiscretion by providing “sporting satisfaction to the kings mind” (268). Thus may a fart—in other circumstances an actionable offense—be made decent in the volatile situational alchemy of utterance.” But one may not presume upon the latitude suggested by such a surprising success, for in a related incident Flamock’s utterance fails the occasion.

At the king’s instigation, Flamock completes some verses of his Majesty’s that anticipate amorous delights with a “fayre Lady.” Puttenham quotes Henry’s lines: “Within this towre, / There lieth a flowre, / That hath my hart.” Yet he refuses to quote Flamock’s reply in its entirety: “Flamock for aunswer: Within this hower, she will, &c. with the rest in so vndecency termes, as might not now become me by the rule of Decorum to vtter writing to so great a Maiestie” (268–69). Puttenham apparently realizes that a reader might well wonder, since even a fart may be rendered decent “as the case fell out” within a larger interaction, “wherein . . . lay this vndecencie?” He prepares to answer this question by invoking that familiar tautological precept of decorum that insists the only discourse fit for kings is an elevated, kingly sort of discourse: “And wherein I would faine learne, lay this vndecencie? in the skurrill and filthy termes not meete for a kings eare?” “Perchance so,” Puttenham grants, but only in a special, limited sense.

Flamock’s problem is not that he used terms unfit for a king, but that he employed language unfavoried by this king: “For the king was a wise and graue man, and though he hated not a faire woman, yet liked he nothing well to heare speeches of ribaudrie” (269). In the final analysis, however, such explanations, whether based on a general rule about speech with kings or on the more particular demands posed by addressing this individual king, are superseded by the still more specific demands of situation. “The very cause in deed,” Puttenham ultimately claims, “was for that Flamocks reply answered not the kings expectation,” and he begins defining this expectation in terms of an anticipated speech genre with its requisite tonal expectations: King Henry commenced his own verses in a tone “pleasant and amorous” but Flamock
finished them with "lothsomnesse" of tone and in "termes" indecorously "rude and vnciuill."

Yet the issues at stake can hardly be dismissed by recourse to notions of decorum according to levels of usage, tonal register, or appropriateness to differing subjects or genres because Puttenham's own text registers indifference to the demands of genre purity by its "gallimaufry" combinations of clowns and kings (like Flamock and Henry) even in the narrative examples grounding decorum. Puttenham's vexed sentence expounding upon Flamock's verbal indecency is revealing:

for the kings rime commencing with a pleasant and amorous proposition: Sir Andrew Flamock to finish it not with loue but with lothsomnesse, by termes very rude and vnciuill, and seing the king greatly fauour that Ladie for her much beauty by like or some other good partes, by his fastidious aanswer to make her seeme odious to him, it helde a great disproportion to the kings appetite, for nothing is so vnpleasant to a man, as to be encountred in his chiefe affection, & specially in his loues, & whom we honour we should also reverence their appetites, or at the least beare with them (not being wicked and vterly euill) and whatsoeuer they do affect, we do not as becometh vs if we make it seeme to them horrible. (269)

The length and elusiveness of this sentence signal the dangers it traverses. In its form one may detect written equivalents for those evaluative intonations that are implied in Puttenham's suggestive references to decency and indecency in "the very sound or voice of him that speaketh."

The same narrative voice that showed no hint of reservation about implying any social condescension in adjudging a fart to be the appropriate utterance to direct toward a keeper's "man" here speaks about a man one might "honour" with qualifiers and hedges that reveal obvious uneasiness, piling up clause after clause with odd connectives and significantly altering terms. Whatever the monarch's own role might be in determining what is "seemly," Puttenham's locutions (and hesitancy) in the specific matter of sexual misconduct register signs of anticipated objection. Suddenly, the wise and grave individual king, so decidedly particular in his standards of taste and decorum, becomes subsumed in the broadest category; Puttenham tells us that "nothing is so vnpleasant to a man, as to be encountered in his chiefe affection." Now, it is King Henry who is "a man." As though to mark the uncertainty or insuffi-
ciency of this move, Puttenham’s syntax shifts from logical connectives like “by” and “for” to a series of additive conjunctions: “& whom we honour we should also reuerence their appetites, or at the least beare with them (not being wicked and utterly euill) and whatsoever they do affect.” The shifts and hesitations, the parenthetical qualifiers, suggest that there is ample precedent for a quite different moral assessment of Flamock’s speech, an assessment that runs directly counter to Puttenham’s criticism of its discursive indecency. We are in territory like that of the first scenes of Richard II, in which ambiguous locutions and changes of discourse signal an uneasy silence that haunts what is said. After all, ethical “decency” might demand dissuading a king from lust. Flamock’s “rude” lines, whatever their carnivalesque potential in referring humorously to lower bodily strata, could be seen as serving such a serious purpose: to arouse disgust by physicalizing the erotic object follows an established religious and ethical precedent. Furthermore, even the terminology of sexual “appetite” that Puttenham employs has its place in the political language of the period. “Appetite” is frequently invoked in discourses concerning early modern monarch-subject relations to describe the point at which monarchy becomes tyranny, which is characterized as the subject’s acquiescence to the demands of royal appetite. In light of such traditional values Shakespeare’s vague imputation of sexual transgressions to Richard II and his favorites is fitting, and the same values are a factor in Marlowe’s Edward II. In Shakespeare’s play the charges amount to hints about broken marriage ties and suggestions of royal self-indulgence, while in Marlowe’s by contrast, the display of appetite is as blatant as Edward’s longing for Gaveston’s caresses and his final symbolic punishment for those longings. The moral aura that accompanies any such sexual-political imputations in the period could hardly be ignored. Thus, Puttenham’s odd mixing of discourses in enjoining “reuerence” for the “appetites” of one “whom we honour” suggests implications of tyranny like those that arise when Malcolm responds to Macduff’s offers of rule. Surely some of Puttenham’s contemporaries would have heard his utterance in similar contexts. At the very least they would have heard him in an atmosphere of other utterances that are implied, answered, or anticipated. Certainly he hears him-
self that way: witness his nervous qualification concerning indulgence when he adds the reservation that the appetites involved be not “wicked and vtterly euill.” “Vtterly” reveals an especially nice touch. He may avoid recounting Flamock’s very words because it would not become “the rule of Decorum to vtter writing to so great a Maiestie” as Queen Elizabeth, but Puttenham also clearly has other audiences in mind when he “utters” his book. Given his statements about the situated nature of speech and behavior, it is not surprising that he betrays sensitivity to the social dimensions of his own utterance, but contemporary perception of speech as a place where contexts and languages intersect is not confined to Puttenham.

II

By mixing Italian, Latin, Greek, French, and English, the title character of the anonymous play, *Lingua* (1607), prompts a revealing discussion. Common Sense assesses her “Gallemaufry of speech” as an innovative practice associated with individual “language makers.” Phantastes sees her use of “*Heterogeneall* languages” as resembling common practices of foppish gulls:

**COMMON SENSE** I am perswaded these same language makers haue the very quality of colde in their wit, that freezeth all *Heterogeneall* languages together, congealing English Tynne, Graecian Gold, Romaine Latine all in a lumpe.

**PHANTASTES** Or rather in my imagination like your Fantasticall Gulls Apparel, wearing a Spanish Felt, a French Doblet, a Granado Stocking, a Dutch Slop, an Italian Cloake, with a Welch frise Jerkin. (F2r)

By contrast, Memory takes Lingua’s utterance neither as an artistic innovation by a single “maker” nor as a practice shared by a defined subgroup; instead, he identifies it by “kind,” as a speech genre, a period style. “I remember about the yeare 1602,” he says, “many vsed this skew kind of language” (F2r). While this dating is absurdly precise (Common Sense dates Orpheus’s harping “about some foure yeares after the Contention betwixt Apollo and Pan, and a little before the excoriation of Marsyas” [F2v]), the discursive tendency represented by *Lingua* attracts particular notice in the later sixteenth century. At risk of sounding like
Common Sense, one might claim that “skew” combinations of “Heterogeneousall languages” attained special prominence around 1590.20

In a famous passage in the St. Paul’s Prologue to Midas (performed 1590, published 1592), John Lyly reflects on the “gallimaufrey” or confused mixture of dramatic forms demanded by drama’s varied audience.21 As a playwright, Lyly constitutes one of Common Sense’s “language makers,” but he disclaims individual responsibility for linguistic mixture, placing the blame on the demands brought to bear on all kinds of utterances by a changing society. His plays cross generic boundaries and mix social types because “Traffic and travel,” he writes, “hath woven the nature of all nations into ours, and made this land like arras, full of device, which was broadcloth, full of workmanship” (13–16). It is not merely the traveler come back from abroad that is the corrupting agent. National uniformity and artistic integrity have been affected by commercial intercourse, the “traffic” that brings together people of diverse callings and correspondingly different tastes in the theater and in the increasingly urbanized environment generally.22 Soldiers “call for tragedies, their object is blood; courtiers for comedies, their subject is love; countrymen for pastorals, shepherds are their saints,” but in a theatrical space where all come together, Lyly maintains that insofar as his mixed art observes no single decorum but is composed of many elements identified with these groups, it is merely reflective: “If we present a mingle-mangle, our fault is to be excused, because the whole world is become a hodgepodge” (20–22). In other words, social developments gave leave to his unwilling tongue. However, as Peter Holbrook observes, what Lyly says about the implications of social mixture for verbal art appears belied by the form of his utterance, which deploys its verbal elements within the framework of a pervasive stylistic uniformity: “what is remarkable about [Lyly’s] passage is its balanced phrasing, imposing on this instability, a rhetorical order.”23 Holbrook rightly opposes this preserved aesthetic symmetry to the challenges posed by Nashe and other contemporary writers, but before considering those who foreground such challenges in the early 1590s, it is worth briefly placing the issues of decorum and style in a dramatic context because the problem addressed by Lyly’s remarks is not exactly, or not only, what Holbrook suggests. At
issue is not merely the mixing of genres, discourses, and socially disparate characters in the playwright’s utterance but the degree of proximity and angle of intersection into which the playwright’s utterance places the elements it combines.24

When Lyly calls his drama a hodgepodge or gallimaufry, he responds to criticisms of English dramatic formlessness that had been around since the earliest days of the London theater. The standard ground for this criticism predates the public theater itself. Nicholas Grimald’s preface to Christus Redivivus (1542), for example, insists on stylistic uniformity according to generic expectations and social position: “it is certain that one and the same sort of style is not called for in the case of a rich man as of a poor one; in plain, straightforward narrative as in thrasonical boasting; in soothing consolation as in complaint; in a voice from heaven as in the wailings that arise from hell.”25 George Whetstone’s Preface to Promos and Cassandra (1578) and Sidney’s Defence of Poesy (published 1595) broadcast the charge that English drama violated such demands by indiscriminately mixing social and linguistic levels while also confusing genres. Whetstone calls the native dramatic tradition “indiscrete” for, “Manye tymes [to make mirthe] they make a Clowne companion with a Kinge: in theyr grave Counsels, they allow the advise of fooles.”26 The point is not that tragedy, history, and comedy require total exclusion of characters drawn from disparate social levels. Rural clowns may inhabit the same work as kings; only their relations, and above all their linguistic relations, ought to observe certain boundaries of decorous differentiation. It is indeed a “grose Indecorum” to let the different social orders share the same “order of speach”: “they use one order of speach for all persones: a grosse Indecorum, for a Crowe wyll iyll counterfet the Nightingales sweete voice: even so, affected Speeche doth misbecome a Clowne. For to work a Commedie kindly, grave olde men should instruct: yonge men should showe the imperfections of youth: Strumpets should be lascivious: Boyes unhappy: and Clownes should be disorderly: entermeling all these actions, in suche sorte, as the grave matter may instruct, and the pleasant delight.”27 On these grounds Lyly’s prose drama is vulnerable. From top to bottom of the social order Lyly’s characters exhibit a uniformity of speech that
binds them to one another in their form of utterance whatever their occasional differentiation by vocabulary or subject. Thus, King Midas sounds very like the rural clown of the same play:

**MIDAS** Have not I enticed the subjects of my neighbor princes to destroy their natural kings, like moths that eat the cloth in which they were bred, like vipers that gnaw the bowels of which they were born, and like worms that consume the wood in which they were engender’d? (3.1.38–42)

**AMINTAS** Well, then, this I say, when a lion doth so much degenerate from princely kind that he will borrow of the beasts, I say he is no lion but a monster; pie’d with the craftiness of the fox, the cruelty of the tiger, the ravening of the wolf, the dissembling of hyena, he is worthy also to have the ears of an ass. (4.2.25–29)

Here there is no regional dialect or rude mechanical usage dividing top from bottom, country from court. Nor does Lyly’s prose have a formal equivalent for the difference between fourteeners and heroic couplets. Instead of an absolute difference between, or even a stratification of, characters, one finds in Lyly a constructed intersection among them. These two utterances take shape within a single language in which either might address and be understood by the other, and they discuss the same things, exhibiting similar concern and recognizing mutually comprehensible values. If the two speakers do not so much contest as complement one another’s positions (rebellious subjects appearing to the king the bestial equivalents of the derogate monarchs that the shepherd sees as bestial), it need not and would not prove to be so in other contemporary drama.

In a world that predated the dominance of written standards of lexicography and the oral standard of institutionally reproduced “received pronunciation,” a world that had not yet been totally claimed by means of communication that would tie disparate regional concerns and customs to urban hegemony, a verbal medium bringing together clowns and kings in one language must necessarily have registered, in its exclusions and mediations, the forces of heteroglossia. In the linguistic space of Lyly’s utterance there must have been silences and foreclosures of sense that resembled to contemporary ears the hesitations and shifts of
terms in Puttenham’s uneasy utterances concerning the flattery of royal lusts. Lyly’s centripetal utterance invents a linguistic meeting ground that levels what must have been enormous discrepancies between the language and behavior of clowns and kings, and that leveling must surely have left traces. But in the case of Lyly it is difficult to recover what has been so thoroughly excluded. Even when his characters do refer to professional jargon, for example in the case of the barber Motto and his boy Dello in Midas, the discussion of “phrases of our eloquent occupation” exhibits the same rhetorical structures exhibited elsewhere. Motto’s utterance becomes a natural history catalogue, replete with alliteration and balance, and his boy’s response culminates in a learned, witty pun:

MOTTO  Besides, I instructed thee in the phrases of our eloquent occupation, as, “How, sir, will you be trimmed? Will you have your beard like a spade, or a bodkin? A penthouse on your upper lip, or an alley on your chin? A low curl on your head, like a bull, or dangling lock, like a spaniel? Your mustachios sharp at the ends, like shoemakers’ awls, or hanging down to your mouth, like goats’ flakes? Your lovelocks wreathed with a silken twist, or shaggy to fall on your shoulders?”

DELO  I confess you have taught me Tully De Oratore, the very art of trimming. (3.2.37–47)

Here there appears something of the grotesque element that characterizes the similes of Thomas Nashe likening beards to spades, mustachios to shoemakers’ awls or goats’ beards, but nothing of the disruptive force that such oddly paired details take on in Nashe’s prose. Instead of forcefully registering a social point, the details merely accrete, suggesting that even barbers, to the limits of their abilities, see themselves as a group the way others see them, engaging in a learned play and self-irony that can bring together Cicero and a pun on the barbers’ own stereotypical professional proclivity for “trimming” in both cheating and barbering. One could say that Lyly’s prose includes representatives of different groups or strata and elements of their languages only to “familiarize” them under the hegemony of one dominant, courtly humanist standard and style of language and behavior. The effect is to imply a single set of standards, composed of qualities like wit, learning, and discursive ease, by which to evaluate everyone, since virtually all his characters show the ability and desire to deploy such qualities.
Of course, one could simply say that the characters all speak like Lyly; kings, clowns, barbers and lovers all exhibiting what G. K. Hunter calls Lyly's personal "key-signature" in that they share the characteristic authorial idiom of *Euphuies*: its balanced periods, its unnatural natural similes, its playful learning, its alliteration, assonance, and so forth. There is some testimony that Lyly's invented language, which crystallized elements of humanist education into a common idiom, did become something like an assumed standard, at least in courtly conversation. However, there were other voices, with other key-signatures and different attitudes toward the centrifugal forces of linguistic differentiation and interaction.

III

There were Kyd, Marlowe, and the early Shakespeare, to name three very popular theatrical figures. If Lyly's idiom wittily mixes clowns and kings within the ambit of a unitary language and tonality, the stage languages of Kyd, Marlowe, and Shakespeare do too, but they also register, as Lyly generally does not, the contentions and violence of encounters within such proximate space. In the dramas of Marlowe and Kyd speeches by socially diverse characters do resemble one another, do overlap in tonality, formal device and content, as they do in Lyly, but the resemblances and overlaps do not constitute sites of assumed agreement or even peaceful coexistence. Instead of a presumptive single standard (such as "wit" or "copiousness") by which any utterance may be judged, one finds characters using the same or similar forms in ways that actually heighten differentiation. While they may sound like one another to a large degree, instead of a unifying shared standard of value, there is insistent conflict and relativism. Even such imposing figures as the imperial Tamburlaine or the aggrieved Hieronimo inhabit a world which contests the stability and integrity of their values and subjects even their most impassioned utterances, their most imposing bodily demeanors, to multiple qualifications and irony. In atmospheres composed of deception, emulation, competition, irony, fierce resentment, and violent struggle for dominance, characters stake claims to validity of idiom and value amid insistent echoes from imitators and among audible traces of nearly silenced alternatives.

This is territory not far removed from the earliest plays of Shakespeare,
where, for example, the religious tone and pious demeanor of Henry VI are treated as at once higher, truer alternatives to the fierce aggression of honor, revenge, and desire, and simultaneously as ideological dead ends, modes of self-deception that actually facilitate the success of ambitious evil.\textsuperscript{35} Richard II has been said to exhibit Shakespeare's most "Marlovian" language, and in a limited sense this is true, but the play develops potentials that take Marlowe's devices and insights in new directions, directions that Marlowe had also begun to explore in Edward II and Faustus.\textsuperscript{36} The subtleties of Richard II, with its complex assessments of language, behavior, and ideologies in tension and conflict, grow out of insights and recognitions prepared in the heavily marked ironies of plays like Marlowe's The Jew of Malta and Shakespeare's own Titus Andronicus, works that combine familiar rhetoric and device with grotesque effects resembling those evident in contemporary nondramatic writing. Before turning to these two plays, let us be sure what we are and are not talking about.

Shakespeare and other contemporary dramatists did occasionally differentiate characters through socially stereotyped distinctions among physical deportments and according to accents pertaining to different regions and strata, making gesture or speech differ not just in import, vocabulary, or subject matter but in manner and sound. On the Elizabethan stage, the nonverbal form of physical differentiation is familiar in the various bodily restraints that distinguish "gentle" deportment from the rudeness of its polarized "mechanical" opposite. The most overt verbal differentiation appears in the malapropism or the broadly foreign or regional pronunciation sometimes given to non-English or nongentle characters. Yet, granted what must have been the considerable behavioral and linguistic diversity of late Elizabethan London, there is surprisingly little of this, either in drama generally, or in Shakespeare.

There were well-established clichés about national identity, of course, such as Thomas Wilson's catalogue of Europeans, with Dutchmen characterized by drinking, "the Frenche man for pryde and inconstaunce: The Spanyard for nymblenes of bodie, and muche disdaine: the Italian for great witte and policie: the Scottes for boldenes and the Boeme for stubbornesse."\textsuperscript{37} Opinion may have agreed that non-Englishmen looked and
sounded funny, but, unless out to make a joke as in the bawdy French in *Henry V* or to convey difference as in the Irish of the *Famous History of Captain Thomas Stukely* or the (unrecorded) Welsh of *Henry IV, Part One*, most dramatic characters speak a textually unremarked English, making Athenians, Romans, Italians, and Frenchmen into native speakers. 38 Aside from the ridicule of a few stage-Spaniards like Don Armado in *Love's Labor's Lost*, who is really rendered more as a type of the “braggart” (5.2.520, stage direction [s.d.]) than as Spanish, or such French characters as the princess in *Henry V*, or the disguised Barabas in *The Jew of Malta* with the addition of a few extra vowels (“Must tuna my lute”) and some confused consonants and verbs (“Very mush, monsieur, you no be his man”), there is surprisingly little attention to representing foreign demeanor or accent. 39 The most detailed Shakespearean case may be Caius in *Merry Wives*, whose mixed English and French resembles the princess’s in its modified consonants and unintended bodily puns and whose extreme reactions somewhat resemble Armado’s in stylization (in this case as choleric), but whose overall representation, as A. J. Hoen-selaars argues, manages to avoid some of the “French” characteristics represented in Lodge’s *Wounds of Civil War* (1588) and Ruggle’s *Club Law* (1599). 40 Nor, so far as the evidence suggests, do English regional or status-specific speech forms get nearly as much stage representation as one might imagine.

Among Shakespeare’s “British” characters, a few exhibit rudimentary national or regional accents, but the resources employed to render their differences in print are slight. Welshmen like Fluellen of *Henry V* and Parson Evans of *Merry Wives of Windsor* usually (but not always) turn “v” into “f” or “b” into “p” as in Fluellen’s “Alexander the Pig” (H5 4.7.12–13) or Evans’s “py’r Lady” (MW 1.1.25), and they misuse singulars and plurals (*MW* 3.1.13 and *H5* 4.7.20–49). 41 The Irishman, Captain Macmorris, of *Henry V* speaks with a minimal pronunciation difference (“the work ish ill done; it ish give over” [H5 3.2.89–90]). Shakespearean differentiation probably reaches a high-water mark in Captain Jamy’s Scottish accent: “It sall be vary gud, gud feith, gud captens bath, and I sall quite you with gud leve, as I may pick occasion. That sall I, marry” (H5 3.2.101–3). About the same approximate distance from standard
usage, Edgar’s adopted southwestern regional accent has a history on the English stage that dates back at least to *Respublica* (1553) and demands the voicing of initial fricatives and *ch* forms: “‘Chill not let go, zir, without vurther ‘cagion . . . Good gentlemen, go your gait, and let poor volk pass. An ‘chud ha’ bin zwagger’d out of my life, ‘twould not ha’ bin zo long as ‘tis by a vortnight” (*KL* 4.6.238–42).41 That is about as far as regional accent goes in Shakespeare; otherwise, characters employ an unmarked London pronunciation, at least in print.42

Of course, what actors actually sounded like lies beyond reconstruction.43 In the case of the disguised Evans, for example, even when the texts of *Merry Wives* give him lines that are recorded in clear, correct English, with none of the marks that usually accompany his pronunciation, Falstaff immediately identifies a spoken accent, and prays God defend him “from that Welsh fairy.” From Orlando’s remarks on the unlikely urbaniety of Rosalind’s accent, we can infer an opposition between a general courtly urban acceptability—what Rosalind/Ganymede characterizes as “inland” speech—and its rustic opposite.44 And there is some evidence suggesting actors mimicked spoken and behavioral tonalities that carried social rather than regional implication. Thomas Godwin claims a significant overlap between classical and English theater in representing socially accented tonalities in “gestures or speeches”:

Concerning the diverse kindes of stage-plaies I read of fowre, called by the Grecians, Mimicae, Satyrae, Tragoediae, Comediae: by the Romanes Planipedes, Attellanae, Praetextatae, Tabernariae. In English, Fables Mimicall, Satyrical, Tragicall, Comical. These Mimicall players did much resemble the clowne in many of our English stage-plaies, who sometimes would go a tip-toe in derision of the mincing dames; sometimes would speak ful-mouthed to mocke the country clownes; sometimes vpon the top of their tongue to scoffe the citizen. And thus, by their imitation of all ridiculous gestures or speeches, in al kindes of vocations, they provoked laughter; whencse both the plaies and plaiers were named *Mimi* . . . an Imitator, or one that doth apelike counterfet others.45

According to Godwin, classical players and contemporary stage clowns alike imitated the sound and demeanor of “al kinds of vocations” including such identifiable class and group attributes as the “ful-mouthed” articulation of “country clownes,” the “tip-toe,” mincing gait of fine “dames,” and the precise enunciation of the middling “citizen[s],” who,
it appears, characteristically spoke “vpon the top of their tongue.” These remarks suggest an awareness and a representational practice that may have been shared by Shakespeare. But Shakespeare’s understanding and treatment of matters of tone and deportment may be more complexly interactive, more nearly Bakhtinian in bringing speakers into a shared linguistic environment, and less simply schematic in differentiating speakers according to group status than Godwin’s formulations allow.

It is true that certain aspects of Hamlet’s advice to the players suggest social divisions as broad and attributes as firmly stereotypical as those found in Godwin. The articulation and demeanor that Hamlet recommends clearly presume social differences. The actor should speak “tripplingly on the tongue” and act “gently,” with “temperance” and “smoothness,” while avoiding “mouth[ing]” like a “town crier” or “saw[ing]” the air like a “robustious” fellow. The player should speak and act with “discretion” and “modesty” rather than with the “overdone” volubility or “tardy” awkwardness typical of citizens or mechanicals. Furthermore, Hamlet’s remarks on acting suggest a highly polarized division of the audience between “barren spectators,” epitomized in “groundlings” who are “incapable” of anything but spectacle and overdrawn emotion—”inexplicable-dumb shows and noise”—and “judicious” audience members whose capacities for subtle discernment and preferences for decorous understatement are embodied in Hamlet’s own critical precepts (Ham 3.2.1–45). Two principal complications prevent one from taking Hamlet’s advice for definitive. First there is the failure of his own staging to match his stated values. Hamlet’s play within the play begins with a dumbshow that needs explication, proceeds to a prologue that prompts criticism for stilted versification, and closes with a murderer whom Hamlet chides for overdone gesture and tardy enactment: “Begin, murderer; leave thy damnable faces and begin. Come, the croaking raven doth bellow for revenge” (Ham 3.2.250–52). What one makes of this failure of aesthetic practice to live up to theory may be affected by its appearing in a play which frequently mentions and exhibits other discrepancies between theory and practice. But then Hamlet appears in the production of his play, as Shakespeare was apparently in some of his own plays, only an adapter or co-author. Still, another more important issue remains.
Despite his parodic rejection of grand classical claims for the power of rhetorical eloquence in his own specific case, when Hamlet advises the players, he pays no attention to differentiating either speech or actions according to differences of standing among the characters being represented.\(^49\) Hamlet acknowledges no differences in voice or demeanor to distinguish clowns from kings, ladies from oyster-wenches, unskillful groundlings from judicious critics. The differences mentioned are emotional or moral (passion, scorn, virtue, laughter), while the stress is laid upon a universal standard of “humanity” by which “accent” and “gait” are to be judged: “O, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, and that highly, not to speak it profanely, that, neither having th’ accent of Christians nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellowed that I have thought some of nature’s journeymen had made men and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably” (Ham 3.2.28–35). Hamlet does not recognize, and, indeed, Shakespeare does not write, city comedy.\(^50\) Whatever Hamlet says about a reflecting “mirror” to show “the very age and body of the time his form and pressure” (Ham 3.2.23–24), this mimetic imperative of Hamlet’s art, and to some extent of Shakespeare’s art, exists in a dialectic tension with a universalizing trend that resists any simple reification of social difference into rigidly separable forms of articulation such as those in Godwin’s remarks. “Homo,” as Gadshill says, “is a common name to all men” (1H4 2.1.96).\(^51\)

Such a universalizing trend need hardly be protodemocratic. Consider early attempts to codify a national vocabulary through dictionaries, such as Robert Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabetical (1604). In some regards, such universalizing tendencies at the cost of linguistic and behavioral diversity may be taken to resemble the courtly humanist aesthetic of Lyly with its decidedly hegemonic aspects.\(^52\) Cawdrey enjoins “one manner of language” while warning against “outlandish English.”\(^53\) Similar tendencies with similar implications appear in Puttenham as well. Puttenham warns against “strange accents or ill shapen soundes” (144), encouraging a language “naturall, pure, and most vsuall.” Not surprisingly, Puttenham’s “naturall, pure” standard turns out to be that of the dominant region and social strata. However, it is evidently not suf-
ficient to define what is “naturall” and “pure” as a geographic idiom or accent like the “good Southerne as we of Middlesex or Surrey,” for he not only specifies as ideal “the vsuall speach of the Court, and that of London and the shires lying about London within lx. myles, and not much aboue” (145), but he also elaborates further social exclusions. The recommended English language is not spoken:

in the marches and frontiers, or in port townes, where straungers haunt for traffike sake, or yet in Vniuersities where Schollers vse much peeuish affectation of words out of primatiue languages, or finally, in any vplandish village or corner of a Realme, where is no resort but of poore rusticall or vnciuill people: neither shall he follow the speach of a craftes man or carter, or other of the inferiour sort, though he be inhabitant or bred in the best towne and Citie in this Realme, for such persons doe abuse good speaches by strange accents or ill shapen soundes, and false ortographie. (144)

Avoiding strangers, polylingual pedants, outlying regions, rustics, uncivil people, craftsmen, laborers, or any of “inferiour sort,” the language maker should “follow generally the better brought vp sort, such as the Greekes call [charientes] men ciuill and graciously behauoured and bred” (144). While Shakespearean drama includes characters taken from every one of Puttenham’s excluded categories, it would also be true to say that these characters generally sound more like one another than different in any simple sense. For every line in which an exotic figure like the Jew Shylock sounds strange with his repeated “well,” or every time that a polyglot pedant like Holofernes slips into latinate clauses, or each speech when a “carter” like the Carrier in Henry IV, Part One approaches jargononed incomprehensibility, there are many lines, even from the same characters, that register no clear sign of reified national, vocational, or educational difference in their formal features.54

It is not that Shakespeare does not recognize social differences in speech and demeanor—just remember Hamlet’s encounter with the grave digger—but that his art often puts differentiating elements into odd combinations and encounters. Difference does not disappear, as it comes close to doing in Lyly’s monoglot form, but its elements appear loosened from any too tight tethering to a single typifying individual, location, or valuation; they come to interact in new and surprising ways,
entering into strange combinations and relationships. A few representative examples may suggest both Shakespeare’s awareness of formal differentiation and the plays’ complex instantiations of such differences within broader contexts of interorientation.

In an early play such as Henry VI, Part One (1590?), this simultaneous awareness of speech differentiation and an apparent failure to represent it might seem at first glance, as it has been taken by Robert Y. Turner, to be a measure of the dramatist’s artistic limitations. So, for instance, Joan La Pucelle admonishes her fellow invaders of Rouen to take care how they “place [their] words” if they are to “Talk like the vulgar sort of market men” (1H6 3.2.3–4). Yet when confronted with the sentry’s apparently rustic French challenge—“Qui là?”—her spoken response is “vulgar” only in subject matter, not in form: “Paysans, la pauvre gens de France, / Poor market folks that come to sell their corn” (1H6 3.2.13–15). Nothing in its form suggests awareness of a difference in manner between the speech of the “vulgar sort” and that of anyone else. Elsewhere, however, the same play renders social distinctions in form or manner. For example, the formal lamentation by Sir William Lucy for the dead English hero Talbot, which begins “But where’s the great Alcides of the field” and continues with eleven lines recounting Talbot’s glorious titles (1H6 4.7.60–71), is answered by Joan’s ironic dismissal for its “style”:

Here is a silly, stately style indeed:
The Turk, that two-and-fifty kingdoms hath,
Writes not so tedious a style as this. (1H6 4.7.72–4)

Whatever one’s other allegiances, and it may be assumed from Thomas Nashe’s testimony that the post-Armada London audience would have had strong ties to “brave Talbot,” there is an ironic wittiness in the French commoner’s curt dismissal that is, potentially at least, surprisingly disorienting. Thus, the play turns Lucy’s sad epitaph into an utterance, and in so doing marks it as the rhetorical bearer of ideology rather than as the unmarked bearer of information. His string of titular distinctions appears recast in Joan’s remark as constituting a “style” that is ponderously “stately” and “tedious” in its over-elaboration. Even in this early play, categories of stylistic differentiation become potential matters
of ideological contention and multivalency rather than of simple reified difference: “stately” poetic utterance, even on behalf of English chivalry, is not simply superior to, more credible than, or immune to reevaluation by, a curt common idiom. Joan’s remark turns a patriotic historical monologue into a dialogical encounter of languages common and “stately,” with neither the incontestable winner.

IV

This sort of difficulty is not merely a product of early technical uncertainties. An instance from the late plays suggests a related complexity in the treatment of demeanor and tone of voice. When Cleopatra teases Antony, she recurs to the very “vndecencie” that Puttenham uses to define a “greatly annoy[ing]” “sound or voice”—that is, speaking “with so small and shrill a voice” (265). Cleopatra imagines that “shrill-tongued Fulvia scolds” (AC 1.1.34). This mock has a gendered dimension, of course, but unlike Puttenham who specifies shrillness as unfitting “a man,” Cleopatra’s joke presumes that a “shrill” tongue is objectionable in itself. Whether for men or for women, whether among aristocrats, bureaucrats, or servants, Shakespeare routinely treats a low tone of voice positively, frequently associating such a vocal tonality with other positively evaluated traits like slowness of delivery and stateliness of manner. Even among warriors these formal traits carry an assumed positive value, although the preeminence of low and slow voice appears to be contradicted by an extraordinary historical contingency, which actually proves the general rule. Hotspur’s fast-talking volubility (associated by Puttenham with women and eunuchs [265]) is reported to have briefly inverted normal values by providing a model so imposing that, for a time at least, all “noble youth” practiced his “gait” and style of speaking:

speaking thick, which nature made his blemish,
Became the accents of the valiant,
For those that could speak low and tardily
Would turn their own perfection to abuse
To seem like him. (2H4 2.3.24–28)

In the context of a very different social field, a related notion of “perfection” is assumed when Malvolio imagines his elevation to the status of
great "sir" as demanding "a sad face, a reverend carriage, a slow tongue in the habit of some sir of note" (TN 3.4.74–75). The lower end of this social equation appears in The Rape of Lucrece when the heroine's elevated moral status appears reflected in the vocal refinement of her maid who speaks with a "soft-slow tongue, true mark of modesty" (1220). At the other social extreme, Lear remembers royal Cordelia's epitomizing gendered virtue in a voice "ever soft, / Gentle, and low, an excellent thing in woman" (KL 5.3. 277–78). In such contexts Fulvia's shrillness takes on a fuller social significance. She is not merely an instance of that gendered caricature the "scold," for to be shrill in voice is bad form for anyone in any context. However, when Cleopatra later mocks Antony's second wife, Octavia, the hitherto positive values of slow demeanor and low vocal tone are treated ironically.

A messenger describes Octavia to Cleopatra in terms that relate her exalted station to her grave deportment. Octavia's demeanor approaches that still, statuesque grandeur that some Elizabethans associated with noble Roman constancy:

She creeps:
Her motion and her station are as one.
She shows a body rather than a life,
A statue than a breather. (AC 3.3.19–22)

Instead of accepting the available positive evaluations of the traits embodied in her rival, Cleopatra expresses both personal jealousy and her Egyptian otherness by assessing them negatively. In the Egyptian anti-Rome, values that are otherwise positive may be inverted. Cleopatra treats her rival's grandeur in state and in personal stateliness as summing Octavia's insignificance: "There's nothing in her yet" (AC 3.3.25). Something similar may be observed in Cleopatra's remarks concerning Octavia's voice:

CLEOPATRA Didst hear her speak? Is she shrill-tongued or low?
MESSENGER Madam, I heard her speak. She is low-voiced.
CLEOPATRA That's not so good. He cannot like her long.
CHARMIAN Like her! O Isis! 'tis impossible.
CLEOPATRA I think so, Charmian. Dull of tongue, and dwarfish. (3.3.13–17)

Here there can be no question of an exotic Egyptian context that fails to
recognize the values of Rome since Cleopatra had begun the play by assuming “Roman” values when she mocked Fulvia’s shrill tongue. Now, in a clear reversal of a previously assumed evaluative linkage, Cleopatra, desperately perhaps, implies the superiority of the shrill tongue to the low voice, equating “low-voiced” intonation with limitation, with being “Dull of tongue.”

The simplest explanation for such a reversal would be Cleopatra’s personal insecurity getting the best of her. She would then appear locally inconsistent for understandable reasons, disclaiming what she knew to be true due to jealousy. Yet this individualized explanation would fail to do justice to other instances of value confusion or reversal which demand a broader sense of the possible multivalence of formal traits such as demeanor and tone. Consider the dullness of tongue which functions in Cleopatra’s remark as an assumed negative. Failure in discursive form and resource, dullness of tongue could easily be treated as a stereotypical trait associated with certain groups or social strata. Jokes at the expense of characters like Constable Dull (LLL 4.2) originate in such associations, but it is noble Octavia whom Cleopatra accuses of such a trait, and it is not merely this one spiteful assessment that uncouples verbal dullness from any clear linkage to a particular social stratum. In other works and contexts, including the treatments of Casca in Julius Caesar or Bolingbroke in Richard II, Shakespeare’s treatment of such formal limitations in voice is more complex than any simple equation of standing or vocation with capacity.

Surprisingly, the problems of being tongue-tied, inarticulate, or verbally clumsy are exhibited by characters from one end of the social spectrum to the other. Mechanicals, like the drawer Francis of Henry IV, Part One, are left standing “amazed” (tH4 2.4.79 s.d.) and mocked for their lack of words, but a similar failure is imputed to the otherwise voluble, and by no means mechanical, Hotspur (2.4.98–108). The “mechanical” crowd of Julius Caesar are said to leave the stage “tongue-tied in their guiltiness” (JC 1.1.62); but a similar condition is said to occur in learned upper bourgeois figures such as the “great clerks” who, Theseus says, are reduced to a “tongue-tied simplicity” that causes them to “Make periods in the midst of sentences, / Throttle their practic’d accent in their fears”
(MSND 5.1.96–97). Although, differences of social standing often have a role in such failure, Shakespeare does not render verbal breakdown as the reified attribute of any single group.58

The extent to which Shakespeare associates this problem with emotion, to which difference of standing contributes, as one factor among others, may be illustrated by the noble Roman Lucrece, whose “modest eloquence” fails her from fear:

She puts the period often from his place,
And midst the sentence so her accent breaks
That twice she doth begin ere once she speaks.
(RL 565–67; cf. 1716–20)

Speechlessness due to intense emotion appears famously embodied in the “nothing” of Cordelia’s dramatic response to King Lear, but Shakespeare also represents the vulnerability of those who read or compose verse to verbal collapse, either from overwhelming emotion or from a lack of what Holofernes calls “facility” (LLL 4.2.121), a capacity pointedly distributed by Shakespeare along lines that are not simply determined by status, regional origin, or even by education.59

True, the “rude mechanical” Quince reads his prologue to Pyramus and Thisbe incorrectly, turning attempted compliments into insults by failing to “stand on points”; and in this linguistic failing his reading is said, like the speech performances of many nongentle figures in Elizabethan drama, to represent a failure of “government” (MSND 5.1.118–23). Nevertheless, in the context of Shakespeare’s other works, Quince’s problem appears hardly specific to his standing. Similar difficulties vex the learned and gentle figures in Love’s Labor’s Lost when Nathaniel the would-be scholar attempts to read the sonnet of gentle Berowne or in As You Like It when the unlearned but gentle Orlando tries to pen his own sonnets. Nathaniel is criticized by the arch-pedant Holofernes for failing to mark the accent—“You find not the apostrophus, and so miss the accent” (LLL 4.2.118–19)—and Orlando’s lines have, according to Rosalind, “more feet than the verses would bear” (AYLI 3.2.163–64). The speaker of Sonnet 85 attests to the depth of his emotion by proclaiming ineptitude, writing elegantly about the failings of his verses, calling his inspiration “My tongue-tied Muse,” and claim-
ing to be reduced by love to the silence of “dumb thoughts.” All this by no means qualifies the claim that Shakespearean drama is usefully understood in terms of Bakhtinian utterance, which is social through and through, nor does it deny the claim of Vološinov that social implications are inevitably conveyed by form. The cases of two highly voluble characters—Marlowe’s Barabas and Shakespeare’s Aaron—are instructive.

Titus Andronicus and The Jew of Malta share villainous characters who deliver grand Tamburlainean speeches. Aaron the Moor’s praise of Tamora and of his own prowess as her lover hits the note of Tamburlainean aspiration, replete with the characteristic metaphors and uses:

Now climbeth Tamora Olympus’ top,
Safe out of fortune’s shot, and sits aloft,
Secure of thunder’s crack or lightning flash,
Advanced above pale envy’s threatening reach. (TA 2.1.1–4)

Barabas the Jew’s similarly extravagant opening lines praise his own prowess in heaping up wealth and world-dominating power: “Thus trowls our fortune in by land and sea, / And thus are we on every side enriched” (Jew of Malta 1.1.102–3). This similar stylistic key-signature is not, as in Lyly or as it sometimes is in Marlowe, a signal of an imposed authorial homogeneity of voice in characters, their values, and their utterances. Both plays exhibit pervasive alliances and divisions that reach down into the language, the behavior, and thoughts of the characters themselves. These combinatory and divisive factors render any stylistic overlap or opposition subject to qualification by its part in a grotesque seriocomic dramaturgy with multiple, unsettling implications. Both plays complicate things primarily by a discomfiting resemblance in actions and values between groups that ought to be strictly opposed according to prevailing sixteenth-century thinking. Marlowe constructs a Christianity that mirrors the greed and exploitative hypocrisy conventionally attributed to Jews; Shakespeare implicates “noble” Romans in the “barbarous” cruelty that they attribute to non-Romans.

These complex situations exemplify a dramaturgy that deserves to be contrasted with the monological homogenization of discourses and ideological orientations in Lyly’s barber jokes. For instance, when Marlowe’s Barabas speaks with Lodowick, whom he hates as the son of
the governor who has expropriated Barabas's property on the unjust yet historically traditional Christian grounds of Jewish racial guilt, Barabas mirrors his Christian oppressors in ostensibly flattering while actually threatening an interlocutor he finds physically offensive; but his speech also offers grotesque comment on one conventional sign of difference between Jew and Christian:

lodowick Barabas, thou know'st I am the Governor's son.

barabas I would you were his father too, sir, that's all the harm I wish you. (The slave looks like a hog's cheek new singed.) (2.3.40–43)

In exchanges like this, Marlowe constructs a dramatic territory in which Jewish habits and uses are alternately demonized according to available stereotypes or enlisted in order to relativize Christian illusions of superiority. There is no question of the two interlocutors here speaking a unified language as do Lyly's clowns and kings, for even when they use mutually comprehensible words, there is a great divide in how they use them. Lodowick's seemingly straightforward announcement of identity typifies the condescending privilege the Christians assume in their dealings with Barabas. While for his part, not only does Barabas's genealogical wish betray his desire to destroy Lodowick's entire line, but he bestializes the cultural badge of Christian clean-shaving, likening the preening Lodowick to the singed beast that Jews find ritually distasteful. Furthermore, in its physical context, Barabas's line employs an epithet that also reminds the audience of the un-Christlike but historically Christian practice of slave-trading, as the two of them, alike buyers of flesh, stand exchanging compliments in the market of slaves. In a drama that is among the first to exploit the aside to register actual social division amid apparent expressions of unanimity, Marlowe traces the lines by which one side is both like and different from the other. As the grotesque nature of Barabas's simile suggests, however, in and with such calibrated interlocution, whereby the play suggests the arbitrary nature of established cultural divisions, there are mixed wilder farce and anarchic playfulness, even a reveling in the reification of values and oppositions otherwise exposed as factitious. Thus, it is notoriously hard to pin Marlowe down as simply anti-Christian or anti-Semitic. In this ambi-

61
ous quality, the play suggests the odd mixture of sophisticated cultural critique and diverse grotesque energies in Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus*.

When Aaron confesses having incited the Goths to rape and mutilate Roman Lavinia, Shakespeare’s barbering images are, like Marlowe’s own, at once pointed and farcical:

**Aaron**

They cut thy sister’s tongue, and ravished her  
And cut her hands, and trimmed her as thou sawest.

**Lucius**

O detestable villain! Call’st thou that trimming?

**Aaron**

Why, she was washed and cut and trimmed, and ‘twas  
Trim sport for them which had the doing of it.

**Lucius**

O barbarous, beastly villains, like thyself!

**Aaron**

Indeed, I was their tutor to instruct them. (*TA* 5.1.92–98)

Although there is a pun here on a slang sense of “trim” meaning to know sexually, the more pointed part of this exchange is that the metaphoric terminology treating bodily mutilation as a value neutral form of trimming—a usage which the Roman Lucius takes for the most egregious expression of cruel, alien insensitivity—first enters the play in the words of Lucius himself. In the first act, Rome’s harshness to its enemies is manifested through Lucius’s command to mutilate and slay one of the Goth prisoners: “Away with him! And make a fire straight, / And with our swords, upon a pile of wood, / Let’s hew his limbs till they be clean consumed” (*TA* 1.1.127–29). This callous pronouncement, which is followed by Lucius’s triumphant announcement that “Alarbus’ limbs are lopped” (*TA* 1.1.143), is denounced by the Goths with the very term Lucius later uses for Aaron’s remarks—“barbarous” (*TA* 1.1.131). What is different, however, is as striking as the resemblance. His tone of righteousness signals that Lucius, like the Romans generally, never loses the conviction of rectitude and of an absolute difference separating Roman from Goth, while Aaron’s voice, by contrast, reveals an awareness of the barbarity lodged in Roman civilization and religion. In the mouth of the outsider, invocation of the same Roman values of civilized decorum and learning turns them into hollow terms fraught with derision. The similarity of terms or the formal proximity and density of metaphors do not simply register the style of the dramatist, but point to the place of
style and usage as arenas of conflict and division, even self-division, within the play world.

At moments such as these, when Barabas or Aaron get hold of them, words and values that virtually go without saying as native to Christianity or to classically derived humanism acquire, through the form and situation of their instantiation, the force of alien, or alienated, utterances. What they “mean” cannot be separated from either how they are articulated or from circumstances of their embodiment and reception, from their “themes” in the Bakhtinian sense. Those circumstances, furthermore, necessarily involve the relationships of the larger work of art to its own contexts of utterance. In this case such circumstances should include related developments in nondramatic writing, for whether one looks to prose or lyric in the period of the 1590s one finds striking connections to the forces evident in Titus and The Jew of Malta.

V

In 1593 George Peele’s “The Honour of the Garter” pays Sir John Harington a measured compliment for his vocabulary: “And Harrington well letter’d and discreet, / That hath so purely naturalized / Strange words, and made them all free-denyzons.” Although there is irony in praising the polyvocality of someone who elsewhere treats polyglot women in terms resembling those in Lingua, Peele praises Harington’s learned, “discreet” naturalization of unusual or foreign terms, assimilating strange elements into a common tongue that he and Peele are assumed to share. However, other writers of this period develop a mode of discourse that aggressively challenges the capacity of any single form of written English to absorb diverse terms and uses. While some of these writers display signs of being “well letter’d” in the breadth of their references, they are anything but “discreet” in employing strange terms, and the form of their usage is anything but a naturalizing assimilation for responsible citizenship. I think of the Marprelate controversialists, and especially of Thomas Nashe, but the complexity of their utterances may be perhaps better approached by way of two contemporaries, John Donne and John Eliot, who share with Nashe the distinction of being readers of Rabelais. While all three had written works bearing on the
topic of heterogeneal utterance before the publication of Richard II in 1597, two of them, Nashe and Eliot, also appear to have been read by Shakespeare by that time.

Donne’s first four Satires, probably written between 1593 and 1597, comment on the sociolinguistic situation of the early 1590s. Both poetry and nonaesthetic discourse are said to exhibit similarly marked heteroglot tendencies. In particular Satire II (1594?) and Satire IV (1597?) comment on a trend toward pronounced heteroglot form.

The speaker of Satire IV scorns a “Makeron” for his pretension to outdo Panurge, the Apostles, and Calepine’s Dictionary as history’s “best linguist” (53). While his macaronic utterance draws phrases from several distinct languages, it amounts finally to “one language” comprised of pieces and accents from “all tongues,” domestic and foreign. In a telling pun, the one who embodies this portmanteau language is said to have “travail’d” widely, learning of all “States,” a description which might refer to his exposure to the phrases and accents of different occupations and social strata and to those of different geographic locations:

This thing hath travail’d, and saith, speaks all tongues,
And only know’th what to all States belongs;
Made of th’ Accents, and best phrase of all these,
He speaks one language; If strange meats displease,
Art can deceive, or hunger force my tast,
But Pedants motley tongue, souldiers bumbast,
Mountebankes drugtongue, nor the termes of law
Are strong enough preparatives, to draw
Me to beare this: yet I must be content
With his tongue, in his tongue, call’d complement. (35–44)

The all-inclusive speech of the satirized figure more offends the speaker than any specialized jargon of soldiering, pharmacy, or law, its pretentious eclecticism surpassing pedantry’s “motley tongue” for offensiveness. The Makeron’s language, termed “complement,” offends by its pretense to a knowing inclusiveness of accents, phrases, and jargons that renders any determinate English idiom and its speakers merely mechanical and coarse by contrast: “base, Mechanique, coarse, / So’are all your Englishmen in their discourse” (81–82). That is, as the poem looks down on the pedant, soldier, pharmacist, and lawyer for their discursive limi-
tations, the Makeron's heterogeneal usage condescends toward the poet himself. The poem attacks the Makeron by associating his idiom with courtly compliment which is, as Jaques or the Bastard of *King John* concur, an easy target for moralizing. However, given that Donne’s own vocabulary and phrasing are eclectic, even macaronic, there is a conflict inherent in this attack on heterogeneal utterance. *Satire II* locates this conflict on the border between poetry and practical discourse.

Speaking as their professed enemy, the speaker of *Satire II* nevertheless pities the desperate state of poets. Adopting phrases from contemporary polemic against poetry and theater, he observes archly that even “Though Poëtry indeed be such a sinne / As I thinke that brings dearths, and Spaniards in” (5–6), poets themselves are pitiable. They are divided into those who write for the stage, giving “ideot actors meanes”; those who write old-fashioned love poetry; those who flatter “rewards to get”; those who write “because all write”; and “worst of all,” those who plagiarize (5–30). Although he hates them all, the speaker turns his wrath from them because their futile pursuits “punish themselves.” The real object of his hatred is Coscus, who combines the linguistic attributes of poet with those of lover and lawyer:

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a Lawyer, which was (alas) of late
But scarce Poët; jollier of this state,
Then are new benefic’d ministers, he throwes
Like nets, or lime-twigs, wheresoere he goes,
His title’of Barrister, on every wench,
And wooes in language of the Pleas, and Bench:
‘A motion, Lady.’ ‘Speake Coscus.’ ‘I have beene
In love, ever since *tricesimo* of the Queene,
Continuall claims I have made, injunctions got
To stay my rivals suit, that hee should not
Proceed.’ ‘Spare mee.’ ‘In Hilary terme I went,
You said, If I returne next size in Lent,
I should be in remitter of your grace;
In th’interim my letters should take place
Of affidavits—’: words, words, which would teare
The tender labyrinth of a soft maids eare. (43–58)
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Immediate topicality heightens Donne’s parody, for “Intermix[ing]” discourses from law (remitter, continual claims, affidavits) and love (grace, rivals suit) is a response to contemporary usage.

For example, the anonymous sonnet sequence Zepheria (1594) uses the name Coscus and employs obscure neologisms, especially conceits from legal discourse. Canzon 37 begins:

When last mine eyes dislodged from thy beautie,
Though serud with proces of a parents writ,
A Supersedeas countermanding dutie
Euen then I saw vpon thy smiles to sit.69

Canzon 20 develops such conceits to greater length:

How often hath my pen mine hearts solicitour
Instructed thee in breuiat of my case?
While fancie pleading eyes (thy beauties visitour)
Haue patternd to my quill an angels face.
How haue my Sonnets (faithfull counsellers)
Thee without ceasing mou’d for day of hearing?
While they my plaintiue cause (my faiths reuealers)
Thy long delay, my patience in thine eare-ring.
How haue I stood at barre of thine owne conscience?
When in requesting court my suite I brought.
How haue thy long adiournments slow’d the sentence,
Which I through much expense of teares besought?
Through many difficulties haue I run,
Ah sooner wert thou lost (I wis) then wonne.70

Seen in this linguistic context, Donne’s Satire II mocks a contemporary polyglot aesthetic by embodying its style in a concrete situation.71 The lover asking permission to speak with the courtroom formula “A motion, Lady” is funny enough to be appreciated as a put down. But Donne also adds the narrator’s commentary—“words, words, which would teare / The tender labyrinth of a soft maids eare”—as if the object of disapproval were not clear from the reported speech itself. The presence of this second-order discourse of authorial commentary suggests the poet’s uncertainty whether even his coterie audience, let alone a broader public, would recognize his parody for parody or would perceive the
object of parody to be polyglot discourse. The possibility of such uncertainty is significant in determining the themes of Donne's utterance.

Contemporary evidence suggests that the use of specialized terms and diverse accents and phrasings, whether in aesthetic or practical utterances, was subject to evaluation according to the various contexts in which such utterances appeared. On the one hand, it may have gone without saying that a witty sonneteer might employ the jargons of the day to praise his love, with no restraint but the limits of his copious invention. The author of *Zepheria* must have thought this to be the case. On the other hand, incorporating professional discourses into verse might occasion mockery. Canzon 20 of *Zepheria* is mocked in John Davies's *Gullinge Sonnets* (1597):

My case is this, I love Zepheria brighte.
Of her I hold my harte by fealtye
Which I discharge to her perpetuallye,
Yet she thereof will never me accquite.
For now supposinge I withhold her righte
She hathe distrein'de my harte to satisfie
The duty which I never did denye,
And far away impounds it with despite.72

Is it easy to identify this as parodic? Would its form alone characterize Davies's poem as "Gullinge"?73 The genre of love lyric, like the recently invigorated erotic epyllion, had by the 1590s established an ambivalence about itself, an uneasiness about its generic demands that is registered in self-consciousness about its typical verbal and emotional excesses. The edge of self-mockery, as sonnet sequences from Sidney to Shakespeare reveal, pervades the lyrical voice of the period. Moreover, value conflicts occurring in an explicitly polyglot medium are not confined to verse but are vigorously thematized by prose writers like Eliot and Nashe.

In the prefatory material to *Ortho-Epia Gallica* (1593), John Eliot employs a style that anticipates the multilingual style of *Lingua* and that would have won Donne's disapprobation:

So with a gentle Beso las manos, the Petite accollade, and with the Courtesan clip clasping you fast by the buttockes, I pray the God Aesculapius patron of
Phisitians, Mercurie the God of cunning, and Dis the father of French crownes, in santy long time to conserue your Signiories, that you may haue as faire a life in this world, as had the goodly and wise Philosopher Epictetus, who did all his life time but take his easess. 

Eliot runs English together with phrases and vocabulary from Spanish, French and other European languages; however, as this passage illustrates, he also includes phrases and coinages from different social strata and groups, and refuses to keep them decorously separated. The author's utterance combines the “Courtesan clip,” apparently an obscene gesture embracing the buttocks (parodying an exaggerated contemporary greeting), with a refined “gentle” kissing of hands. Evocations of goodliness and wisdom furnish praises for the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who is also said, however, to have exemplified these moral virtues in a life of “eases.” Ostensibly learned references to mythology connect with phrases concerning currency (French crowns) in a notorious pun on money and venereal disease. A grand name for aged authority or an extensive estate, “Signiories,” alliterates with the rustic “santy.” Praise for material well-being in money, estate, and health (“santy” puns on the French for “health” and on “sanctity”) accompanies the wish that the reader might enjoy as “faire a life” as the philosopher who was famous for principled indifference to material circumstances. This mixing of styles, levels of diction, and values deserves attention in light of Eliot’s stated authorial purpose.

Against imputations that compiling his dictionary amounts to loitering, Eliot defines writing the Ortho-Epia Gallica as a special labor: “by the worke of my pen and inke, [I] haue dezinkhornisistibulated a fantastical Rapsody of dialogisme” (A3v). In their narrowest sense these terms define his project as a nontechnical compilation of miscellaneous dialogue exchanges. That would be the dictionary meaning of the terms. But the manner in which he characterizes his undertaking locates his verbal usage in other, broader contexts of discursive and ideological innovation that speak to recognized practices in the early 1590s. He shows an awareness that his words have themes as well as meanings. As his sentence suggests and as the rest of his prefatory material verifies, Eliot’s verbal medium does not simply deploy defined national languages nor keep different social levels of usage distinct. His “skew” lan-
language exemplifies in exaggerated form an awareness of the interanima-
tion of socially heteroglot discourses within a single language.

His terms—“inkhorn,” “rhapsody,” and “dialogism”—are technically
specific. “Inkhorn” denotes overly bookish vocabulary, such as, Putten-
ham suggests, “Irreucoble, irradiation, depopulation and such like . . .
which . . . were long time desipred for inkehorne termes.” “Rhapsody”
refers to a cross-generic stylistic tendency toward heterogeneous inclu-
siveness in content, style, and organization. By contrast dialogism or
Dialogismus, according to Puttenham, is a “manner of speech” demand-
ing proper discriminations of what is verbally “fit and naturall.” In pas-
sages that clash with his recourse to concrete specifics of utterance,
Puttenham defines dialogism as exercise of the quintessential form of
right reason in differentiating speakers and actors according to social
type. In the figure of “Dialogismus, or the right reasoner,” the writer or
speaker reports:

some speech from another mans mouth, as what a king said to his priuy coun-
sell or subiect, a captaine to his souldier, a souldiar to his captaine, a man to a
woman, and contrariwise: in which report we must alwaies geue to euery per-
son his fit and naturall, & that which best becommeth him. For that speech
becommeth a king which doth not a carter, and a young man that doeth not
an old: and so in euery sort and degree. Virgil speaking in the person of Eneas,
Turnus and many other great Princes, and sometimes of meaneer men, ye shall
see what decencie euery of their speeches holdeth with the qualitie, degree, and
yeares of the speaker. (235)

Eliot’s own dialogism violates exactly these restraints of “decencie” and
decorum that should differentiate usage according to social type. And he
does not violate these strictures quietly, in a uniformly imposed style the
way Lyly does. The designation of his dialogism as “dezinkhornisistibulated” compactly exemplifies the violently disruptive tendency in his
prose. His “fantasticall” neologism suggests a style that does not merely
represent other languages from the outside, as Donne represents Coscus,
but that enacts a pointed interanimation among identifiable styles and
usages, which meet one another in the same utterance. Thus, Eliot’s
defensive authorial voice poses him as a hard worker, rejecting bookish
vocabulary while using a term that exaggerates bookishness to ridiculous
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self-parody. His pompous evocation of classical and mythological references culminates in joking associations of author and readers with lechery, rusticity, mock-deference, and lazy ease.

To what end? The complex interplay of identifiable group-specific values, discourses, and forms of voicing in a work such as Eliot’s is hardly conceivable as inadvertent, as such combinations might seem to be in Puttenham’s own worried prose concerning Flamock and Henry VIII. Yet the combinations are too various and volatile to be simply satiric.79 Eliot is not merely rejecting learning, status, labor, or gentle manners and speech. As far as decorum goes, the way he uses “Heterogeneall” languages mocks both Donne’s assumption that a lover should eschew the language of the lawyer and Puttenham’s classical demand for differentiating utterances according to “sort and degree” or the “qualitie, degree, and yeares of the speaker.” Instead, the values and discourses assumed to be “naturall” among widely divergent speech communities and social classes are brought into odd conjunctions. This conjoining does not constitute a simple instance of copia, either, since Eliot’s utterance does not reiterate itself, making a single point in different terms. Nor does it resemble Lyly’s euphuism in carefully deploying the same stylistic fund of figures, checks, balances, and periods among widely various speakers. It does nothing to hide, indeed, it exaggerates misalignments, conflicts of interest and allegiance, among the various examples, instances, and uses that it embodies or evokes. If anything, such usage seems, in the terminology of Russian Formalism, to defamiliarize boundaries that might otherwise go without saying.80 In these features, Eliot’s prose shows relationships to that of Thomas Nashe.

Nashe explores the linguistic territory of intersecting “heterogeneall languages,” and his “dialogism” is complex in the extreme. It may be true, as John Carey says, that Nashe had “few imitators and no successors,” and that no one—with the possible exceptions of Jonson and, to a lesser degree, Shakespeare—really develops the full implications of his stylistic explorations; nevertheless, his prose style represents a highly wrought development of more general trends.81 From 1589 through the mid 1590s, he plays a part in the important developments occurring in prose: as an anonymous combatant enlisted in the Martin Marprelate
controversies, then as a visible protagonist in the Nashe–Harvey quarrels, and simultaneously as a culture critic and novelist in his own right. Although his targets differ in his controversial writings, Nashe’s basic tactics, whether attacking the antiecclesiastical Martinists or the learned Harvey, are largely the same: he performs something like a close reading, interspersing critical assessments with parodic exemplifications of the discourse, tonality, and characteristic gestures of his adversaries.

The anonymous *An Almond for a Parrat* (1590) mocks its adversary’s epithets, plodding style, and faulty arguments, as “inkehorne stuffe . . . vttered in a iarring stile” and “trashe [conveyed] to our eares by a daintie figure of *idem per idem,*” before proclaiming, “I shall run my penne out of breath, if I articulate all the examples of their absurdeties that I could” (3:373). Parodic invective replaces dull critical exposition. The narrator likens himself to Phebus, “the discouerer of Mars & Venus adultery,” for having caught Martin in a “net where he daunceth,” and then taunts him by revealing his concealed identity:

Blush, squint-eied caitife, since thy couert no more wil containe thee. *Caelum te contegit, non babes vrnam.* Therfore let al posteritie that shall heare of his knauerie attend the discouery which now I will make of his villainie. *Pen., I. Pen.,* welch *Pen., Pen.* the Protestationer, Demonstrationer, Supplicationer, Appellationer, *Pen.* the father, *Pen.* the sonne, *Pen. Martin Iunior, Martin Martinus,* *Pen.* the scholler of Oxford to his friend in Cambridge, *Pen. totum in toto,* & *totum in qualibet parte,* was sometimes (if I be not deceiued) a scholler of that house in Cambridge whereof D. *Per.* was maister. (3:365)

This passage mixes Latin, latinate usage, English high and colloquial language, pompous address to “al posteritie” with such downright affronts as “Blush, squint-eied caitife,” parodic echo (quoting Martin’s own self-characterization as “the scholler of Oxford to his friend in Cambridge”), national association (the “welch *Pen.*”), finely-sliced theological faction (“the Protestationer, Demonstrationer, Supplicationer, Appellationer”), and truncated mock-liturgy (“*Pen.* the father, *Pen.* the sonne”). In all, this passage displays the stylistic volatility that made the prose of Nashe and the other controversialists a source of unease, even for their employers or for those who believed themselves in sympathy. In the context of a concern about what William Perkins’s often reprinted treatise of 1593 calls “the abuse of the tongue among all sorts and degrees
of men everywhere” in “swearing, blaspheming, chiding, quarreling, contending, jesting, mocking, flattering, lying, dissembling, vain and idle talking,” this style threatens violence in and of itself.footnote{83}

It is important to note the role of poetry and the ideological properties of the poetic in Nashe’s work, as well as the complicated presence of sociolinguistic hierarchy and division in its multilingualism. Understanding Nashe may help one locate Richard II, and especially its lyricism, in the context of utterance.

VII

Although Nashe is best known for innovative prose, two of his poems embedded in The Unfortunate Traveler share with John of Gaunt’s praise of England in Richard II the distinction of being anthologized in Englands Parnassus.footnote{84} As Lorna Hutson points out, taken out of context Nashe’s lyrics appear to be conventional love poems, while in context, they are images of lyric form itself rendered ambiguous, “giving readers a sly glimpse of the farcical social operations of exalted literary discourse.”footnote{85} The second poem in particular is clearly compromised by the exaggerations of the narrator’s introduction. This preamble suggests that the verses convey, as indeed Gaunt’s England speech also conveys, a particular social-behavioral ideology that betrays its own limitations even within its self-articulation. This poem that Nashe has Surrey address to his lady’s birthplace is introduced by Jack Wilton’s account of restraining Surrey from ridiculous utterance: “hee was so impassioned that in the open street, but for me, he would haue made an oration in prayse of it” (2:270):

O, but when hee came to the chamber where his Geraldines cleere Sunbeames first thrust themselves into this cloud of flesh, and acquainted mortalitie with the purity of Angels, then did his mouth ouerflow with magnificats, his tong thrust the starres out of heauen, and eclipsed the Sun and Moone with comparissons; Geraldine was the soule of heauen, sole daughter and heir to primus motor. The alcumie of his eloquence, out of the incomprehensible drossie matter of cloudes and aire distilled no more quintescence than would make his Geraldine compleat faire. In prayse of the chamber that was so illuminatiuely honored with her radiant conception, he penned this sonet. (2:270)

The sonnet continues the language of religious adoration in this passage’s references to “magnificats” and angelic “purity” by offering Surrey’s
professions that “Prostrate, as holy ground Ile worship thee” and “Our Ladies chappell henceforth be thou namd.” There may be a clash of religious and amorous discourses in “soule of heauen, sole daughter and heir,” yet such combinations, like the conceits of “alcumie” and “drossie matter,” would not offend against contemporary standards of verse or even, in some cases such as Essex’s effusions to the Queen, of address. Its inclusion in England’s Parnassus attests that there is nothing inherently ridiculous about the sonnet that Nashe writes for Surrey:

Faire roome, the presence of sweet beauties pride,
The place the Sunne vpon the earth did hold,
When Phaeton his chariot did misguide,
The towre where Ioue raund downe himselfe in golde,
Prostrate, as holy ground Ile worship thee;
Our Ladies chappell henceforth be thou namd;
Here first loues Queene put on mortalitie,
And with her beautie all the world inflamd.
Heauens chambers harboring fierie cherubines,
Are not with thee in glorie to compare;
Lightning it is, not light, which in thee shines,
None enter thee but straight intranced are.
O, if Elizium be aboue the ground,
Then here it is, where nought but ioy is found. (2:270)

It is only the contextualization of its sonneteering language by Surrey’s behavior that exposes the ideological bases of that language. In one sense, Nashe’s contextualization develops a potential already there in the first published English lyric: Tottels Miscellany printed poems with suggestions of occasion such as “a song written by the earle of Surrey by [sic] a lady that refused to daunce with him.” But by putting the poem’s own language into proximate interrelation with contextualizing languages, Nashe’s treatment of the sonnet makes it more nearly resemble a concrete everyday utterance. This is territory Shakespeare’s poetic drama explores in the same period. Romeo and Juliet and Richard II meld lyric forms, including sonnets, into dramatic situations that explore the socio-ideological dimensions of those poetic forms.

As if the point were not clear enough, Surrey’s further poetic utterances concerning his beloved betray a more striking heterogeneity. He
carves in the glass of the chamber an extremely worldly line from Ovid’s *Amores* that clashes with the spiritualizing sentiments and language of his sonnet: “*Dulce puella malum est*” (A girl is a sweet evil). Immediately following this invocation of the language of classical libertinism, however, Surrey switches to the behavior and language of chivalric romance: “he published a proud challenge in the Duke of Florence court against all commers, (whether Christians, Turkes, Iewes, or Saracens,) in defence of his *Geraldines* beautie” (2:271). His romantic aestheticism is further literalized in his “intermixed” armor:

His armour was all intermixed with lillyes and roses, and the bases thereof bordered with nettles and weeds, signifieing stings, crosses and ouergrowing incumberances in his loue; his helmet round proportioned lyke a gardeners water-pot, from which seemed to issue forth small thrids of water, like citterne strings, that not onely did moisten the lyllyes and roses, but did fructifie as well the nettles and weeds, and made them ouergrow theyr liege Lords. Whereby he did import thus much, that the teares that issued from his braines, as those arteficial distillations issued from the well counterfeit water-pot on his head, watered and gaue lyfe as well to his mistres disdaine (resembled to nettles and weeds) as increase of glorie to her care-causing beauty (comprehended vnder the lillies and roses). (2:271–72)

The target and means of such mockery differ from those of contemporary polemic directed against sonnet and elegy such as Guilpin’s *Skialethia* (Satire I), for, as Hutson points out, instead of denouncing a target, “the absurdity that is already latent in fashionable or officially authoritative discourse is merely helped into prominence by being stylized as gesture, a mock version of itself.” It is also important to note the formal device of mirroring elements that Nashe uses throughout *The Unfortunate Traveler* and that Shakespeare gives prominence in *Richard II*, as well as Nashe’s peculiar treatment of authority in language.

The exaggerated mock armor of Surrey does not merely disparage chivalric affectation because the effect of the description is complicated by its resemblance to two other descriptive evocations in the same work—the famous description of John Leiden and Jack Wilton’s description of himself. John Leiden is described by Nashe:

flourishing entred *John Leiden* the Botcher into the field, with a scarffe made of lysts like a bow-case, a crosse on hys breast like a thred bottome, a round
The point of this armor, like that of Surrey’s own, lies in its “all intermixed” nature, although the mixture is different. Surrey’s armor shows exaggerated refinement of poetic significance in a ridiculous stylization of otherwise functional elements, turning a fine helmet into a “gardeners water-pot”; John Leiden’s accoutrements show the carnivalesque principle of “the bottome turnd vpwards.” The functional tools of trades become aspiring and ultimately ineffective would-be martial weapons. The formal parallels of the two passages suggest satiric complementarity, making fun of both ends of the social spectrum. Surrey lamely aspires to spiritual elevation; the commoners aspire to a similarly unattainable social distinction. However, the evenhandedness of these parallels is at odds with other aspects of Nashe’s narrative, which alternately qualify the narrator’s own position by including him among the caricatures or extol the authority of Surrey as poet militant over John Leiden, Anabaptist leader of “Dunsticall” laborers.

Despite his punning claim to “signiorie ouer the Pages” of the novel as of the court, Jack Wilton’s description is an “intermixed” compendium that formally resembles those of Surrey and Leiden, who embody the extreme upper and lower social and discursive strata in the novel:

For your instruction and godly consolation, bee informed, that at that time I was no common squire, no vndertrODDEN torch-bearer; I had my feather in my cap as big as a flag in the fore-top; my French dublet geltle in the bellie as though (like a pig readie to be spitted) all my guts had been pluckt out; a paire of side paneed hose that hung downe like two scales filled with Holland cheeses; my longe stock that sate close to my docke, and smoothered not a scab or a leacherous hairie sinew on the calfe of the legge; my rapier pendant like a round sticke fastned in the tacklings for skippers the better to climbe by; my cape cloake of blacke cloth, ouerspreading my backe like a thorne-backe, or an Elephantes care, that hanges on his shoulders like a countrie huswiues banskin, which she thirles hir spindle on, & in consummation of my curiositie, my hands without glooues, all a more French, and a blacke budge edging of a
beard on the vpper lip, & the like sable auglet of excrements in the rising of the ankle of my chinne. I was the first that brought in the order of passing into the Court which I deriued from the common word Qui passa and the Heralds phrase of armes Passant, thinking in sinceritie he was not a Gentleman, nor his armes currant, who was not first past by the Pages. (2:227)

The narrator himself is grotesquely composed of the importations—physical, linguistic, and behavioral—that are customarily reified during this period in the stereotype of the traveler. He is a “mingle-mangle” of ill-joined objects and usages that are both nationally foreign and socially foreign to the courtly world he joins, and his own angle of vision displays obvious limitations. He jests with languages of religious edification and social distinction, offering an account of himself for “instruction and godly consolation” and proclaiming himself, although a mere page, superior by reason of his mock sophistication to the “common squire.” His judgment is affected to the point of “curiositie,” and part of his affectation is that, “in sinceritie,” he believes pages to be the proper judges of gentility. It is such as he who “first . . . brought in” the behaviors and the phrases borrowed from foreign tongues and specialized discourses that are denounced by Donne and others for turning England into a gallimaufry.

Such a formal parallel, which puts the narrator on a plane with the characters of whom he writes, is at the heart of what Bakhtin finds interesting about the novel as a form, and novelization as a process affecting other literary forms, in which voices and ideologies, otherwise stratified or separated, can engage and interpenetrate one another in intimate struggle. But what interests Bakhtin particularly about novelistic polyphony is the degree to which authorial ideology resists and gets caught up in the adversarial struggles, the alliances, and misalliances that constitute the novelistic form. In this context, it is striking that the same Jack Wilton who appears at such moments to be, like the other characters, subject to authorial scrutiny will also be granted moments in which his language and values carry enormous cultural and social authority. While it may seem that the two ends of the social scale embodied in John Leiden and Surrey mirror one another in representing inverted forms of ridiculousness, elsewhere Jack sounds like Nashe himself in
lauding the poetic vocation in terms that oppose good to evil, aesthetic virtue to mechanical limitation:

If there bee anie sparke of Adams Paradized perfection yet embert vp in the breastes of mortall men, certailie God hath bestowed that his perfectest image on Poets. None come so neere to God in wit, none more contenme the world, \textit{vatis aaurus non temere est animus}, sayth Horace, \textit{versus amat, hoc studet vnnum}; Seldom haue you seene anie Poet possessed with auarice, only verses he loues, nothing else he delights in: and as they contenme the world, so contrarilie of the mechanickall world are none more contenmed. Despised they are of the worlde, because they are not of the world: their thoughts are exalted aboue the worlde of ignorance and all earthly conceits. (2:242)

This passage assumes that the poet truly is the divine image and that the “mechanical,” like John Leiden, belongs to the material “world” that opposes poetic spirituality. This evaluation betrays none of Jack Wilton’s bumptiousness and self-limitation in form or content, and it is articulated in language that carries enormous, if embattled, cultural and social prestige. Yet the force of Nashe’s formal parallels equating poet, mechanical, and narrator suggests that the narrator’s evaluations cannot be simply taken for the sole truth, even when they are supported by divine invocation and Horatian Latin. In fact, soon after these exalted praises for the poet, Surrey violates their very terms and does so in their own idiom, employing the same language as the narrator, but in unwittingly self-parodic form:

Ah, quoth he, my little Page, full little canst thou perceiue howe farre Meta-morphozed I am from my selfe, since I last saw thee. There is a little God called Loue, that will not bee worship of anie leaden braines; one that proclaimes himselfe sole King and Emperour of pearcing eyes, and cheef Soueraigne of soft hearts; hee it is that, exercising his Empire in my eyes, hath exorsized and cleane coniured me from my content. (2:243).

Surrey maintains Wilton’s contrast between “earthlie conceits” and divine exaltation, but instead of speaking about God and transforming spiritual inspiration, he names the source of his inspiration as “a little God called Loue” who has “metamorphozed” him. This Ovidian trivializing continues in Surrey’s further admission that poetry is only his “second Mistris” (2:244); it is a woman who has actually transformed him.
In fact, as Jack Wilton later sees, ultimately pride in his own sensibility and its superiority to that of “leaden braines” animates Surrey: “I perswade my self he was more in loue with his own curious forming fancie than her face; and truth it is, many become passionate louers onely to winne praise to theyr wits” (2:262). Here Jack’s language is adopted from a contemporary antipoetry discourse that Puttenham struggles against.90

Given the self-exposing nature of such moments, Lorna Hutson’s Bakhtinian account of Nashe’s “festive” writing makes sense. Hutson rightly points out the degree to which Nashe unsettles the stability of the languages and values he invokes, so that his writing, “far from being the vehicle of one histrionic personal voice,” is “a parodic medium of dozens of public voices. Accentuating the properties and revealing the strategies of these public voices, Nashe’s writing celebrates the dispersal of their discursive authority.”91 Hutson does not quite do justice to the fact that in works like *Pierce Pennilesse* (1592) or the Preface to Sidney’s *Arcadia* (1591) Nashe celebrates precisely the timeless discursive authority of certain poets and writers: Sidney, Nicholas Bacon, Thomas More, and Chaucer are termed “chiefe pillers of our english speech” (1:193–94), and Sidney is said to reign “in *Hermes* place, sole *prolocutor* to the Gods” (3:331). Furthermore, readers like Michael Drayton apparently took seriously the praise of Surrey and of the poetic gift he embodies in *The Unfortunate Traveler* without noting its irony.92 Nashe’s relation to authority is more complex than a festive model allows, even with Hutson’s proviso that each work must be approached individually. Then, too, there is also the relation of Nashe’s languages to social division and hierarchy to consider.

Pierce answers attacks on the “Poets of our time” (i.e., August 1592 according to the *Stationers’ Register*) by praising the “fruites . . . wherein they are able to proue themselues necessary to the state” (1:193), and he cites the inadequacies of poetry’s enemies. Poetry encourages virtue and discourages vice, but Pierce also claims that poetry can elevate the general level of discourse. Poets “haue cleansed our language from barbarisme and made the vulgar sort here in *London* (which is the fountaine whose riuers flowe round about *England*) to aspire to a richer puritie of speach, than is communicated with the Comminaltie of any Nation.
vnder heauen” (1:193). Poetry provides a “richer puritie” of discourse and incites the “vulgar sort” to aspire above their natural barbarity. This vision of the relation between poetry and common discourse is strikingly positive compared to Nashe’s assessment of the linguistic situation three years earlier. His 1589 preface to Greene’s *Menaphon* mocks the sham eloquence of the present (“how eloquent our gowned age is grown of late”), exemplifying it in what might initially appear to be the same linguistic appropriations Nashe later praises as uplifting: “every mechanicall mate abhorreth the English he was borne too, and plucks, with a solemn periphrasis, his *vt vales from the inke-horne*” (3:311). The difference between negative and positive versions of linguistic appropriation is that the negative draws from the wrong source, from the language of the stage rather than from true poetry: “I impute, not so much to the perfection of Arts, as to the seruile imitation of vaine glorious Tragedians, who contend not so seriously to excell in action, as to embowell the cloudes in a speech of comparison, thinking themselves more then initiated in Poets immortality, if they but once get *Boreas* by the beard and the heauenly Bull by the deaw-lap” (3:311). Although the preface is famous for dismissing Kyd in a later passage, the remarks here point more broadly to two styles and their ideological bases. Nashe censures two groups among the leading playwrights. The one he characterizes as intrusive aspirers beyond their station, “ideot Art-masters, that intrude themselves to our eares as the Alcumists of eloquence, who (mounted on the stage of arrogance) thinke to out-braue better pennes with the swelling bumbast of bragging blanke verse.” Their tonality is a loud monotony in which a single ground tone of “manhoode” voices its “cholericke incumbrances” in the “spacious volubilitie of a drumming deasil-labon.” The second sort to be eschewed are those who “in the mouth of a Player . . . take vppon them to be the ironicall Censors of all, when God and Poetrie doth know they are the simplest of all” (3: 311–12). Ironic censoriousness is their basic tonality.

“God and Poetrie” go coupled here as elsewhere in Nashe, but an accompanying constant is the insistence upon distinguishing the true and false forms in which each is worshipped. One ought not to be “ready to swallow all draffe without difference” (3: 313), but to be aware of the
salient divisions within the dominant discursive genres—lyric, theological
disputation, tragedy, satire, or history—or within each of their corres-
ponding practical ideological spheres—love, religion, emotion, manners,
or politics. Thus, divines who write against poetry in general resemble illit-
erate commoners in failing to recognize a basic field distinction among
writers: “they . . . tearme our best Writers but babling Ballat-makers, hold-
ing them fantastical fools that haue wit, but cannot tell how to vse it”
(1.192). Furthermore, these preacherly enemies of poetry are actually less-
er writers, who, unable to recognize “wit” in others, betray an ignorance
born of low social status and in leaping “from the Coblers stal to their pul-
pits” display a host of discursive failings: slowness, scant resources of
rhetoric and logic, and lack of creativity. Such “slow spirited Saturnists”
have only “pilfries” for semantic resources, “no eloquence but tautologies,”
“no invention” but borrowing—“no wit to mooue, no passion to vrge, but
onelye an ordinarie forme of preaching, blowne vp by vse of often hearing
and speaking.” By contrast, true writers are distinguished by speed, inven-
tiveness, stylization, and variety. In sum, “there goes more exquisite paines
and purtie of witte, to the writing of one such rare Poem as Rosamond,
than to a hundred of your dunsticall Sermons” (1:192).

Citizens fair little better at Nashe’s hands, because even sympathet-
ic citizens fail to recognize the true bases for distinctions among writers:
“They no sooner spy a new Ballad, and his name to it that compilde it:
but they put him in for one of the learned men of our time. I maruell
how the Masterlesse men, that set vp their bills in Paules for seruices, &
such as paste vp their papers on euery post, for Arithmetique and writing
Schooles, scape eternity amongst them” (1:194). The salient point is
the division between those who have one sort of discursive capability
and capacity for discrimination, and those who lack such distinguishing
traits. Pierce may mock those who lack learning (“poore latinlesse
Authors”), but the important difference is something else, since such
knowledge even the detested “son of ropemaker” like Gabriel Harvey
may attain. The important thing is style: language that is choice, sweet,
elegant, and, above all, impressive. Not only does Nashe claim himself
to have the “very Phrase of Angels” to employ in praises, but he lays claim
to “tearmes (if I be vext) laid in steepe in Aquafortis, & Gunpowder, that
shall rattle through the Skyes, and make an Earth-quake in a Pesants eares” (1:195). By contrast, the citizens resemble Harvey in being plodders whose language lacks the power and port necessary to make a favorable impression on true “gentle” arbiters. Nashe epitomizes these citizens in the figure of the chronicler:

Gentles, it is not your lay Chronigraphers, that write of nothing but of Mayors and Sherieffs, and the deare yeere, and the great Frost, that can endowe your names with neuer dated glory: for they want the wings of choise words to fly to heauen, which we haue: they cannot sweeten a discourse, or wrest admiration from men reading, as we can, reporting the meanest accident. Poetry is the hunny of all flowers, the quintessence of all Sciences, the Marowe of Witte, and the very Phrase of Angels: how much better is it then to haue an eligant Lawier to plead ones cause, than a stutting Townsman, that loseth himselfe in his tale, and doth nothing but make legs: so much it is better for a Nobleman, or Gentleman, to haue his honours story related, and his deedes emblazoned, by a Poet than a Citizen. (1:194)

Here, Chronicle History stands for the citizen genre par excellence, and the difference between citizen chronicle and true poetry is conceived, as often in Nashe, according to deportments that are at once physical and discursive. Neither poet nor citizen is assumed “gentle” by birth; the one is superior to the other in that his style, like that of the “eligant lawyer,” offers a closer approximation to the values of gentility. In action as in language, the citizen is out of his league when he aspires to distinction; clumsy “stutting,” aimless verbosity, and inappropriate curtsies reveal his true standing in the orders of words and things.

To claim that poets are superior to citizens, to assert them more securely endowed, the better embodiment of self-possession, and the equal of the lawyer in pleading serious causes, constitute claims of distinction on behalf of a subgroup whose standing was by no means secure and whose typical deportment was generally taken to be anything but reliable elegance. Elderton’s red-nosed drunkenness, Marlowe’s brawling atheism, the actor’s strutting, Greene’s dishevelment of life and person were more likely to be associated with poets in an age when many thought, as Richard Helgerson has argued, that poetry and prodigality were near allies. Even Nashe’s Surrey constitutes a trivialization of poets by embodying a behavioral ideology that represents the poetic sensibility as foolishly abstracted from the responsibilities and observances demanded by gentility.
VIII

That there was division and hierarchy among individuals and subgroups all agreed, even if the principles and vocabularies upon and through which such distinction was conceived, articulated, and instituted—birth, honor, learning, righteousness, skill, vocation, wealth—were contested. The fact of division and hierarchy was seen to carry implications for dress, speech, demeanor, and behavior, so no aspect of life appeared value-neutral or free of semiotic markers with ideological implications. Even personal pronouns carried social determinations, although the “rules” governing their deployment had become extremely various by the late sixteenth century. The most familiar of these signifying domains might be the repeatedly codified (and much contended) systems of dress represented in the sumptuary laws, such as Queen Elizabeth’s 1597 “Edict Enforcing Statutes and Proclamations of Apparel,” with their specifications of cut and material for every rank, but there was a broader established sense of demeanor and appearance that went into the determination of rank.

In De Republica Anglorum, Sir Thomas Smith holds that being gentle demands not just resources and education but a behavioral component as well:

As for gentlemen, they be made good cheape in England. For whosoever studieth the lawes of the realme, who studieth in the universities, who professeth liberall sciences, and to be shorte, who can live idly and without manuall labour, and will beare the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master, for that is the title which men give to esquires and other gentlemen, and shall be taken for a gentleman.

William Harrison’s contribution to Holinshed’s Chronicles employs much the same phrasing, although with more latitude of inclusiveness and more mockery in tone:

Who soeuer studieth the lawes of the realme, who so abideth in the vniuersité giuing his mind to his booke, or professeth physicke and the liberall sciences, or beside his seruice in the roome of a captaine in the warres, or good counsell giuen at home, whereby his common-wealth is benefited, can liue without manuell labour, and thereto is able and will beare the port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman, he shall for monie haue a cote and armes bestowed vpon him by heralds (who in the charter of the same doo of custome
pretend antiquitie and seruice, and manie gaie things) and therevnto being made so good cheape be called master.\textsuperscript{98}

This passage recognizes the offices of counselor, public servant, and field commander as conferring gentility, and adds a mock at the “gaie” qualities one may purchase with a herald’s pedigree. However, the phrase concerning the “port, charge, and countenance of a gentleman” survives intact, as if they were as crucial as avoiding “manuell labour” in determining gentility.

“Port, charge, and countenance” might be translated into style of life, responsibilities, and reputation or approval, but “port” and “countenance” carry a significant bodily component, while “charge,” as the phrase “good cheap” suggests, clearly admits of economic as well as ethical senses.\textsuperscript{99} “Port” can mean the manner in which one deports oneself in carriage or demeanor. Indeed, immediately following the passage quoted, the text criticizes the “demeanor” of travelers returned from Italy.\textsuperscript{100} Shakespeare uses the term to mean bearing or deportment when the Chorus to Henry V wishes for true “princes to act” the part of the onstage nobility, since “Then should the warlike Harry, like himself, / Assume the port of Mars” (H5 prologue 5–6). In Henry VI, Part Two, there is an echo of Harrison’s usage when the Lieutenant demands angrily of a “Gentleman” who hesitates to ransom himself: “What, think you much to pay two thousand crowns, / And bear the name and port of gentleman?” (2H6 4.1.18–19).\textsuperscript{101} “Countenance” commonly denotes facial expression or gesture as well as the approval of those who “countenance” one. Shakespeare plays with these double senses when Falstaff conveys that his thieving is done by the light of the moon’s shining face and under the moon’s approving patronage by using the phrase, “under whose countenance we steal” (1H4 1.2.29); similarly, in Love’s Labor’s Lost there is joking on “countenance” as “face” and as a synonym for self-possessed composure (LLL 5.1.603–20).

From early to late, Shakespeare explores ironies and instabilities potential to bodily components of social distinction. Kent’s claim to read “Authority” in the “countenance” of the uncrowned Lear (KL 1.4.27–30) is an instance of a general concern with the problematic conjunction of ideology and physical demeanor that is examined thematically in such
plays as Richard III or Julius Caesar and that constitutes a major element in Richard II. Although this problem of congruence between social standing and deportment frequently occupies Shakespeare's stage in the context of state power and its vagaries, the issues at stake are clearly broader than any monarch's problems. The implications are not specific merely to the emerging professional theater, either, despite the fact that the relation of deportment and degree is made unavoidable by the theatrical necessity of having actor-commoners pageanting their betters. A drama of kings (and actors) like Richard II provides a site where the values and languages of the rest of English society find themselves interarticulated in and with the values and dilemmas, the terms and uses, of monarchy—or at least of agency, monarchy's most readily apparent defining trait—and theater. Although Elizabeth may have believed herself particularly figured in Richard II (perhaps in Shakespeare's Richard II), she is hardly the only one who might find herself, find aspects of her values, her language, and her demeanor, figured or disfigured there. Nor is it merely the kingly figure of Richard who might focus the gaze or tune the ear in such a way.

During his departure into exile, Bolingbroke, a character representing enormous power, wealth, and standing, oddly recurs to terms of apprenticeship and journeyman labor to express his frustration, even evoking the "freedom" of urban guild membership:

Must I not serve a long apprenticehood
To foreign passages, and in the end,
Having freedom, boast of nothing else
But that I was a journeyman to grief?
(R2 1.3.271-74)

Eighteenth-century adapters like Theobald found this language "not in the sublime taste," but the measure of sublimity depends on one's relationship to the position of apprenticeship and its values. Language like this, no less than Bolingbroke's nationalistic rhetoric which Theobald might prefer for sublimity—"Where'er I wander boast of this I can, / Though banish'd, yet a true-born Englishman" (R2 1.3.308-9)—offer audience and readers points for adherence and differentiation. These relationships can be complex. For example, despite his own background
and assumed audiences, Thomas Deloney’s ballad treatment of this same scene in *The Garland of Good Will* contains nothing resembling Bolingbroke’s journeyman image. Deloney’s intensely lyrical depiction gives Norfolk verses evoking England’s “fields and flowers,” classical allusions to “Eolus,” and prayers that “the Sun, with shining face, would stay his Steeds by strength.” In the refractions of sociolinguistic interaction, *Richard II*, like any utterance, opens onto a densely populated field of varidirectional social contexts.

For a related example, the face, to which *Richard II* devotes considerable attention, may be described in the institutional discourse of the kingly “eye” that “lightens forth / Controlling majesty” (*R2* 3.3.68–70) or, alternatively, in the theatrical language of the “well-grac’d actor” who performs “as in a theatre” (*R2* 5.2.23–24); but no matter from which end of the social scale such references are drawn, they are also shaped by their relations to other, nonmonarchical and nontheatrical contexts.

Outside the theater and royal chamber, countenance and bearing occasioned analysis. The gaze itself might be perceived as socially communicative behavior. Erasmus warned, “Let the eyen be stable, honest, well set, not frownyng which is a sign of crueltye, nor wanton: which is token of malapertnes, nor wanderynge and rollinge, which is signe of madness.” Of course, gender is frequently implicated, as in the sonnets in vogue in the 1590s, but ways of looking could carry different evaluative intonation and be discussed in differing vocabularies.

Writing from Bridewell in the late 1590s, the Catholic secular priest and Essex dependent, Thomas Wright, goes beyond the commonplace observation that facial demeanor constitutes a kind of language by observing that the “silent speech pronounced in [the] very countenances” of political subjects and women “whose passions may easily be discouered” can easily be interpreted by rulers and by men according to a broader social semiotic. According to a logic of practice that applies to interactions of all inferiors and superiors: “children and especially women, cannot abide to looke in their fathers, masters, or betters faces, because, euen nature it self seemeth to teach them, that thorow their eyes they see their hearts; neither doe we hold it for good manners, that the inferiour should fixe his eyes vpon his superiours countenance, and
the reason is, because it were presumption for him to attempt the entrance or priuie passage into his superiors minde, as contrariwise it is lawfull for the superior to attempt the knowledge of his inferior.” For Wright, the law and custom (“manners”) that apply in the public sphere of male interactions agree with “nature itself,” as revealed in its two most typical human avatars, women and children, by forbidding inferiors to look directly at superiors. Francis Bacon, however, differently articulates the social-ideological underpinnings of this “natural” behavior.

Wright’s own utterance is that of an imprisoned Catholic whose complex relations to the pro-toleration forces surrounding Essex and to his own missionary purposes are subtly conveyed in a discourse that would occlude differences of nation and religion to write of the “minde in generall.” Typically, such discourse defines its benchmark “human” practice upon unspoken subjections; here women and children are assumed to be something that all men may confidently generalize about. By contrast, Bacon writes as a distinguished product (and champion) of a newly national state with its own blend of common law and monar- chism. Whatever his interests in humanist generalization, he writes without Wright’s interest in converting English particularism back into catholic universalism. Thus, what is arguably a widespread European deferential behavior appears in Bacon as the exaggerated and arbitrary “custom” of a non-European Other in order to serve a different articulation of values. For Bacon, the practice of averting the gaze is not a natural human instinct that “we” all recognize, but only an “outward ceremony,” a dispensable metaphor for an inward, individual “moral” choice. If between friends it shows “want of integrity” to be “speculative into another man, to the end to know how to work him or wind him or govern him,” so “towards princes or superiors [such examination] is want of duty”: “For the custom of the Levant, which is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous; but the moral is good: for men ought not by cunning and bent observations to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.” Bacon employs a vocabulary of freely rendered duty, of oughts, of morals, and affirmed obedience to scripture, but he uses this language in an utterance (“The
Advancement of Learning”) that would quite literally advance values that distinguish his own group, the “learned men.” Learned counselors are to be valued, he writes, for combining the capacity to advise great ones, indeed the very greatest one, the monarch, with the honesty and judgment that sets the “ universality” of their action and counsel apart from the petty, self-interested flattery exhibited by “the corrupter sort of mere politiques, that have not their thoughts established by learning.”

In this context, his references to Levantine slavishness both construct the writer’s own “ universality” of scope and distinguish his chosen obedience as a form of principled independence of mind and heart—a Protestant version of heartfelt individual commitment that is opposed to an “ outward ceremony” that Bacon appropriates from a familiar anti-Catholic discourse. And finally, Bacon’s regiocentric analysis concentrates on the monarch’s divinely enjoined inscrutability, largely ignoring the claims of intermediate degrees to hierarchical distinction in this regard.

A social order that could produce two such different utterances as those of Wright and Bacon concerning the significance of physical phenomena like the gaze, or that gave rise to the writings of Puttenham, Nashe, and Marlowe, suggests the kinds of sociolinguistic diversity and the basic elements of consciousness which would eventually combine in the Bakhtinian (re)“discovery” of utterance and its heteroglot dialogism.
The practice of close reading deserves reconsideration outside the confines of its appropriation by New Criticism and the political agendas to which its foremost American practitioners directed it. Provisionally dislodged from its New Critical appropriation and considered according to certain underdeveloped implications of Bakhtinian sociolinguistics the activity of close reading may yet prove useful to various forms of social analysis while, simultaneously and paradoxically, suggesting a possible alternative to certain current interpretive modes. Specifically, close reading that investigates the formal elements of texts in the light of socially and historically conjoined utterances instead of concentrating attention upon those elements within the aesthetic object as constituted by text-intrinsic method deserves consideration as a means of pursuing the volatile element of social-evaluative orientation as defined by the Bakhtin circle. Furthermore, a critical practice that would bring together substantial portions of text with its own critical countertext in a dense encounter modeled on close reading but extending its purview to the noncanonical might offer an alternative to practices that, despite their avowal of “thick description” in principle often approximate the familiar literary-historical model of critics such as E. M. W. Tillyard in their deployment of minimally contextualized citation and paraphrase. As a
practical instance, the argument in this chapter engages with a nexus of utterances constituted by four textual loci: the famous report of Queen Elizabeth’s conversation with William Lambarde in 1601, Shakespeare’s *Richard II*, John Hayward’s *History of Henry IV*, and documents concerning the abortive uprising of the Earl of Essex.

I

To assume the Bakhtin circle’s model of utterance as the basis for analysis is in part to consider the pragmatic dimensions of communication, but such considerations are, finally, only components of a more fundamental inquiry into what V. N. Vološinov calls “evaluative orientation.” “No utterance can be put together without value judgment,” Vološinov writes. “Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has a meaning but also a value.” In fact, “referential meaning is molded by evaluation; it is evaluation, after all, which determines that a particular referential meaning may enter the purview of speakers” (*MPL* 105). This primacy of valuation in determining referential meaning may be seen as at once Marxist and Nietzschean in grounding such evaluation itself on conflict, on a “constant struggle of accents in each semantic sector of existence” (*MPL* 106). Thus, a fundamental constituent of any signifying practice is the product neither of a unitary and stable social “context,” since contexts of each utterance “are in a state of constant tension or incessant interaction and conflict,” nor of the solitary creative consciousness—as it sometimes appears near to becoming despite reservations about “completely free combination” in Bakhtin’s own more lyrical, phenomenological moments (*MPL* 80). Vološinov, even in claiming that evaluative orientation “will be the determinative factor in the choice and deployment of the basic elements that bear the meaning of the utterance,” insists that the grounds of such choice, like those of all experience, lie wholly on “social territory” (*MPL* 105, 90).

Despite its crucial importance to any signifying practice, the “evaluative orientation” of the utterance is “least amenable to reification,” a volatile “multiaccentuality” which ought to be “closely associated with the problem of multiplicity of meanings” (*MPL* 81). For the Bakhtin circle,
such volatile phenomena are the very life of everyday discourse. Concrete discourse, as Bakhtin puts it, is populated with devices and deviations resembling those in the most complex verbal art: “We very sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another person’s practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips” (PDP 201). Acceptance of such basic priorities of the Bakhtinian metalinguistic enterprise entails recognizing the impossibility of ever coming to definitive and final terms with the warring accents and contexts within each utterance. Thus, contextualizing might appear all the more nightmarishly difficult the further one moves—semantically, physically, culturally—from the concrete circumstances of utterance. Yet there is at least a provisional ground for optimism, insofar as the great “chain of speech communication” (SG 94) is said to stretch on, generating in the very necessity for “counter word[s]” (MPL 102) the potential for new levels of understanding—and, not inconsequentially, misunderstanding.

To put it another way, considering critical writing as the encounter of utterance with utterance, with the aim of embedding the text’s words in its contemporary counterwords as well as in our own paraphrases and indirect locutions, might further an archaeological inquiry into the emergent and repressed, into those “rhetorical survival skills of the formerly unvoiced,” those “lies, secrets, silences, and deflections of all sorts” that Barbara Johnson finds constituting “the routes taken by voices or messages not granted full legitimacy in order not to be altogether lost.” At the same time and nearer to home, such a critical practice might also further disclose—in the silences and indirections inhabiting our own struggles with the alien utterance of which we write—the openings and foreclosures we would not or could not name as our own, no matter how rigorous our rituals of self-situation. That such a pursuit is posited upon failure, upon a labor of analysis and response which would be, in Pierre Bourdieu’s phrase, “strictly interminable,” need not diminish the potential implications of its practice. The attitudes and abilities potentially fostered by a worldly close reading so conceived need justification neither from aestheticism nor the academy. As Terry Eagleton has asked: Why
assume that acuity and discrimination are any less appropriate to the analysis of that “nuance and particularity” to be found at large in worlds beyond the self-imposed boundaries of traditional literary exegesis and its high aesthetic text? 

In this light, arguments that both New Criticism and deconstruction are premised on related quietisms appears true but limited. Both movements offered, within certain historical circumstances and in certain versions of their practice, the critical opportunity of surprise. Their power lay in renunciation of one kind of power—the certainties of a dominant historicoliteral sense in one case and of culturally dominant binarisms in the other—in order to suggest how little one knew about the “known.” If in their domesticated, institutionalized forms, deconstruction and New Criticism tended to produce predictable instantiations of the already known—in the one case, différance, the abyss, and so on, and in the other, irony, ambiguity, and paradox—it is far from clear that such a fate is avoidable by any critical movement. If the work of the Bakhtin circle has something to offer, it is not so much a case of something new, of some utopian escape from the rhythms of institutional appropriation, as it is a serviceable reminder of unfinalizability, of how much there must always be left to be done.

II

Amid otherwise appropriate thoughts about loneliness, escape, fortune, death, identity and timeliness, Shakespeare’s Richard II takes a partially extrametrical detour into a discourse on textual interpretation, consciousness, and theology:

And these same thoughts people this little world,
In humours like the people of this world;
For no thought is contented. The better sort,
As thoughts of things divine, are intermix’d
With scruples, and do set the word itself
Against the word,
As thus: “Come, little ones”; and then again,
“It is as hard to come as for a camel
To thread the postern of a small needle’s eye.” (R2 5.5.9–17)
The practice of interpretation is here made to stand synechdochically for thought itself. Consciousness resembles “the people of this world” in its fundamental discontent: “For no thought is contented.” Even the eternal self-identical significance of the biblical “word itself” is said to be subject to this divisive tendency upon becoming the object of human cognition.

Within the confines of traditional close reading one might question the credibility of Richard’s *aporia*. The New Critic might discuss intertextuality among canonical Renaissance tragedies and relate Richard’s soliloquy to the opening soliloquy of *Doctor Faustus*. Both assert theological difficulty and buttress the assertion with distorted truncations of familiar biblical quotations. Faustus’s “The reward of sin is death” (1.1.40) leaves out the rest of Romans 6.23, “but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord,” while Richard’s instances of divine invitation and rejection do not mention that in the Gospel, “children” are invited to come and a “rich man” is promised difficulty in divine access.

Thus far this is a relatively intrinsic analysis according to New Critical practice. But to define Richard’s problem as an “ironic” misinterpretation revealing the “voice” of the “speaker,” and to relate it to other instances of “ambiguity” within the play in order to evaluate an overall “tone,” would be to limit analysis in a way that would preclude further sociohistorical definition of that tonality itself—or, rather, tonalities, since tone only emerges amid the differentiation of intonations acting upon one another.

Remarkably, this passage shares the phrase “set the word itself / Against the word” with lines occurring earlier as the Duchess of York contends with her husband’s demand that their son be punished for treason. Her request that King Henry “pardon” their son meets York’s counterword: “Speak it in French, king, say ‘pardonne moy.’” To which the Duchess herself counters:

Dost thou teach pardon pardon to destroy?
Ah, my sour husband, my hard-hearted lord,
That sets the word itself against the word!
Speak “pardon” as ’tis current in our land,
The chopping French we do not understand.

(*R2* 5.3.118–22)
Here it is the element of intonation which is said to offer the possibility of purposefully, rhetorically setting the word against itself. Under the pressure of conflicting purposes, and with the assistance of differing linguistic usages current in the England of the 1590s despite the Duchess’s asseverations of national preference, “pardon” can mean either “yes” or “no.” In the case of Richard’s final soliloquy, by contrast, it is not a variance in the rhetorical intonation of the spoken word but consciousness itself, which, no matter how presumptively unitary its object, betrays an inevitable fractious tendency, setting word against itself. One might find various points of agreement and disagreement between the assumptions and values expressed by the Duchess and Richard. The Duchess’s assumption of a national speech community that would unanimously disallow foreign usage or the “chopping” of a normative sense might appear less than compelling in an England combining legal French, humanist Latinism, and euphuism, or in a play abounding in instances of politic ambiguity. But one might also object that a vestigial commitment to normative senses, operating in something like Stanley Fish’s speech communities, is what makes York’s joke a joke rather than an unmarked alternative to “pardon.” Conversely, although Richard’s view of interpretation as divisive might be relativized in historical or social terms, his example suggests a more universalized notion such as may be found in Barbara Johnson’s pronouncement: “Any utterance, if scrutinized sufficiently, does become problematic, like the dots in a newspaper photograph.”

But the differing treatment accorded by the Folio to Richard’s utterance and that of the Duchess does not suggest their being equally problematic. The Folio alters Richard’s phrase “the word itself against the word” to “the faith itself against the faith” while leaving the Duchess’s utterance unmodified. Perhaps Richard’s account of inevitably destabilizing interpretation might carry more troublesome extratextual resonances than would a reference to intentional oratorical ambiguity. The Folio relocates divisiveness within the familiar battlefields of institutional division, a site already visited in King John in the disputes between Rome and Europe’s monarchs, who are warned by the papal legate not to make “faith an enemy to faith.”
So one utterance is altered in print and the other not, though the "word itself" is semantically identical in both; yet Richard's elliptical utterance is revealing in another way as well. It is not merely blind to the way it creates the discrepancy between word and word that it also articulates insofar as it silently omits the difference of rich man and child; it is also strategically limited by its abstract phenomenological form. "No thought is contented": in such a formulation, discontent is posited as free of social valuation, as a human characteristic natural to kind and found—slightly differentiated as to its object, perhaps, but equivalent nonetheless—even in "the better sort" of the clerisy. What such a generalized religious or "theoretical" formulation forecloses, of course, is an analysis of the social genesis and intergroup differentiation of such entities as "ambition" or "discontent," or, for that matter, "the word." One might consider the particularly pious quality of "the Word" (cf. Ben Jonson's epigram "On Reformed Gamester") or the embattled status of the practice of biblical interpretation itself in post-Reformation England—quite aside from particular interpretations. "Doe all interpret?" asks Oliver Ormerod in The Picture of a Puritane (1605), his rhetorical question expressing the exasperation of Anglican divines caught between centralized, institutional authority, as embodied in bishops, convocations, and codified dogma, and the more radical impulses toward dispersion of authority among individual interpretive consciences as sanctioned by the Reformation.¹⁵

In its limitations, then, Richard's analysis remains predictive of certain limitations of New Critical or poststructuralist exegesis, but these very limitations might also suggest the potential usefulness of a close reading that would turn its attention laterally to consider the choice of idiom inhabiting each signifying act. Surrounded by the competing forms and usages of social heteroglossia, Bakhtin argues, the writer exemplifies the multivocal condition of any utterance: "Consciousness finds itself inevitably facing the necessity of having to choose a language. With each literary-verbal performance, consciousness must actively orient itself amidst heteroglossia, it must move in and occupy a position for itself within it, it chooses, in other words, a 'language'" (DI 295). Yet, to follow this formulation in reducing the encounter with social het-
eroglossia to the necessity of “choice” among “languages” is to accept a limitation in Bakhtin’s emphases and to risk undercutting Vološinov’s emphasis on form as the interactive expression of group identities, differentiations, and struggles that themselves produce possibilities that appear as choice.

The assertion that every element of the utterance is dialogically addressive and responsive does not necessarily assume that the elements are the exclusive product of some controlling transcendental cogito making its discriminations of finer tones and subtler harmonies and communicating them to an audience unified conceptually either by some shared cultural identity or aesthetically “disinterested” condition. Taken by itself, and despite its insistence on the oppositional elements of communication, the Bakhtinian pronouncement on choice of language might appear to sanction an analysis that would, reading after the fashion of Tillyard, identify in Richard II the linguistic elements of an official worldview or hegemonic discourse rather than attempting to examine the density of the play’s social situatedness and the possible angles of its attack and reception within the concrete field of utterances. The “strictly interminable” analytical alternative proposed here would encourage looking closely at the formal elements of the aesthetic text and of the utterances with which that text coexists, agrees, struggles, and takes its very form and shape.

III

No New Critic himself, Tillyard made much of interconnectedness among texts: Richard II, for example, was said to share a discourse of Tudor providentialism with John Hayward’s History of Henry IV. Hayward, Tillyard writes, “deals with history precisely as Shakespeare did,” and Tillyard’s treatment of this equivalence exemplifies the limitations of approaches that would isolate discourse from close reading of its concrete manifestation as utterance. Granting that Hayward’s book occasioned his imprisonment, Tillyard reasons that the cause lay in the extrinsic matter of a dedication to the Earl of Essex and in official misinterpretation of a single speech by the Archbishop of Canterbury detailing successful depositions. The content of Hayward’s book Tillyard pronounces “per-
fectly orthodox” in representing Henry Bolingbroke as a usurper and proclaiming providential judgment upon his crime (243–44). But when Tillyard mentions discourse that Hayward shares with Shakespeare, he cites as an instance “Hayward’s solemn setting forth of the prosperity of Edward III and his seven sons” (244) in the initial sentence of his history: “The noble and victorious prince, king Edward the third, had his fortunate gift of a long and prosperous reign over this realme of England, much strengthened and adorned, by natures supply of seven goodly sons.” Characteristically, Tillyard’s attention to content rather than occasion leads him to miss the very features that might warrant contemporary suspicion.

Sir Edward Coke’s notes on Hayward’s book, titled “his outward pretence and his secret drift” and intended for the author’s trial in July of 1600, record “a king described by these marks” and first of these is “without children” followed by citation from the paragraph Tillyard quotes.19 Considering Hayward’s opening sentence as an utterance rather than according to its “perfectly orthodox” content thus suggests that one evaluative orientation might be interfering with another, as Tillyard’s grand scheme of Tudor historiographic narrative meets Coke’s local sense of the Elizabethan succession question. Further analysis of Hayward’s utterance as utterance, however, reveals how one discourse may articulate itself in the terms of another. Edward III is called “noble” and “victorious” in the opening sentence of a work that cites the fortunate deposing of his father as the culminating example in the Archbishop of Canterbury’s attempts to “cleare this action [i.e. usurpation] of raresnesse in other countries; & noueltie in our.”

Yet the official treatment accorded Hayward’s history might suggest an even closer attention to form and circumstance of articulation, for in all copies of Coke’s notes from 1600 to 1601 there survives his exact citation from the opening paragraph: “Neyther armyes nor strongholds are so greate defences to a prince as the multitude of children, forts may decay, forces decrease.”20 Of course, such a sentence in the form of a general remonstrance to “a prince” concerning the benefits of secure succession might be more offensive to Coke’s late Elizabethan official sensitivities than a specific historical reference to, say, King Richard’s own childless-
ness; but the concrete circumstances of utterance between 1599 and 1601 should occasion further consideration. References to “decrease” in troop strength and “decay” in matériel as points of hypothesized weakness in the heirless realm align Hayward’s generalized historical apothegm with contemporary sources of friction. “He presupposed,” Coke writes, “that there should be ill success in Ireland he writing his booke in 99 after the archtraitor was in his strenghe.” From Coke’s perspective an utterance framed in a generalized language of mutability (all things are subject to “decrease” and “decay”) could appear as a specific prediction that is itself—even in its very conditional form, of things that “may” decay and decrease—in fact a threat: a predicted collapse of Essex’s Irish campaign not as a reflection of the weakness of his forces (or of the historical Richard’s) but as a threat of potential mutiny led by the Essex faction in their “streng[th]” and expressing disaffection (as their failings were pronounced in some circles). The general recommendation to “a prince” thus might appear a threat to this queen and, more specifically, to those Elizabethan officials who had opposed, and would continue to oppose, Essex and certain values with which he was associated.

This brings us back to Tillyard’s first sentence and the epithets “victorious” and “noble” that are applied to Edward III. The language of Hayward’s account of the defeat of Richard II’s Irish expedition attracts Coke’s attention in his notes and in the actual proceedings against Hayward, but in both cases it is a connection between military failure and social division that Coke focuses upon. Coke’s fragmentary notes read, “Many succors sent but scatteringly and droppinge, and neuer so many as were able to furnishe the warres if anything were attempted happily acheued by any of the nobilitie it was by the kings base ha[.]” Which leads to the following in the manuscript record of Hayward’s interrogation: “And also that he [Hayward] gathered out of the actions of that king recorded by Walsingham that matters of peace were managed by menne of weakest sufficiency by whose counsell either ignorant or corrupt . . . . that the kings counsel accounted ancient nobilitie a vaine iest wealth and virtue the ready means to bring to destruction which complaynt is extant in Hall and Polydore Virgill & many other wrighters.” These observations are gathered from a passage in Hayward’s
book in which the Archbishop of Canterbury says that England's military failure exemplifies its pitiful state—"a pitty to our friends, and a verie ieast to our most base and contemptible enemies"—a state resulting from the fact that "all our diligent and discrete leaders (the verie sinewes of the field) are either put to death, or banished, or els lie buried in obscurity and disgrace: and the marshallling of all affaires is committed (without any respect of sufficiency or desert) to the counsaile & conduct of those, who can best apply themselues to the Kings youthfull delightes. Among these, auncient nobility is accompted a vaine ieast, wealth, and vertue are the ready meanes to bring to destruction."27 Thus, in terming Edward III "victorious" and "noble," Hayward merely retails historical fact—Edward's victories and birth being public knowledge—and simultaneously positions the values Edward stands for as a positive ideal precisely in opposition to that "base" faction controlling King Richard to the hindrance of "auncient nobility," "wealth," "vertue" and martial distinction. In this process, Hayward might well appear to Coke to enlist Edward III to support a socially defined division of strategic import to Elizabeth and her contemporaries. Read closely and laterally, considered as an utterance in struggle with other utterances, Hayward's "perfectly orthodox" discourse betrays complicating fissures and discrepancies in evaluative orientation and allegiance.

IV

Related complications riddle a text frequently appropriated in more recent scholarship. Arguably the most widely cited "historical evidence" in discussions relating Elizabethan theater and society, the account of William Lambarde's exchange with Queen Elizabeth in East Greenwich, dated 4 August 1601, has established itself as a documentary linchpin of various readings.28 Most frequently cited as a single phrase—Elizabeth's "Know ye not that I am Richard II"—which is often cited alongside her subsequent observation, "This tragedy has been played forty times in open streets and houses"—the anecdote has been enlisted, according to Walter Cohen, as "historical evidence that such apparently orthodox plays as Richard II seem to have "deeply troubled the Elizabethan and Jacobean upper classes."29 Even scholars who have cited the exchange
more fully have given little attention to potentially interesting features of the text taken as utterance, and above all to the evaluative orientations detectable in its formal and semantic features.30

Called a “Copy” of Lambarde’s conversation with Elizabeth, and dated in the month of his death, the document represents his presentation of the “Pandectae of all her Rolles, Bundles, Membranes and Parcells that bee repoased in her Maties Tower at London.” Elizabeth accepts the work “chearefully,” with a personal gratitude that she expresses in the anecdote as a general royal personalism: “you intended to present this Booke unto mee by the Countice of Warwicke, but I will none of that, for—if any subject of myne doe mee a Service, I will thankfully accept it from his owne hands.” Then, she reads and questions: “Then openinge the Booke, sayes, ‘you shall see that I cann reade’; and soe, with an audible Voice, read over the Epistle, and the Title soe readily and distinctly poyned, that it might perfectly appeare, that shee well understood and conceaved the same.”

Although Elizabeth’s readerly competence is remarked, a major component of the anecdote consists of her queries and Lambarde’s explications.

Of the first page, Elizabeth “demaunderd the meaninge of Oblata, Cartae, Litterae clausae et Literae Patentes,” and Lambarde dutifully responds: “WL[—] Hee severally expounded the Meaninge and layed out the true Differences of every of them; her Matie seeminge well satisfied, sayd that she would bee a Scholler in her Age, and thought it noe scorne to learne duringe her Life, being of the Minde of that Philosopher, who in his last yeares began with the Greeke alphabet.” After this initial exposition of terms and her reported self-characterization as perpetual scholar, unmindful of “scorne” from antihumanists, “Then,” in the anecdote’s typical parataxis, “shee proceeded to further pages, and asked (where she found cause of Stay) as were meant by Ordinationes, Parliamenta, Rotulus Cambii, and Rediseisnes?” These terminological queries immediately bracket the famous self-comparison:

WL[—] Hee likewise expounded all these to theire originall Diversities, which she took in gratious and full satisfaction—Soe her Matie fell upon the Reigne of King Rich. 2d sayinge, “I am Richard 2d.” know ye not that?

WL— Such a wicked Immagination was determined and attempted by a most unkind Gent, the most adorned Creature that ever yr Matie made.
*Her Matie*—Hee that will forgett God, will also forgett his Benefactor; this Tragedie was played 40tie times in open Streets and Houses.

*Her Matie* then demanded, what was *Praestita*?

Abruptly, the anecdote “then” returns to terminology, yet the conversation is not easily segmented; it is marked throughout by recurrences.

Lambarde’s explanation of *Praestita* as “Monies lent by her Progenitors to their subjects for theire Good, but with assurance of good bond for repayment” occasions the first return to Richard II, by way of a remark concerning Henry VII: “*Her Matie* Soe did my good Grandfather Kinge Henry the 7th sparinge to dissipate his Treasure or Lands.—Then returninge to Richard 2d. shee demaunded whither I had seene any true Picture or lively Representation of his countenance or Person?” Upon Lambarde’s remarking that he had seen “none but such as be in common Hands,” Elizabeth mentions a portrait found in a “back room” that is to be put “in order with my Auncestors and Successors” and says it will be shown to him. This is followed by another apparent change of subject: “Then she proceeded to Rolles.” But the conversation circles once more, for Elizabeth returns to the terms immediately preceding her first turn to Richard II when, apparently unprompted, she “then” restates her understanding of “Rediseisnes”: “*Her Matie* then demaunded againe if *Rediseisnes* were not unlawfull and forcible throwinge of men out of their lawfull Possessions?” Lambarde’s confirmation occasions her final historical assessment:

WL[—] Yea, and therefore, these be the Rolles of Fines, Assesses and Levies uppon such Wrong Dooers, as well for the great and willfull Contempt of the Crowne and Royall Dignitie, as Disturbance of Common Justice.

*Her Matie*— In those Days Force and Armes did prevale, but now the Witt of the Foxe is every wheare on foote, soe as hardly a faithful or vertuouse Man may bee found. Then came shee to the whole totall of all the Membranes and Parcells aforesaid, amounting to [blank space] commendinge the Worke, not only for the Paynes therein taken, but alsoe for that she had not receaved since her first comminge to the Crowne any one thinge that brought therewith soe great Delectation unto her; and soe beinge called away to Prayer, she put the Booke in her Bosome, having forbidden mee from the first to the last, to fall uppon my Knee before her, Concludinge—“Farwell, good and honest Lambarde”!
It is arguable that Elizabeth's reference to "those Days" in this paragraph constitutes another return to Richard II, since Lambarde had elsewhere written of seizure of real property in Richard's day. Most clearly, however, Elizabeth characterizes the past as exhibiting public, open violence of "Force and Armes" which "now" has been replaced by the covert "Witt of the Foxe" which "every wheare" corrupts the virtues of individuals and their bonds of faith. That past, as well as this present, are both constructed in opposition to "good and honest Lambarde." Here are places as good as any to pursue evaluative orientations and social heteroglossia: oppositions of now and then, of open and covert, of a good, honest individual and an omnipresent foxlike wit, to be sure, but also discrepancies among languages that are not reducible to oppositions—discursive heterologies, for example, between her account of Essex's "tragedy" and Lambarde's references to the "wicked Immagination" of an "unkind Gent" and "adorned Creature.

If "now" is taken to be August 1601 rather than simply the wake of the Essex rebellion, then a specific light is cast on Elizabeth's self-identification with Richard II. Furthermore, if Lambarde is taken to be the bureaucrat and judicial reformer, writer of legal and parliamentary history, Protestant activist, and Cecil adherent rather than mere "antiquary," then yet other implications of that identification and of the "Tragedie" that was "played 4otie times in open Streets and Houses" bid for attention.

In August 1601 Hayward's continuing imprisonment demonstrated there could be infelicitous responses to a royal self-identification with Richard II—especially if an interlocutor shared Hayward's politically sensitive profession as an historian. Although Lambarde's response appears to avoid problems—"Such a wicked Immagination was determined and attempted by a most unkind Gent, the most adorned Creature that ever yr Matie made"—it is not allowed to stand without recasting by Elizabeth: "Hee that will forgett God, will also forgett his Benefactor; this Tragedie was played 4otie times in open Streets and Houses." Lambarde's initial response joins the languages of legal and ecclesiastical clerisies: his "wicked Immagination," which was "determined and attempted," turns one legal designation of plotting as "imag-
ination” toward what will be the King James Bible’s characterization of human sinfulness as the wicked “imagination” of men’s hearts and flexes it back again toward the courtroom in the lawyerly distinction between intention and action. But his subsequent phrasing offers other, less universalized evaluative orientations. The “wicked Immagination” Lambarde invokes is located neither in man generally nor in a political subject but in a doubly superlative epitome, “the most adorned Creature that ever yr Matie made.” Here his phrasing follows the well-worn path of antiparasite polemic traditional to commons’ complaints about courtly dependency. Yet this polemic is embedded in another narrative of much wider application: the dependent “Creature” “made” by the sovereign is an Elizabethan social recasting of the biblical creation narrative in the form of an assumed universality of patron/client vertical dependencies. Elizabeth repositions this commonplace story, however, placing it in a horizontal orbit as a counterutterance to other utterances adjacent to or even impinging upon it. A trace of these shadow utterances appears in Lambarde’s designation of Essex as “a most unkind Gent,” an equivocal utterance (like Hamlet’s “less than kind”) potentially implying individual unkindliness and/or violation of “kind”—an assumed, natural standard of conduct appropriate to a “Gent.”

Elizabeth’s reply at first appears to preclude such overtly social orientation in that she responds only to the theological discourse in Lambarde’s statement, making Essex’s wrong and her virtue mere extensions of the larger, depersonalized, timeless, and estateless, indeed, actionless, and most human frailty—forgetting God and “Benefactor”—rather than the more specific crimes either of a historically particular “wicked Immagination” and attempted uprising, or of a socially particularized violation of “kind” by a “Gent.” Yet, the second half of her sentence seems quite specific in time and circumstance: “this Tragedie was played 40tie times in open Streets and Houses.” This statement has often been read, of course, as referring to a play, perhaps Shakespeare’s, about Richard II. If, however, as syntax suggests, Elizabeth is speaking of the tragedy of Essex himself rather than that of Richard, other questions arise. Why might Elizabeth, her interlocutor, and/or recorder of the anecdote have chosen to speak of the Essex uprising as a “Tragedie”
of ingratitude “played” repeatedly in both “open Streets and Houses”? With and against what other utterances might such an utterance have taken its shape?

Seen from the broad perspective of “discourse,” the anecdote could easily be assimilated to the language of gratitude and ingratitude, benefactor and creature that permeates late Elizabethan official discourse in differing contexts of utterance. In her notes to the so-called Golden Speech to Parliament in 1601, for example, Elizabeth rejoices to be “a Queen over so thankful a people.” 37 And of all the matters for which Elizabeth might excoriate the late Philip of Spain in her final speech to the 1601 Parliament, she chooses to denounce him as one who “had as many provocations of kindness by my just proceedings, as by hard measure he hath returned effects of ingratitude.” 38 John Croke’s speech before her on October 30 stresses the thankfulness due from her subjects and the likely divine retribution if they begrudge that due. 39 Nor is this public discourse discontinuous with the terms of private exchanges, as is evident in the correspondence of the Earl of Essex. In his detailed advice for a letter to Elizabeth, Francis Bacon suggests, for example, that Essex explain his motivation for writing as “first and principally gratitude” and that he gently remind her of “anything that hath been grateful to her Majesty from you,” while admitting that “princes’ hearts are inscrutable.” 40 The reply framed for Essex employs similarly combined rhetorics of gratitude and religion. 41 And yet the Lambarde anecdote is not merely an instantiation of such a culturally hegemonic discourse, nor does it simply express a desire for generous patronage. Features of that discourse’s deployment in this utterance, as well as in the exchanges surrounding the Essex affair more generally, register the anecdote’s function in constituting a counterword addressed to certain other concrete utterances.

Official accounts repeatedly describe the personal threat of the Essex rising to Elizabeth, and in turn subordinate that threat to a larger sin of “ingratitude” to God. These accounts share the anecdote’s language of dramatic form in typifying the uprising itself. Elements of this official line—with one noteworthy occlusion shared by the Lambarde anecdote—are exemplified in the accusations brought against Sir Christopher Blunt, who is said to be more culpable for conspiring against the “queen
“Word Itself against the Word” 107

herself” than against the “State,” and more heinous still for manifesting “ingratitude against God” in seeking “toleration of religion.” Blunt’s intention, furthermore, is said to have involved a resemblance to the “story of Richard II,” and a royal assassination, which is likened to the “catastrophe, the conclusion” of Edward II’s murder.40 The language of dramatic form here employed is widely used elsewhere in the official pronouncements, with specific reference to tragedy. “Tragedy” is, of course, a term of wide provenance during the period, but particular uses of it in the polemic surrounding the Essex rebellion can be related to aspects of evaluative orientation in the Lambarde exchange and in the charges against Blunt.41

Bacon’s Declaration,42 which was sent to press 14 April 1601 and was, he says, “perused, weighed, censured, altered, and made almost a new writing” both by the “principall Councillors” and “the Queen herself,” repeatedly refers to the uprising as a “tragedy”—complete with “preludes” (9:249), “platform,” (9:264), “second act,” (9:264), and a “catastrophe or last part of that tragedy for which [Essex] came upon the stage” (9:253). Among the “preludes,” furthermore, Bacon invokes terms that resonate with Elizabeth’s express concern about “open . . . Houses.” Bacon refers to Essex’s “open doors” (9:248), reiterating complaints about his behaving “popularly,” that are prominent in official concerns about his keeping “his house open to all comers” and especially to military veterans.43 Of the plot to seize the Court by Sir Charles Davers, Sir Christopher Blunt, and Sir John Davies, Bacon writes, “This being the platform of their enterprise, the second act of this tragedy was also resolved; which was, that my Lord should present himself to her Majesty as prostrating himself at her feet, and desire the remove of such persons from about her” (9:264). But the “tragedy” that Bacon, and apparently the queen and council had in mind was of a particular sort.

After proclaiming its intent to counter “divers most wicked and seditious libels thrown abroad” (9:247), Bacon’s Declaration opens with this assessment of the Essex story:

The most partial will not deny, but that Robert late Earl of Essex was by her Majesty’s manifold benefits and graces, besides oath and allegiance, as much tied to her Majesty as the subject could be to the sovereign; her Majesty having heaped upon him both dignities, offices, and gifts, in such measure, as
within the circle of twelve years or more there was scarcely a year of rest, in
which he did not obtain at her Majesty’s hands some notable addition either
of honour or profit.

But he on the other side, making these her Majesty’s favours nothing else
but wings for his ambition, and looking upon them not as her benefits but as
his advantages, supposing that to be his own metal which was but her mark and
impression, was so given over by God (who often punisheth ingratitude by
ambition, and ambition by treason, and treason by final ruin), as he had long
ago plotted it in his heart to become a dangerous supplanter of that seat, where-
of he ought to have been a principal supporter. (9:248)

Bacon offers commonplaces—a “creature” who forgets the “benefactor”
who has “made” him and is providentially punished in a “tragedy” of self-
love and ruin that follows in condign self-punishment. No matter the
qualities and varieties of historical participants and social particularities
that might aid or retard the actors, the origin of evil is a self-generating dis-
content outside the fabula—perhaps, as Bacon hypothesizes, the product
“of a nature disposed to disloyalty,” yet ultimately beyond human expla-
nation: “But as it were a vain thing to think to search the roots and first
motions of treasons, which are known to none but God that discerns the
heart, and the devil that gives the instigation”(9:249). “Subordinated with-
in the account and addressed by it are possible alternatives to this homilet-
ic “tragedy” of monarchical magnanimity, inexplicable human “ingrati-
tude,” and self-destructive “ambition.”

As Bacon’s references to “oath and allegiance” suggest, one alternative
would be to denounce Essex for violating the values of chivalric honor;
another, to accuse him of rending those ties of “subject” to “sovereign” pro-
mulgated in Tudor accounts of consolidated monarchical authority. But
Bacon’s officially sanctioned choice of the rhetoric of theological tragedy
over either of these evaluative alternatives should be considered according
to other evidence within the Declaration that indicates its social het-
eroglossia as a response to yet another social “language,” against which
either of these alternatives might have proven relatively ineffectual. The lan-
guage Bacon chooses casts light on the heteroglossic dimensions of Eliza-
beth’s own “Tragedie” of ingratitude “played 40tie times in open Streets and
Houses.”

Bacon’s Declaration claims to respond to the fact that “there do pass
abroad in the hands of many men divers false and corrupt collections and relations of the proceedings at the arraignment of the Late Earls of Essex and Southampton” and to “divers most wicked and seditious libels thrown abroad” (9:247). He attempts the rhetorical neutralization of such voices by proclaiming them “partial.” But already in the fragmentary, unpublished records of the proceedings concerning Essex held at York House in June 1600, well before the uprising proper of February 1601, similarly unauthorized “discourses” are mentioned as demanding official response. In this earlier instance, Bacon’s providentialist rhetoric—distinctly Protestant in its emphasis on superabundant royal “grace”—specifically responds to the offending discourse and the form of its utterance:

when Offence was grown unmeasurablie offensive, then did grace superabound, and in the heate of all the ill news out of Ireland, and other advertisements thence to my Lo: disadvantage, her Mate entered into a resolution, out of herself and her inscrutable goodness, not to overthrow my Lo: fortune irreparablie by publique and proportionable justice, nowtwithstanding, inasmuch as about yt time, there did fly about in London Streets and Theaters divers Seditious Libells, and Powles and Ordinaries were full of bold and factious discourses, whereby not onlie manie of her Maties faithful and zealous councillors and Servants were taxed, but withall the hard estate of Ireland was imputed to any thing rather than unto the true cause (the Earl's defaults).47

These threatening “publique” attacks in “London Streets and Theaters,” “Powles and Ordinaries,” are epitomized by a letter addressed to Elizabeth. This letter, arguing that Essex suffered under “passion and faction” and not under “justice mixed with mercy,” though unfit to pass in “vulgar hands,” was first divulged by “copies everywhere (that being as it seemeth the newest and finest form of libelling)” and then was committed to “press.” 48 Thus, unofficial counternarratives to the official Augustinian tragedy of isolate evil inexplicably arisen to trouble “inscrutable,” self-sufficient goodness and its superabundant “grace” appear officially represented as openly circulating “bold and factious” accusations. These are said to denounce “her Maties faithful and zealous councillors and Servants” for their own “passion and faction” and call their faults the origin of Essex’s troubles. Such a discourse is, in the circumstances of its utterance, itself “factious,” insofar as it publicly invokes factional contention within the official ranks of faithful, zealous servants and councilors rather than the individual “tragedy” of a sub-
ject's atheism, "ingratitude," or "wicked imagination" as the origin of Essex's actions. Furthermore, it offers an alternative evaluation of official "justice mixed with mercy" as instancing the same factional struggle. Thus, by its semantic choices, its practice of sociopolitical analysis, and the form and circumstance of its utterance—in "Streets and Theaters," "Powles and Ordinaries," and printed "copies everywhere"—the letter invites open and public participation in such analysis.

These "factious" utterances that Bacon claims instigated the proceedings against Essex are also discussed by Fulke Greville, the earl's relative and posthumous defender. Fulke Greville destroyed his unpublished tragedy of Antony and Cleopatra rather than risk having it "construed or strained to a personating of vices in the present governors or government." In his account of this act of self-censorship, he describes Elizabeth and Essex both as victims of "sect-animals" or "Party" among the "factious English" (4:156, 160). In this narrative Essex is treibly a victim. First the "sect-animals" torment him with flatteries and minor vexations, which prompt in one of his "great heart" careless actions (4:157); then they forge libels in his name in order, finally, to propel him into the mills of the law:

Into which pitfall of theirs, when they had once discerned this Earle to be fallen: straight, under the reverend stile of Laesae Majestatis all inferiour ministers of Justice—they knew—would be justly let loose to work upon him. And accordingly, under the same cloud, his enemies took audacity to cast libels abroad in his name against the State, made by themselves: set papers upon posts, to bring his innocent friends in question. His power, by the Jesuiticall craft of rumour, they made infinite; and his ambition more then equall to it. His letters to private men were read openly, by the piercing eyes of an Atturnie's office, which warrantes the construction of every line in the worst sense against the writer. (4:157)

Fulke Greville consistently demeans the legal profession from its highest officials to the "inferiour ministers of Justice." His indirect discourse mocks the pretensions of their "reverend stile" and its strategic hypocrisy: they "warrant[]" the reading of "private" letters "openly," and they are said "justly" to be "let loose to work on him."

While Essex's enemies at court are said to encourage legalistic violence "as against an unthankfull favourite and traiterous subject; hee standing,
by the law of England, condemned for such” (4:158), Fulke Greville defends the earl for his martial accomplishments on England’s and Elizabeth’s behalf and for his immunity to the temptation to usurp the monarch’s sovereign power of “creation” in cases that most immediately concerned him. In fact, Essex was such a loyal “favourite,” that, true to values of chivalric honor, he “never put his soveraigne to stand between her people and his errors; but here and abroad, placed his body in the forefront, against all that threatened or assaulted her” (4:158–59). Far from affecting “absolute power,” Essex avoided the abuses of Henry III’s men: “I meane under a king to become equall at least with him, in creating and deposing chancelors, treasurers, and secretaries of State, to raise a strong party for himselfe; as he left both place and persons entire in their supreme jurisdictions, or magistracies under his soveraigne, as shee granted them” (4:160). For “secretaries of State” one might read (in 1601) Secretary Robert Cecil, which might recall Lambarde’s personal ties to Cecil and familiar stories of divisions between Cecil and Essex. But more is at stake here than personal contention, for there are institutional and cultural parameters to the division and its available articulations.

However else the contention of Cecil and Essex factions might be articulated, Fulke Greville represents it as a struggle between the values of sword and robe—chivalry and clerisy.” The “prosperity” of Essex’s pursuit of “the standard of Mars” inevitably entails “the falling of their scales,” and thus awakens the “envious and suppressing crafts of party” (4:160). Fulke Greville’s utterance is certainly not the only one to represent the conflict between Essex and Cecil this way, and, I would argue, it is precisely in an atmosphere charged by such utterances that the representation of Elizabeth’s exchange with Lambarde takes shape. The chosen language of homiletic tragedy with its religiously universalized account of human nature and its inexplicable sinful propensities addresses (by precluding) other available accounts that might articulate specific conditions and tensions of profession, class, and economy. Evidence of such tensions riddles the surviving documentation. So, for example, in that letter of 1598 to Thomas Egerton, which would become notorious for refusing to identify “absolute infiniteness in heaven” with “infinite absoluteness on earth,” Essex locates the clerical offices but little above abjection: “I owe
her majesty the duty of an earl and lord marshal of England. I have been content to do her majesty the service of a clerk; but can never serve her as a villain or slave.” Bacon himself rhetorically invokes the tension between civil and military values when he advises Essex to give up the appearance of “military dependence,” while disclaiming the intention “to play now the part of a gownman that would frame you best to mine own turn.” And Essex writes to Anthony Bacon with an analysis of professional solidarity meant to address the charge that he favors men of war: “Every man doth love those of his own profession. The grave judges favor the students of law; the reverend bishops the laborers in the ministry; and I, since Her Majesty yearly used my service, in her late actions, must reckon myself among her men of war.” That Essex actively employed his own pen and those of others in writings designed to further his courtly and political aims did not prevent widely circulated stories and devices from repeating similar divisions of sword against robe or, as the Duke of Stettin Pomerania puts it, of “cannon” against “writing-pen.”

A differing evaluation of this contention emerges most tellingly in Secretary Cecil’s remarks at the trial of Essex. Cecil attacks the values of the honor culture for un-Christian warlikeness and economic self-interest. Essex would have him appear odious, Cecil says, because he always worked “for the good and quyett of my countrye,” and he goes on to denounce Essex: “But with yo it hath euuer bene a Maxime to pr’fer warr before peace, in respecte of the consequence to yo followers and dependers.” Cecil further articulates differences between honor culture and civil culture in a rhetorical flourish that epitomizes the stakes in contention: “My Lo. ffor witt I giue yo the p’eminence, yo haue it aboundantlie. ffor birthe I giue yo place. I am not noble, yet I am a gent: neither am I a sword man. You haue therefore the oddes of me. But I haue inocencye to p’tect me.” Not noble, neither “sword man,” nor “witt,” and yet a “gent” —over the definition of gentility, factions and values of robe and sword contend at court or in the city, and, as Lambarde’s anecdote might suggest, in private chambers of counsel as well.

If semantically the analogical tragedy of personal ingratitude appears to override categories of political analysis such as estate or profession avail-
able in Lambarde's own phrasing, formal elements of the whole anecdotal utterance nevertheless conform it not only to royal needs but also to values of gentility as redefined by Tudor humanists. Although these very formal qualities of the anecdote make it appropriate that Lambarde be described as an "antiquary," or "archivist," such designations—like the anecdote itself—fail to convey either the political and economic value of scholarship such as his to early modern England or the depth of Lambarde's involvement in the theory and practices of that state and hence fail to register possible heteroglossic resonances of the anecdote itself. In speaking as they do, monarch and official do not speak as they might. In fact, the intimate yet disinterested quality of their exchange, with its combination of royal proclivity and councilor's capacity to take up and drop, apparently at random, past monarchs, old laws, ancient languages, recondite terms, and antique portraits, manages to bracket, contain, and all but displace present threats or concerns. That these achieve articulation in only two royal excursions into present tense ("I am Richard 2d" and "the Witt of the Foxe is every wheare on foote") is an aspect of the anecdote that embodies significant evaluative orientations and displaces others.

Terms surrounding and interpenetrating Elizabeth's two present-tense utterances certainly touch upon areas of her interlocutor's expertise that are of immediate interest to Crown and Council in August 1601. Most strikingly, Lambarde's capacity as an authority on legal and parliamentary history to expound terms such as *Parliamenta* and *Litterae patentes* in their "originall diversities" could render their exchanges highly pertinent to present governmental concerns. August 1601 was a time of preparation for the Parliament that had been anticipated since spring (the last of the treble subsidy approved in 1597–98 had been collected by then, and money was needed to counter Spanish incursion in Ireland). Of special interest to the Privy Council, as correspondence from that August reveals, were patents of monopoly. At issue since the previous Parliament and obviously threatening to arouse debate again since little had been done to fulfill royal promises of reform, disputes over regulation of monopoly patents threatened territory contested among the advocates of royal prerogative, parliamentary initiative, and common law. Lambarde's learning in the politically charged histories of Parliament and
common law might interest Elizabeth; yet to judge by the record, neither she nor he accords such present concerns significant attention.

Nor do they appear to explore related areas of Lambarde’s expertise in fiscal policy and real property, which are also objects of considerable contemporary royal concern and are obliquely touched upon by the terms Oblata, Praestita, and Rediseisnes. Instead of enjoining current disputes concerning instruments of royal revenue, the legal connivances of concealed tenure, the continuing struggles over enclosure, or emerging claims of absolute private property, the anecdote records “good” Henry VII’s practical economies and moral denunciations of historically “un-lawfull” and open “force and armes” against “lawfull Possessions.” In each such choice of languages the identification of Elizabeth with Richard II might be a factor because her exchanges affirm values opposing those widely associated with Richard. Repudiating craft as well as violence, concerned for law and the subject’s possessions, for financial practicality, and for precedent rather than innovation, Elizabeth appears the antithesis of the prodigal autocrat—and, conversely, the fitting monarch for her civil servant’s allegiance.

Furthermore, the manner of their discussions embodies an antithesis to the sly purposefulness characterized as the “Witt of the Foxe.” The phrasing recalls contemporary translations of Machiavelli’s Prince, in which Machiavelli describes the practice of the effective prince as combining the strength of the lion with “the skill to playe the foxe” and “by fayninge and dissemblinge to sett a fayre varnishe on his fowle vice.” Instead of raising narrowly instrumental matters of strategy and policy, their intimate, wide-ranging exchange never once descends to a discussion of uses for Lambarde’s labors. His efforts are appreciated in and for themselves as the “service” of a “Scholler,” fit cause of “delectation,” and occasion for freely associative conversation articulated in terms of law, religion, history, morality, and practical benevolence, but not immediate issues of state. These exchanges grant Lambarde’s labors and those of the professional class he represents the status of humanist learning and in the process associate them with a nonfactional discursive mode which Lambarde elsewhere characterizes as writing “academically, and without
taking any part.” Given his close association with John Stubbs, ill-fated author of *The Gaping Gulf*, it might be, as Paul L. Ward has suggested, that Lambarde's scholarly reticence had had serious encouragement. Whatever the validity of his claim to academic disinterest in other contexts, Lambarde’s quarter session addresses of the years 1600 to 1601 are highly relevant to these evaluative orientations.

In his 1600 address to the justices assembled for the sessions at Maidstone, Lambarde defines the most pressing public enemy as a “wickedness and contempt of good laws” that “boldly lift[s] up the head and hopeth to prevail”:

> For such is nowadays the bold sway of disobedience to law that it creepeth not in corners but marcheth in the open market, and is not only to be seen plainly of such as have any eyes at all but is become in manner palpable and to be felt of such as be utterly blind. Yea, such is the inundation of wickedness in this last and worst age that if speedier help and hand of justice be not applied, we are justly to fear that we shall every one be overwhelmed thereby. For albeit every man of us feeleth more or less the present evil, foreseeeth future danger, feareth the end, and complaineth of the case; yet how few are there found amongst us that will use the bridle of authority which they have in their own hand and cast it upon the head of this unruly monster!

It is difficult to say how precisely Lambarde’s “open market” is meant to be taken for a physical location rather than to stand metonymically for the popular, public nature of disobedience. The address does invoke villains from a familiar litany—“seducing papists, thieves, extortioners, usurers, engrossers, and the rest of that rabble” (141)—yet, here, in the year preceding the Essex uprising, is a sense of the “open” space of public gathering—in this case the market rather than Elizabeth’s “streets”—as a place where disobedience to “law” exercises “bold sway” and “marcheth” unchecked by “authority” vested in the commons themselves. “Marcheth” might be merely a rhetorical antithesis to the stealth of “creepeth,” but in 1600 Lambardes's figure of troops marching under the “bold sway” of disobedience preemptively appropriates the potentially authoritative appearance of order that might be mustered by an aristocratically marshaled and militarily deployed rebellion, assimilating this civil nightmare to that commonplace image of the monstrous mob flow-
ing in market and street. At the same time, responsible “authority” is located in the lowest individual upholders of the common law: “private men” serving in the much demeaned office of justices.

The work of these “private men,” moreover, is repeatedly articulated in 1600 in terms appropriated from honor culture. The law and its most humble upholders are said to defend God, England, and the Queen against “intestine enemies”; law-abiding persons, not the military, “advance the honor of her Majesty,” protect against the “period of the English honor,” and serve England as a defensive wall—“if laws be duly administered they be the very walls of our country and commonwealth. But what walls, though of brass itself, be not expungable if there be not men to defend them?” (142, 144). In 1601, however, shortly after the Essex rebellion, Lambarde’s address written for the Easter sessions (but apparently not delivered) subordinates this appropriated language of honor to that of religion, arguing that “as the minister of the word soundeth the inward heart, so doth the magistrate and minister of the law exact the outward sign and testimony of a well-persuaded mind,” with “honor” itself appearing now recast as a religious reverence not to be diverted from God or prince to fractious religions, states, or nobles:

So as in religion it is utterly unlawful for the servants of God to erect any golden calf or other idol and to transfer unto it the honor that ought to be proper to God alone, and in policy it is not sufferable that subjects should set up any glittering calf of Rome, of Spain, of Norfolk, or of Essex and to communicate thereunto that royal, obedient, and filial love which they owe to their natural prince, the mother of our country and earthly God over us. (147)

Essex, like the rebellious Norfolk, is an idol, an image of authority rather than the thing itself. But whatever their apparent shift in semantic register, Lambarde’s addresses consistently invoke a continuity between public and “private” realms that contrasts with public considerations of chivalric honor. Insistently “common good” and “public benefit” are equated with the “proper business and particular profit” of “private men” (140, 141, 142). In doing good, one could do well. So in 1600 Lambarde writes that one’s “own profit is so fast conjoined with the good of other men that if he neglect theirs his own also must of necessity decay and perish therewithal” (140); and in 1601 he maintains the “end” of the justices’
endeavors is "the glory of God, the general welfare of your prince, the church, and commonwealth, and the particular profit of every of yourselves and yours" (149). Integrating the open, public values of chivalric honor, national survival, apocalyptic Protestantism, and commonwealth with the domestic and personal value of "private" profit, Lambarde's addresses suggest an evaluative orientation for the intimate form of his exchange with Elizabeth.

Her denial of courtly mediation in asserting that Lambarde need not have sent his manuscript through the Countess of Warwick when she would "thankfully accept" such "service" from "any subject"; the refusal to permit him to kneel; the self-deprecation of her scholarly ability, while avowing the value of scholarship; the combination of vulnerability and linguistic exhibitionism in her reading; the personal reliance of monarch on dependent (slightly eroticized by tucking his gift "in her Bosome"); the equation of individual gratitude and piety—in these the anecdote surely represents that very royal generosity and openness which would constitute Essex's behavior as impious ingratitude rather than a response to compromised status or economic desperation. But it also represents, in an intimate setting, the congruence of publicly acclaimed values of her reign with their "private" expression as personal thrift, piety, openness, fairness, generosity, and humanistic learning. Caught in a moment between state business and devotion, neither she nor her justice of Kent spends a word on merely factious, political, or instrumental reasoning, nor on public appearances. What they are, whether in open streets or private chambers, is what they are; neither plays for an audience.

Above all, Elizabeth's image of a tragedy played over and over again admits what people could see—Essex's so-called "popularity" out in the streets as well as in his own "open" house—while revaluing those undeniable facts as instances of hypocritical playing before an audience that could not see the real personal and religious tragedy that such playing truly represented. The invocation of the model of self-destructive "tragedy" played out between a single player and his God and/or benefactor occludes the appearance of reesentiment in Lambarde as a self-proclaimed "common" passing judgment on the fitness of a noble to share the designation of "Gent" and as a legal official commenting in lawyerly
terms upon a cultural subgroup of martial adherents who loudly denounced professional jurists for pettiness and rigor. The anecdote itself represents the private world of Elizabethan officials as characterized by the same mixed values of earnest piety tempered with scholarly disinterest and practicality alloyed with generosity that are much a part of its public presentations. Elizabeth and Lambard, at least, should not be mistaken for playing one thing publicly while being another privately. Rather than calculating factional division, financial advantage, or parliamentary strategy, the two pause between business and prayer to regret one dependent's suicidal self-destruction and to appreciate the contrast provided by the steadfast values "good and honest Lambard" represents. Their exchanges repeatedly touch upon divisive issues articulated in Parliament and the open streets between 1598 and 1601 without getting closer than religion, history, scholarship, and drama: form and silence turning word against word.
The agrarian origins of capitalism in early modern England have been usefully conceptualized by John E. Martin as a transitional social formation characterized by an “articulated combination” of feudalism and capitalism rather than by their linear succession. This articulated combination arises from a complex encounter of feudalism’s parcelized sovereignty or “juridical-conditional ownership” with changing conditions that facilitated the emergence of “capitalist” landowning: “land was released for the market, absolute property was consolidated, rents became subject to market forces, and the traditional constraints on agricultural development were removed by the destruction of the peasant economy. Land was freed and made available for new forms of management and usage.”

Accounts of agrarian change, from the sixteenth century to the present, have considered enclosure a key element in each of these developments. Although intense debate surrounds everything about enclosure—its extent, occasions, conditions, chronology, and effects—two broad notions of its agents have emerged. One long-standing argument stresses the aggression of landlords seeking to convert peasant holdings to pasture; the other emphasizes internal economic differentiation within the peasant community itself, which polarized landholding between wealthy tenants interested in specialized land use and poor tenants struggling to
retain the means of survival represented by common rights and the open
fields. In the argument which follows, I assume that outright eviction
and internal differentiation are, in Martin's phrase, “two faces of a chang-
ing agrarian structure,” and attempt to locate aspects of these changes in
a discursive context.

The key terms in Martin's structural articulation—land, market,
absolute property, rent, traditional constraint, management, and develop-
ment—constitute for early modern England a field of discursive interarticulation of that struggle, qualification, and implication that the
Bakhtin circle calls social heteroglossia, and which it finds enacted
around, about, and within utterances employed by agents and ideolo-
gies. Through a survey of polemical usage and attention to three
Shakespearean “garden” scenes and Burgundy's lament for the “best gar-
den of the world,” in this chapter, I reconstruct aspects of discursive interarticulation through which agents in this transitional social struc-
ture engaged changing conditions, encountered one another, and, most
crucially though no less dialogically, voiced themselves.

I
Though the editor of the Oxford Henry V acknowledges hedges as “the
most normal species of agricultural fence or boundary” in England, the
ditor's notes to the Duke of Burgundy's lament for war's devastation of
“this best garden of the world” refer to the “rather peculiar inclusion of
hedges” and suggest an indebtedness to Virgil. Certainly, any familiari-
ty with English attacks on enclosure—a tradition of remarkable dura-
bility from the late middle ages to the present—renders Burgundy's
speech “peculiar” enough:

all her husbandry doth lie on heaps,
Corrupting in its own fertility.
Her vine, the merry cheerer of the heart,
Unprunèd dies; her hedges even-pleached,
Like prisoners wildly overgrown with hair,
Put forth disordered twigs; her fallow leas
The darnel, hemlock, and rank fumitory
Doth root upon, while that the coulter rusts
That should deracinate such savagery.
The even mead, that erst brought sweetly forth
The freckled cowslip, burnet, and green clover,
Wanting the scythe, all uncorrected, rank,
Conceives by idleness, and nothing teems
But hateful docks, rough thistles, kecksies, burrs,
Losing both beauty and utility.
And all our vineyards, fallows, meads, and hedges,
Defective in their natures, grow to wildness.
Even so our houses and ourselves and children
Have lost, or do not learn for want of time,
The sciences that should become our country,
But grow like savages—as soldiers will
That nothing do but meditate on blood. (5.2.39–60)

The assumed values here obviously belong to an ideology of improve-
ment, of “sciences” exercised upon a fallen world where the natural and
the human are both “defective in their natures.” The “wildness” of this
“uncorrected” nature is to be tamed for “utility,” and its “idleness” is to
be governed according to the management of “time.” Above all, bound-
aries and distinctions demand maintenance: “hedges” to return order to
a husbandry now in disordered “heaps.” While this passage has been
related to descriptions of Irish resistance and colonial husbandry, the
hedges might also have a resonance closer to home. It might awaken at-
tention because it represents quickset hedges—the very symbol of “cap-
italist” landowning, pursuit of profit, exploitation of rural labor, expro-
priation of land, and the development of absolute private property—as
the martyred prisoners of disorder.6

One might argue that this acclamation of order and distinction is
authorial, expressing class-oriented values akin to those evident in Mont-
joy’s horrified reaction to boundary violation among the unsorted dead
who lie in anarchic confusion of nobility with commons, masters with
subjects, men with beasts, and agents of savage rage or hired servitude
with chivalric combatants. Montjoy begs

To sort our nobles from our common men.
For many of our princes—woe the while!—
Lie drowned and soaked in mercenary blood;
So do our vulgar drench their peasant limbs
In blood of princes; and our wounded steeds
Fret fetlock-deep in gore, and with wild rage
Yerk out their armèd heels at their dead masters. (4.7.73–79)

The implied social threat registered in this reaction to proximity and confusion is most clearly marked by the reference to princes drowning in “mercenary blood.” The attitude towards distinction in standing here as toward division of land in Burgundy’s speech, suggests values of power and blood.

But there is another possibility. The association of “common,” “vulgar,” and “peasant” with “mercenary” and its opposition to “noble,” “princes,” and “masters” epitomize a traditional view of French society as bipolar, that is, lacking the English yeomanry, the “free” landholding peasant of median wealth and of a glorious capacity for voluntary military service praised by Shakespeare's Henry V. In fact, and despite apparent similarities of orientation, the values expressed by Burgundy and Montjoy are—in certain specific, conditionally significant aspects—at potential odds. This disagreement may be highlighted by juxtaposing Burgundy’s speech and the “garden” scenes of The Contention, Henry VI, Part Two, and Richard II with the conditions, arguments, and values associated with enclosure.

II

Despite the extreme variety of what modern analysis, with its attentiveness to localization, has described as the causes, origins, and formal articulations of enclosure, expressions of opposition to enclosure show a striking discursive consistency. J. A. Yelling may remind us that enclosure, to take only a few examples, has been “attributed in particular cases to population growth, to population decline, to the presence of soils favourable or unfavourable to arable, to industrial and urban growth, to remoteness from markets, to the dominance of manorial lords, to the absence of strict manorial control, to increased flexibility in the common-field system, and to the absence of such flexibility.” But with remarkable consistency, variations on the themes of nostalgia and loss concerning the human costs of agricultural change characterize a chain of anti-enclosure utterances stretching from the sixteenth century to the present, from Sir Thomas More to recent historians. Marx’s own discourse (which incor-
porates earlier polemic) may furnish a useful compendium: from the later fifteenth century the “free peasant proprietors” (or their usual embodiment, “the yeomanry, the class of independent peasants”) lose feudal rights to communal property as a result of the “usurpation of the common lands” by enclosure, and are thereby “precipitated without any transitional stages from [their] golden age to [their] iron age”; “the place of the independent yeoman was taken by tenants at will, small farmers on yearly leases, a servile rabble dependent on the arbitrary will of the landlords, the systematic theft of communal property was of great assistance, alongside the theft of the state domains, in swelling those large farms which were called in the eighteenth century capital farms, or merchant farms, and in ‘setting free’ the agricultural population as a proletariat for the needs of industry.” Similar views appear in earlier commentators upon the Post-Restoration Tudor years such as John Aubrey, who looked back from the Post-Restoration period to a “Golden Age” when men lived in feudalism’s “Nest of Boxes: for Copy-holders (who till then, were Villaines) held of the Lords of the Manor, who held of a superior Lord, who held perhaps of another superior Lord or Duke, who held of the King,” and contrasted this past with a present in which the “lovely campania” has been replaced by property enclosed “for the private, not the public good,” and has thereby come to “[swarm] with poore people.”

Contemporary commentary often strikes similar notes in lamenting the passing of the moral economy: Francis Trigge (1604) evokes “merie England” transformed by “covetous Inclosures [that] have taken this ioy and mirth away,” destroying “communitie of feeding,” “communitie of dwelling,” and the “Yeomanrie . . . the ancient glory of England.” William Harrison (1587) decries “the universality of this evil” of imparking for hunting or cattle keeping as “not sparing the very commons whereupon many townships now and then do live,” and he deems it a species of the rich man’s “laying of house to house and land to land.” “These inclosures,” writes Philip Stubbes (1583), “be the causes why rich men eat vp poore men, as beasts doo eat grasse.” The landlord who “incloseth commons . . . is an vsurer,” writes William Vaughan (1600), and those landlords who “doe leave no ground for tillage, but doe enclose for pasture many thousand acres of ground within one
hedge” despoil the yeomanry of independence and the poor of their “tenements.”

Despite their near ubiquity, consistency, and sympathy-evoking rhetoric, such complaints—with their lament for the conditions and values of a communal past undergoing brutal violation as greedy enclosers take away “the common field,” which as John Stow maintains “ought to be open and free for all men”—neither adequately defined the facts or the timing of enclosing nor, more crucially, succeeded in halting it. Modern accounts estimate that most enclosing took place before the sixteenth century—as many contemporary writers knew and sometimes acknowledged—and just after it. Nevertheless, there were factors at work in the latter part of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries that kept enclosure a vexed and highly symbolic topic. One such factor was its role in aggravating deearth: The repeal of anti-enclosure legislation in 1593 contributed to devastating hardship during the generally bad harvest years of 1593 to 1597. Particularly concentrated and offensive local instances of enclosing and conversion of land to grazing also aggravated the deearth that hit the Midlands in 1607 and 1608. And there was attendant governmental activity in the anti-enclosure statutes of 1597 and the enclosure commission of 1607, the last large-scale inquiry.

Why, then, despite its demonstrable capacity to awaken outrage; despite condemnations from the first official statute against depopulation in 1489 through seven royal commissions, twelve statutes, and numerous Proclamations; despite decisions by the Privy Council, Star Chamber, and Court of Requests; despite countless tracts, sermons, debates, and petitions, does enclosing become not only widespread but, by the mid-seventeenth century, publicly defensible? The complex factors involved in this phenomenon and their relationship to the emergent values of a nascent capitalism deserve attention.

For one thing, considerable evidence suggests that the very people who were attacking enclosure or being defended against it were often engaged in acts of “enclosure” and in defending enclosures. So, for example, the first item included in the demands of the Kett rebellion in 1549—a rebellion that had as one of its stated goals rights of common for freeholders and copyholders—was a request that “where it is enacted for
enclosing that it be not hurtful to such as have enclosed saffron grounds for they be greatly chargeable to them, and that from henceforth noman shall enclose any more."20 And, in the seventeenth century, the Levellers, who took their name from the leveling of quickset hedges and park palings, exempted from their objections such enclosures as are "only or chiefly for the benefit of the poor."21 Such apparent contradictions can and should be localized: the cultivation of saffron was an important local industry in Robert Kett's Norfolk, for example and the reference to defense of enclosure may be attributable to an East Anglian farming custom of foldcourse, which entitled the manorial lord to pasture sheep as he pleased on tenants' lands and was thus "liable precisely to reverse the attitude of manorial lord and tenant toward enclosing."22 But however resistant such local instances are to generalization and however challenging the individuating factors involved—such as Kett's having his own fences destroyed in the rising he later headed, or Lord Protector Somerset's privately being a rack-renter and encloser—there are larger, less local and personal issues and trends at work.23

During the period, in fact, the word "enclosure," like the hedges that embody it, exemplifies the heteroglossic—an arena for the criss-crossing of disputed and competing values and orientations.24 So, for example, one senses the social cross fire when the doctor of Sir Thomas Smith's Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England is compelled to defend the common field system not only against the arguments of the landed knight—"That which is possessed of many in common is neglected of all"—but also against the general will attributed to those actually working the land.25 The Husbandman of the Discourse maintains, "everyday some of us encloses a [plot] of his ground to pasture, and were it not that our ground lies in the common fields intermingled one with another, I think also our fields had been enclosed of common agreement of all the township long ere this time"(57). Under such pressure from so many fronts, the doctor strategically delimits a definition of enclosure that typifies the multivocality of the era's discourse: "I mean not of all enclosures, nor yet all commons, but only of such enclosures as turn common arable fields into pastures, and violent enclosures of commons without just recompense of them that have right
to common therein. For if land were severally enclosed to the intent to continue husbandry thereon and every man that had right to common had for his portion a piece of the same to himself enclosed, I think no harm but rather good should come thereof, if every man did agree thereto” (50). Of course, every man would not and did not agree thereto. Nonetheless, individuals of virtually every stratum of tenancy and ownership came to agree with the doctor that enclosure of arable land for improvement—if not for conversion to pasture—was “good,” or, to employ a term with which the doctor has considerable difficulty, that the enclosure of arable land was “profitable.” Though the Discourse identifies profit as the immoral cause of multiplying pastures and enclosures (51), the word loses this sense of appropriation and violation of the moral economy and becomes synonymous with “advancement,” that which “nourishes every faculty” (58), becoming thereby a proper end of property. The process by which this change occurs may be indexed in contemporary utterances.7

If, as Maurice Beresford argues, the problem presented by enclosure and its attendant depopulation was generally articulated in the public debate and legislation of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in terms of the profit incentive driving landlords’ decisions to enclose, there are nevertheless indications that by the latter part of the sixteenth century this polemical discourse hardly fits the facts, and that, in E. C. K. Gonner’s assessment, a “new period in the history of enclosure begins, marked by the steady growth of farming improvement as an active motive.”8 Instead of enclosure by the manorial lord for pastoral use, enclosure by agreement became dominant during the period, according to J. A. Yelling.9 Agreement, of course, should not be taken to rule out force or even violence as a factor in tenurial and agricultural change.10 But there is evidence that in the mid-sixteenth century enclosure began to be associated with—and thus to be defensible in terms of—“more intensive economies, requiring a less drastic reorganisation of farm structures and providing more employment.”11 So, for example, the tenants of Mudford and Hinton proposed to divide up the common fields in 1554 because “every man will use a further trayvale and dylygence with his londe to converte yt to the best use and purpose.”12 And even as the
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Justices of Nottinghamshire complained that enclosure was driving people into the towns, they exempted from their criticism enclosures under five acres on the grounds that such enclosures actually improved agriculture without causing depopulation. Such arguments characterize the frequently reprinted improvement literature of John Norden and John Fitzherbert, both of whom denounce forced enclosure by lords seeking to rack-rent or depopulate but assert that arable land enclosed by agreement may prove “halfe as good agayne in all maner of profytes to the tenauntes as it was before.” This improving literature is permeated, furthermore, with values of industry, thrift, individual discretion, efficiency, and private property rights.

The field is not uncontested, to be sure. Reynolde Scot’s preface to the first English manual devoted to cultivation of a single crop, A Perfite plat forme of a Hoppe Garden (1574), includes, as Andrew McRae points out, a denunciation of the “covetous man” for placing “private profite before common humanitie,” and seeks to avoid blame for providing means that might make “men riche in yeelding double profite.” Nevertheless, when Thomas Tusser contrasts the wealth and efficiency of land held in “severall” with the poverty and disorder of land commoned in “Champion countrie,” he not only employs the language of Tudor Stuart authority on behalf of enclosure—”Where champions ruleth the rost, / there daily disorder is most”—but also maintains

    More profite is quieter founde,
    (where pastures in severall be:)
    Of one sillie aker of ground,
    than champion maketh of three.
    Againe what a ioy it is knowne:
    when men may be bolde with their owne?

Against the threat of both “lordes of the soile” and the “commoners” who “for commons . . . crie” and “count it their owne they can get,” Tusser defends the enclosed farm as not only efficient, but right, original, and proper to individual possession and use—one’s “owne” to “be bolde” with—rather than itself a usurpation of the juridical-conditional rights of community, lord, or crown. The contrast could not be sharper between this affirmed boldness with one’s own and the widespread
condemnation of enclosers as exhibiting “the greedy desire of such as would live alone and only to themselves.”\textsuperscript{8} Furthermore, such positive evaluations are not particular to express defenders of enclosure itself but are instead part of a larger rationalization of property and labor informing utterances in realms as diverse as theology and theater.

Employing a discursive arsenal of terms and assumptions concerning real property throughout his theological writings, William Perkins writes against the notion of grace available without the church:

\begin{quote}
It pulis downe the pale of the Church, and laies it waste as every common field: it breeds carelessness in the use of means of grace, the word and Sacraments; when as man shall be perswaded, that grace shall be offered to every one effectually, whether hee be of the Church or not, at one time or other; whersoever or howsoever he live: as in the like case, if men shall be tolde that whether they live in the market towne or no, there shall be sufficient provision brought them, if they will but receive it and accept of it, who would then come to the market?\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

In this passage, the pale of the enclosed field is assumed to predate the common, the common itself to be equated with inevitable “waste” (“as every common field”) and the evils of a proto-Arminianism to be epitomized in “carelessness”—about uses and means, about time, space, and style of life, about property and propriety. The ills Perkins invokes, of course, are those antithetical to the classical values of rationalized production, whereas the assumed primacy of the market itself and its demands on human space, time, and labor in the final lines are more than predictive of social-economic hegemonies to come. Perkins’s metaphoric usage, untroubled by that need for self-explanation and localization found in Norden and Fitzherbert, registers assumed sympathy with values that radically oppose the culturally dominant anti-enclosure discourse.\textsuperscript{40}

These conflicting values and orientations can be found variously conjoined in \textit{The Contention, Henry VI, Part Two}, and \textit{Richard II}. In them we find the two faces of agrarian change: the polarization of a peasantry already internally differentiated in values as well as wealth and the aggression of landlord against feudal tenant. But we also find a remarkable conception of labor and property which bids to cast both in a different light.
In both the 1590s *Contention* and the 1623 *Henry VI, Part Two*, Alexander Iden’s encounter with John Cade is represented as the confrontation of a Kentish smallholder with an intruding Kentish commoner. The Alexander Iden of *Henry VI, Part Two* expresses pride in the double sufficiency of his brick-walled garden and his own hospitality, which renounces a competitive economy that seeks “to wax great by others’ waning, / Or gather wealth . . . with what envy” (2H6 4.10.20–21). To Iden, inheritor of a garden “worth a monarchy” (2H6 4.10.19), Cade’s intrusion—coming “like a thief to rob my grounds, / Climbing my walls in spite of me the owner” (2H6 4.10.33–34)—appears not only as theft and an insult to his authority of ownership but as an affront to his capacity to “[send] the poor well pleasèd from my gate” (2H6 4.10.23). By contrast, the Eyden of the *Contention* claims neither the other Iden’s hospitality, his lack of interest in competition, his garden, nor quite the same kind of possession. Content with his “land” because its “pleasure” equals that of the Court, Eyden spends no pity on the poor. Cade seems to him not a thief but a trespasser. Furthermore, his boundaries, though inherited, are not the brick walls of Iden’s “fee simple” garden but the very emblems of enclosed arable: “Ist not inough,” Eyden demands, “that thou hast broke my hedges, / And enterd into my ground without the leaue of me the owner.” In the *Contention*, the relation of property to appropriating enclosure appears uncompromised by the temporal continuity embodied in Iden’s brick wall, by the comparatively innocuous status of a garden plot, by the absolute heritability of fee-simple ownership without feudal entail, by the threat of robbery, or by a rhetoric of hospitality. Thus, the Folio palliates the potential identification of Iden with possessive accumulation, effectively increasing the difference in values distinguishing the Kentish landowner from the ambitious, hungry Kentish clothier.

In the period between 1594 and 1623, the years in which the dearth of the 1590s coincided with the rescinding of anti-enclosure legislation, Shakespeare wrote the garden scene of *Richard II*. The gardener is neither the possessive individualist of *The Contention* nor the socially con-
scious owner of *Henry VI, Part Two*. His landholding status is left unstated, but the values he embodies and the attitudes he expresses concerning enclosure, as well as other aspects of the changing agrarian economy, are pronounced, and they intersect remarkably with elements of feudalism elsewhere in the play. In pursuit of stated aims of "profit," the gardener—unlike either Eyden or Iden—labors rather than owns. He is represented not as "lord of the soil," not as a lesser embodiment modeled upon the sovereign as preeminent possessor of land, but as himself a "modle" for the occupation of monarchy. His authority derives specifically from "skill," from efficient management rather than from title of land or birth, the mainstays of feudalism's juridical-conditional structure. Nor is he called upon, as are the others, to enact yeomanry's mythic service as armed defender of that structure in order to participate in the political nation. His activities of political and agricultural critique are represented as instances of independent discrimination and evaluation occasioned by occupational needs meeting specific circumstances: he must actively intervene by excluding, restraining, measuring, and developing according to "time of yeare" and the ever-evolving conditions presented by "newes." The values he articulates are those of a rationalized economic production concerned with profit, number, condition, and efficiency rather than land and deference. These values constitute an ideal of propriety exercised within the enclosed "compas of a pale" that is extended to the "sea-walled garden," the disorder of which is defined as occasioned by a "wastefull king" and epitomized in the violated boundaries of England's "knots disordered" and "hedges ruinde." And such evaluations comment powerfully upon the feudal values elsewhere assumed, invoked, and conflicted in the heteroglot encounter of monarch and Lancastrians.

What the gardener actually possesses is neither capitalism's absolute property in land nor feudalism's conditional use rights to land, but the capital of skill in his occupation. The seriousness with which this idealization of labor is taken is evident in the fact that his status by virtue of this possession is represented as manifestly more secure than that entailed in the inherited land of the House of Lancaster (Bolingbroke's
inheritance) or in the heritable title of the monarch himself (Richard’s inheritance). This surprising security, most vividly indexed in his cogent resistance to the queen’s degrading attacks, corresponds to emergent values registered in Perkins’s account of occupation: “an occupation is as good as land, because land may be lost; but skill and labour in a good occupation is profitable to the end, because it will help at neede, when land and all things faile.”

Profitable skill and labor: if labor had long been considered a curse resulting from the biblical garden scene of the first Adam, references in Norden and others temper that sense with a sense of the “increase of their earthly reuenues” available to the improver. If the actions and pronouncements embodying these values in early modern England often appear pitiless to the poor and displaced, as Perkins himself frequently seems to be, that harshness could justify itself in the presumptive universality of its measure. It even applies to King Richard—and to his successors. Most clearly this is the case of Hal, whose gratuitous fall in the two parts of Henry IV seems contrived to necessitate his “redemption” through an otherwise unnecessary labor of statecraft and management. It is the case of his father, his grandfather, and their king, as represented in Richard II, however, that makes the relation of these values to changing agrarian conditions most clear.

From the perspective of feudalism, Richard is guilty of two related innovations against juridical-conditional ownership that render him no longer England’s supreme lord—in Gaunt’s phrase, not king but “landlord” (C4v). Both these violations of tradition represent prominent aspects of early modern England’s transitional articulation. First, Richard is represented as doing what Elizabethan lords are so frequently criticized for doing: violating customary tenurial relations by converting his own demesne lands to leasehold property for the use of exploitive middlemen—“farmers” in contemporary usage—rendering it to Gaunt’s feudal perspective “leasde out . . . Like to a tenement or pelting Farme” rather than preserving it as the Edenic mutual right of England’s chivalric “breede of men” (C3v). Second, Richard intervenes in Bolingbroke’s own case at precisely the point where large numbers of English landholders proved vulnerable to much-denounced seigneurial
aggression: entry into inheritance. In both cases Richard represents versions of popular agrarian villainy—the greedy evicting or rack-renting landlord, who contributed to the emergence of capitalist absolute property by treating land as an estate for profit rather than a conditional tenure held in feudalism’s “Nest of Boxes.” But he is not an encloser.

In fact, his managerial middlemen—those whom Bolingbroke claims have broken the ties of feudal allegiance between his lord and himself—are represented as violating Bolingbroke’s enclosures. With his “Disparkt . . . parkes” (E4r), Bolingbroke claims sympathy as the victim of seigneurial anti-enclosure violence that has reduced him to that prototypical figure of agrarian displacement, the “wandering vagabond” (E3r). Thereby we may be reminded that enclosing could be articulated during this period as an innocent, proper means of agricultural management, as well as the fact that anti-enclosure violence was frequently—sometimes with help commissioned from commoners—the expression of landlord aggression against enclosing tenants or against other landlords rather than the simple expression of popular outrage or class antagonism.

In the complex though necessarily provisional context constructed in this chapter, it may appear significant that Bolingbroke’s rising down-plays patriotic disinterestedness while both professing feudal allegiance (his “true service” [G2r]) and articulating claims of absolute property independent of feudal conditionalities of grant, tenure, or holding; or that his coming for “his owne” (G2r) is coupled with repeated invocation of economic profit that his adherents—including the gardener himself—may pursue. Furthermore, we should contrast Bolingbroke’s strategic interarticulation of feudal and capitalist values with the uncompromising feudal values embodied in Gaunt’s elegiac vision of England’s garden as “This other Eden, demy Paradise” undergoing wrenching transition from the hierarchic solidarity of “christian servise and true chiualry” (C3v) to leasehold contractuality—a vision remarkably related to that of Cade in Henry VI, Part Two and powerfully countered by the gardener of Richard II. Situational differences may seem to separate Cade’s vision of the present and future from Gaunt’s views of past and present, but the voice of the new disorder and the old order are repre-
sented as fundamentally related to one another in the values they profess. Cade’s utopian vision of himself as a warrior aristocrat in a society “all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord” (2H6 4.2.72–73) and his repudiation of a fallen present constituted by “parchment” bondage—in which to “but seal once to a thing” has meant being “never mine own man since” (2H6 4.2.76–80)—parallel in their terms Gaunt’s elegy for the fall of a king who epitomizes a whole “breede of men” who have been disidentified by “parchment bonds.” This shared antipathy reacts to the great proliferation of written records concerning landholding in the later sixteenth century and echoes the complaints that pervade contemporary attacks on the appropriation of the country by a market orientation perceived as urban. However, neither Cade nor Gaunt recognizes the complicity of his own feudal values and an emergent absolutism which would use those values, perhaps even believe them—as does Richard—when possible. Their misrecognition contrasts markedly with the gardener’s response to the queen’s attempt to cast him into a similarly disjunct identity as “old Adams likenesse,” a “cursed man” (G3v) newly fallen as a result of his attainment of a socially inappropriate political consciousness. The gardener professes an awareness that, by virtue of its capacity for both the socioeconomic rationalization of and personal regret for the cost—to Richard and his queen—of the changing conditions of class and politics (i.e., the “newes”), measures precisely the degree to which he is constructed not only as “his owne” man but also as a man of the times. That is, he is neither an unconstrained subjectivity nor a simple tool of others but capable precisely of the conditional freedom of agency. His enclosed garden, like that of England, is not Eden nor can it be Edenic, but it may be managed. In this, too, his garden conforms to the speech of Burgundy and the polemic of Norden, which identifies weeds as inevitable “markes of the first curse.” But the earth is capable of being “reformed” by “Industry,” “thryft,” and enclosure, “praise worthy, and profitable to the planter, and to the common wealth.”

IV

Joyce Oldham Appleby maintains (following Karl Polanyi) that market values are limited in their influence on a given social order by the extent
to which the pursuit of profit becomes a socially accepted goal. These plays and the discourses that enclosing invokes and provokes, however variously and discrepantly, participate in struggles to articulate or resist that goal. “Enclosing” should be not only localized but contextualized in the heteroglot conditionality of its feudal-capitalist interarticulations. When William Combe attempted to enclose his Welcombe tithe holdings between 1614 and 1615, whether, as Thomas Greene seems to consider writing in his diary, Shakespeare could not “help” the enclosure of his moiety, or, as Greene actually does write, Shakespeare could not “beare” it, Combe could defend this violently and legally resisted action in powerful terms. Combe could claim absolute rights to his own (“there was never psident seene that a man seised of an absolute and ffree estate should deprive himself of that libertie and be bound to husband his land to the Contente of a Third Pson”); he could invoke the value of improvement (“ye tents and freeholders Comon will be rather much bettered than Impayred by this Inclosure”); and he could employ terms of hospitality and profitable management (“for necessarye mainteynance of hospetallitie & good husbandrie”). In the event, Combe was blocked by communal violence and legal resistance, and by Chief Justice Coke’s intervention, but the Stratford Corporation’s defense of its source of funds for the poor dependents on the tithes was only one such encounter among countless others. Elsewhere arguments and force, coercion and agreement, internal differentiation and landlord eviction contended in a discursive interarticulation that accompanied and shaped the encounter of changing values and conditions.

For two final examples, compare the embattled survival of manorial values in John Norden’s idealized utterance concerning landlord-tenant relations with John Stow’s somewhat fatalistic depiction of demographic changes in the London suburbs. When Norden’s surveyor attempts to define what ought to be the proper relation of landlord to tenants, his definition contains a strong element of feudal, manorial values:

And therefore ought there to be such a mutuall concurrence of love and obedience in the one, and of aide and protection in the other, as no hard measure offered by the superiour, should make a iust breach of the loyaltie of the inferior: which kind of vnion is no waies better preserued and continued. . . then
by the Lords true knowledge of the particulars that euery tenant holdeth, and a favorale course in Fines and Rents: and by the Tennants loue and thankfulnesse in all ready servise and dutie towards the Lord.61

The surveyor articulates the rental relation as if it were the old manorial mutuality—with elements of “loue and obedience,” “protection,” “loyaltie,” and “servise,” between “superiour” and “inferiour.” However, this description also contains a discursive element that stands at odds with its nostal-gic aspects. The relation is also to be based on a new sort of measure, a “true knowledge of the particulars that euery tenant holdeth.” This reference to “true knowledge” bespeaks a demand that, as Andrew McRae says, “over-rides traditional assumptions about manorial relationships” in favor of ideals of economic and epistemological power.62 The old protection enjoyed by the tenant under the presumed approximations that defined manorial holdings according to customary measure becomes an abuse that should give way to the obviously superior claim of the landlord’s right to exact knowledge of his property—to “know his owne”—in order to manage it efficiently.63 What chance will love and obedience have against the “truth” of facts and figures?

Similarly, no matter how adamantly John Stow may oppose enclosure, his account of enclosing in the London suburbs betrays in the manner of its articulation an opening for the inevitable. The anti-enclosure violence on the suburban commons in 1515 has since given way to change, Stow writes:

after which time (saith Hall) these fields were never hedged, but now we see the thing in worse case than ever, by means of enclosure for gardens, wherein are built many fair summer-houses; and, as in other places of the suburbs, some of them like Midsummer pageants, with towers, turrets, and chimney-tops, not so much for use of profit as for show and pleasure, betraying the vanity of men’s minds, much unlike to the disposition of the ancient citizens, who delighted in the building of hospitals and alms-houses for the poor, and there-in both employed their wits, and spent their wealths in preferment of the common commodity of this our city.64

Available in Stow’s denunciation of enclosure is one crucial loophole qualifying disapproval: “use of profit” is allowed a relative superiority over “show,” “pleasure,” and “vanity.” The problem of the displaced poor,
moreover, is conceded to be an “ancient” concern of hospital and almshouse, of charitable institutions and individuals, as if the manorial economy with its agricultural system of interdependent conditional owner-tenants, living in “mutuall concurrence of love and obedience . . . and of aide and protection,” had never existed.
The “individual,” while unthinkable apart from social definition, retains an important place in an interactive, dialogical sense of identity and practice for the Bakhtin circle, as “the psyche and ideology dialectically interpenetrate in the unitary and objective process of social intercourse” (*MPL* 41). V. N. Vološinov, furthermore, describes the aesthetic discourses of the Renaissance as registering the historical emergence of a “heavily marked” individualizing trend (*MPL* 151). In this context, *Richard II* offers an especially interesting field of inquiry, and not only because King Richard constitutes, as has often been noted, a pronounced example of what nineteenth-century critical and theatrical traditions regarded as “character.” Along with the potential the play provides those traditions and their descendants for interpreting the personhood of its royal protagonist, it also offers support for approaches that would analyze interrelations among the various heteroglot discourses employed by its characters, and not least by its “individualized” protagonist, as they act and interact with one another. It is not simply that various individual characters speak in different institutional discourses, employing, say, feudalist estate terms, absolutist monarchical terms, or the language of commonwealth to describe the public order for which they contend. More importantly, the characters articulate themselves, name their values, and
define their ideological positions in utterances that seem to cross themselves as well as one another, suggesting odd alliances, interior divisions, misrecognitions, and cross purposes within as well as among "individual" interlocutors.

In this chapter, I read Richard II, and particularly the often-remarked individuation of its regal protagonist, in light of these interlocutionary aspects of utterance. The analysis that emerges offers alternatives to post-structuralist or Foucauldian conceptualizations of the subject in "language" or in "discourse itself," positing the claims of voice against the totalizing claims of "textuality" or the more localized systematizations of the discursive "archive." If "life begins only at the point where utterance crosses utterance" (MPL 145), any utterance is always already the arena of such crossings, a meeting ground for the struggles and agreements of social forces, accents, and intonations of an embracing social heteroglossia, "each word . . . a little arena for the clash and criss-crossing of differently oriented social accents. A word in the mouth of a particular individual person is a product of the living interaction of social forces" (MPL 41). From this perspective, the specific polyphonic dialogism of the novel, the "frank and free" heteroglossia of carnival, or the dodgy indirections of reported speech may appear merely extreme forms of the interaction and indirection fundamental to human life, but specific form remains crucial. There may be "voices in everything" (SG 139), but one of the most important aspects of Bakhtinian practice is detecting voices within voices themselves.

Alone and imprisoned, the deposed Richard II would "people" his cell with thoughts that are like people.

My brain I'll prove the female to my soul,
My soul the father, and these two beget
A generation of still-breeding thoughts,
And these same thoughts people this little world,
In humours like the people of this world;
For no thought is contented. (R2 5.5.6—11)

But instead of "people" defined according to "humors," his representations have the character of three social estates: the "better sort" of the
religious ("as of things divine"); those who openly pursue "ambition" and "pride"; and those who are "content" with subjection.

The better sort,
As thoughts of things divine, are intermix'd
With scruples, and do set the word itself
Against the word,
As thus: "Come, little ones"; and then again,
"It is as hard to come as for a camel
To thread the postern of a small needle's eye".
Thoughts tending to ambition, they do plot
Unlikely wonders: how these vain weak nails
May tear a passage thorough the flinty ribs
Of this hard world, my ragged prison walls;
And for they cannot, die in their own pride.
Thoughts tending to content flatter themselves
That they are not the first of fortune's slaves,
Nor shall be the last—like silly beggars
Who sitting in the stocks, refuge their shame,
That many have and others must sit there;
And in this thought they find a kind of ease,
Bearing their own misfortunes on the back
Of such as have before indur'd the like. (R2 5.5. 11–30)

These thoughts, like the social strata whose functions they represent in exaggerated form—clerisy, nobility, and subjects—only emerge in Richard's soliloquy to be assessed as essentially the same in their fundamental human discontent. Despite their apparent differentiation, Richard's summation reveals that the defining human condition for members of these three categories is what the Puritans called Self-will, that necessarily endless and profoundly corrupt desire to be pleased:

But whate'er I be,
Nor I, nor any man that but man is,
With nothing shall be pleas'd, till he be eas'd
With being nothing (R2 5.5.39–41).

Such identifiable discursive formations here and elsewhere repay examination.

Of course the man that "but man is," the human genus here constituted, is hardly a necessary and eternal natural category, as recent analy-
sis, whether deconstructive, historicist, or feminist, reminds us. Yet to expose its categorical factitiousness does not assess the function of Richard’s formulation as a situated utterance that is itself fraught with socially heteroglot potential. Moreover, Richard’s situated utterance emerges from another utterance, one constituted by the historically and institutionally specific conjunction of playwright with audience. The “man that but man is,” the “thing itself” that Lear will invoke, appears within this play neither as a universalized morality protagonist nor as the shared assumption grounding the action and thought of the characters and playwright but as a situated object produced by the discourse of a historically constituted, monarchical subject who can no longer simply assume that the “estates” and their role in defining “men” are eternally stable. Confronted with the changing membership of the estates, most radically embodied in his own uncrowning, the fallen monarch declares estates themselves, after the fashion of the Wheel of Fortune, illusory. Collectively stratified men are thus rendered unworthy of consideration except in the more essential form of “man,” and that man, because no longer separated from what he desires by anything more (or less) substantial than accident and illusion, is defined as inevitably and always a desiring being. Seen in such a light, this “ambition” may be affirmed (as in Marlowe’s theatrical protagonists), renounced (as in Reformers’ renunciations of selfishness), or managed (as in Machiavelli’s strategic accounts of political life), but its natural claims on “man” may not be denied nor the historical conditions of its production subjected to analysis. In this context Richard’s practice of textual exegesis is revealing.

Freed from the clerisy’s institutional constraint, the isolated subject, in this case a king, ironically exaggerates the hermeneutic sovereignty opened by the Reformation to both the monarchical head of the church and conversely to the lowliest inner-light Anabaptist: by himself he confronts the Word itself by itself. Without council, church, or clerical tradition to guide him in this lonely encounter, Richard passes biblically inflected judgment even on theology itself, the “better sort” of thoughts. These elevated spiritual thoughts that in uncoerced freedom (unlike the gallows drudges later mentioned) leave behind any constrained thinking about “this world” and turn to eternal verities “as” of things divine are, nevertheless, to Richard’s eye, human. Because human, they are driven by
desire, and desire, even when it appears in the field of spirituality, inevitably makes room to assert the self. In the spiritual field, human ambition appropriates a space for selfhood in the institutionally specific form of "scruple" or "nice" reservations, even in reading the Bible and even at the cost of scriptural coherence, willfully turning the word of God against itself in heresy or schism; no small matter of public concern. However, the silences deployed by the playwright in the particular words of God that this individual protagonist turns against one another validate the very categories of social differentiation that Richard's analysis proclaims illusory. The contradiction that Richard finds within the Gospels thus need be taken neither as a textual aporia that he as de-institutionalized "individual" reader discovers as sovereign subject confronting its object, nor as the inevitable meconnaissance resulting from just any individual interpreter's instantiation of a universalized human desire or will to power. Rather, Richard's (mis)reading shows marked relation to his other utterances, to utterances by other characters among which Richard's own utterances take shape, and to theatrical and extratheatrical utterances within and among which the play itself is constituted as an utterance.

Specifically, the familiar verses Richard abbreviates assume a valid (if divinely sublatable) discrimination between "children" who, as the least in social estimation, are encouraged to come to God and the "rich" who, as products of their privileged socioeconomic conditions, experience greatest difficulty in so coming.4 The biblical word is not, as an Elizabethan audience would easily recognize, at war with itself. On the basis of this obvious inadequacy, the form of Richard's analysis, reminiscent of the faulty logic of Doctor Faustus's opening soliloquy, discredits its own possible authority, and his pronouncement appears as the ironized utterance of a particular speaking character. Moreover, the form of the interpreter's willfulness seems itself more specific to Richard himself than to interpretive free play or universal human desire: the apparent contradictions of Richard's representation seem to be produced by his tendency to disregard the specificity of social distinctions that others take seriously as illusory and to treat them as a transitory overlay upon the fundamental sameness of that desire which constitutes for him the natural human condition.

The obvious limitations of Richard's reading could be enlisted to individualize Richard himself in terms of "thoughts tending to ambition."
Maybe it is Richard's own frustrated desire that leads him to read against the accepted sense and turn biblical phrases in such a distorting, universalizing way; thus the way Richard reads might constitute a particular expression of a consistent subjective tendency that could be called, in nineteenth-century usage, his "character." Or, to consider another and diametrically opposed possibility, perhaps Richard's misreadings, like his self-defeat, are not matters of individual character finding its inevitable fate but synecdoches for an all-embracing "culture of Absolutism" such as that which Franco Moretti finds informing Renaissance tragedy. In this light, even when Richard has been reduced to the pathetic limitations of his final imprisonment, his willful misinterpretation might represent the centrality of the monarch's will as imagined in an extremely broad historical ideological formation. The subject matter that Richard II shares with Gorboduc might permit such an inclusive account, but there is much to be gained from defining formal parameters of difference.

Richard's royal tragedy, like his act of misreading, does not hinge simply upon the will of a freely originary subjectivity. Richard's political downfall and his interpretive error take shape within the interactions of discursive tendencies and situational directives that cannot be simply dismissed or evaluated apart from one another. By contrast, King Gorboduc's self-deposing is not only chorically denounced but clearly represented as willful innovation; his feeble optimism about the "nature" of family love easily evaluated by Eubulus's authoritative pronouncement: "Within one land one single rule is best. / Divided reigns do make divided hearts." Against such widely recognized cultural givens, Gorboduc's individual romantic illusions about natural goodness look about as willful as the drunkenness to which his forerunner in stage willfulness, King Cambyses, freely "subjects" himself. By contrast, in Richard II decisions are made and interpretations forged within situated utterances and among the discursive promptings of alternative languages which do not admit such univocal evaluation or clear-cut opposition. In addition, the play constantly suggests the ways in which one discourse or ideology takes form, shape, limitation—its very meaning—within and among others. Thus, typically, Richard's biblical miscitations differ from those of Faustus in that Richard's own utterance does not merely
shape the biblical utterance into an identifiable cliché of willful misap-
propriation but instead voices it in the form of a culturally acceptable
religious discourse upon the universal depravity of desiring man. In
other words, a sixteenth-century Christian could agree with part of what
Richard says and still be perfectly within the bounds of orthodox opin-
ion. One is not simply reminded of what is ideologically wrong but
prompted to evaluate the limitations in what is right about what he says.
Richard's textual interpretation, like his downfall, does not appear to be
the simple product of a wrong choice arising from the misguided indi-
vidual willfulness of a character who acts under the prompting "flattery"
of a patently factitious discourse or ideology (as in Gorboduc's roman-
tic idealism or Faustus's nihilism); rather, acts of (mis)interpretation like
acts of (mis)rule appear in the play as utterances—situated, enabled,
contested, and represented among other utterances—and demand eval-
uation as such.

This dimension of the play is not altogether surprising, given cer-
tain features of the historical material with which Shakespeare was work-
ing, nor have critics altogether missed it, although some have perhaps
misrecognized it, even within the great tradition of nineteenth-century
character criticism. The argument of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, a found-
ing figure of that tradition, suggests as much.

II

Well before, during, and beyond Shakespeare's era, the person of King
Richard II and the story of his downfall were subjects of considerable
discussion. Quite aside from the usual discrepancies, the historical
chronicles, even such semi-popular works as The Mirror for Magistrates,
have acknowledged the weight of this discursive inheritance as a palpable
factor that shapes any subsequent utterance. And when it comes to
speaking for Richard rather than about him, one member of the autho-
rial committee for The Mirror for Magistrates puts the problem suc-
cinctly, "I would . . . gladly say sumwhat for king Richard. But his per-
sonage is so sore intangled as I think fewe benefices be at this day." The
problem here is not so much that Richard's reign makes it impossible to
say anything positive on his behalf—after all, it was far from an unmit-
igated disaster and its problems were not simply Richard’s own fault—the problem of saying something positive is complicated by the fact that the available languages in which to define his failings were already so various, so “intangled.”

Revealingly, in the case of the Mirror itself, the authors’ endeavor to speak “for king Richard” actually amounts to allowing the character of Richard a more or less standard de casibus lamentation while adding to that voice a second order discourse which, while attributed to Richard, actually objectifies him from the viewpoint of authorial assumptions. Thus, “Richard” tells his own story as that of “a Kyng that ruled al by lust.” Such diagnostic language shows that any felt need to render Richard’s voice or to suggest the discrepant circumstances and qualifications contained in the historical accounts of his reign remains under the sway of the work’s stated moral purpose “to diswade from vices and exalte virtue.” While the Mirror articulates its own didactic aims in a familiar sixteenth-century moral discourse, other contemporary accounts, recruit King Richard’s story for purposes more self-consciously political and institutionally specific in ideology. Richard Grafton’s Chronicle (1569), for example, appropriates Richard’s story to argue for age discrimination in governmental posts, claiming that Richard’s downfall shows “the fraylties of [Richard’s] youth,” and, more specifically, the failings of a monarchy being led by “yong counsayle” rather than the “sage and wise men of his realme.” John Stubbs’s The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf (1579) claims Richard’s story as a warning against foreign marriage, showing how a “French match it was which within one year brought the King to dishonourable captivity, death, and deposing.” Leicester’s Commonwealth (1584) joins Richard’s downfall to that of Edward II and, somewhat improbably, to that of Henry VI, to illustrate the perils of kingly favoritism, that “specialist rock of all other whereat kings and princes do make their shipwracks,” namely, “this too much affection towards some unworthy particular persons.” William Warner’s The Second Part of Albion’s England (1589) claims that Richard was corrupted by a courtly milieu characterized by “Ambition, Avarice, and counsell lewd.” Peter Wentworth’s Pithie Exhortation to Her Maiestie for Establishing her Successor (1598) claims that Richard’s story shows that inherited title is secondary in importance to knowing the pragmatic arts of rule, arguing that
the “nobility and commons” alike rightly prefer a “vsurper” to “a rightfull king, that would perill the crowne and state” by “great misgovernment.”

Whatever audiences might have thought about the role of Richard II and his reign in causing the great civil war conflict between the houses of York and Lancaster, they would have realized that the reign was a nexus of negative forces. When Queen Elizabeth says to William Lambarde that she identifies or has been identified with Richard II, it is difficult to know precisely what criticism she is reacting to because this identification suggests so many different aspects, but the likeness is negative. Shakespeare’s play presents Richard according to the prevailing negative portrayals of Richard’s reign, a notion underlined by the critical tradition that comes closest to a positive assessment, the romantic and post-romantic strand that stems from Coleridge and runs through Walter Pater and William Butler Yeats to Mark Van Doren and Hardin Craig. These critics associate Richard with the imaginative powers of the “poet” yet they feel compelled to define his lyrical utterance in relation to a debilitating personal inconsistency.

Coleridge credits two excellencies that make the play supreme among Shakespeare’s works: “the masterly delineation of the principal character” and Gaunt’s speech on behalf of England—”the most magnificent, and, at the same time, the truest eulogium of our native country that the English language can boast.” Remarkably, in order to maintain his definitions of Richard as a distinctively individual “character” and Gaunt’s speech as a timeless prescription for English virtue, Coleridge has to treat the utterances of the two characters very differently. Facing Richard’s abrupt changes of mood and behavior, Coleridge nevertheless assesses Richard’s speeches as variations on a single character. In contrast to Dr. Johnson, Coleridge proclaims “the utmost consistency of character” in Richard as demonstrated precisely by inconsistent words and actions: “he is weak, variable, and womanish, and possesses feelings, which, amiable in a female, are misplaced in a man, and altogether unfit for a king,” and although he may show surprising flashes of “immediate courage” or “fore-sight,” “what he was at first, he is at last, excepting as far as he yields to circumstances.” Among the gendered terms here, the behavioral ideology ascribed to Richard is a consistent inconsistency. Coleridge does
not relate this apparently individuated behavior to available sixteenth-century generic modes of monarchical behavior. Nor does he treat the specific dramatic “circumstances” to which he alludes as perhaps producing rather than revealing a basic, consistently individual character who is essentially independent of specific circumstance or interlocutor. Coleridge treats the speeches of Gaunt and his son Bolingbroke in a radically different way.

Coleridge removes Gaunt’s England speech from any connection to the speaker’s own sometimes startling reversals of mood and position, indeed from any individual circumstance whatsoever; in this case neither “character” nor context apparently has anything to do with meaning. He extracts Gaunt’s eulogy for English chivalry from its dramatic context and from the ties that bind its language to a historical discourse of honor culture. Coleridge takes Gaunt’s speech as a detached pronouncement on a timeless English “patriotism” and the “morality” on which it must be based. Ignoring any historical specificity in Gaunt’s images of Crusading knighthood as “Christian service and true chivalry” and their opposition to images of leasehold tenure and its concomitant contractual legalism as “inky blots, and rotten parchment bonds,” Coleridge asserts the timeless “meaning” of the speech for all English audiences of any time: “If this passage were recited in a theatre with due energy and understanding, with a proper knowledge of the words, and a fit expression of their meaning, every man would retire from it secure in his country’s freedom, if secure in his own constant virtue.”

From a Bakhtinian perspective, one might ask how the “meaning” of these words can be what Coleridge makes it out to be? Surely nineteenth-century definitions of “freedom” and “morality” significantly differ from the virtues expounded in Gaunt’s context-specific nostalgia for militant feudalism and his bitter rejection of the emerging contractual state order? But the salient point is not that Coleridge, like the rest of us, fails to discern all the implications of his own (transhistorical) categories but the implications of his procedural inconsistencies for the larger argument of individuation. This point is brought home in the different treatment he accords the speeches and actions of Bolingbroke.

In this third variation of method and emphasis, Coleridge initially
admits a certain inconsistency in Bolingbroke's own speeches and action. This inconsistency is neither ignored as in his treatment of Gaunt, nor essentialized as a defining individual trait as in his account of Richard. Instead, it is subsumed in a detailed account of the circumstances of Bolingbroke's utterances. When, for example, Bolingbroke might appear to resemble Richard in changing his tone and his mind from moment to moment in a single speech, the explanation is not that he resembles Richard in being prone to “rapid transitions.” Instead, Coleridge constructs an explanation that lays the responsibility for the apparent shifts on his interlocutors. In one instance, Bolingbroke first threatens national destruction if his lands are not returned, and then draws back:

If not, I'll use the advantage of my power
And lay the summer's dust with showers of blood
Rain'd from the wounds of slaughtered Englishmen—
The which, how far off from the mind of Bolingbroke
It is such crimson tempest should bedrench
The fresh green lap of fair King Richard's land,
My stooping duty tenderly shall show. (R2 3.3.42–48)

Coleridge explains this shift of mood by recourse to imagined stage business, a glance from York: “He passes suddenly from insolence to humility, owing to the silent reproof he received from his uncle. This change of tone would not have taken place, had Bolingbroke been allowed to proceed according to the natural bent of his own mind, and the flow of the subject.” Whether or not this imagined scenario is accurate to the moment of the play it depicts, Coleridge’s (uncharacteristic) recourse to the conjectural stage business of York’s admonitory glance treats the speech of Bolingbroke as if it were shaped in a dialogue, determined by an intersection of speaker and interlocutor. In this case, Coleridge emphasizes precisely the element he downplays in the case of Richard himself, giving no hint that Richard's speeches are joint creations of interlocutors rather than merely his consistently inconsistent reactions to “circumstances.”

Another speech by John of Gaunt offers a framework for pursuing the analysis of utterance that Coleridge fails to develop. Gaunt’s reaction to
his own concurrence in the banishment of his son, Bolingbroke, outlines certain dynamics of speech considered as utterance. Questioned by Richard about his apparent regret at the sentence of banishment with which he formerly concurred, Gaunt first explains his inconsistency in universalized, proverbial terms, “Things sweet to taste prove in digestion sour” (R2 1.3.236), a familiar paradox of desire and fulfillment that renders everyone consistently inconsistent. The sources attribute no such fickleness to Gaunt, but the historical accounts do attribute such a quality to Richard, calling him youthful, inconstant, wanton, or one who willfully “ruled al by lust.” Thus, in the historical silence concerning reasons for Gaunt’s behavior, the play first offers an invented character diagnosis that appropriates an aspect of the received characterization of the monarch to explain Gaunt’s enigmatic consent. The character constructed by Gaunt’s proverb is of the same universalizing “human” sort as that constructed by Richard’s soliloquy. Using the same terms elsewhere used for that proverbial self-willed “tyrant” imprisoned and self-alienated in achievement of his desire, Tarquin the rapist (“His taste deliciouis, in digestion souring” [RL 699]), Gaunt delivers a commonplace assessment of human will as inevitably self-subjecting. Man, the desiring being, is inevitably alienated from the object that he would possess precisely by the endless desire for possession and thus like the self-indulgent tyrant that Moretti describes.

So like that of the “man” with nothing pleased till eased with being nothing, this generalized homiletic note is followed, however, by Gaunt’s complaint about the particular condition of particular men rather than about the general condition of mankind. Maintaining that he himself never really desired what in fact he asked for, Gaunt provides a highly particularized analysis of utterance that undercuts the notion of a universal human character—even that of willful subjectivity—assumed in his first response, while at the same time offering a profound assessment of the reality and the complexity of interrelationship among those social differentiations that Richard’s soliloquy dismisses as merely illusory. Neither universal as human “ambition” nor exclusively individual as personal character, the speaking subject, the “I” constructed in his complaint, appears inextricable from the social demands of utterance:
You urg'd me as a judge, but I had rather
You would have bid me argue like a father.
O, had it been a stranger, not my child,
To smooth his fault I should have been more mild.
A partial slander sought I to avoid,
And in the sentence my own life destroy'd.
Alas, I look'd when some of you should say
I was too strict to make mine own away;
But you gave leave to my unwilling tongue
Against my will to do myself this wrong. (R2 1.3.237–46)

Gaunt takes back what he said because, in effect, he did not say it. What was said was determined by the context of its utterance. He said what he said because he was approached in a particular discourse (bid to argue juridically “as a judge” instead of paternally “like a father”). He said it because he shared certain values (aristocratic honor culture’s higher internal standards for one’s own “child” than for “a stranger”). He said it because he feared a critical response from his interlocutors on the basis of these values if he were not “strict” in their application (seeking to avoid “slander” as “partial”). And he said it because he anticipated his interlocutors would respond to his pronouncement of sentence on the basis of lineage values he assumes they share (hoping some will restore his heir, his “own” and his “life”). Despite the potential self-contradictions in this account, its burden is tellingly summed up in Gaunt’s protest that far from being interpretable as simple expressions of his own will, his express judgments upon his son, as just previously upon himself, are not his own: “you gave leave to my unwilling tongue / Against my will to do myself this wrong.” The personal pronouns here employed testify eloquently against the notion of a solitary ego as the origin or proprietor even of the words that proceed from its “own” mouth. Gaunt’s “yes” was not “yes” at all, but appears as a dialogized utterance, preformed and mediated among a complex of struggling social evaluations and differentiations.

But much would be missed if we were to limit our understanding of utterance to the content of Gaunt’s analysis. The formal features of his speech also bear upon the question of character and utterance in the play. First of all, one might notice the contradiction between the self-accusation that blames himself for human willfulness, for changing his
mind, and the self-exculpation in his subsequent denial of personal responsibility for his pronouncement. Second, although here directly questioned by the monarch, Gaunt does not merely reply directly to this supreme interlocutor but includes the larger audience of Peers and court in his address. Third, his speech nostalgically invokes the very assumptions that helped produce his difficulties in the first place: his mournful evocation of the values of honor culture seeks to elicit solidarity on the basis of precisely those values that his stage audience’s previous silences have already effectively denied by failing to provide him with what Vološinov calls a “supporting chorus.” Finally, and not surprisingly, this speech like so many others in the play, fails rhetorically despite its lengthy eloquence. Eloquent formulation and lengthy elaboration repeatedly appear to get nowhere despite their prominent place in defining the form of the play’s utterances. Attention to such formal features can help direct our inquiry beyond the elementary pragmatics suggested in Gaunt’s account of his difficulties and toward the more indirect reaches of consideration demanded by an analysis of utterance.

First Gaunt blames himself for a willfulness that is assumed to be the definitive human condition—universal and indifferent to particulars of object or subject (all “things,” with time, equally “sour” to any “digestion”); then he blames the court for violating his personal will. Gaunt’s apparent self-contradictions attempt to mediate a deeper level of self-contradiction that marks his utterances throughout the play. These self-contradictions may appear to some extent individualized as his “character,” but they are integrally related in form and content to self-contradictions observable in the utterances of other characters and embedded in the social heteroglossia of the play as a whole. In the historical silence concerning Gaunt’s agreement to his son’s banishment, the play offers this invented account, just as elsewhere an explanation is invented for Gaunt’s failure to act in response to the murder of his brother Gloucester. The two cases provide two different forms of explanation: the one an analysis of utterance, the other an explicit avowal of ideology. However, both have much to do with one another, with “who (de facto and de jure) may speak, to whom, and how.”

The bereaved Duchess of Gloucester demands that Gaunt revenge his brother Gloucester’s murder. By undertaking that act, she urges, he
will perform a religious duty to defend “sacred blood.” In urging this violent recourse she vehemently rejects the claims of a competing religious discourse. The duchess repudiates the values of “patience” as narrowly class-specific rather than universal, being consolatory to “mean men” but constituting “despair” or “cowardice” in “noble breasts” (R2 1.2.9–36). By virtue of stressing this social component, her argument differs from standard forms of rhetorical redescription by which one may, in Henry Peacham’s terms, “Call him that is craftye, wyse: a covetous man, a good husband; murder, a manly deed; deepe dissimulation, singuler wisedome; [and] pryde, cleansynesse.” Instead, the duchess inextricably binds character to social differentiation: the very same act of forbearance signifies according to who practices it, becoming for nobility the vice of despair or cowardice and for commons the virtue of patience. In its resistance to the claims of Christianity or of Tudor state religion that insists on subjection to the monarch, her speech assumes primacy for aristocratic lineage values, accurately reproducing the avowed corporate demands of one feudal discourse in an extreme, undiluted form, even when those demands threaten regicide. Furthermore, according to her, personal honor is inextricably defined by family considerations and fatally compromised insofar as that family is threatened at any point: unavenged “blood” of kin threatens the demise of the whole line—threatening “brotherhood,” the “life” of the spouse, and, mystically, the further sacrilege of parricide upon the slain family member’s already dead father. As she says to Gaunt: “Yet art thou slain in him; thou dost consent / In some large measure to thy father’s death.” Because kinship is presumed to be self-evidently important, any failure to respond to a threat against family appears as a failure of individual will before an implacable imperative.

Gaunt’s response to these powerfully articulated pleas and accusations, as is so often the case with speeches in this play, invokes strongly held and distinctly different values. In doing so, Gaunt’s speech also casts light on the thematics of his response to Richard concerning the banishment of his son while illuminating its own form with larger significance:

God’s is the quarrel—for God’s substitute,
His deputy anointed in His sight,
Hath caus’d his death; the which if wrongfully,
Let heaven revenge, for I may never lift
An angry arm against His minister. (R2 1.2.37–41)

Particularly remarkable here is not the invocation of this ideological commonplace of absolute obedience (familiar from officially promulgated Homilies, prayers, and the like), nor the extremity of its formulation (even proscribing judgment upon the king for culpability in committing murder), but the degree to which the terms of this invented ideological explanation for the historical Gaunt's support of Richard are not simply accredited as an authoritative discourse. The play represents Gaunt's values as it represents the duchess's own kinship-honor values; neither stands as authoritative but both are interwoven into struggles of utterance with utterance. In this scene, to be sure, Gaunt's professed religious obedience to the monarch does not so much effectively answer the duchess's charges as reduce her to a species of forlorn and self-contradictory complaint, much as Gaunt himself is reduced to complaining self-contradiction by Richard's sentencing of his son. No matter how perfunctorily her reaction is treated, Gaunt's statements have an effect. Her subsequent complaints divert her accusations away from their original royal target and display a telltale self-contradiction that registers the limitations inhering in kinship-honor discourse in resisting royal authority when such authority supports itself, as it did in the sixteenth century, with its own state religion. Told to trust to "God, the widow's champion and defence," as indeed God alone must be everyone's defense if Gaunt's model of strictly downwardly directed authority were uncontested by the available upwardly directed models of English rule, the duchess says she will console herself with trust in the divine. However, she also immediately redirects her animosity from King Richard to his associate Norfolk (R2 1.2.47–52 versus 1.2.4–5 and 1.2.37–41) and abruptly characterizes such "consolation" as, in fact, a suicidal renunciation of hope equivalent to the futile "despair" of which she formerly accused Gaunt: "Desolate, desolate, will I hence and die" (R2 1.2.73).

Thus explicitly, as implicitly in Gaunt's confrontation with Richard, religious demands for absolute obedience redirect the religiously articulated claims of lineage honor into what would become by the sixteenth century the closest approximation to an acceptable form of utterance—
a speech genre—for calling the monarch into question.” The duchess ultimately attacks the royal associates and not the king, despite the fact that she begins with the knowledge that it is the monarch himself “which made the fault”:

O, sit my husband's wrongs on Herford's spear,
That it may enter butcher Mowbray's breast!
Or if misfortune miss the first career,
Be Mowbray's sins so heavy in his bosom
That they may break his foaming courser's back
And throw the rider headlong in the lists,
A caitive recreant to my cousin Herford! (R2 1.2.47–53)

Here, she even redirects the specific language of religious apostasy away from Gaunt and toward Mowbray, employing the discourse of Bolingbroke's denunciations of Mowbray as “traitor and a miscreant” (R2 1.1.39). In sum, it becomes difficult to credit her assessment of Gaunt's individual character as cowardly for failing to attack Richard when her own accusations against the king submit to similar redirection in becoming attacks upon his associate. Besides, both her utterance and that of Gaunt are versions of what is said earlier by Bolingbroke himself, who, despite evidencing considerable personal knightly fortitude, manages only to accuse Mowbray and not King Richard when everyone—Gaunt, the duchess, and York—recognizes Norfolk to be merely the loyal instrument acting at Richard's behest. While Bolingbroke's verbal indirection in the public assembly of the first scene might be strategic, the duchess's diversion of her own murderous anger against Richard into prayers for Norfolk's merely symbolic reduction at the hands of Bolingbroke to “caitive recreant” suggests the historical weakness of kinship-honor values against the claims of a centralizing monarchy. The early modern period saw the very way of life that depended upon truculent lineage solidarity progressively reduced to individual expressions of symbolic violence exercised under increasingly restrictive control. The assertion of family honor and personal identity through competitive pursuit of “honor” was hamstrung against a monarchy that monopolized the institutional means, such as armed combat, by which one might acquire honor's public recognition.36
Not that honor values—blood kinship, personal will, and word of honor—do not command a degree of authority. Richard himself takes account of their claims when he explicitly denigrates them in favor of the primacy of the monarch/subject relation and its values. So, for example, he demands that Bolingbroke accuse Norfolk “as a good subject” rather than upon the “ancient malice” of a family feud (R2 1.1.10); or he denies the ties of “sacred blood,” reducing speech itself to royal allowance rather than allowing it to be the product of the knight’s overriding duty to speak out on behalf of his own will and for the welfare of his kin:

Were he my brother, nay, my kingdom's heir,  
As he is but my father's brother's son,  
Now by my sceptre's awe I make a vow,  
Such neighbour nearness to our sacred blood  
Should nothing privilege him nor partialize  
The unstooping firmness of my upright soul.  
He is our subject, Mowbray; so art thou:  
Free speech and fearless I to thee allow. (R2 1.1.116–23)

The values Richard trivializes are precisely those invoked in Bolingbroke’s initial challenges. In those speeches Bolingbroke demands revenge “by all the rites of knighthood else” (R2 1.1.75) and swears by “the glorious worth of [his own] descent” to answer the claims of familial “blood” (R2 1.2.75–107). Yet, these same values of knighthood and descent that Richard dismisses reappear in this same scene as powerful enough actually to limit the claims of royal allegiance that Richard (and Tudor orthodoxy) demands. The same Bolingbroke and Norfolk who profess the “devotion of a subject’s love” to Richard also invoke “name” and “honour” in refusing his command to withdraw their challenges (R2 1.1.175–95). Bolingbroke even takes the extreme step, paradoxically authorized by this same honor and kinship code, of denying his actual father’s express demand for “obedience” (R2 1.1.163) in the name of an ideal “father,” defined according to an abstract role within the code: “Shall I seem crest-fallen in my father’s sight? / Or with pale beggar-fear impeach my height?” (R2 1.1.188–89). In this way the play depicts the honor culture’s primary demand for constancy of personal will even in
the teeth of demands by the knight's lord and father—the living representative of that kinship order to which the knight's allegiance is owed.\textsuperscript{17}

Subsequent action demonstrates the inability of the single knight to resist royal authority, of course, since Bolingbroke's honor combat is aborted and both combatants are sent into dishonorable banishment. However, Bolingbroke's apparently abject submission, employing the very terms of "man" religiously subjected to his God ("your will be done" [R2.1.3.1440]), should be seen neither as manifesting an uncompromised power resident in the monarch's will nor as revealing Bolingbroke to be cowardly or inconsistent. Richard's successful demand upon Bolingbroke is not articulated in the form of highhanded personal sovereignty, as had been his earlier, ineffectual command, "Wrath-kindled gentlemen be rul'd by me" (R2.1.1.152). Instead, Richard draws his vocabulary from an alternate store of Tudor ideology that represents the monarch as amenable to counsel rather than imperious and extols civil peace as a neighborly inclusiveness that makes all Englishmen members of one "kindred[\ldots] blood":

\begin{quote}
Draw near,  
And list what with our council we have done.  
For that our kingdom's earth should not be soil'd  
With that dear blood which it hath fostered;  
And for our eyes do hate the dire aspect  
Of civil wounds plough'd up with neighbours' sword,  
And for we think the eagle-winged pride  
Of sky-aspiring and ambitious thoughts,  
With rival-hating envy, set on you  
To wake our peace, which in our country's cradle  
Draws the sweet infant breath of gentle sleep;  
Which so rous'd up with boist'rous untun'd drums,  
With harsh-resounding trumpets' dreadful bray,  
And grating shock of wrathful iron arms,  
Might from our quiet confines fright fair peace,  
And make us wade even in our kindred's blood—  
Therefore we banish you our territories. (R2.1.3.123-39)
\end{quote}

Here Richard employs the very language in which Tudor critics of kinship-honor culture had attacked its shortcomings. Denouncing family "rival hating envy," personal "pride," and "ambitious thoughts," Richard echoes humanist critiques of honor for producing "civil wounds."\textsuperscript{18}
Yet this is not simply a broadly humanist appeal in terms of Christendom or Commonwealth. Mowbray’s response to his exile defines a new source of authority in Richard’s utterance. Mowbray laments Richard’s “sentence” as leaving him “speechless” by robbing him of his “native breath” (R2 1.3.172–73). Unlike Richard’s previous assertions of monarchical sovereignty, which failed to silence the feuding knights, his invocation of a peaceful national order appears to have the power (as similar invocations would historically prove to have) to rob the “native” honor discourse of its authority. Sixteenth-century adherents of kinship-honor values would find little to counter the discursive power of such claims, since any objection outside of protestation of loyalty, which is itself contradicted in refusing to submit to the royal demand that has necessitated the protest, could only be articulated as assertions of the very values which this discourse of selfless devotion to “our country’s” order renders suspect. Thus, the combatants’ previous volubility is effectively reduced to silence, while any objections, such as those of Norfolk or Gaunt, insofar as they recur to values of personal autonomy and family honor rather than to national unity, cannot but risk appearing selfish and petulant by comparison. Bolingbroke’s final words on leaving the scene seem to recognize the need imposed upon him by this discourse because he parts with a new sort of “boast” that is no longer cast in terms of family honor: “Where’er I wander boast of this I can, / Though banish’d, yet a true-born Englishman” (R2 1.3.308–9).

In this way Shakespeare represents the volatility as well as the ultimate weakness of honor values against the centralizing forces of Tudor nation building. But Richard’s successful invocation of counsel, reason, nation, and peace must be gauged in contrast to the failures of his invocations of royal sovereignty and the subject’s obedience—themselves also versions of recognizable Tudor-Stuart discursive strategies—to silence resistance, win assent, or even avoid self-contradiction. Nowhere are these problems more clear than in the remarkable relation between Gaunt and Richard that unfolds in the second act, confirming a paradoxical complicity between these two apparent antagonists that is forged at levels of discursive interaction neither recognizes. Whatever Coleridge might think of the universal morality of Gaunt’s speech prais-
ing England, in their dramatic and historical contexts of utterance the very terms of Gaunt’s resistance to Richard’s abuses of royal prerogative actually encourage further abuses.

Gaunt’s frequently anthologized evocation of past English chivalry employs terms in which he might protest against Richard’s violation of knightly brotherhood, even if the power of lineage values has thus far been insufficient to prompt him to the defense of his actual brother or son:

This royal throne of kings, this scept’red isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war,
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands;
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,
Fear’d by their breed, and famous by their birth,
Renowned for their deeds as far from home,
For Christian service and true chivalry,
As is the sepulchre in stubborn Jewry,
Of the world’s ransom, blessed Mary’s son;
This land of such dear souls, this dear dear land,
Dear for her reputation through the world,
Is now leas’d out—I die pronouncing it—
Like to a tenement or pelting farm. (R2 2.1.40–60)

Most strikingly, Gaunt does not invoke the memory of a crusading “breed” in order to denounce Richard’s violence against the knightly class by his murder and banishment of kin nor to repudiate Richard’s crime against its ethos by aborting the rites of honor. Instead, Gaunt uses the crusades to criticize fiscal policy: England is “now leas’d out.”

Richard’s practice of farming the realm as its “landlord” is mentioned in such accounts as Daniel’s Civil Wars, and in the anonymous Woodstock. Yet in Shakespeare’s play the Gaunt who vehemently denounces this practice is the same character who also articulates the
absolutist ideology that enables the abuses he would criticize.\footnote{43} That ideology figures explicitly as a causal factor in the mistakes that Richard makes, but this is not the only paradox. The values of Gaunt’s nostalgic “true chivalry”—elsewhere furnishing terms employed in speeches by the duchess, by Bolingbroke, and even by Norfolk—do not constitute the only possible ground for opposing Richard’s abuses. Gaunt’s speeches also display a cognizance of the claims of common law to define royal status, but these claims, too, appear disabled in his utterance:

\begin{quote}
It were a shame to let this land by lease; 
But for thy world enjoying but this land, 
Is it not more than shame to shame it so? 
Landlord of England art thou now, not king, 
Thy state of law is bondslave to the law. (R2 2.1.110–14).\footnote{44}
\end{quote}

In its very expression, which generalizes abuse of royal prerogative into self-subjection to any legal restraint, Gaunt’s attack manifests features that paradoxically constitute his speech as a form of the very “flattery” he blames for having occasioned Richard’s excesses.\footnote{45} Not the vain “lascivious metres” of ambitious, Italianate fops nor Richard’s own “youth” (R2 2.1.2, 20, 69), but the “wholesome counsel” (R2 2.1.2) of “aged Gaunt” (R2 2.1.72) encourages the royal “will [to] mutiny with wit’s regard” (R2 2.1.28). The claim that farming the royal holdings subjects sovereignty to a new bondslavery of limitation by “law” and “bond” uses the same language of absolutist sovereignty without responsibility, mediation, and limitation that Gaunt elsewhere employs to answer the duchess’s attacks on him for silence in the face of tyranny and murder.\footnote{46} Gaunt subordinates his accusation of inherited land and lineage violations to the accusation that Richard has violated a royal autonomy represented as absolute unless and until the monarch recognizes limitation upon himself.\footnote{47} These values subsequently reappear in Richard’s own utterances, but they are immediately contested by York’s related but significantly different criticism of Richard’s shortcomings.\footnote{48}

According to his own account, York remains silent concerning his monarch’s failings despite “Gloucester’s death . . . Herford’s banishment . . . Gaunt’s rebukes . . . England’s private wrongs” and his own personal disgrace. Only seizure of the Lancaster inheritance constrains him to
speak. When he finally speaks out, York offers an alternative to Gaunt’s absolutist values while also introducing a discursive possibility to be taken seriously, both within the play and in the England of the later sixteenth century:

Take Herford’s rights away, and take from time
His charters, and his customary rights;
Let not to-morrow then ensue to-day:
Be not thyself. For how art thou a king
But by fair sequence and succession? (R2 2.1.195–99)

York locates identity in social role: Richard remains himself only so long as “a king,” and that role, like those of “son” and “heir,” depends upon “customary rights” and time’s “charters.” As York recognizes, such discourse enables “thoughts / Which honour and allegiance cannot think” (R2 1.2.208–9), furnishing the very terms that would eventually be used to articulate the values of common law, terms foreign both to the personalized bond reciprocities of honor and to the individualized royal permissions theorized by absolutism.49

Beyond noting its proximity to an identifiable sixteenth-century political ideology, York’s speech repays consideration as an utterance tied to various possibilities and limitations of articulation situated within the play as well as outside it. His demand, “how art thou a king / But by fair sequence and succession?” is far from admitting a simple answer in either context, and his metaphysical intonation of the language of “rights” and “charters” authored and maintained by “time” functions at once to raise and to occlude material and political analysis, whereby “charters” and “customary rights” had strong social, material connotations.50 The play will end, as it was already evident in the 1590s that the reign in which it is written would end, with a monarch who is “a king” although hardly the self-evident lineal product of “fair sequence and succession.”51 Furthermore, both Shakespeare’s play and Elizabeth’s reign will conclude with the role of “a king” arguably constrained by a good deal more than the self-limitations of willful desire or the physical encroachments of “time” upon the monarch’s physical body and acts.52
True, Richard's own self-diagnosis—"I wasted time and now time doth waste me"—shares terms with York's speech, but Richard's pronouncement upon himself no more adequately defines his fall than do his meditations on "thoughts tending to ambition," despite the rhetorical force and homiletic appeal of such high tragic laments from a "man that but man is."

York's statements are not definitive, either. His utterances are, like Gaunt's own warnings or Richard's retrospective reflections, neither entirely incorrect nor beyond contestation. Significant development appears immediately. When Northumberland, Ross, and Willoughby react to the Lancaster disinheritance, their dialogue might seem merely to reiterate elements from the discourses of limited monarchy, honor, lineage, nation, and absolute sovereignty. The king is "not himself, but basely led / By flatterers" (R2.2.1.241); the conquests of chivalrous "ancestors" are being "basely yielded upon compromise" (R2.2.1.253–54); national sufferings are endured by "this declining land" (R2.2.1.240); lineage shame inheres in Richard's attacks on his "noble kinsman" (R2.2.1.261–62); identity has been lost by such depredations of estate; and "high majesty" needs to be rescued from self-imposed limitations to "look like itself" (R2.2.1.295). Despite their echoes of earlier statements, these brief speeches are different because they suggest the potential of all such discourses to express socioeconomic values that, strictly speaking, belong to none of them.

It is not just that the speakers descend from high ideological abstraction to specify estate-differentiated, economic abuses: "grievous taxes" on the commons, fines against the nobles, as well as "new exactions" of "blanks, benevolences, and I wot not what" (R2.2.1.246–50). More significantly, they suggest capacities for resistance and alliance in a realm of valuation heretofore subordinated or metaphorized. For example, Gaunt's metaphysical denunciations of Richard for abandoning English chivalry and farming the realm reappear with new economic inflections:

NORTHUMBERLAND warr'd he hath not,
    But basely yielded upon compromise
That which his ancestors achiev'd with blows;
    More hath he spent in peace than they in wars.

ROSS The Earl of Wiltshire hath the realm in farm.
Bankruptcy is not here as elsewhere a metaphor for tragic waste, for the "man that but man is" subjected to the ravages of time (old Gaunt "bankrout" in having "spent" his "words, life, and all" \([R2\ 2.1.150–51]\)), or the vicissitudes of fortune (deposed Richard's word no longer "sterling," his face "bankrupt of majesty" \([R2\ 4.1.264–66]\)). Instead bankruptcy is an economic actuality that renders even "the king" a social being understandable in terms not of metaphysical similarity to "man" but of similarity to men socioeconomically conceived—"like a broken man." The fact that the realm is "now leas'd out" is not repugnant because it makes England "like to a tenement or pelting farm" but because the realm has been given to the Earl of Wiltshire. The leasing is not a symbol of willful self-deposition, but one social and economic relationship among others.

Similarly, York's terms for Richard's violation of his own identity—"Be not thyself. For how art thou a king / But by fair sequence and succession?"—appear transmuted into concrete economic circumstances:

York's grand abstract principle of lineal "sequence and succession" appears almost beside the point. In itself, titular succession is, according to Willoughby, "barely" succession at all, while violation of the "revenue" entailed in succession appears crucial to identity. Similar things could be said of other discursive possibilities raised in the subsequent speeches of these three. Violation of abstract bonds of kinship is translated concretely into Richard's detestable "robbing" of his kinsman, Bolingbroke \((R2\ 2.1.261)\). The vague threat posed by unspecified flattery is transmuted into fears that spies will "inform" "'Gainst us, our lives, our children, and our heirs" \((R2\ 2.1.242–45)\). National dishonor reappears as base "compromise" with enemies and costly peace at home \((R2\
Royal self-subjection becomes Richard's material indebtedness in "broking pawn" (R2 2.1.293). In fact, this scene suggests that it is not seizure of Bolingbroke's inheritance, nor violated principles of succession, royal sovereignty, personal honor, or kinship that are in themselves capable of catalyzing effective resistance; crucial is the extent to which each discourse furnishes terms that can function in close relation to the values of property.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the confrontation between the returned Bolingbroke and his uncle York. This scene embodies a situation of utterance that exactly answers Gaunt's complaints about his tongue being coerced to speak against his own son. First of all, Bolingbroke argues with York in terms that provide all the opportunities for leniency Gaunt claims to have lacked. Bolingbroke urges York to consider him as if he were a stranger, "Look on my wrongs with an indifferent eye" (R2 2.3.115), not a relative. Then he does the opposite, urging York to remember their kinship, even addressing him as "father" (R2 2.3.116, 117, 126). Finally, Bolingbroke shifts his discourse to proclaim the primacy of the principle of "inheritance" (R2 2.3.135) and the sovereignty of "law" (133). While these speeches provide exactly the discursive prompting that Gaunt had lacked, the scene also adds a supporting chorus:

**northumberland** The noble Duke hath been too much abused.

**ross** It stands your grace upon to do him right.

**willoughby** Base men by his endowments are made great.

(R2 2.3.136–38)

But, despite York's appreciation of claims concerning inheritance and a "kinsman" (R2 2.1.111–15), nothing succeeds in winning his agreement until Northumberland voices Bolingbroke's plea in a particular way:

**northumberland** The noble Duke hath sworn his coming is
But for his own; and for the right of that
We all have strongly sworn to give him aid.
And let him ne'er see joy that breaks that oath!

**york** Well, well, I see the issue of these arms.
I cannot mend it, I must needs confess,
Because my power is weak and all ill left.
But if I could, by Him that gave me life,  
I would attach you all, and make you stoop  
Unto the sovereign mercy of the king;  
But since I cannot, be it known unto you,  
I do remain as neuter. So, fare you well,  
Unless you please to enter in the castle,  
And there repose you for this night. (R2 2.3.147-60)

Although he knows nothing more now about his “ill left” forces than he knew twenty lines earlier, York quickly gives in, rapidly moving from outright antagonism, to being “neuter,” to passive acceptance and even aid. The pretense of standing in “pause” between rival claimants is belied by the abetting he gives the rebel cause in offering them lodging and food:

It may be I will go with you; but yet I’ll pause  
For I am loath to break our country’s laws.  
Not friends, nor foes, to me welcome you are.  
Things past redress are now with me past care. (R2 2.3.167-70)

Significantly, York does not surrender his objections until the moment his charges against Bolingbroke are answered by Northumberland with the claim that Bolingbroke’s forces are united in the “strongly sworn” goal of coming. “But for his own.”

Clearly, Bolingbroke’s “own” is not the “own” of kin and heir that Gaunt laments having lost when he complains “I was too strict to make mine own away.” Bolingbroke’s “own” is property, property assumed as absolute, self-evident possession, not the reciprocal issue of kinship alliance or the dependent creation of “royalties,” “tenure,” or any other such feudal or monarchical grant and qualification. Whatever else may be said about Bolingbroke’s situation—he himself invokes law, descent, and royalties to talk about it, while York nostalgically invokes monarchical values—absolute property emerges as the one authorizing source of overwhelming solidarity in resistance to royal authority. Its unarguable “right” is not even called a “right” but assumed in the form of its utterance to be right. Thus, once again, as in the case of Norfolk’s and Bolingbroke’s abrupt self-reversals in submitting to restraint when commanded by a joint articulation of king and council on behalf of civil peace, a character’s sudden reversal is represented as a function of the
force of utterance in its whole social dimension: put this way, by these speakers, in this situation, a course of action that once was abhorrent now appears irresistible. Like Gaunt, like Bolingbroke, like the Duchess of Gloucester before him, York reverses himself, and not simply because his military forces are outnumbered.17

To represent values of absolute property as having such power to unify opposition constitutes a remarkable choice considering the options available to the playwright. To base effective resistance to royal authority upon the presumed rightness of property would be to represent such property right as a shared value not to be offended lightly by those who seek to defend the established hierarchy of the state. This is a far more politically specific caveat than generic warnings about the monarch’s “tyranny” or the subject’s “ambition.” After all, Richard tyrannically lies, murders, and disregards counsel with impunity, and the rebellion against him is no rising of ambitious upstarts. Furthermore, such values pertaining to property might constitute a source of potential agreement among the most disparate audience strata. The bonding agent would not be empathy with the common “human” meaning of the individual yet exemplary royal subject’s tragic experience of human limitations, as Richard is prone to articulate things, and how moral, homiletic, tragedy might articulate them. Certainly the opposition of usage becomes clear when Bolingbroke’s practical terms are heard against Richard’s own metaphysical language, which rejects proprietary relations as illusory: “nothing can we call our own but death” (R2 3.2.152). Nor would possible audience agreement be based, as it might be in the chronicle histories, on simple recognition of the usual political polarities of tyranny and rebellion. Nor would the basis for possible solidarity lie in recognition of lineage or estate values.18 The play does demonstrate, however, that the languages customarily used to articulate such values permit possible interlocution with and among property claims: morality, tyranny, and family could all be addressed in terms of defending one’s “own.”

The play clearly marks connections between the disastrous political misprision that occurs when Richard violates Gaunt’s property and Gaunt’s own conceptions of sovereignty. Gaunt’s notion of divinely appointed monarchy transcending law, bond, and landlordship reap-
pears with a vengeance in Richard’s evocations of England as “my earth” and himself as “anointed king,” the “deputy elected by the Lord” supported by all creation in “the right” (R2 3.2.1–62). Nevertheless, the play does not simply represent one politically or historically superior “right,” that of property, asserting hegemony over another, that of royal sovereignty. Whatever their potency in creating solidarity in resistance, the values of property as foundations for political life are as subject to critical scrutiny in the remainder of the play as the values of royal sovereignty and the subject’s obedience are in its first portions. Again, voicing is crucial, and character is deeply implicated. The “right” of property, like the “right” of royal sovereignty, appears articulated within and among contesting intonations of material practicality and religious piety that cross the borders of individual utterances. Thus, although it is scarcely an exaggeration to claim that the second half of the play misses few opportunities to lend pathos and religious resonance to the utterances of Richard and his followers while the speeches of Bolingbroke’s camp largely bespeak sharp practice both material and political, neither of these tendencies can be evaluated apart from the other nor without taking into account the social persons who give them utterance.59

The rebels’ utterances, like those of Bolingbroke’s new court, are permeated with assumed values of patronage. Patronage values, with their capacity for “vertical integration and the formation of solidarities between higher and lower status groups,” inform the utterances in which relationships between Bolingbroke and his supporters are constituted outside kinship alliances, feudal ties, or lineal royalty.60 As they speak with one another, the rebel and his followers associate their enemies with waste, as “upstart unthrifts” (R2 2.3.121), parasitical “caterpillars” (R2 2.3.165), or feeders and dispossessors (R2 3.1.12–30), while Bolingbroke’s own speeches resonate with the “value” of companionship, the “recompense” his rising fortunes will allow, and the “treasury” that will replace mere verbal thanks, “the exchequer of the poor,” with less symbolic “bounty” (R2 2.3.19–67). His allies proclaim themselves “rich” in the “benefit” of his presence and in their own “labour” of “service and desert.” At play’s end the new king promises in reward for enemy heads that Fitzwater’s “pains . . . shall not be forgot” nor his “right
noble . . . merit” overlooked, and that he “will add right worthy gains” to Northumberland’s “worth” (R2 5.6.12–18).

Such utterances suggest a strong contrast between Bolingbroke’s appreciation of political alliance and Richard’s understanding of the need for “friends” as signifying subjection:

Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood
With solemn reverence; throw away respect,
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty;
For you have but mistook me all this while.
I live with bread like you, feel want,
Taste grief, need friends—subjected thus,
How can you say to me, I am a king? (R2 3.2.171–77)61

Bolingbroke could hardly overlook the economics of friendship nor miss, as Richard does, the differences between rich men and children. Unlike Richard, he can scarcely be expected to presume that the ultimate fiscal basis for rule should be the “heavenly pay” apportioned to angels who “guard the right” (R2 3.2.60–62). In form and circumstance, however, the utterances of Bolingbroke and his associates suggest how little inheres in the values of relationship between patron and client to forestall the flattery and manipulation traditionally associated with tyranny. Though they could be articulated within a discourse of faithful “service” and rightful “benevolence,” patronage values easily lend themselves to legitimation of faction and such “friends” as Piers Exton who not only put personal loyalty above conscience, law or nation but also eagerly anticipate the patron’s willful desires.62 In fact, it is not Richard, that notorious historical instance of the flattered monarch, but Bolingbroke who appears subjected to fulsome compliment (e.g. R2 2.3.1–20) and solicitous of openhanded ambition.63 Bolingbroke’s encouragement of such relationships might represent, in the context of Richard’s impracticalities, a reassuringly practical form of political awareness. His announced strategy of winning “after-love” in pardoning his enemies suggests such awareness (R2 5.3.34), and his actions in reappointing the Bishop of Carlisle (R2 5.6.25) or in offering to restore Norfolk’s lands (R2 4.1.86–90) might appear to suggest the same strategy in action, even if such provisions and offers are decidedly more com-
plicated in fact than they at first appear to be. Nevertheless, whether in the embarrassing case of Exton, or that of Fitzwater, who hopes to “thrive in this new world” (R2 4.1.78), the monarch’s need for such “friends” can hardly escape the notice of those “friends,” his clients themselves; it is they who have made him what he is, as King Henry IV will be pointedly and uncomfortably reminded.

And what is he? A king, but a king constituted and maintained by a network of self-conscious relationships of desire and dependence that threaten the very absolute property, that “right” assumed preeminent over claims of honor, allegiance, and divinely instituted sovereignty, upon which his rise to power is based. Such a king is, in fact, the “rich man” without peer, defined precisely by superior capital of wealth and status, but at the same time in competition with the rights and aspirations of other property holders. He is produced as king in the same social conditions that constitute his kingdom as a kingdom of men that are “but man” in their inevitably discontented desire. If a subject could become king, as he has, so could others aspire to the “next degree in hope.” Richard puts the case aptly when he denounces Bolingbroke’s “ladder” Northumberland in terms of just such a conflict of interests:

thou shalt think,
Though he divide the realm and give thee half,
It is too little, helping him to all;
He shall think that thou, which knowest the way
To plant unrightful kings, wilt know again,
Being ne’er so little urg’d, another way
To pluck him headlong from the usurped throne. (R2 5.1.59–65)

In such a social order estates, degrees, and strata are real but permeable to faction and ambition in a way that makes them every bit as impermanent as they appear in Richard’s metaphysical soliloquy. If such distinctions are impermanent, they are far from inconsequential because they may serve as impediments and objects of appropriation for every desiring individual, who, given the circumstances of Bolingbroke’s new order, cannot but feel and yet must not express personal ambition, since to be openly ambitious would be to threaten the absolute property of others.
Although the general discursive situation of “ambition” in the 1590s is hardly open to question, the negative value that is inevitably put upon ambition and associated with actions undertaken at its prompting is sometimes qualified by specifics of utterance. True, denunciations of ambition’s role in fomenting covert treachery and outright “force and violence” are ubiquitous. The “Homilie against Disobedience and Wylfull Rebellion” sweepingly attributes all civil rebellion to ambition, defining the “restlesse ambitious person” as the chief threat to order as embodied in “the ordinarie authoritie and power of lawful princes and governours” and warning that “the restless ambitious having once determined by one meanes or other to acheive to their intended purpose, when they can not by lawfull and peaceable meanes clime so high as they do desire, they attempt the same by force and violence: wherein, when they can not pre-vayle agaynst the ordinarie authoritie and power of lawful princes and governours them selves alone, they do seeke the ayde and helpe of the ignoraunt multitude, abusing them to their wicked purpose.”

Other texts associate ambition with a context that is broader and yet more narrowly defined than the homilist’s manipulative agents pursuing full-scale political rebellion. Thomas Nashe discusses ambition as both a human condition occasioned by a universal “warre” of all against all and also a specifically urban problem. “Ambition is any puft vp greedy humour of honor or preferment,” Nashe writes, judging it to be so universal as to have occasioned the incarnation of Christ: “Humilitie was so hard a vertue to beate into our heades, that Christ purposely came downe from heauen in hys owne person to teach it vs, and continued thirty yeeres together, nothing but preaching and practising it heere vpon earth.”

But “the deuils chiefe Basso, Ambition” does not reside among the discontented nobility and their factions, as the homilist thought, but in the “great Townes” and chiefly in London. Locating ambition in London opens an interesting discursive loophole.

Officially, of course, London authorities joined the homilist in denouncing political ambition. The Lord Mayor’s Pageants interpret the rising of Jack Straw against Richard II as “ambition” in action. In civic
pageantry of 1590 the only allegorical figure to threaten the peace is "Ambition," who proclaims that he "Doth dailie seeke to worke sweete Englands fall," and it is possible that Jack Straw was enacted by the same figure who portrays ambition, since he announces "for our bad ambitious mindes by Walworth we were tamde."73 But such official city functions also betray some potentially significant qualifications of the blanket condemnation of ambition. Walworth's defense of King Richard is treated as a precedent for one significant rise in status that is taken very positively: the "hereditary" knighting of London's Lord Mayors. The treatment of this upward mobility appears consistent with Laura Stevenson's model of nonnoble discourse following precedents embodied in aristocratic honor narratives, since Walworth's knightly title, the "honors" and "fame" that he wins for subsequent mayors, is represented as resulting from his chivalric daring rather than from exercise of capacities in business or management.74 The pageants did oppose the evils of ambition as such, so that the Recorder of London's speech presenting the Lord Mayor, Sir John Spencer, to the Lord Chief Baron and his Brethren of the Exchequer in 1594 predictably proclaims the virtues of submission to authority: "A Citty is a society of men congegated into one place, not only by mutual helps to live together, but to live well and godlie together; but can they live well without order and government? and what order or government can there be where there is not one to commaund, others to obey, one to rule, and others that submit themselves?"75 However, the same speech also employs languages that might open the way to a rather different set of values in describing the office and election of the mayor: "this Chief Magistrate is not to be emposed upon us, or set over us without our consent and choise, but to be elect-ed by ourselves, to be chosen not from amongst forrayners or strangers, but de nobis ipsis, a member of our body, a brother of our brotherhood, a Fellow Cittizen of the same society, whereof himself shall be the chiepest. What grant can be more grateful, or what princely gift more bounteous unto subjects, then for the inferiour to chuse his superior; the members their owne head; the Cittizens their own Magistrate?"76 The conclusion of this passage flies in the face of typical official usage. To ask what body should be allowed to choose its own head elsewhere admits
of no possible positive answer. But the languages of “princely gift” and “bounty” are here enlisted to create a space for and to defend the status of the “brotherhood” of “Fellow Cittizen[s]” in choosing their leaders for themselves rather than having their superiors “emposed” upon them. Amid deference appears a loophole for resistance or assertion.

Another passage concerning this process of election by the will of the common people has an even more precise bearing on the problem of the languages and values to be associated with ambition in a London context. The annual election of the mayor is said to convey a powerful, if double, message to the citizenry: “To the well-disposed Cittizens; to stirr them up to ascend the same degrees that hath advanced others to that honourable dignity, when they see the self-same way for them as it was for others to attayne to the same, which is from vertue to vertue, from service to service, from one office to another, until they come to the highest office, which is the chiefest honour the Cittizens do bestowe, not upon him that will desire it, but by his vertues that deserve it. Honour is the reward of vertue” (256). This passage simultaneously praises and disavows ascent from degree to degree in the pursuit of office. Higher offices are there to be aspired to and yet not aspired to. “Virtue” not “desire” (read “ambition”) merits reward, but the speech and the ceremony of investiture intend to stir the citizens to want the advancement that the office of Mayor represents.

VII

One might now return to Richard’s soliloquy and find it neither a simple revelation of a fatuous individual character nor the straightforward reiteration of a self-blinded ideology that ignores social differentiation. Richard’s subjective musings upon “man,” despite their metaphysical discourse, turn out to have real political topicality for the realm of “men” now constituting—either at the end of the play or at the end of the sixteenth century—his former kingdom. Even his (mis)appropriations of biblical texts without regard to the social differences between “rich man” and “child” have, when taken as features of a situated utterance, a revelatory force because they accurately prophesy the emergence of a factional competition where all are at war with all.” Reconsideration of his
soliloquy, then, like reconsideration of his character, gains from attention to the concerns of form and situation appropriate to analysis of utterance. A sense of what he says, like a sense of what he is, may be clarified by attention to how and when speech and speaker are shaped in dialogical interrelation with their multiple (and by no means necessarily copresent) interlocutors. As final support for this recommendation, let us reconsider Richard's soliloquy in relation to an exchange with Bolingbroke concerning his "own" property:

**Bolingbroke** My gracious lord, I come but for my own.

**Richard** Your own is yours, and I am yours, and all.

**Bolingbroke** So far be mine, my most redoubted lord,
As my true service shall deserve your love.

**Richard** Well you deserve. They well deserve to have
That know the strong'st and surest way to get.
Uncle, give me your hands; nay, dry your eyes—
Tears show their love, but want their remedies.
Cousin, I am too young to be your father,
Though you are old enough to be my heir;
What you will have, I'll give, and willing too,
For do we must what force will have us do. (R2 3.3.196–207)

Richard cuts through the discursive stalking horse of defensive property rights to articulate their ideological underpinning in acquisitive accumulation. Bolingbroke's attempt to restate his armed acquisition in the terms of allegiance and patronage—urging Richard to "be mine," to be his patron as Bolingbroke shall be his deserving client—is similarly exposed for its hollowness. The perfunctorily added claims of honor's "true service" fair no better when Richard precisely names the "force" that actually underlies Bolingbroke's locutions. And, finally, as Richard here says, the discourse of inheritance—York's principle of "fair sequence and succession"—will be used by Bolingbroke and his allies officially to articulate and simultaneously to hide the violence that ambition would have it work. In deposing Richard, a cousin will be made a father, a young man will be made old, and his "child" will become, in the process, a "rich man."
Richard II has been noted for its consistent formality, its elaborate imagery, exceptional lyricism, and insistent elegiac mode. Andrew Gurr claims that the play has “more rhymes, more declamation and more formally structured speeches such as oaths, curses, lamentations, and proclamations than any of the tragedies.” Richard Altick describes the “tightly interwoven imagery” of Richard II creating a “poetic unity that is unsurpassed in any of the great tragedies.” It has also frequently been claimed that the play’s tone is set by the lyrical speeches of its protagonist, and that the range of its forms and the wealth of its images serve a dominant elegiac mode. Stanley Wells calls Richard II “the most purely lyrical of Shakespeare’s histories—perhaps of all his plays, and the role of King Richard is the most lyrical among the tragic heroes.” While recognizing its range of formal speech types, Wells adds, “the mode we feel to be most characteristic of Richard II is the elegiac.” I wish to examine these claims more closely in relation to Bakhtinian notions of tonality. Taking the third act garden scene as a model instance, this chapter considers aspects of the play’s poetic form and their socio-ideological implications.
In the garden scene of *Richard II*, the otherwise choric gardener extensively elaborates the traditional humanist analogy of the garden with the “commonwealth,” provides the news of Richard’s impending downfall, and lyrically diagnoses Richard’s collapse as “a fall of leaf” caused by the “waste of idle hours.” Late in the scene, however, he is halted by an angry challenge from the eavesdropping queen. Such forcible dramatic interruption of “choric” poetry is a device that Shakespeare had already employed in other plays, for example in *Richard III*, where Margaret’s initial curses are halted by an unlooked for reply from Richard, but here the case is different. This choric speaker is not, as Margaret is, fiercely partisan nor are his poetic figures identifiably his own rather than those of the play at large. Furthermore, elements of the ensuing encounter between the queen and the gardener echo similar moments throughout this play. Here, as elsewhere in *Richard II*, metaphor and language derived from the Bible, from Tudor humanism, *de casibus* medievalism, and Elizabethan providentialism interact in a struggle that carries considerable social implications. But, more importantly, this densely allusive exchange furnishes an example of the remarkable ways in which the play employs tonal elements to suggest social-evaluative orientations that complicate the values that would otherwise appear to be the ideological content of its highly figured and highly formalized utterances.

Upon hearing the gardener’s remarks about recent secret correspondence, his judgment concerning King Richard’s political condition, and his conjecture that “depos’d / ’Tis doubt he will be,” the queen steps forward to deliver a formal accusation that vehemently invokes a familiar discourse and a set of associated metaphors on behalf of officially promulgated Elizabethan values. Authoritative in its metaphors and content, her denunciation is, like so many other utterances in this play, wide of the mark, inaccurate, inappropriate in specifics, and troubling in tonality:

Thou, old Adam’s likeness set to dress this garden,
How dares thy harsh rude tongue sound this unpleasing news?
What Eve, what serpent, hath suggested thee
To make a second fall of cursed man?
Why dost thou say King Richard is depos’d?
Dar’st thou, thou little better thing than earth,
Divine his downfall? Say, where, when, and how
Cam'st thou by this ill tidings? Speak, thou wretch. (R2 3.4.73–80)

On the face of it, the queen trumpets the gardener’s humanist equation of the state with his garden and his lyrical equation of the human condition with the vegetative cycle by playing the superior cards of biblical analogy and righteous vehemence. Rather than privileged analogues for virtuous statecraft, as they appear in Elyot’s *Gouvernour*, or allegorical equivalents for the seasonal mortality of flesh, as in *The Spanish Tragedy*, the garden and the labor of gardening appear in the queen’s lines as typologically embodying fallen humanity’s sinful ambition. Not Adamic in simplicity, nor sadly seasonal in mortality, but expressing the inherent sinfulness of “old Adam,” gardening betokens “earth[ly]” resistance to authority. In appropriating the power to “divine” the state of his superiors, the gardener has failed to defer to the superior capacities for knowledge and judgment that are reserved for representatives of divinely instituted hierarchy.

However acceptably orthodox the queen’s speech might be, both in its tone of righteous royal vehemence and in its content, its anticipated effect on a theater audience, a viral component of its theme, is qualified by circumstances of its articulation. First of all, the queen’s speech is inaccurate. After all, not twenty lines earlier the gardener had precisely defined King Richard’s political condition—”Depress’d he is already, and depos’d / ’Tis doubt he will be” (R2 3.4.68–69). He employs carefully qualified distinctions that the queen’s crudely formulated response—”Why dost thou say King Richard is depos’d?”—fails to register. Furthermore, although the queen’s denunciations for wrongfully passing judgment on his king are legitimately orthodox, accusing the lowly gardener of affronting the status of the divine “deputy” in a way that even so revered a councilor as aged Gaunt or so elevated a man of God as the Bishop of Carlisle expressly avoid, her intensely emotional speech displays a loss of equanimity in stark contrast to the broad magnanimity of the gardener’s appraisals. She roundly abuses this “wretch,” this “little better thing than earth” for daring to affront royal dignity with his own “divin[ing]” evaluations, for undertaking, in Carlisle’s phrase, to judge the king with “subject and inferior breath” (R2 4.1.128),
but the gardener, for his part, expresses himself in measured tones of public-spirited regret. “O, what pity is it” that Richard has come to this, he laments, before sadly commenting on the “black tidings” conveyed in state letters recently passed “To a dear friend of the good Duke of York’s” (R2 3.4.70–71).

Not only is the queen’s tone of righteous vehemence credibly countered by the gardener’s composure, but he also answers her biblical analogy with his own:

\begin{quote}
Pardon me, madam, little joy have I
To breathe this news, yet what I say is true.
King Richard he is in the mighty hold
Of Bolingbroke. Their fortunes both are weigh’d;
In your lord’s scale is nothing but himself,
And some few vanities that make him light.
But in the balance of great Bolingbroke,
Besides himself, are all the English peers,
And with that odds he weighs King Richard down.
Post you to London and you’ll find it so;
I speak no more than everyone doth know. (R2 3.4.81–91)
\end{quote}

As Willard Farnham has argued, such speeches in Richard II incorporate discursive elements from the de casibus and Mirror for Magistrates tradition that originated in the Bible and that inform Hall and Holinshed’s accounts of Richard. But while Farnham emphasizes the play’s links to this medieval discursive inheritance, it is not enough to claim, as Robert Ornstein does, that the abstract “formality” of such speeches simply signal an attempt to “creat[e] through poetic manner the medieval ambiance and setting of the play.” Tonal elements of the gardener’s utterance suggest far different social-evaluative contexts than those found either in Farnham’s tradition of uncomplicated orthodoxy or in Ornstein’s all-embracing “medieval” cultural ambiance.

II

The key tonal elements emerge more prominently when we consider what the gardener has to say against the backdrop of the play’s historical sources and of a nearly contemporary dramatic analogue. Concerning Richard’s fall and Bolingbroke’s rise, Holinshed, following Hall, maintains:
This suerlie is a verie notable example, and not vnoorthe of all princes to be well weied, and diligentlie marked, that this Henrie duke of Lancaster should be thus called to a kingdome, and haue the helpe and assistance (almost) of all the whole realme, which perchance neuer thereof thought or yet dreamed; and that king Richard should thus be left desolate, void, and in despare of all hope and comfort, in whom if there were anie offense, it ought rather to be imputed to the frailtie of wanton youth, than to the malice of his hart: but such is the deceiuable iudgement of man, which not regarding things present with due consideration, thinketh euer that things to come shall haue good successe, with a pleasant & delitefull end. But in this deiecting of the one, & advaucing of the other, the prouidence of God is to be respected, & his secret will to be woondered at. For as in his hands standeth the donation of kingdoms, so likewise the disposing of them consisteth in his pleasure, which the verie pagans vnderstood right well."

This passage employs terms important to the play’s action, characterization, and thought. Holinshedd describes the complementary dejection and advancement of king and usurper, Richard’s wanton youthfulness and eventual despair, the obscurity of Bolingbroke’s motives, and above all a religious deference, more insistent in Holinshedd than in Hall, to the “secret will” that determines earthly affairs and that ought to be “respected” and “woondered at” rather than evaluated by the “deceiuable iudgement of man.” York compactly renders this view: “heaven hath a hand in these events, / To whose high will we bound our calm contents” (R2 5.2.37–38).

Yet, the play as a whole does not simply embody this religiously grounded quietism, despite E. M. W. Tillyard’s remark about its “perfectly orthodox” nature. At the same time, however, I would caution against assuming, as some critics have done, that this or any play of the early modern period inevitably corrodes orthodoxy merely because it participates in an inherently subversive public theatrical medium. Much more remains to be said regarding specific instances of any such representation. In fact, the gardener’s speech illustrates ways in which a play may employ formal means to effect significant and rather surprisingly precise reassessments of the very values it articulates—a process that the polar either/or alternatives of subversion or containment do not take into account.

The gardener’s utterance actually turns the quietist implications of the ideology articulated in Holinshedd against themselves with a speech that registers resistance to a whole range of pressures. In his measured response, the gardener qualifies the immense authority of monarchical
presence, the ideological demands of allegiance to hierarchical social order, and the humanist consular formulae that commend learned cooperation with princely power; he does so by recasting the familiar biblical and humanist metaphor of the scales of judgment in remarkable new ways. The twinned metaphors of the divine scales and of the lightness of human vanity when weighed in those scales originate with the Psalms: “Yet the children of men are vanitie, the chief men are lies: to lay them upon a balance thei are altogether lighter then vanitie.” While the religious inclusiveness of this formula might seem to preclude its use in criticizing the vanity of any particular office or officer, since any human evaluator of whatever degree would be included in its indictment, it is instructive that the King James version is compelled to emphasize explicitly that not merely “chief men” deserve condemnation: “Surely men of low degree are vanitie, and men of high degree are a lie: to be laid in the balance, they are altogether lighter than vanitie” (Psalms 62:9). The authorized version answers an implicit “loophole” of possibility in the psalmist’s utterance by insisting that “Men of low degree” are not to miss the fact that the denunciation of vanity applies equally to them as well as to the powerful.\(^4\)

It is true that in Hall this discursive material supports a worldview that is in fundamental agreement with the sweeping generalizations of Shakespeare’s deposed monarch:

> But whate’er I be,  
Nor I, nor any man that but man is,  
With nothing shall be pleas’d, till he be eas’d  
With being nothing. (R2 5.5.38-41)

Hall shares Richard’s general assumption that inherited and inherently unrealizable desire universally corrupts humanity. Yet Hall’s articulation of this inclusive metaphysical pessimism concerning the vanity of “this world” for “man” is not entirely evenhanded. Amid general indictment of human ingratitude, Hall singles out the inconstancy of the “mutable commonaltie” as the only group trait demanding special castigation:

> What trust is in this world, what suretie man hath of his life, & what constancie is in the mutable commonaltie, all men may perceive and see by the ruin of this noble prince whiche beeyng an undubitate kyng, crowned and
anoyned by the spiritualtie, honored and exalted by the nobilitie, obeyed and worshipped of the common people, was so vainly disceyued by them whiche he moste trusted, betrayed by them whom he had preferred, & slayn by them whom he had brought up and norished: so that all menne maye perceyve and see that fortune wayeth princes and pore men all in one balance.  

While Hall does not blame the common people for the actual deception, betrayal, and slaying of King Richard, because, after all, they had little to do with the historical power politics that Hall claims to have caused Richard’s downfall, he nevertheless identifies them as “mutable” and lacking in “constancie.” Fortune may weigh princes and poor men all in one balance, but Hall does not. Neither does the play’s queen—nor its gardener, for that matter. Before returning to them, it would be helpful to examine a dramatic work that also employs the metaphor of the scales and that Shakespeare appears to have known by 1597.

When Nashe uses the metaphor of the scales, it appears in a decidedly mixed generic context. Summers Last Will and Testament offers elements of virtually everything but history. In an elaborately mixed dramaturgy that borrows from the morality drama while transposing the Christian narrative of divine judgment into humanist terms, Nashe’s play brings in the scales as Summer examines various allegorical figures who represent the seasons and the modes of life appropriate to them. As each of the figures appears before Summer to render his mortal “reckoning” and to receive Summer’s judgment upon his values, Summer’s inverse counterpart, the jester Will Summers, offers his own prosaic, materialist, all-too-human perspective in counterpoint to the prevailing tones of moral seriousness and lyrical lamentation. Sounding almost exactly the note of the Everyman tradition, Nashe invokes the metaphor of the scales when Summer addresses Solstitium, the “best steward of [his] hours” concerning the ultimate futility of everything but good deeds: “Nought but good deedes hence shall we bear away.” But the values here comprised in “good deedes” are more various than they are in Everyman’s theological definitions, including such humanist virtues as secular “learning,” for example, while the language of Nashe’s characters and the tonalilty of the work as a whole are decidedly mixed. The play is, as Will Summers calls it, a “gally-maufrey.” The incident involv-
ing Solstitium’s scales illustrates the difference between Nashe’s play of voices and Shakespeare’s, while also suggesting that Shakespeare knew Nashe’s play by the time he composed *Henry IV*, a play that closely followed *Richard II* in publication.¹⁸

Accompanied by piping shepherds, Solstitium enters “like an aged hermit, carrying a payre of ballances, with an houre-glass in eyther of them; one houre-glasse white, the other blace”; he is called by an archaic summons straight out of earlier dramaturgy: “Peace there below! make roome for Master *Solstitium*” (360). Asked what he does with the scales, Solstitium offers a metaphysical justification, which first prompts Summer’s decidedly social re-interpretation and, finally, Will Summers’ own carnivalesque prose reduction of their abstractions and moralizing:

**SOLSTIUM**

In them I weigh the day and night alike.
This white glass is the houre-glasse of the day,
This blace one the iust measure of the night;
One more then other holdeth not a grayne:
Both serue times iust proportion to mayntayne.

**SUMMER**

I like thy moderation wondrous well;
And this thy ballance, wayghing the white glasse
And blace with equal poyze and stedfast hand,
A patterne is to Princes and great men,
How to weigh all estates indifferently,
The Spirituallty and the Temporalty alike:
Neyther to be too prodigall of smyles,
Nor too seuere in frowning without cause.
If you be wise, you Monarchs of the earth,
Haue two such glasses still before your eyes;
Thinke as you haue a white glasse running on,
Good dayes, friends, favoir, and all things at beck,
So, this white glasse runne out (as out it will),
The blace comes next; your downfall is at hand:
Take this of me, for somewhat I haue tryde;
A mighty ebbe followes a mighty tyde.

**WILL SUMMERS**

Fye, fye of honesty, fye: Solstitium is an asse, perdy;
this play is a gally-maufrey: fetch mee some drinke, some body.
What cheere, what cheere, my hearts? are not you thirsty with listening to this dry sport? What haue we to doe with scales and hower-glasses, except we were Bakers or Clock-keepers? I cannot tell how other men are addicted, but it is against my profession to use any scales but such as we play at with a boule, or keepe any howers but dinner or supper. It is a pedantical thing to respect times and seasons: if a man be drinking with good fellowes late, he must come home, for feare the gates be shut: when I am in my warme bed, I must rise to prayers, because the bell rings. I like no such foolish customes. (383–434)

Will's reduction of the scales to their material functions is a relief after their extended service as signifiers for various abstract, “pedantical” meanings. The scales of absolute divine justice become measurers of humanist “moderation” in Solstitium’s account; but, somewhat bizarrely, the biblical scales that weigh all men weigh the sands of time and, even more specifically, weigh the timekeeping devices that signify a behavioral ideology. One is encouraged to weigh with “iust proportion” the uses that may be made of time, whether by day or night. This translation of spiritual just measurement to the precise weighing of diurnal and nocturnal time against one another might easily be made to support larger values of efficient time management, such as those repudiated by Will or those implied in King Richard's worries about wasting time and wasting himself. Rather than providing a consistent lesson about prodigality, however, Summer gives the image of the scale a narrow, estate-specific meaning. Dropping the night and day distinction between the scales in favor of another meaning of white and black, Summer reinterprets the balanced scales of black and white for “Princes and great men,” whom he tells to learn to “weigh all estates indifferently.” In turn, this political imperative gives way to yet another reading of white and black, when Summer warns the princes about their own mutability, the impending “downfall,” the “mighty ebbe” represented by the black sand that will inevitability follow after the “mighty tyde” of good fortune represented by the white. And this message gives way to yet another general implication in Summer's final lamenting address to Solstitium:

I grieue no more regard was had of thee:  
A little sooner hadst thou spoke to me,
Thou hadst bene heard, but now the time is past:
Death wayteth at the door for thee and me;
Let vs goe measure out our beds in clay;
Nought but good deedes hence shall we beare away. (413–18)

The rapidly shifting symbolic treatment of the scales provides a micro-
cosm of the play and a telling contrast, despite similarities of content
and tone, with Shakespeare's poetic dramaturgy.

Elements of _Summers Last Will and Testament_ accrete a variety of
meanings but do not engage one another in specific contestatory rela-
tions except insofar as all gravitate toward two schematically opposed
poles of content and tone. That is, the play is divided between, on the
one hand, expressions of "summerly" irresponsibilities that are shared
both by its various figures of privileged self-indulgence and by Will's
common materialism, and, on the other hand, repeated reminders of
spiritual priorities. These priorities are embodied in the many elegiac
lines concerning the encroachment of all-consuming mutability. Will
Summers may have a local tonal advantage over Summer because Will
has humor on his side; nevertheless, the whole work is interspersed with
compelling lyrical laments, verses such as "Autumn hath al the summers
fruitful treasures" and the frequently anthologized "Adieu, farewell
earths blisse," a song which reduces even Will Summers to sad reflection:
"Lord, haue mercy on vs, how lamentable 'tis" (1617). Will may laugh,
but his laughter is subsumed in Summer's "griev[ing]" lament that "now
the time is past."

This lamenting note is a major component in _Richard II_, but by
contrast with Nashe's tonally polarized poetic gallimaufry, Shakespeare's
play shows us pointed interactions in which more determinate ideologi-
cal content and more differentiated tones intersect with one another
and are interwoven within and among representative characters. The
gardener, for example, responds to the queen's onslaught by employing
the metaphoric scales of justice before finally assuming an elegiac tone.
With a tongue neither "harsh" nor "rude," but by no means apologetic,
the gardener initially appears to ignore the powerful invocations of bib-
lical sinfulness in the queen's attacks upon his knowledge, his judgment,
and his impudence in giving them utterance. He does not respond in
expected ways to her accusation that he did profanely “Divine [Richard’s] downfall” or to her curses upon him for having judged his king. He neither goes silent, connives, rants, nor grovels before her royal wrath. He neither employs the demonized discourses of politic Machiavell or of rude leveler, nor, conversely, does he profess the deferential penitence appropriate to an apprehended violator of sacred hierarchy. Disclaiming delight in displaced authority while also avoiding abject expressions of unworthiness, he proclaims the ineluctable primacy of what is “true.” And the truth he claims is neither an accepted precept nor general principle, but the “news.” In other words, he trusts that very same “opinion” so often denounced in fulminations against the “mutable commonaltie”:

Pardon me, madam, little joy have I
To breathe this news, yet what I say is true.
King Richard he is in the mighty hold
Of Bolingbroke.

Nor does he hesitate further to evaluate the precise truth to be derived from these events:

Their fortunes both are weigh'd;
   In your lord's scale is nothing but himself,
   And some few vanities that make him light.
But in the balance of great Bolingbroke,
   Besides himself are all the English peers,
   And with that odds he weighs King Richard down. (R2 3.4.81–91)

Here, instead of a universal metaphysical weighing of all things human or an ethical evaluation weighing two individuals according to principles and merits—of vanity, say, poised against virtue—the scales adjudge the vanities of Richard in counterpoise with the political weight of Bolingbroke’s factional alliances with “all the English peers.” Words like “mighty” and “great” have been revalued so that they refer neither to birth, as in the biblical uses of high and low, nor to family, as in the discourses of lineage culture, nor to heroic personal strength or virtue, as in chivalric or humanist uses. Nor do they, surprisingly, apply strictly to the qualities of the individual Bolingbroke in himself. Rather, in the gardener’s utterance “mighty” and “great” are associated with numbers,
the “odds” upon which the might and greatness of the play’s new social order will be founded and through which it must maintain itself. Even the conservative York eventually abandons his principles and allegiances when faced with superior numbers and will justify aiding Bolingbroke “Because my power is weak and all ill left” (R2 2.3.153).

Furthermore, the relevant factor in the numerical majority of adherents mentioned by the gardener is socially differentiated status. Bolingbroke’s forces consist of “peers,” a more precise, “politic” characterization than the inclusive totalizations offered elsewhere in the play, where characters speak of broad consensus in sweeping, largely undifferentiated terms: “Where one on his side fights, thousands will fly” (R2 2.2.146); “Thy friends are fled to wait upon thy foes” (R2 2.4.23); “Against thy seat: both young and old rebel” (R2 3.2.119). In the gardener’s account it is the majority of a powerful caste, not the universality of acclaim, that constitutes Bolingbroke’s might and greatness. In this awareness of the estates as consisting of groups with political agendas, the gardener’s scales register the kind of social consciousness that appear as the first rule in the contemporary “Mysteries, or sophisms of state” that “pertain to all states”: “as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree or part of the commonwealth do not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity, as that the number of the nobility, or of great persons, be not more than the state or commonwealth can bear. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree: for as in weights the heavier weights bear down the scale; so in commonwealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in quality and quantity overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations, and conversions of state.” The author (perhaps Sir Walter Raleigh) begins with traditional vocabularies of estates or degrees but clearly conceives of the state as consisting of groups that must be balanced against one another according to factors of relative power, wealth, and numbers.

It is especially significant that the gardener does not claim that all orders and degrees simply avow Bolingbroke’s sovereignty. “Everyone,” he says, shares knowledge of, not commitment to, the realm’s new authority figure. This articulation avoids a source of potential legitimation for the usurper by sidestepping the notion of universal acclamation,
that vaguely evoked alternative to lineal descent that is evident in the chronicles, while it treads very dangerous territory in the Elizabethan political context. The gardener urges the queen: “Post you to London and you’ll find it so; / I speak no more than everyone doth know.” What “everyone doth know”? The speech is ultimately authorized by a democratized knowledge that is locally exemplified in his bizarre awareness of the secret correspondence of the Bolingbroke coalition. In granting him this inexplicable knowledge of privileged information, Shakespeare shows less realism than Marlowe, who attributes the fact that lesser figures of Edward II know about high-level secret communication to their ambitious connivance and conjecture. Young Spencer bolsters his politic recommendations to Baldock by speculating about his lady’s correspondence concerning the banished Gaveston:

A friend of mine told me in secrecy
That he’s repeal’d and sent for back again;
And even now a post came from the court
With letters to our lady from the king,
And, as she read, she smil’d; which makes me think
It is about her lover Gaveston. (2.1.16-21)

This analogue from Marlowe reveals the distinctive quality in Shakespeare’s representation of the gardener: the gardener’s values matter as much as his knowledge.

Unlike Marlowe’s Spencer, he does not connive or speculate. His stalwart tone, despite a challenge from the very embodiment of the established authority he elsewhere respects, represents a stability and power inhering in commitment to the “true.” Yet the truth he claims is embodied not in precept or pronouncement but in “news,” a kind of utterance, a genre often traditionally castigated as “rumor” or “opinion,” despite its enormous growth in importance as a component of printed publication in the 1590s. Furthermore, his staunch commitment appears all the stronger in light of the fact that a defense based on the truth of what one says is decidedly not incontestable. The gardener’s self-justification should be heard within a context that includes contemporary developments in the doctrine of seditious libel.

Stow’s Survey reports a notorious anecdote bearing upon contempo-
rary issues in the doctrine of libel. Stow claims to have heard the unfortunate bailiff of Romford in Essex utter the following last words: “Good people, I am come hither to die, but know not for what offence except for words by me spoken yester night to Sir Stephen, Curate and Preacher of this parish, which were these: He asked me what newes in the Countrey, I answered heauie newes: why quoth he? it is sayde, quoth I, that many men be vp in Essex, but thanks be to God al is in good quiet about vs: and this was all as God be my Judge, &c.”

Stow’s anecdote suggests a double bid for sympathy by conveying not only the injustice of punishment for telling the truth in the “newes” but also the pathos of suffering on the part of one who utters the truth regretfully, expressing his loyalty to state and monarch and his desire for peace. Stow reveals his purposes in the end of the story, for he claims the words of the condemned man caused such universal revulsion that his accuser, Sir Stephen, was forced to flee “to auoyde reproach of the people.” Instead of denouncing this public reaction as mob action, Stow sympathetically represents a sphere of common public opinion, and he does so at a time when Sir Edward Coke was spearheading significant repressive developments in the laws governing expression of such opinion.

Against generally accepted principles of common law, Coke argues in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries for legal principles that would remain in effect until the nineteenth century: in matters of sedition truth was no defense and libel could be committed even in private communication. In prosecuting a 1605 case, for example, Coke is reported by John Hawarde to have cited a famous passage from Ecclesiastes, “The indignacion of the harte [is] treason: althoughe the libelle be true & ye person infamous,” with the application that “ye state & gouvemmente is deluyered to ye magistrate, & therefore any priuate deliuey or wrytinge of a lybelle is a greate offence: yea, to see it, heare or reporte it.” Amid heightened scrutiny of expressions of private opinion, the gardener’s mere “reporte” of “truth” appears fraught with personal danger.

Despite the fact of official disapproval and the fact that his message itself announces change, it is precisely the tonal “constancie” of his utterance that challenges values assumed by Coke’s arguments concerning
“priuate” opinion or by Hall’s references to “mutable commonaltie.” In its particularized response to changing events, this statement by a common laborer concerning “what everyone doth know” precisely opposes Hall’s totalizing principle of general mutability as well as the social reflex that causes Hall to identify mutability with its stereotypical carrier, the commons. What Hall claims “all menne maye perceyve and see” is recast by the gardener as political truth rather than metaphysics, and its articulation evidences a stable, rationalized evaluation amid changing circumstances instead of exemplifying mindless, fluctuating opinion. In part, he stands for the values that Christian humanism had championed against the claims of chivalry and contemplative withdrawal in the name of the godly layman: temperance, prudence, gravity, and fortitude. It would not do justice to the garden scene, however, to overlook the implications of its lyricism for this most “lyrical” drama.

III

It is not sufficiently precise to label the gardener’s tone unwavering constancy; for his utterance does change within the scene. Moreover, the sequence and manner of its changes evoke an ideological position that, paradoxically, amounts to anything but the mere inconstancy attributed to “mutable commonaltie.” His firm, unwavering response, his readiness, so unusual in a play filled with equivocators, to stand by his word, is not the only source of evaluative differential between his utterances and those of the queen— or those of the king, for that matter. Upon her departure, the gardener’s steadfast tone quickly gives way to a lyricism that recalls her own earlier regrets and foreboding of “nameless woe.” Paradoxically, even these lyrical lamentations subsequent to her departure, which, taken out of context, might make him seem merely mutable or straightforwardly orthodox in their apparent abjection, help instead to delineate the gardener’s dignity and power. In their discourse, tone, and complex irony they also stand in a revealing relation to the lyricism of the play as a whole.

Rage at the gardener’s announcement of “what everyone doth know” prompts the queen to assume for herself that likeness to the biblical Creator granted the monarch in Tudor commonplaces. In leveling
curses of infertility upon the garden for the gardener’s profane knowledge, she recalls her husband’s own earlier pronouncements of sacral authority over the great garden of England. But her expressions of affronted rank, self-pity, and harsh vindictiveness are differently received than are those of King Richard. Richard’s curses upon the earth prompt skeptical unease even among his allies and are marked by self-conscious disclaimers. When he tearfully calls upon “my earth” to “Yield stinging nettles to mine enemies,” neither he nor his loyalist allies quite assent to what he says, despite his vehemence:

Yield stinging nettles to mine enemies;
And when they from thy bosom pluck a flower,
Guard it, I pray thee, with a lurking adder,
Whose double tongue may with a mortal touch
Throw death upon thy sovereign’s enemies.
Mock not my senseless conjuration, lords:
This earth shall have a feeling, and these stones
Prove armed soldiers ere her native king
Shall falter under foul rebellion’s arms.

**Carlisle**

Fear not, my lord. That Power that made you king
Hath power to keep you king in spite of all.
The means that heaven yields must be imbrac’d
And not neglected; else, if heaven would,
And we will not, heaven’s offer we refuse,
The proffered means of succor and redress.

**Aumerle**

He means, my lord, that we are too remiss;
Whilst Bolingbroke, through our security,
Grows strong and great in substance and in power. (R2 3.2.18-35)

The self-conscious hesitation in Richard’s own order that the attendant lords “mock not” his “senseless conjuration” merely registers the extent to which he occupies an uneasy ground between conviction and the embarrassing realization that his convictions rest on an uncertain basis.¹ The attempts of Carlisle and Aumerle to put a positive spin on his utterance, far from supporting what he says, convey significant reservation through their matter of fact tone. Their concrete urgings speak eloquently by their contrast with King Richard’s lyrical curses.³²
In the case of the queen and the gardener, by contrast, the common interlocutor grants a surprising degree of sympathy to the royal figure by echoing her laments and curses; the effect of this agreement in tone, however, is complex:

QUEEN

Nimble mischance, that art so light of foot,
Doth not thy embassage belong to me,
And am I last that knows it? O, thou thinkest
To serve me last that I may longest keep
Thy sorrow in my breast. Come, ladies, go
To meet at London London’s king in woe.
What, was I born to this, that my sad look
Should grace the triumph of great Bolingbroke?
Gard’ner, for telling me these news of woe,
Pray God the plants thou graft’st may never grow.

Exit

GARDENER

Poor queen, so that thy state might be no worse,
I would my skill were subject to thy curse.
Here did she fall a tear; here in this place
I’ll set a bank of rue, sour herb of grace.
Rue, even for ruth, here shortly shall be seen,
In the remembrance of a weeping queen. (R2 3.4.92–107)

Whatever its poignancy, the gardener’s lament actually serves further to appropriate—in and through the very form of its articulation—a version of authority from the queen’s officially sanctioned possession, even as the content of his speech expresses the desire to be subject to her sacral role. His tone evidences capacity for sympathy, but also rational distance.

This final exchange reinforces the impression that the conjunction of their speeches reveals more dignity in the gardener than royal worthiness in the queen. There is more here, however, than a contrast between his individual capacity for accurate knowledge, precise judgment, and sympathy and her own ignorance, obtuse unfairness, and self-regard. Returning good for ill, blessings for curses, the gardener picks up and revalues her reference to courtly “grace” in his Gospel vocabulary of repentance, grace, and pity, while he performs a symbolic gesture redolent of a self-sacrificial fellow feeling that strongly counters the offended hierarchical distinction expressed in her echoes of Genesis and in her
resentment that sorrow's message has come last to her. His religious usage makes her own look petty, self-centered, and vindictive. The gardener's sympathetic expressions of rue and ruth employ a symbolic natural vocabulary that opposes, like mad Ophelia's mournfully signifying flowers in *Hamlet*, the courtly egotism of his interlocutor, with her concern about how one such as she, "born to this," should be reduced to being the "sad" spoil for another's triumph. More importantly, his affirmed values of Christian sacrifice and self-effacement answer the strictures of offended ontological hierarchy, as, indeed, the play's later acts will grant increasing credence and value to the identification of Richard himself with the suffering victim of the Passion, the embodiment of divinity understood as self-sacrifice rather than as omnipotent dominance. His regretful reference to the ineluctable reality of his own "skill" and its inescapable logic constitutes an important consideration.

In its handling of religion, the garden exchange recalls that the poetic equation of King Richard with Christ in suffering undergoes a progression in the play. Initially, the identification of Richard with Christ in passion amounts to an egotistical metaphor rather than a shared ontological assumption. Although Richard is officially the divine deputy, assuming the likeness of the betrayed Christ appears first as his own idea and as a mistake. Apprised of the rising of his enemies, King Richard's utterance assumes the formal outlines of the elegiac *ubi sunt*—"Where is the Earl of Wiltshire? where is Bagot? / What is become of Bushy? where is Greene?"—only to shift abruptly from formulaic lament to vehement curses when he hears his allies have made "peace":

O villains, vipers, damn'd without redemption!  
Dogs, easily won to fawn on any man!  
Snakes, in my heart-blood warm'd, that sting my heart!  
Three Judases, each one thrice worse than Judas!  
Would they make peace? Terrible hell,  
Make war upon their spotted souls for this! *(R2 3.2.129–34)*

Like the gardener, Richard gets news, but Richard gets it wrong. Scroope will forcefully correct him by pointing out that his friends have made the "peace" of death rather than of betrayal. The grotesque tone of Richard's curses speaks as loudly as their erroneous content. His hyper-
bolic royal vehemence in mistakenly denouncing them as “thrice worse than Judas” says volumes. But what exactly does it say? Surely, the point is not, as Scroope first takes it to be, that all passions are subject to inexplicable mutability: “Sweet love, I see, changing his property, / Turns to the sourest and most deadly hate” (R2 3.2.135–36). Rather, Richard’s extreme utterance suggests his own self-centered failure to observe “law, form, and due proportion,” whether in utterance or government. Thus it would be wrong to take King Richard’s frequently reiterated identification with the Man of Sorrows as registering the play’s simple acceptance of sacramental kingship. It would be likewise insufficient to consider the gardener’s lyrical expressions of sympathetic “remembrance” for the queen’s sorrow as merely registering acquiescence in an apolitical definition of the subject’s role. Understanding the gardener’s lament will prepare us further to consider Richard and the “elegiac mode” that so dominates his speeches and that so many have felt to dominate the tone of the play.

The gardener’s patent sentimentality desire that his “skill” might be “subject” to the royal curse might appear to the theater audience in roughly the same way that Richard’s self-consciously “senseless conjuration” of England’s vegetation appears to those who hope to protect Richard’s “sea-walled garden.” Both utterances might at first appear to express suicidal violations of the values and duties of vocation: gardeners should further fruitfulness, monarchs confront aggression. Yet for a gardener to speak as he does against his calling actually pays tribute to the moral virtues of his own sensitivities. His wishes may be as countervocational and as futile as Richard’s own, but they effectively redeem his acts of political analysis from charges of self-interest.35 Despite their similar countervocational tendencies, Richard’s wishes do not carry the same positive effect. Political analysis obviously embodies a dangerous capacity that could be instrumental in the downfall of exactly that authority the gardener pities the queen for losing, but he pities her nonetheless. His pity is as important as his analysis because his lamentations render political analysis and the inevitable judgment of one’s betters, even of king and realm, as painful but inescapable knowledge, as a consciousness that is potentially produced in “everyone” by the force of circumstances themselves, without the agency of that individual “ambition” and “willful” disobedience that are so insis-
tently denounced during the period and so firmly linked to the act of judgment. The gardener’s lamentable utterance helps to differentiate his critical analysis of authority from its typical Elizabethan associations with the aboriginal sin of selfhood in the Creature. No agency or action—no Eve, no serpent, no “second fall of cursed man”—is represented in the gardener’s assessment of Richard’s state; rather, the truth itself speaks itself through him, uncontaminated by his individual will. The proof lies in his regret. He would not have it so, and yet it must be so: alas, the weeping queen. Lyrical grief redeems him.

In the absence of an Elizabethan language for political analysis that could not be construed as “ambition” and denounced as merely reproducing irresponsible general opinion or as the product of a willful subjectivity, or as a combination of both, this scene accomplishes something important by casting the gardener’s analysis in tones of compelled responsibility dignified by the pathos of Christian self-sacrifice and sealed with sorrowful regret. It effectively creates through tonality itself—and through the differential representation of his own utterances against the self-interested (and, in a paradoxical sense, “ambitious”) statements of the queen—a site for the legitimation of critical resistance to constituted authority. Similarly, when the deposed Richard is granted the mantle of Christlike pathos later in the play, the effect is arguably not to validate the sanctity of royal authority but to lend force to a negative critique of the attempts to appropriate such authority by the new rulers. Whatever the personal qualities that make Richard’s self-nomination as Christ appear willful, obtuse, and self-interested, the degree to which others in the later acts—Bolingbroke, Northumberland, Carlisle, York—implicate themselves and Richard in a version of the Passion story is remarkable. Yet as is most obviously the case with the Bishop of Carlisle’s predictions of another “Golgotha,” a prophecy that Shakespeare’s audience knew to be historically realized in the War of the Roses, the play’s invocations of the Passion occur in utterances which articulate truths that “everyone” in the theater knows but that few on the stage will admit: the “force” (R2 3.3.207) and corrupt “inten[t] to thrive” that underlie the public pretenses to authority in Bolingbroke’s “new world” order (R2 4.1.78). The new king’s pardon of Aumerle may prompt
Henry's nomination as a "god on earth" and invocation of the baptismal service with its rejoicing in the "old" Adam made "new" (R2 5.3.134-44), but every such instance of pious utterance associated with the new government is qualified and complicated. These echoes of the baptismal service, for example, recall the values of Christian redemption and reconciliation even as they constitute the immediate prelude to Henry's instigation of Richard's murder. Similarly, Henry's stated wish to wash the blood of Bushy and Greene "From off my hands, here in the view of men" (R2 3.1.6) simply fixes that blot more surely upon him, as he employs phrasing that assimilates him to the role of Pilate. More subtly, even expressions of Christian charity come from Henry's mouth bearing tones of falsity. It would be one thing to wish his sworn enemy, Mowbray, peace in death; it clearly amounts to something else when Henry articulates his wishes with a surfeit of pious sweetness—"Sweet peace conduct his sweet soul to the bosom / Of good old Abraham!" (R2 4.1.103-4)—and then shifts immediately back to business. There is no clear justification for such an utterance from the perspective of the character as character; rather the play evokes a distanced evaluative stance toward him. Thus, even in its tonality, the poetry of the play prompts political analysis. Bolingbroke's speech may bear the same content, even exhibit the same religious discourse and the formal devices of repetition that elsewhere constitute the play's lyrical, "elegiac" nature, as he regrets the loss of someone "sweet" to him, but his expression is haunted with formal overtones that belie, even contradict its own import.

Pious terms and lyrical tears fill the play, but its tears and verses have a peculiar relation to one another. This odd relation is fraught with implications that reach out into the broader contexts of both the literary field and the social-political life of skills and occupations in and among which that field took its early modern shape.

IV

Like the rest of the so-called lyrical plays of the early to mid-1590s, Richard II exhibits two elements that are very widely distributed throughout late Elizabethan prose and verse: Petrarchan language and an elegiac tone. Richard II is unlike the other plays often classed with it in this lyrical
group—Love's Labor's Lost, Midsummer Night's Dream, and Merchant of Venice—in defining itself as history and tragedy, and notoriously, in suggesting contemporary state politics. The peculiarity of the play as a literary object emerges more clearly when it is set in the context of the elements shared with other contemporary prose, drama, and verse. In Richard II, Shakespeare handles the woes of Richard and his queen in ways that are interestingly different from the way Samuel Daniel treats them in Civil Wars, one of the play's likely sources, and both versions look different when placed in proximity to the lamentable tragedy of Romeo and Juliet.

From the enormous amount of what Daniel calls “wayling verse,” “fatall Antheames, sad and mournful songs” among the popular collections and sonnet sequences of the late sixteenth century, one would think that the only contemporary way to articulate love was with an acknowledgment of loss. This emphasis could easily be discussed in terms provided by deconstruction or feminism, casting the sonneteer's “love” as founded on failure and violation, but the tone of loss appears virtually everywhere one looks, quite independently of genre or subject matter. Even leaving aside the mournful dramatic progeny of the Mirror for Magistrates, which prompted Wolfgang Clemen to claim that “the note of lamentation” permeates “the whole of pre-Shakespearian tragedy,” when one looks at prose fiction, lyric, epic, or drama, the tone is everywhere prominent. Nashe's The Unfortunate Traveller (1594), whatever else it is, includes “eligiacall historie” among its self-designations. Extended verse narrative like Shakespeare's Rape of Lucrece searches for “means to mourn some newer way” (RL 1365). Kyd's foundational revenge play The Spanish Tragedy intersperses violent action with the copious agonies of a “hopeles Father of a haples Sonne.” A “pleasant comedy” like Mucedorus laments that “All joy is comfortless, all pleasure pain.” Spenser's Teares of the Muses (1591) mourns, “O all is gone!,” and Ruines of Rome (1591) renders an historical panorama of ruin and destruction.

When it comes to love poetry itself, many poets acknowledge a link between Petrarchan love poetry and the “sweet-complaining” of lament. Shakespeare's Proteus recommends such a conjunction in Two Gentlemen of Verona. “You must lay lime to tangle her desires / By wailful sonnets,” he advises, and then:
After your dire-lamenting elegies,
Visit by night your lady's chamber window
With some sweet consort. To their instruments
Tune a deploring dump. The night's dead silence
Will well become such sweet-complaining grievance. (*TGV* 3.2.69–85)

This generic combination of “dire-lamenting elegies” and “wailful sonnets” pervades the poetry of the period with “sweet-complaining grievance.” Sidney’s *Astrophil and Stella* included eleven amatory and tearful song lyrics among the sonnets. Giles Fletcher’s *Licia* (1593) contained a half-dozen “Odes and Elegies” among its sonnets; Barnabe Barnes’s *Parthenophil and Parthenope* (1593) included twenty-one “Elegies”; Thomas Lodge titled his series *Phillis Honoured with Pastorall Sonnets, Elegies, and amorous delights* (1593). In *Palladis Tamia* (1598), Francis Meres relates those ancients “famous among the Greeks for Elegie” to English poets he calls “the most passionate among vs to bewaile and bemoane the perplexities of Loue.”

This predominant tone of despair and loss in the love poetry of the period may arise from the preeminent need to prove, in Proteus’s words, the “integrity” (*TGV* 3.2.76) of the speaker in light of the obvious pursuit of gratification that inheres in the form. In the context of what the speaker may actually desire from the beloved, hope might in fact appear to be a thoroughly compromised and compromising emotion, nearly akin in its desire to possess its object to that much-denounced “ambition” that would seek to possess a higher place in the courtly or public spheres. Sir William Cornwallis acknowledges this parallel: “What we call licorousnesse in children, greedinesse in Clownes, misery in courtious persons, the same is ambitio[n] in a higher fortune: the head of this humor is one, but in the disposing takes seuerall passages.” Sidney makes typically ironic use of this perceived similarity of desire in the erotic and political fields when Astrophil rather ineffectually attempts to defend himself against the charge of “pride” by explaining his displays of antisocial behavior as resulting from “ambition” to win Stella’s “grace”:

Yet pride, I think, doth not my soul possess,
Which looks too oft in his unflatt’ring glass;
But one worse fault, Ambition, I confesse,
That makes me oft my best friends overpass,
Unseen, unheard, while thought to highest place
Bends all his powers, even unto Stella’s grace. 44

Sidney handles the self-interest that might otherwise conceal itself under sonneteers’ euphemisms in typically playful fashion, since the speaker’s rejection of one egotistical discourse—the moral vocabulary of “pride”—is accompanied by his simultaneous admission of charges brought within another discourse—an “ambition” for a “highest place” that is, in a courtly context, ambiguously sexual and/or political. 55

Richard II makes a similar point more seriously.

Unlike the generic predisposition of semifictionalized courtly poetry to acknowledge, albeit warily, a speaker’s longing for change, the presumption of drama based on historical state affairs tends to cast hope in a more negative light. Appropriately enough, then, Queen Isabel denounces hope as compromised by its affinity with flattering, cozening ambition:

**Bushy**

Despair not, madam,

**Queen**

Who shall hinder me?
I will despair, and be at enmity
With cozening Hope—he is a flatterer,
A parasite, a keeper-back of Death,
Who gently would dissolve the bands of life,
Which false Hope lingers in extremity. (R2 2.2.67–72)

The queen’s personification of “Hope” anticipates the behavior of characters in the next scene. There, in a self-serving attempt to present hopefulness positively, the “parasite” Northumberland accompanies his egregious, and, in the event, cozening flattery of the rising Bolingbroke with the formulaic affirmation: “hope to joy is little less in joy / Than hope enjoy’d” (R2 2.3.15–16). Imitating in its ingratiating form the content of its message, Northumberland’s lines affirm the value of “hope” while embodying that very ambition that Isabel associates with the false flattery of hopefulness generally. Of course, Northumberland will later prove in Henry IV, Part One the symbol of self-serving political fickleness. As Richard phrases it, Northumberland amounts to a willing, but
temporary, “ladder” for the “mounting Bolingbroke” (R2 5.1.55–68). Given the flattering ambitions that may underlie the discourses of love and of court, the only way left to attest to the constancy of a passional self and to guard the speaker’s desire against association with self-interested acquisitiveness would be to affirm the value of the object of desire while expressly renouncing the prospect of attaining it. The dying Gaunt affirms the principle that the tone of despairing agony is the only sure measure of truthfulness: “they breathe truth that breathe their words in pain” (R2 2.2.8). No end of Tudor elegy and complaint attests to some such equation of painful renunciation with truth-telling. Yet the sonnet genre, as newly reinvigorated for the 1590s by publication of Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, also opened the way for ironic examination of this assumed relation between truthfulness and the tonalities of pain, an examination pursued by plays like The Spanish Tragedy and Hamlet with bizarre combinations of rigor and indulgence. Not surprisingly, as with so many stylized emotions, the expression of painful renunciation within the sonnet tradition is compromised by the fact that such expression simultaneously announces despair and also pays tribute to the superior qualities of the despairing poet-speaker himself, who becomes the more deserving to have what he lacks the more abjectly he gives up ever having it. Thus it makes sense that the sonnet and its language, as Diana Henderson has argued, should be a prominent means of political self-expression within a courtly society where so much depended on desiring without appearing to desire for oneself. One might recall Sir John Harington’s worries about the vicissitudes of his career and his resolution to act by writing poems that use “Petrarcke” to “eke out good matter” and by leaving them for Queen Elizabeth to find as if by chance. By the time Richard II is written, sonnets had amply meditated on the inescapable but necessarily misrecognized fact that, within the erotic field at least, lamenting renunciation was not simply renunciatory, but was, in fact, an established rhetoric with its own interests and designs. Attempts to prove steadfastness by asserting faith despite failure and painful loss had been exposed to ironic scrutiny as sonnets evoked those strange dynamics that threaten to turn the speaker’s proofs of steadfastness into evidence of self-assertion and possessiveness.
With typically incisive wit, Sidney joins Astrophil's despairing voice (like "some sad tragedy"), his use of the abject "I am not I" trope (the very discourse that Shakespeare uses in Richard III's final, despairing approximation of anagnoresis), with hints of Astrophil's palpable self-interest. Astrophil urges Stella to have pity on him by first taking "pity" on him as a character in the imaginary narrative "tragedy" that is his own story: "Then think, my dear, that you in me do read / Of lover's ruin / some sad tragedy: / I am not I, pity the tale of me." As they appear in Sidney's sequence, the discourse of "sad tragedy" and its tone of lament for the personal costs exacted by emotional upheaval and encroaching mutability—"I am not I"—signal no real self-loss or painful self-denial. Instead, they constitute elements in a highly self-conscious attempt to gain that which the desiring Astrophil hopes to achieve through his manipulative, self-interested fiction making. Protestations to the contrary, the speaker is all the more an egotistic "I" and all the more interested in getting what he wants the more he disclaims ego or the chance of gratification. The very "pity" he seeks from the beloved is a traditional euphemism for gratification anyway. As Richard Lanham says, Sidney's sonnets pursue "under the guise of a 'pure' sacrifice, an 'impure' plea for succor."

When Richard takes up the sonneteers' discourse of self-division and abandoned hope by adopting the I/not I trope in the punning renunciation of his rule—"Ay, no; no, ay; for I must nothing be" (R2 4.1.201)—and when he adopts the tone and discourse of the pitiful tale by requesting, "Tell thou the lamentable tale of me" (R2 5.1.44), the self-consciousness and irony of the sonnet tradition acquire new dimensions. They are put to work not among erotic poetics nor among the intimate associates of courtly advancement but within the broader public politics of the state, and the speaker is no longer the courtier or his amatory analogue, the lover, but the desired of all desirers, the king himself. This shift may be further clarified by examining the difference between the sonnet motifs in the dramatic utterances of Richard II and of Romeo and Juliet.

When Romeo and Juliet share a sonnet, they do so amid circumstances of utterance that in one sense resemble those in the scene of separation between Richard and his queen: both couples speak interlaced
rhymes among voices that express the values and forces that threaten their lyrical isolation. At the ball, Tybalt, the nurse, and Old Capulet utter the discourses of time, materiality, and family ties that threaten to separate the lovers. In the separation of Richard and his queen, Northumberland represents the forces of social and political change that threaten royal unity. Richard II follows Daniel in inventing a final reunion of the royal pair in order to separate them, but, unlike Daniel, Shakespeare chooses to surround them with the specific discourses associated with political ambition—”swift speed” and “policy.” This choice of terms is the more significant since Queen Isabel was, according to the histories Shakespeare read, rather prevented from going back to France than sent there hurriedly by Henry’s associates. Moreover, Shakespeare’s ostensibly historical tragedy connects this ahistorical parting to a political context that is far more complicated than the forces embodied in either the star-crossed metaphysical fate or the violent contention of reflexively warring, interchangeable families that threaten Romeo and Juliet. It is more difficult to sympathize with the royal agents than with the young victims.

In Shakespeare, and not in Daniel, the scene of royal separation is constructed as a parallel to the political scene of royal deposition, and the two scenes are connected by an eroticized discourse. Shakespeare’s Richard lends emphasis to these parallels and connections when he responds to Northumberland’s order to “Take leave and part, for you must part forthwith”:

Doubly divorc’d! Bad men, you violate
A two-fold marriage—’twixt my crown and me,
And then betwixt me and my married wife.
Let me unkiss the oath ’twixt thee and me;
And yet not so, for with a kiss ’twas made. (R2 5.1.71–75)

The “unkiss[ing]” of lips in this divorce resembles in compressed form the extended “undo[ing]” of Richard’s royal self in the deposition scene and the momentary hesitation over his own part in the ritual divorce—”Let me unkiss the oath ’twixt thee and me; / And yet not so, for with a kiss ’twas made”—repeats in miniature those extended moments of waffling about surrendering the crown which begin with “Ay no; no, ay; for I must nothing be” (R2 4.1.201).
By contrast with such polyvocality, in which echoes of state politics inhabit scenes of personal separation and where, conversely, the typical lover’s trope about lacking an “I” is inserted into parliamentary proceedings, Juliet’s use of the “I am not I” and “ay, no” tropes occurs in an erotic context which channels their possible implications. Juliet demands of her nurse:

Hath Romeo slain himself? Say thou but “Ay,”
And that bare vowel “I” shall poison more
Than the death-darting eye of cockatrice.
I am not I, if there be such an “Ay,”
Or those eyes shut, that makes thee answer “Ay.”
If he be slain, say “Ay,” or if not, “No.”
Brief sounds determine of my weal or woe. (RJ 3.2.45-51)

The delay of action here occasioned by Juliet’s verbal figures, the sort of thing that bothered Dr. Johnson in Shakespeare’s wordplay, exemplifies how Romeo and Juliet repeatedly lyricizes its dramatic exchanges. It is not just their sonnet moments that represent the lovers and others speaking in the dominant forms and tones of lyrical tragedy and its “weal or woe,” or more appropriately, its weal in woe. As many critics have observed, the power of the play emerges from the degree to which this pervasive and quite conventional Petrarchan love language is, in the words of the sonnet prologue, precisely “death-marked” with anticipation of the lovers’ personal “piteous overthrows.” The surprising intensity of Romeo and Juliet arises from the way that impending death breathes life into lovers’ clichés, their passion wagering its totalizing and inevitably fatal “if,” staking their individual commitment against everything—family, state, friends, and personal safety. This heady romanticism is certainly compromised by its being related to individualized weakness and limitation (Romeo’s sometimes insipid verses, his easily provoked suicidal tendencies, Juliet’s metaphors of childish self-indulgence), but the play nevertheless elicits sympathy by means as powerful as those to be found in Sonnet 15, where the context of inevitability constituted by “wastefull time” and “inconstant” circumstance is the foil to set off the intensity of the speaker’s attachment to the beloved: “Then the conceit of this inconstant stay, / Sets you most rich in youth before my sight.”
In this sonnet as in *Romeo and Juliet*, it is not a case of “I” or “no,” but “I” and “no.” Self-assertion in the face of complete negation is the only credible possibility because realization is, finally, incredible. Their personal identity, their “I,” emerges in the insistent confrontation between the lovers’ intense desire “to incorporate two in one” (*R* 2.6.37) and a seeming negation that is actually the paradoxical condition of anything like its fulfillment, in death and (self)destruction.

A similar “death-marked” intensity could inhere in a “tragedy” of King Richard II, since any Elizabethan audience would know at every moment the inevitability of the protagonist’s deposing and destruction. Marlowe’s *Edward II* had illustrated the theater’s power to infuse the drama of a failed historical ruler with intensely lyrical, highly individualized pathos. But the lengths to which Shakespeare goes in giving the entire play of *Richard II* a general lyrical tone of lament are extraordinary. Lament, as Stanley Wells has amply demonstrated, is structured into the play’s action and language in ways that exceed the suggestions of the historical subject matter, with invented or enlarged opportunities for lament in virtually every scene. Not only does the play couple expected sorrows for the death and downfall of a great prince with lamenting meditations on such subjects as the deteriorating state of England (*R* 2.4.8; 3.4.43; 4.1.139), the loss of native language (*R* 1.3.159), the decay of a great house (*R* 1.2.67), and time’s effects (*R* 1.3.229), but it also significantly expands the possibilities for lamentation by inserting multiple occasions in early scenes, well before the protagonist begins to undergo his sufferings. As Wells points out, the word “grief” and its derivatives occur forty times, more often than in any other of Shakespeare’s plays. Three points should also to be noted: first, unlike most pre-Shakespearean tragedies, the treatment of the protagonist’s sufferings does not, as Clemen says of the earlier plays, “give[] rise to rage, rebellion, and frenzy,” nor does it often “turn[] into accusation.” Second, the “gentler feelings” that Clemen finds absent in the earlier tragedies are precisely the ones most foregrounded in Shakespeare’s Richard. Third, the play’s lamenting tone is accompanied by attention to the ideological limitations of the discourses it employs and to the compromising circumstances of the occasions it seizes. In this attention, Shakespeare’s play more closely recalls insights pursued in contemporary
sonnets than it recalls the more or less static inheritance of the lament within earlier tragic drama.

This translation of sonneteering insights into a different genre is not a simple result of the writer's being also a sonneteer. Sonnet writers Samuel Daniel and Michael Drayton also versified the story of Richard II in the 1590s, but while Daniel's version of Richard's story provides a possible source for Shakespeare's play and Drayton's seems modeled on it, the specifically Petrarchan qualities of Shakespeare's discourse and the particularly ironic tone he adopts toward the employment of Petrarchan discourse is distinctive.73 Contrasts between the scenes of royal parting that Shakespeare and Daniel invent reveal these differences.

The parting of Daniel's Richard from his queen is really two scenes. In one scene Isabel first watches for, then looks at, and finally addresses an apostrophe to Richard, who cannot hear from the street below what she says from her window; in the second scene, the two figures converse in Richard's prison cell. Although Isabel's lines approximate recognizable sonnet tropes, Daniel's handling remains resolutely different from Shakespeare's. Daniel does not mix elegy with elements of sonnet as Shakespeare does.74 For example, once Daniel's Isabel overcomes her swoon on recognizing the humiliated figure paraded through the streets as her once-royal husband and gets beyond the emotional confusion of "Teares, sighes, and words, doubled togethers"75 she employs a trope she shares with Marlowe's Faustus, "Was this the face that launched a thousand ships," and Shakespeare's Richard, "Was this the face / That like the sun did make beholders wink" (R2 4.1.283-84), but the effect is different:

Are these the triumphs for thy victories?
Is this the glory thou dost bring with thee
From that vnhappy Irish enterprise?
O haue I made so many vowes to see
Thy safe returne, and see thee in this wise?
Is this the lookt for comfort thou dost bring,
To come a captiue, that wentst out a king? (2, 88)

The lines that convey such self-destructive romantic longing in the case of Marlowe's Faustus addressing the image of Helen and such intensely agonizing self-regard in the case of Shakespeare's Richard addressing his
own reflected image remain resolutely sane and measured in Daniel's Isabel. She may be disappointed and incredulous, she may be described in, and herself utter, antithesis and paradox ("Thus as shee stoode assur'd and yet in doubt, / Wishing to see, what seene she grieud to see" [2, 83]), but these expressions of self-division, loss, and confusion never take on the tone of surrender to self-destructiveness evident in Faustus's desiring raptures or in Richard's repeated self-abdications, wherein the one embraces as real the image he elsewhere proclaims illusory and the other precipitously uncrowns himself of kingdom and unkisses himself of his beloved. By contrast to the wavering self-doubts and long good-byes of Shakespeare's Richard, Daniel's Isabel suggests quick certainty of herself and of the persistence of her private relation to her husband despite his altered public state: "I do remaine the same, vnder thy hand, / Thou still dost rule the kingdome of my hart" (2,89). Isabel's protestations of unchanging love do not resemble those of Romeo and Juliet, either.

Her version of the "I am not I" formula is not at all like that of the sonneteer, nor like that of the lyrical tragedian. Daniel's Isabel may exchange words from her window with a beloved who is set at a social and physical distance from her, as does Shakespeare's Juliet, but her utterance remains different: "Ah no sweete Lord thou must not mone alone, / For without me thou art not all thou art" (2, 91). Isabel's terms and turns of phrase approximate the "Ay me" and "I am not I" of the sonneteers, yet they are deployed within a discourse of mutuality that is free of the intertwined tonal strands of abnegation and egotistic self-assertion that mark the speakers of the sonnets. When the sonnet speaker says to the beloved that he or she is incomplete without the speaker, the phrasing cannot easily, at least after Sidney, convey sympathy that is above scrutiny for complicated overtones of ambitious self-assertion. By contrast, Daniel's Isabel displays a straightforward sense of secure personal identity despite circumstantial flux and aspires to nothing beyond the mutual complementarity of married love. Finally, whatever unsonnetlike utterances Daniel invents for his Isabel, despite shared terms with the languages of the sonnet, Daniel's Richard is left, quite to the contrary of Shakespeare's Richard, virtually speechless, managing only stammers and falsely hopeful clichés:
Straight cleers his brow & with a borrowed smile
What my dere Queene, ô welcome deare he saies?
And striuing his owne passion to beguile
And hide the sorrow which his eie betraies,
Could speake no more but wrings her hands the while,
And then (sweet lady) and againe he staiies:
Th'excesse of ioy and sorrow both affords
Affliction none, or but poore niggard words. (2, 95)

After some stanzas describing their standing “silent and confused,”
Daniel concludes his account of Richard's speech:

But he whom longer time had learn'd the art
T'indure affliction as a vsuall touch:
Straines forth his wordes, and throwes dismay apart
To raise vp her, whose passions now were such
As quite opprest her ouerchardged hart,
Too small a vessell to containe so much,
And cheeres and mones, and fained hopes doth frame
As if himselfe belieu'd, or hop'd the same. (2, 98)

And that is it. From this note of “fained hopes” framed as meager if humanly understandable consolations sympathetically provided by one spouse for the other amid fears and afflictions that both quite clearly recognize even as they attempt to repress them, Daniel propels the story to the Parliament and its public, political implications. Drayton never even gets as close as Daniel to the precise interpenetration of idioms that Shakespeare elaborates.

Englands Heroicall Epistles appeared in print the same year as Richard II and is frequently close to it in language, but the similarities make the differences more striking.79 Drayton repeats Richard's parallel divorces in state and marriage in Isabel's accusation that Bolingbroke “hath before diuors'd thy Crowne and thee” (28r); Drayton echoes Marlovian diction in the reiterated trope “Is this the . . .” (32v); and his monarch laments in the tone of Shakespeare's Richard, “Comfort is now vnpleasing to mine eare, / Past cure, past care; my bed is now my Beere” (33r). Yet Drayton does not really combine Petrarchan sonneteering language with the discourses of state history despite such verbal formulae as “one should liue in two, two liue in
one" (28r) and despite an opening address "to the reader" justifying the formal combination of "amorous humour" and "matters historical" in terms of anticipated response: "because the worke might in truth be iudged brainish, if nothing but amorous humor were handled therin, I haue interwoven matters historical" (A2v). There is almost nothing "amorous" about the epistolary exchanges of Drayton's Isabel and Richard; instead the work is an exercise in frequently repetitious lament and vituperation informed by documented references from the chronicle histories.

By contrast, Shakespeare's play inextricably interweaves traces of the public story into the apparent privacy of the royal lovers' parting utterances. The tonalities of Shakespeare's speakers, furthermore, are insistently close to one another; the problems they share are clearly not meant to appear caused by some strictly individual disorder of perspective, some "flaw" of poetic indolence or passionate effeminacy inhering in Richard himself. So, for example, the queen's metaphor for Richard as a "fair rose wither[ed]" to be wished "fresh again with true-love tears" (R2 5.1.8-10) is replicated in Richard's memory of her having been "like sweet May" but being now "like Hollowmas or short'st of day" (R2 5.1.79-80), and his hope that such desolation might be redeemed in a tearful union, "so two, together weeping, make one woe" (R2 5.1.86). Yet, also interchangeably, the interlocutions of Richard and his queen register the sentimentality and limitations of one another's lyrical usage. The very mechanisms whereby the playwright constructs the paradoxically positive value of Romeo and Juliet's love, the growth of its serious intensity out of a meager artificiality as they pursue their death-marked desire, are insistently compromised in the utterances of Richard and his queen. They remain awkwardly prone to intermix self-remarking "senseless conjuration" in their private exchanges. We are constantly reminded of this in the repeated alternation between their perspectives that occurs as each one's utterance completes the other's. So, for example, Richard's potentially moving lament prompts Isabel's bitter qualification of sympathy with a surprisingly downright challenge to his mental capacity:

Hie thee to France
And cloister thee in some religious house.
Our holy lives must win a new world's crown
Which our profane hours here have thrown down.
QUEEN  What, is my Richard both in shape and mind
     Transform'd and weak'ned? hath Bolingbroke depos'd
     Thine intellect? (R2 5.1.22-28)

Richard's lines may echo the gardener's sensible criticism of his rule—
"Had he done so, himself had borne the crown, / Which waste of idle
hours hath quite thrown down" (R2 3.4.65-66) — but the similarity of
phrasing registers the discrepancy of values between the two utterances,
as the queen's reaction makes clear.

Her objection completes Richard's utterance by characterizing his
spiritualized definition of their political situation as diminished "intel-
lect;" thus she clarifies the difference between the gardener's politically
defined use values that stress time management and Richard's politi-

cally useless metaphysical oppositions of "profane" and spiritual time. The
gardener laments something that could have gone otherwise politically;
Richard religiously resigns himself to an eternal division between time
spent in "profane" worldliness and that spent in "holy" cloistering. In
this way, a movement from profane desire to Christian renunciation,
which resembles developments in Petrarch's own poetry from seeking
Laura to seeking heaven (like English sonneteers generally) is roundly
ironized. While the response of the queen to this resigned religiosity
makes sense given trends in the overall thrust of the play suggesting
complicity between religiously formulated ideology of divine royal ordi-
nation and Richard's difficulties, Richard also answers some of Isabel's
own protestations in ways that cast her utterances, strangely, as them-
selves equally limited or tonally melodramatic. This is so even in the
highly charged moment when they exchange a kiss resembling those kiss-
es exchanged upon the meeting and tragic parting of Romeo and Juliet:

RICHARD  One kiss shall stop our mouths, and dumbly part;
           Thus give I mine, and thus take I thy heart.

QUEEN  Give me mine own again; 'twere no good part
        To take on me to keep and kill thy heart.
        So, now I have mine own again, be gone,
        That I may strive to kill it with a groan.

RICHARD  We make woe wanton with this fond delay.
           Once more, adieu; the rest let sorrow say. (R2 5.1.95-102)
Even as they speak and enact the Petrarchan discursive repertoire—with its hearts, its keeping and killing, its kisses and groans, its taking and giving—awkward self-consciousness intrudes; this time it is Richard who recognizes the foolishness of delay and the futility of emotional self-indulgence when faced with political necessity. The values Richard expresses in turning to realism reverse the lyrical prolongation earlier given to his griefs when he had publicly renounced the crown:

_bolingbroke_ I thought you had been willing to resign.

_richard_ My crown I am, but still my griefs are mine.
You may my glories and my state depose,
But not my griefs; still am I king of those. (_R2_ 4.1.190–93)

This speech reveals that Richard is less interested in the political reality embodied in his forced resignation than in his attempt to construct an authority for himself by means of extended self-exposition. What he attains of self-possession emerges in and through the evoked magnitude of his loss and is constructed through his lengthy elaboration of that grief, the sole property over which he remains “king” even as he regally demands that his audience mark his self-undoing: “Now, mark me how I will undo myself” (_R2_ 4.1.203). The self that is undone is yet the self that commands attention in the act of undoing; disclaiming self it claims authority for itself in the name of the highest accumulation of losses and the unique right to mourn them. And is this not homologous to the plea of the wailful sonneteer, who would have himself more to be valued for the more he loses? Or at least might have expected to have himself so valued until Sidney and Shakespeare thoroughly compromised the subterranean symbolic economies of such rhetoric by exposing it to exquisite ironies. Why adapt the modes and insights of a self-ironic sonneteering habitus to the discourse, the situation, and the tragedy of state and king in the public theater?

By exposing the tones of painful lamentation to self-irony like that which had emerged in the sonnet tradition, this play denies that tonality the dominance that it had largely established across the genres during the Tudor period. It does so, however, without denying the validity of lamentation _per se_ and without criticizing it from the outside as had the carnivalized laughter of Will Summers, or his ancestor, the vice Ambidexter.
Instead *Richard II* interweaves the tonality of lament in and among utterances, making it one functional element among many for the communication of more complicated messages than the mutability of circumstance, the downfall of pride, or the woes of the sonnet-writing lover. If the complexity of the circumstances of utterance renders the play’s sadness unable to command simple assent, the tone of lamentation nevertheless frequently manifests itself in passages that would appear to be capable of almost carrying one along with it. For example, Richard articulates his agonizing descent into humiliation at Flint castle with moving eloquence:

Down, down I come, like glist'ring Phaeton,
Wanting the manage of unruly jades.
In the base court? Base court, where kings grow base,
To come at traitors’ calls, and do them grace!
In the base court? Come down? Down, court! down, king!
For night-owls shriek where mounting larks should sing. (*R2* 3.3.178–83)

Richard’s earlier speech in the same scene also evokes sympathy:

What must the king do now? Must he submit?
The king shall do it. Must he be depos’d?
The king shall be contented. Must he lose
The name of king? a God’s name, let it go.
I’ll give my jewels for a set of beads;
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage;
My gay apparel for an almsman’s gown;
My figur’d goblets for a dish of wood;
My sceptre for a palmer’s walking staff;
My subjects for a pair of carved saints,
And my large kingdom for a little grave,
A little little grave, an obscure grave. (*R2* 3.3.143–54)

Between these two speeches, however, something else intrudes, as elaboration gives way to loose copiousness and then suddenly to grotesque exaggeration:

Or I’ll be buried in the king’s highway,
Some way of common trade, where subjects’ feet
May hourly trample on their sovereign’s head;
For on my heart they tread now whilst I live:
And buried once, why not upon my head? (*R2* 3.3.155–59)
This disturbing development continues in the following lines which exceed in bathos even the imaginary procession upon Richard’s head:

Aumerle, thou weep’st (my tender-hearted cousin!),
We’ll make foul weather with despised tears;
Our sighs and they shall lodge the summer corn,
And make a dearth in this revolting land.
Or shall we play the wantons with our woes,
And make some pretty match with shedding tears?
As thus to drop them still upon one place,
Till they have fretted us a pair of graves
Within the earth, and therein laid—there lies
Two kinsmen digg’d their graves with weeping eyes!
Would not this ill do well? Well, well, I see
I talk but idly, and you laugh at me. (R2 3.3.160–71). 88

Approximating the exaggerated lyrical note of Kyd’s Hieronimo during his descent into madness, Shakespeare’s Richard instead lurches into uneasy, self-dismissive mockery. 89 As such embarrassed and embarrassing moments suggest, and examples are numerous, the effect is not to deny the power of lament but to reveal its powers as limited and functional. The sound of tears, one of the poet’s and the playwright’s most powerful and frequently used vocational tools, is placed, in other words, in the larger fields of social and political analysis while being deprived hegemony over them. This development is surprising in a play that includes powerful moments like Gaunt’s deathbed definition of England’s ills or Carlisle’s predictions of woe. 90 The reigning tonality of Elizabethan letters has been, if not dethroned, redefined as monarch-in-parliament rather than absolute—compromised by circumstances and concrete conditions and necessarily compromising itself rather than independently definitive in its dire laments for how things are, have been, or will be. It has become an utterance among utterances.

Twentieth-century practices of close reading would take off from attempts to deal with the ambiguities and ironies of lyrical poetry. Arguably among the first English dramas to demand and reward such an intense attentiveness to form, Richard II deploys formal means to render familiar historical matter—the downfall of Richard II—and familiar poetic tonality—grieving lament—as surprisingly unfamiliar, as unpre-
dictable in import and value. If the effects are at once too volatile and, paradoxically, also too ideologically focused on state politics to be adequately (or dismissively) summed up under Formalist categories of “defamiliarization,” alternatively and more historically, one might say the play renders well-known events and recognizable tones as instances of “news.”91 If the play, like the gardener, does not openly announce an ideological resistance to received notions of authority and to the tonalities that have traditionally accompanied (even while sometimes criticizing) those notions but instead offers invocations of such authority and lamentations concerning violations of it, it does so in the context of a dramatic practice that continually demands audience evaluation. Its exemplifications of truth, like the gardener’s own, demand practices of observation and analysis. If its audience could not confidently pronounce “what everyone doth know” in the sense of a shared, positively formulated assessment of the play’s events and their meanings, the audience might nevertheless have left the theater having repeatedly witnessed authority’s (and rebellion’s) occlusions and having had thrust upon it the inescapable necessity of interpretation.92 Furthermore, the density of social relationships and conflicts registered in its situated utterances and their role in constituting the truth might be seen as contributing to the production of a particular sort of audience. Some at least, having learned how to begin to make sense of such a world, could perhaps neither simply echo Richard on the sacral nature of kingship nor truly repudiate their hard-won knowledge in order to accede to the demands that such kingship makes upon its proper subjects.93
Of all the elements that constitute the varied legacy of the Bakhtin circle, the most influential for the study of Shakespeare has been carnival. When Bakhtin talks about carnival, for once at least, he is encouraging to those who would appropriate his ideas for the study of Renaissance drama. His evocations of "the essential Carnival element in the organization of Shakespeare's drama" have found significant resonance.  

Richard Helgerson, however, has articulated a challenge to the idea of a carnivalized Shakespeare, proposing that Shakespearean drama deploys carnival elements only to mock them and to distinguish Shakespeare's authorial sensibility from the "coarse, common and vulgar culture" out of which they originated.  

According to Helgerson, Shakespeare's history plays and especially *Richard II* with its "preeminently royal image of England" exemplify the social and aesthetic prejudices of a new "authors' theatre" which led the way in what Peter Burke has called the general "upper-class withdrawal" from "popular culture." In this chapter I argue against some aspects of the carnival view of Shakespeare formulated by Bakhtin and developed in subsequent criticism and, conversely, against the anticarnival view of Shakespeare articulated by Helgerson.

Elements of the chapter title suggest the terms of this engagement. Bakhtin's revised Dostoevsky book considers "reduced laughter" rather
than the essentialized, boundless laughter that the Rabelais book claims to have carnivalized European Renaissance literature. Reduced laughter is a more mediated, hesitant, or even silenced form that Bakhtin found permeating a literary line that runs from Menippean satire, through Rabelais, to Dostoevsky, and expressing ambivalence and resistance rather than an outright rejection of social and cultural restraints. Through its affinities with heteroglossia and utterance, reduced laughter offers an alternative to assessing Shakespeare's plays in terms of carnival, as supporting a "complete exit" from social constraints, or in terms of anticarnival, as supporting elite withdrawal. Reduced laughter also suggests ways to approach problems raised by analyses that emphasize the tensions and pressures in historical forms of carnival.

This chapter reconsiders Peter Burke's widely appropriated thesis concerning the "withdrawal" of elite culture, defined as that of "the clergy, the nobility, the merchants, the professional men—and their wives," from a popular culture of "the lower classes" and the practices that they had previously shared. The emergent elite culture, according to Burke, exhibits "reformed" values such as "decency, diligence, gravity, modesty, orderliness, prudence, reason, self-control, sobriety, and thrift," while the plebeian culture exhibits "a traditional ethic which is harder to define because it was less articulate, but which involved more stress on the values of generosity and spontaneity and a greater tolerance of disorder." The point is not to argue that elite and plebeian cultures did not emerge and polarize between 1500 and 1800 but to question the values invoked in these categories and their application to Shakespeare or to "popular" culture during Shakespeare's era. Burke's own formulations are various, sometimes emphasizing the cultural amphibiousness of the elite but also broader "participation" in cultural continuities. In fact, Burke provides a caution in the form of a communications model for cultural analysis which sounds like Vološinov on utterance: "Whether one is considering songs or stories, images or rituals, it may be useful to ask: 'who is saying what, to whom, for what purpose and with what effect? However, in asking this question we must not let ourselves assume that the message transmitted was necessarily the message received.' This utterance-based model of analysis leads directly to the third interest expressed in the chapter title.
Splitting a line from *Richard II*—"the shadow of your face"—with a pause formally registers the fact that silencing and hesitancy may constitute major elements in the utterances of the socially dominated, although such elements are likely to disappear from historical evidence. More positively, even the briefest silence can signify an enlargement of significance for those who belong to certain socially defined groups. Shakespeareans of the early twenty-first century might hear a pause after "the shadow of your" as a heteroglot loophole, an ambiguous link between an institutionally defined object of interest—a pathos-laden line from *Richard II*—and Paul Webster's ubiquitous ballad "The Shadow of Your Smile," from the 1965 Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor movie, *The Sandpiper.* This conjoining of elements from what might once have seemed distinct high and low cultures is not intended as willful carnivalization. The ironic interarticulation is meant to suggest that the canonical original and its pop appropriation already have much in common, despite differences in their current cultural standing.

The title's hesitation also bears on other questions that vex studies of the "popular": how does one determine the status of a cultural product? To associate a now canonical but once popular dramatic work with a sentimental ballad is relevant to this discussion. If Annabel Patterson and Helgerson disagree about the place(s) of early modern drama in the elite/popular field, they might still agree that the ballad form represents popular culture. Yet the "popular" status of the ballad, like that of Elizabethan drama, is defined by time, place, and articulation: obviously, sixteenth-century popular drama becomes twenty-first-century high culture, but ballads also show remarkable variability in status. And they have highly various relationships to drama. Of course, Shakespeare weaves ballad into dramatic dialogue. Yet even such lyrical evocations as the lines to Richard's face resemble Webster's twentieth-century ballad lines in being popular appropriations of earlier popular appropriations of high canonical originals.

Each link in this chain of utterances reaching from Latinity through early modernity to postmodernity is tellingly similar to the others in the complex, socially strategic combination of pathos and irony. Richard's lines to his own face resemble their immediate prototype, Faustus's
address to Helen of Troy’s face, in that both treat their speakers’ abandonment to lyrical pathos ironically while delivering powerful versions of the artistic commodity they mock. Marlowe’s Faustus passionately demands, “Was this the face that launched a thousand ships?” (5.1.97), but the ironically reductive answer to this question is everywhere evident. Faustus himself notes that Helen is an illusion, while registering the fact that invoking her image contributes to his self-damnation. Similarly, Richard’s pathetic demand of his mirror, “Was this face?” (R2 4.1.281), is reduced when Bolingbroke mocks the exaggeration in Richard’s bid for lyrical pathos with his reply, “The shadow of your face” (R2 4.1.292). Do such ambivalent or even self-contradictory combinations of pathos and ironic distance belong to elite, discriminating art? What is their place in popular Elizabethan drama?

Or in the twentieth-century ballad? By alluding to Shakespeare, “The Shadow of Your Smile” appropriates a “classic,” but this appropriation of cultural distinction occurs in contexts that question exactly such distinction. The Sandpiper, like its theme ballad, champions individual emotional sincerity, voluntarism, and especially nonpossessiveness over self-perpetuating, class-oriented, institutionalized forms of love, art, and education associated with the “male establishment.” Yet the film’s naturally noble, deschooled characters quote Chaucer—in Middle English—while its theme song evokes Shakespeare. Thus, oddly, a popular ballad that quintessentially embodies values of populist spontaneity and nonpossessiveness in personal relations that were taken for liberating circa 1965 resembles its Shakespearean original by criticizing a dominant elite while simultaneously delivering a bonus for the culturally elite fraction among its audience. In either case, those who recognize its allusions might gain—much as might later audiences for the Sex Pistols or the Star Trek movie The Undiscovered Country—a measure of cultural distinction in the capacity to recognize a poetic resonance that is presumed to be missed by most. John Fiske observes that late capitalist popular culture is “shot through with contradictions that escape control,” and that its products offer “not just a plurality of meanings, but a plurality of ways of reading, of modes of consumption.” This observation also has merit for a consideration of precapitalist England. Webster's sentimental ballad
line and the line from Shakespeare's lyrical tragedy suggest important things about the complex political potentials embodied in a heteroglot combination of pathos, commitment, and reduced laughter.

Richard II does fall chronologically among other historical plays in which the lower bodily strata and political decrowning are put in proximity to one another (think of Jack Cade and Falstaff), but instead of "paired images" of "top and bottom, face and backside" (PDP 126), Richard II exhibits a more characteristic Shakespearean concentration on the face and the subtle, material effects on it of care and time, and especially of mixed emotions and divided loyalties. This concentration deserves attention in light of those aspects of the Bakhtinian inheritance in which pathos and contradictory commitments do have important roles to play.

Before Rabelais and His World achieved publication, Ernst Kantorowicz's The King's Two Bodies (1957) and C. L. Barber's Shakespeare's Festive Comedy (1959) had established the importance of carnivalesque inversion to Richard II. Since then David Bergeron, Michael Bristol, and Leonard Tennenhouse have linked the play to Bakhtin's carnivalesque. Although the play evokes the "crowning/decrowning" that Bakhtin calls the "very core" of the "carnival sense of the world" (PDP 123), certain features appear to oppose its identification with Bakhtinian carnival. It is consistently poetic and highly lyrical; it concentrates on socially elevated characters; it evokes tragic pathos while largely forswearing open laughter; it lingers over eyes, tears, and faces rather than the open mouth or the organs and functions of the lower bodily strata; and it concentrates on isolated speakers under stress rather than on the free clamor of the public square. Thus, the relation between the play and Bakhtinian carnival has also been negatively assessed. Among those who find opposition to the very spirit of Bakhtin's carnival in Richard II, Graham Holderness and Richard Helgerson exemplify differing yet related grounds of negation. Holderness finds its "tragic form and literate, deterministic historiography" to be "potentially reactionary" and contrasts its pessimism with a Bakhtinian strain of utopian "popular and comic mode of historical
drama" that he finds embodied in the Cade episodes of Henry VI, Part Two and in the Henry IV plays. Helgerson argues that Shakespeare consistently portrays popular culture negatively, even in the cases of Cade and Falstaff. In Helgerson's view, Shakespeare does not enlist carnival for a complex critique of the arbitrariness of hegemonic values, as Ronald Knowles has argued. Instead, Shakespeare strategically appropriates the carnivalesque mode to trivialize it and to mock the popular culture of other writers in his quest for authorial distinction. Unlike the plays of such contemporaries as Thomas Heywood, which Helgerson finds informed by the values of popular culture as represented in ballads, Shakespeare treats “popular culture generally” as theater’s “dark other, the vestigial egalitarian self that had to be exorcised before a more gentrified, artful, and discriminating identity could emerge.” These assessments are thoughtful, yet further attention to Bakhtin, as well as to the plays and the “popular” ballads and pamphlets, could usefully complicate them.

Historical questions about carnival’s political status—usually in terms of whether it should be seen as a relief valve for social tensions or as a form of resistance—have frequently been raised, but another set of issues deserves attention. As with all Bakhtin’s major concepts, radically different interpretations of carnival and the carnivalesque are possible. When one examines writings from the various periods of his life, occasions for subsequent disagreement are readily apparent—and, I believe, significant for a consideration of Shakespearean drama. Furthermore, the question remains of the relation the utopian impulse of carnival populism, and particularly its images of pure freedom and inclusiveness, might bear to existing instances of popular cultural phenomena; recent sociological and feminist critiques of Bakhtin’s carnival have suggested bases on which to reexamine such issues in Richard II.

Though Bakhtin asserts that “laughter . . . overcomes fear, for it knows no inhibitions,” and that “its idiom is never used by violence and authority” (RAHW 90), carnivalesque practices have suggested to others what Allon White has called the violence of displaced abjection, directed not against authority but against disadvantaged individuals and groups (Jews, Blacks, foreigners, the physically challenged, pedants).
Michael Gardiner has pointed out that Stalin employed carnival motifs, including clown-kings and heroic mockery, for repressive political ends, while Keith Thomas has described early modern carnival mockery directed against the weak and socially vulnerable. Martin Ingram has shown how, despite apparent rowdiness and festivity, charivaris or skim-mingtons “had extremely close affinities with the shame punishments meted out officially by certain courts of law.” The treatment of scolds in charivaris was often modeled on the official legal punishment of the cucking stool, and testimony of the early seventeenth century attests to the self-conscious use of mockery in a “riding” by participants hoping to control the behavior of women in general. The prominent role of the “next neighbor” in the charivari further suggests the importance of what Ingram calls “neighbourly surveillance” in popular custom. The fact that one of the most characteristic markers of Shrove Tuesday in early seventeenth-century England was the destruction of brothels by groups of youths and apprentices is also suggestive. Evidence does not support the idea of a safety-valve mechanism permitted by official toleration, but it did suggest to some contemporaries that the sackeders were only doing the magistrates’ work for them. More generally, Pierre Bourdieu has observed that popular utterance often exhibits, not the “free and frank” solidarity of Bakhtin’s “public square,” in which fear, inhibition, and isolation vanish, but predictable forms of precisely unfree speech, tension, hierarchization, even silencing and exclusion, especially of women and racial minorities—a concern cogently raised in Mary Russo’s analysis of Bakhtin’s indifference to conventional misogyny in Rabelais. A better sense of the range of what Bakhtin has to say about carnival as well as what he has to say about heteroglossia and the conflicted dynamics of utterance proves relevant to the pervasiveness of constraint in Richard II. In scene after scene, Shakespeare’s play constructs the utterances of characters as painfully, even violently, entangled in internalized sociohistorical constraints. Yet, for all that, laughter—albeit reduced to irony, parody, tonal effects, and traces of ambivalence rather than carnival’s loud, raucous freedom—registers itself as a dialogizing force that critiques the pathos that drives the tragic action. Understanding how and why the play can conjoin “weeping, smiling,” that is, to laugh and cry at the
same time, may be facilitated by examining moments when Bakhtin does seem to believe in sweat and tears.

Bakhtin describes the traditions and values of popular carnival as furnishing his “fundamental” line of literary authors an “idiom of forms and symbols” and a “spirit” comprised of a set of interrelated attitudes (RAHW 10–11). “The carnival and similar marketplace festivals,” Bakhtin writes, “were the second life of the people, who for a time entered the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality and abundance” (RAHW 9). This experience of “community, freedom, equality and abundance” celebrates “temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order” as constituted by “hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (RAHW 10), but its dominant tone of “festive laughter” is neither merely individually liberating nor even corporately oppositional in any simple sense. Rather it is complexly ambivalent and collectively self-reflexive. “The laughter of all the people” is “universal in scope; it is directed at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants” (RAHW 11), and it expresses a generalized “gay relativity” that recognizes a basic ambivalence in human existence. Over the length of his career, Bakhtin says some apparently contradictory things about his foundational authors in relation to this carnival spirit. The most suggestive point occurs in discussing “historical pathos” in Rabelais.30

On the one hand, in “Discourse in the Novel” Rabelais is a prede- constructionist whose powerful laughter takes no prisoners, particularly in its loud mockery of institutionalized forms of pathos, by which Bakhtin means something like serious commitment. In Rabelais, one finds a radical skepticism toward any unmediated discourse and any straightforward seriousness, a skepticism bordering on rejection of the very possibility of having a straightforward discourse at all that would not be false . . . Here too the ground is being prepared for that new dialogical category, verbal and effectual response to the lie of pathos . . .—the category of gay deception. Opposed to the lie of pathos accumulated in the language of all recognized and structured professions, social groups and classes, there is not straightforward truth (pathos of the same kind) but rather a gay and intelligent deception, a lie justified because it is directed precisely to liars . . . Falsehood is illuminated by ironic consciousness and in the mouth of the happy rogue parodies itself. (DI 401)”
In the Rabelais book, on the other hand, Rabelais is a “convinced champion of humanism” who adopted historically “avant-garde positions in the field of politics, culture, science, and mores” and used “direct and an almost entirely serious speech” to express his true and “completely sincere opinion” (*RAHW* 352–53). Typically, Bakhtin qualifies this construction in subsequent paragraphs that downgrade the importance of a historically committed, truth-telling, pathos-laden Rabelais. In “other episodes, other words, another language,” a carnival utopian super-Rabelais overrules this “commonplace humanist[]” self-construction. Appropriating the “popular festive” view, which “liberated [all objects and phenomena] from all narrow and dogmatic connotations and . . . disclosed [them] in an absolutely free atmosphere,” Rabelais “always leaves a gay loophole—a loophole that opens on the distant future and that lends an aspect of ridicule to the relative progressiveness and relative truth accessible to the present or to the immediate future” (*RAHW* 353).

Bakhtin’s text appears to struggle with its own pathos. As more decidedly elsewhere (especially in the revised Dostoevsky book and in the chronotope essay), Bakhtin qualifies the tendency, especially typical of the Rabelais book, to valorize the “carnival pathos of shifts and renewals” and “the joyful relativity of everything” (*PDP* 125), rendering everything always and everywhere gayly relative except, that is, carnival itself, which is sentimentalized as pure freedom and granted hegemony over its clumsy, limited competitors—historically determinate affirmations, serious commitments, painful losses or more mundane affiliations in the fields of “politics, culture, science and mores” (*PDP* 125). The insistent stress on the gaiety of carnival laughter seems to me not merely utopian in the universal sense, nor hopeful in Ernst Bloch’s sense, but the historical mirror reverse of the “intolerant, one-sided tone of seriousness” that Bakhtin calls “characteristic of medieval culture” but which had its contemporary embodiment in Stalinist monologism. Bakhtin’s rhetoric makes sense in the context of his own decidedly limited situation, in lonely, painful struggle with grotesque demands for commitment and against a Stalinist appropriation of popular culture that validated “the folk” while officially banishing its inconvenient aspects.33
To approach Bakhtin's writings on the carnivalesque with this unnamed interlocutor in mind would be to treat them as situated heteroglot utterances—at once divided between what is being said, what is being responded to, and what is anticipated as a response; and formed out of available linguistic materials that come already ideologically weighted with collective purposes, originating in and constrained by positions within an ongoing dialogical environment. Such situating does not rob Bakhtin's statements of their power nor of their own pathos, but it acknowledges the role of a larger sociodiscursive matrix in their construction. Of course, this is the analysis of situated utterance thematized in John of Gaunt's dilemma. Gaunt desperately argues that his own assent to the political suppression of his son was not the full and free expression of his own opinion but the coerced product of an entire social situation, in which prevailing ideologies, available discourses, and anticipated responses actually dictated that "[his] unwilling tongue" should do himself a wrong. Gaunt's multiple constraints represent the exact reverse of the free anonymity and support Bakhtin finds in the speaker of Rabelais's prologue to Pantagruel who is represented as a hawker in a public square and whose identity is based on the shared "choral support" of the crowd, an "I" that is fully grounded in a "we" (RAHW 167).”

II

Taking a cue from Shakespeare's representation of situated utterance, gay relativity could be relativized as Bakhtin himself does when he describes a laughter that arises where pathos and mockery, commitment and gay relativity meet in a more evenly matched contest. In reduced laughter the territory explored by Richard II seems especially near to hand.

Richard II frequently evokes constraints upon utterance, from the opening hollow promise that characters may "freely speak" (R2 1.1.17) through numerous examples of tongues "engaoled" (R2 1.3.166) or of voices self-censored (R2 2.1.3), and references to social isolation as "speechless death" (R2 2.1.172), or of being "press'd to death through want of speaking" (R2 3.3.72). Moreover, few plays offer so many invocations of deeply felt pathos while also insistently rendering them self-qualified by the form and circumstance of their utterance. Speech after
speech proclaims at length and with vehemence values and affiliations that vie with one another in their potential power to awaken commitment: national allegiance (Bolingbroke); sacred familial bonds (Duchess of Gloucester); the Great Chain of Being (Richard); sacred kingship (Gaunt); Christian chivalry (Gaunt); personal honor (Bolingbroke); claims of personal fealty, succession, and lineal inheritance (York); religious obedience (Carlisle, Queen Isabel); humanist commonwealth (the gardener); and right of property (Ross). This is not Sophoclean tragedy where two codes conflict, nor a revenge tragedy where vengeance and Christian forbearance subsume other oppositions, but a world overpopulated with the demands of multiple and overlapping commitments that are not easily opposed to one another nor ranked on any single ladder of hierarchy. None is fully validated, but none is dismissed painlessly.

The Shakespearean text thus described might recall Bakhtin's justly famous characterization of Shakespeare as sharing with Rabelais a “sober (yet not cynical)” historical “realism” that found expression in a vision of all “the epoch making changes taking place around him and yet recognize[d] their limitations” (RAHW 275). Bakhtin maintains, however, that this vision—at once historically situated and ironic—depends upon a popular inheritance described as “belief in the possibility of a total exit from the present order of . . . life” (RAHW 275). This stress on “exit” from prevailing social-ideological conditions (what Bakhtin calls “ideological routine”) threatens to occlude specific aspects of Shakespeare's social-material practice (as well as Rabelais's own). It risks turning Shakespeare into one of his own disempowered figures like Lear, or Hamlet, or Richard himself, who can see the world only as an unweeded garden that fails to provide the promised largeness, and who cannot gain an analytic grip on the conditions and mechanisms that once rendered them powerful and now seem to render them, to render humanity generally, “slaves to limit” or, as Richard puts it, “subjected thus.” By contrast, the Shakespearean practice I am suggesting is more like that of a historical sociologist in objectifying conditions of agency. These conditions, at once external and internal in the form of belief, ideology, and habitual disposition, both constrain and enable. Exit from the present condition may have been, may still be, the last hope of the truly power-
less—as the destitute Kent says from the stocks, “Nothing almost sees miracles / But misery” (KL 2.2.168–69)—but it is far from clear that Shakespeare saw this terrible either/or condition as the common lot. Nor is it clear that the commoner saw it that way.

Among the remarkable things that historians like G. R. Elton have asserted about the early modern period is the extent of truly varied and truly political modes of commitment and expression among commoners. Not less striking than the existence of what Donald R. Kelley describes as a “Babel of tongues” among competing political discourses during the period is the frequency of popular recourse to strategies of negotiated difference that employed institutional discourses of precedent, legality, and rights—and that demonstrated the pathos of commitment to them. It would seem inappropriate in light of evident popular loyalties and dispositions in Richard II—whether among individuals like Richard’s groom and gardener or among groups such as those at Bolingbroke’s triumphal procession—to imagine, as the anonymous Captain does, an English social order polarized between the established elite and an economic lumpen eager for class war. It is also difficult to grant Helgerson’s characterization of “popular political values” as a resigned indifference to state power compounded out of “instinctive and indiscriminate loyalty” and the experience of being “victims of such power.” Nor is apolitical resignation quite all one finds in either Thomas Heywood’s “ballad-inspired histories” or in ballads themselves.

Heywood’s Hobs, a character derived from the ballad figure of the Tanner of Tamworth, may employ language from a ballad refrain to express indifference to the identity of the reigning monarch: “I am just akin to Sutton Windmill; I can grind which way soe’er the wind blow. If it be Harry, I can say, ‘Well fare, Lancaster.’ If it be Edward, I can sing, ‘York, York, for my money.’” But when approached as an utterance, this discourse of indifference reveals itself to be the strategic product of a severe constraint. Rather than his frank and free “popular” opinion, Hobs’ speech takes a functionally appropriate shape from the belief that he speaks with a stranger from court (actually the disguised King Edward) at a time of political turmoil. Once he is slightly reassured about the stranger’s good will, Hobs, like the ballad from which he
quotes, shows anything but political indifference. His scarcely prompt-ed disquisitions on specific political and social inequities such as royal patents and exploitive accumulation win praise from Edward:

I see plain men, by observation
Of things that alter in the change of times,
Do gather knowledge; and the meanest life
Proportion'd with content sufficiency,
Is merrier than the mighty state of kings. (47)

Sounding like Shakespeare's Henry V in obtusely praising the common state as “merrier” than that of kings, Heywood’s King Edward nevertheless acknowledges something that Henry never allows. Serious evaluations of the highest things by “the meanest” community members ought to be expected, as they practice the “observation” of things.

The clearest representation of such sociopolitical phenomena within Richard II appears in the relationships and contrasts between the aristocratic Duke of York and the gardener. Both the high and the mean figure observe changes of government, and although laughter of a sort is part of the representations of both, so are tears. Each exhibits the pathos of commitments. As they change their alliances and express regrets, however, their voices suggest capacities for analysis that the overly polarized alternatives of freedom and abject victimhood trivialize. Their language admits mediated circumstances, degrees of assent, and practical alternatives.

Paradoxically, only Richard himself repeatedly articulates the either/or alternatives of festive populism, and these alternatives are revealed to contribute to his self-subjection. In addition, his condition is profoun-dly ironized by his own utterances as they repeatedly register the embara-rassed, even laughable nature of his sadness. This aspect of the play is well represented in Fiona Shaw’s recent characterization of Richard, which builds on textual promptings to emphasize his awkwardness; such interpretation has a theatrical history that reaches back at least to the late nineteenth century in Frank Benson’s portrayal. At the same time, elsewhere in the play, it is not the awkwardness, but the gloating laughter of Richard or the mocking laughter of his political opponents that are consistently undercut by traces of premonitory sadness. We know, as any
Elizabethan audience would know, that Richard’s mockery of the dying Gaunt or of Bolingbroke’s courtship to the common people registers limitations in his understanding that precipitate his own downfall. By the same token, we also know that Northumberland’s laughter at the disempowered Richard or his joking dismissal of the Bishop of Carlisle’s pathetic denunciations—“Well have you argued, sir, and for your pains, / Of capital treason we arrest you here” (R2 3.1.150–51) —exhibit blindness to social forces and commitments that will have serious historical consequences. Carlisle’s prophecy of civil discord will bear bitter fruit in ages to come. Thus, Northumberland’s laughter at the obvious limitations exhibited by others in the pathos of their commitments is, at least in the long run, wrong. Like the laughter of Richard’s cronies at the banished “high Hereford” three acts earlier, this derision is no sign of freedom—as any Elizabethan audience, even one that got its history from “popular” ballads, would likely know. 44

To say that the play treats Richard’s sadness ironically and ironizes the laughter of his opponents with hints of sadness and ultimate futility does not deny the positive capacities of pathos or of laughter, or of their combination, to effect real political work. The traces of a mixed, reduced laughter that dog expressions of sadness with self-conscious awkwardness, lapses of misperception, exaggerated histrionics, or self-remarking long-windedness finally contribute to the possible meaning of that sadness for the audience. Conversely, the same may be said of the seriousness that haunts the play’s laughter in the form of premonitions. It is not enough to oppose, as does Bolingbroke, “serious thing[s]” to the popular festivity of “The Beggar and the King” (R2 5.3.77–78), for serious implications follow from the intertwining and mutual qualification of pathetic and comic effects. This sort of subtle mixing is not an aesthetic effect distinctive to a refined, elitist artistic sensibility. Although arguably more subtly inflected than are the effects arising from the twinned plots and mixed casts of the native English dramatic tradition with its high/low, tragic/comic parallels and its mingling of what Sidney calls “clowns and kings,” the mixings of tone and genre in Richard II develop features evident in the ballad milieu and those history plays it inspired.
Long ago, Hyder Rollins described scholarly bias in treatment of ballads: “many critics devoutly believe that individual broadside ballads are indecent, puerile, or ridiculous, while collections of broadsides, if made during Elizabeth’s reign, become ‘poetical miscellanies’ worthy of serious study and high praise.” The values Rollins disavows—indecency, puerility, and ridiculousness—may have become positive in recent appreciations of popular misrule and carnival; however, his point about the seriousness and “poetical” nature of ballads remains telling. Rollins insisted that sixteenth-century ballads were frequently not only indistinguishable from or interchangeable with “poetry” but that they were also quite heavily moralized despite charges of indecency. Both contemporary reactions and modern scholarship have perpetuated strategic distinctions among basically similar materials. Conversely, catch-all terminology of “popular” and “ballad” or “chapbook” flattens diversity among early modern materials by suggesting clear oppositions and divisions. These divisions, with attendant oppositions such as authored and anonymous, serious and vulgar, artful and simple, reify a permeable and paradoxical early modern diversity into categories that are much more rigidly constructed now than in the sixteenth century.

Evidence also makes it difficult to distinguish “popular” works from serious literature on the basis of audience status. About the time Richard II appeared on the stage, for instance, Nicholas Bowndes complained about enthusiasm for “newe Ballades” among all social strata:

you must not onely looke into the houses of great personages, where this musick hath iostled out the singing of Psalmes, or rather kept it from euer entring in, but also in the shops of Artificers, and cottages of poore husbandsmen, where you shall sooner see one of these newe Ballades, which are made only to keepe them occupied, that otherwise knowe not what to doe, then any of the Psalms, and may perceiue them to bee cunninger in singing the one, then the other. And indeed I know not how it commeth to passe, (but you may obserue it) that the singing of ballades is very lately renewed, and commeth on a fresh againe, so that in euery Faire and Market almost you shall haue one or two singing and selling of ballades, & they are brought vp a pace, which though it may seeme to bee a small thing at the first, yet I am greatly afrayd of it. For as when the light of the Gospell came first in, the singing of ballades
(that was rife in Poperie) began to cease, and in time was cleane banished away in many places: so now the sudden renewing of them, and hastie receiuing of them euery where, maketh me to suspect, least they should drive away the singing of Psalmes againe, seeing they can so hardly stand together: of which I am so much the more iealous, because I see that in other places also where these be not receiued in, yet the singing of Psalmes is greatly left, ouer that it had wont to be.\textsuperscript{47}

Other testimony supports Bownde's claim that ballads were attractive to everyone, from wealthy aristocrats to the humble.\textsuperscript{48} Despite his antipathy to the “barbarousness” of native forms in drama and verse, Sir Philip Sidney admitted strong affection for the ballad of Chevy Chase: “I must confess my own barbarousness; I never heard the old song of the Percy and the Douglas that I found not my heart moved more than with a trumpet, and yet it is sung but by some blind crowder, with no rougher voice than rude style.”\textsuperscript{49} Tessa Watt describes the implied reader among teaching ballads as “employer rather than labourer and oppressor rather than oppressed.”\textsuperscript{50}

Nor is it satisfactory to oppose popular and elite literature in terms of modern assumptions about author function. The sixteenth-century ballad is not anonymous “folk” song and does not become anonymous until many ballads are reprinted without attributions in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{51} Tessa Watt calls the sixteenth-century ballad an “author’s medium,” and argues, “Respectable clergymen and educated laymen signed their names to ballads expounding religious doctrine and argument for reform. The Elizabethan ‘ballad’ was more often the wit, poetry or polemic of an individual author than it was the anonymous ‘folksong’ transcribed from tradition.”\textsuperscript{52} Hyder Rollins claims that names of some two hundred Elizabethan ballad writers are known.\textsuperscript{53} Works by the bestselling among these authors were frequently signed or initialed: Deloney’s broadsides often end with “Finis, quod Thomas Deloney” or “T. D.” Elderton’s name or initials frequently appear; and in the seventeenth century Martin Parker could assert, “What ever yet was published by mee, I was knowne by Martin Parker, or M.P.”\textsuperscript{54}

The ballads of the sixteenth century, like other widely purchased publications, were permeated with morality and religion. According to Sandra Clark, the bestsellers were works like the 1537 Sternhold-Hopkins
Psalter, which reached its forty-seventh edition by 1600, or like John Norden’s *The Pensive Mans Practice* of 1583, which went through forty editions in as many years. Clark claims at least “half of all books extant between 1583 and 1623 were theological,” adding that the dominant tone of period publications might be termed “moralistic,” since even obviously nonreligious romances or jestbooks often offered moral instruction. Concerning religion in ballads, Watt suggests fluctuation: “in the early Elizabethan period a minimum of over one third of the ballads being produced were ‘godly’ ballads, as compared with under one tenth by the second quarter of the seventeenth century. For the period 1560–88 the average was 35 [percent]; for 1588–1625 it was 19 [percent] (15 [percent] if we discount the year 1623); for 1625–30 only 9 [percent].” From such evidence, Watt argues (after Patrick Collinson) for a decisive drop in godly ballads around 1580, but she observes a pronounced tendency toward mixture: “it is almost impossible to find a straight ‘news’ ballad in the sixteenth century which does not refer to the greater ‘religious’ significance of the individual ‘secular’ event. Political ballads, dealing with events like the ‘northern rebellion’ of 1569, also straddled the line between secular and religious concerns.”

Similarly, religious, even biblically inspired, ballads mix their moral messages with the discourse and devices of love songs. For example, the transfixed initial glance typically riveting the lovers, usually “fresh and gay,” in ballads like “Little Mousgrove and the Lady Barnet” regularly recurs in ballads like “The Story of David and Berseba,” which opens: “It chaunced so, upon a day, / the king went forth to take the ayre / All in the pleasant moneth of May, / from whence he spide a Lady faire.” Even ballads devoted to erotic love and pleasure are often either moralized by later versions or become part of an ongoing exchange with more godly ballads. The same publisher, William Pickering, registered “Row well ye Mariners” in 1565–66 and “Roo well ye marynors moralized” the next year, while other publishers added “Row well Gods Mariners” and “Row well ye Christs Mariners” in 1567 and 1568. Sometimes the same writer penned notoriously erotic ballads along with works of impeccable piety. William Elderton, who composed “A ballad intituled A newe well
a daye, as playne maister papist as Donstable way” and “Prepare ye to the Plowe,” also wrote the widely-attacked ballad “The Gods of Love,” a conjunction which prompted the Protestant divine Thomas Brice to demand in his own ballad entitled “Against filthy writing”: “Tell me is Christ, or Cupide Lord? / doth God or Venus reigne? / And whose are wee? whom ought wee serve? / I ask it, answer plaine.”61 If there might be considerable variety in the moral and religious tonality of ballads by an individual author, a similar variety apparently also existed in the repertoire of the individual performers. Even severe critics admit that to please their various audiences “some Godly songs they haue: / Some wicked Ballads and unmeet, / as companies doo craue.”62 As the use of erotic clichés in biblical ballads might suggest, the ballad audiences themselves were not easily divided into pious and profane. Several observers claim that moralizing ballads were widely hung on the walls of taverns and brothels.63

Early modern cultural phenomena are more complex and various than oppositions between elite and popular, authored and anonymous, or serious and profane allow; for example, the case of what has been called “Shakespeare’s favorite ballad”—“The Beggar and the King”—which intrudes itself into the York family scenes, suggests complications for the categorical division of artfulness and simplicity.64 The ballad of King Cophetua also reveals the limitations of Helgerson’s account of “commonality” and victimization in the “ballad inspired history” of Heywood’s Edward IV and, conversely, upon the antipopular, self-alienated form of “self-fashioning” he finds in Shakespeare’s history plays but not in the ballad milieu.

Shakespeare refers to the ballad of King Cophetua’s sudden love for a beggar maid in three of the four plays from the lyrical group of the early to mid 1590s (Richard II, Romeo and Juliet, and Love’s Labour’s Lost) as well as in the slightly later Henry IV, Part Two. The plays show a strong interest in ballads about the time Bownde remarked the new fashion in balladry, and Shakespeare’s appropriation of ballad discourse is densely heteroglot. When Bolingbroke offhandedly opposes “a serious thing” to “the beggar and the king” in Richard II, the ballad is little more
than a symbol for comic triviality. By contrast, in each of the other plays, the audience’s assumed knowledge of the ballad contributes to a highly specific mockery of linguistic pretentiousness, while the most extended evocation conveys considerable pointed irony against a single character. In the briefer cases, Mercutio laughs at Romeo’s amorous agonies by virtually quoting the ballad, “Young Abraham Cupid, he that shot so trim / When King Cophetua loved the beggar maid” (RJ 2.1.14–15). Falstaff assumes comically exaggerated grandeur by taking on the persona of mighty Cophetua with Pistol, “O base Assyrian knight, what is thy news? / Let King Cophetua know the truth thereof” (2H4 5.3.102–3). In Love’s Labor’s Lost, evocations of the ballad not only mock a character’s discursive pretensions but suggest the playwright’s recognition of social contradictions in the ballad itself. On one level, Don Armado’s affection for the ballad appears to demonstrate the limits of his aesthetic tastes, despite his pretensions. But Armado’s adoption of the ballad’s story and attitudes to model his own erotic pursuit of Jaquenetta reveals the self-serving nature of that mixture of domination and abjection that comprises both his own and King Cophetua’s love. Shakespeare’s parodic representation reveals the symbolic violence, silencing, and gendered and class-oriented coercion inhering in the ballad itself, which might otherwise seem to embody a “commonality” uniting king and commoner.

Don Armado’s unwittingly self-parodic adaptation of King Cophetua’s utterance lays bare what is highly euphemized in the original. Declaring unequivocally his identification with Cophetua—“I am the King” (LLL 4.1.78)—Armado offers Jaquenetta an opportunity to exchange robes for rags, titles for tittles (LLL 4.1.82–83), but the opportunity also implies a threat:

Submissive fall his princely feet before,
And he from forage will incline to play.
But if thou strive, poor soul, what art thou then?
Food for his rage, repasture for his den. (LLL 4.1.90–93)

Through Armado’s utterance, gender and class tensions assert themselves under the guise of loving proximity between high and low. True, the original suggests utopian transformation of social distinction and domination, bringing the king and his clichéd social opposite, the (conveniently female) beggar, into loving commonality. Nevertheless, certain
elements of the original ballad undercut this utopian vision, evidencing the persistence of power relations.

The ballad relates how King Cophetua, having broken “natures lawes” by renouncing “women-kinde” (like the male characters of Love's Labor's Lost), sees “a beggar all in gray” and is stricken by Cupid’s dart so that he “to love must subject be.” But the monarch’s “subject[ion]” to the power of love actually means that he will, even before inquiring her name, simply announce his love, demand that she “shall” accept him, and that she “shall” transform herself, her clothing and bearing, into some form more acceptable in cleanliness and in degree:

For thou, quoth he, shalt be my wife,  
And honoured for my queene;  
With thee I meane to lead my life,  
As shortly shall be seene:  
Our wedding shall appointed be,  
And everything in its degree:  
Come on, quoth he, and follow me,  
Thou shalt go shift thee cleane.  
What is thy name, faire maid? quoth he.  
Penelephon, O king, quoth she;  
With that she made a lowe courtsey;  
A trim one as I weene.  

Thus hand in hand along they walke  
Unto the king's pallace:  
The king with curteous comly talke  
This beggar doth imbrace:  
The begger blusheth scarlet red,  
And straight againe as pale as lead,  
But not a word at all she said,  
She was in such amaze.  
At last she spake with trembling voyce,  
And said, O king, I doe rejoyce  
That you wil take me from your choyce,  
And my degree's so base.

In “amaze” and “trembling,” she accepts the royal order, “rejoyce[s]” in royal “choyce,” and reaffirms the baseness of her own “degree.”62 This is no image of seamless commonality.

The clothes and the bath the beggar is ordered to take accompany
an instant transformation of her behavior, prompting a proverb about the mysteries of identity transformation due to change in role:

And she behaved herself that day,
As if she had never walkt the way;
She had forgot her gown of gray,
   Which she did weare of late.
The proverbe old is come to passe,
The priest, when he begins his masse,
   Forgets that ever clerke he was;
   He knowth not his estate. (1:187–90)

This stanza brings us very near concerns with role and personal identity in Richard II, particularly in Richard's questions concerning the unreal nature of monarchs without office, but the treatment of the relevant issues seems diametrically opposed. While the beggar of the ballad instantly and entirely forgets the nature of her previous being when given a new office, Richard laments the mixed condition that results from his inability to forget the nature of what he had been before being deposed: "that I could forget what I have been! / Or not remember what I must be now!" (R2 3.3.145–46). Yet notwithstanding what the ballad may say about magical social transformations of low to high, the way it articulates this apparently complete transformation suggests the continuation of at least one difference between beggars and princes: princes are ruled by their own passions and choices while beggars are ruled by princes and by what princes insist upon. Implicitly, the ballad represents a situation which validates the insight of the subjugated Richard, who, after being transformed from "king" to "beggar," acknowledges, "do we must what force will have us do" (R2 3.3.207). Thus, Don Armado's self-parodic heteroglossia, mixing languages of love and force, does not simply mock the ballad he invokes but offers an answering chorus that accentuates aspects of the original, developing a social division already enfolded within it.

If this interpretation threatens to overread the contrary pulls within the ballad, treating the popular text as more complex and self-contradictory than its form and its conjectured audience would seem to warrant, then we might consider the class-hegemonic assumptions that
underlie the assessment of ballads and their consumers as inherently simple. Critics do often find the moral tags of ballads and chapbooks potentially at odds with their content, and the established tendency is to treat these morals as what Peter Lake, somewhat dismissively, calls legitimating elements. Such evaluations presume that we can determine that romance or sensationalism are what really appealed to the popular audience, and that the moral elements, rather than being signs of complex, divided response, were added to palliate official scruples and/or the residue of that scrupulosity into which the popular reader had been interpellated by official apparatuses such as church or school. But even if this sort of assessment were granted its terms, who is to say that the popular reader were not as likely to join Armado in identifying with the king’s symbolic violence as to identify with the palliating communitarian “moral” of the ballad? What if status or gender domination were the real appeal to portions of the audience, providing imaginary gratifications (or degradations) for members of a social order exhibiting polarization in both these fields of power?

Armado certainly misses the idea of commonality entirely. Ignoring portions of the ballad that represent the king’s erotic vulnerability, he imagines the king as an imperial conqueror, who “might rightly say, ‘Veni, vidi, vici’” (LLL 4.1.64). This (mis)reading is not merely ridiculous. The ballad’s narrator also perverts the ostensible moral commonality binding monarch and beggar in the gendered violence of his own direct commentary. He articulates the ballad’s promise of social equilibration as a threat, warning female audience members that they must either allow his own erotic suit or risk the fate of King Cophetua in being constrained to wed beneath themselves, even to wed beggars: “Disdaine no whit, O lady deere, / But pitty now thy servant heere, / Least that it hap to thee this yeare, / As to that king it did” (1:190). The ballad ends with the low made high, but the narrator invokes far more negative, less utopian, limiting perspectives within which to see its implications. His threats to reduce the lady register continuing divisions and power differentials among sexes and social strata. Similar observations could be made concerning Heywood’s Edward IV: elements of commonality and laughter by no means exclude reminders of social divi-
sion, calculation, and antagonism. The same commoner, Heywood's Hobs, who appears as the laughable, plainspoken adviser to the disguised King Edward, also offers lectures to others, both above and below him socioeconomically, on the benefits of small-scale economic calculation while joining in a class-based discourse that derides a fellow commoner who refuses to finance the King's war against France as a "grumbling, grudging churl" and "grudging peasant" (72-73). Nor do suffering and tears preclude Heywood's drama from critically evaluating its victims and the role of their own calculations and investments in social hierarchy in constructing the conditions of their victimization.

This observation holds even for the figures that Helgerson finds epitomizing the interest of the "ballad-inspired" histories in victims of royal power, Heywood's Jane and Matthew Shore. The palpable sufferings of victimization are not the only concern in their story; instead, the play suggests complicated interactions of agency, ideology, and social division. True, Matthew Shore sounds like Shakespeare's Gaunt in resigning himself to victimized silence concerning King Edward's pursuit of his wife: "Oh, what have subjects that is not their kings? / I'll not examine his prerogative" (87). Yet as he refuses to judge his wronger, Matthew Shore's stifled silence speaks as loudly as any discourse about the violent injustice of royal claims: "England, fare thou well! / And, Edward, for requiting me so well— / But dare I speak of him? forbear, forbear" (81). Like Hobs, Shore has indeed been compelled to practice "observation" of his betters, and the passions he displays in attempting self-control speak volumes about his own ability to evaluate their actions. His resentment of Edward's violation of his marriage presses the edge of open articulation. The silences of his utterances evoke a discourse of justice and requital that is no less evident for being truncated. Remarkably, Shore does not suffer similar constraint when seeking a moral discourse for evaluating his wife, Jane. In the name of deference to royal prerogative, he excuses himself and his male relatives from resisting royal injustice—"I cannot help it; a God's name, let her go. / You cannot help it, uncle; no, nor you. / Where kings are meddlers, meaner men must rue" (81). But Matthew Shore demands from Jane a resistance
to royal will that he neither exhibits nor asks of himself nor of any “meaner men,” blaming her solely as the representative agent of a group which has occasioned his pain: “Adieu, O world! he shall deceived be, / That puts his trust in women or in thee” (87). He constructs her, unlike himself, as a free, moral agent who represents “women,” all women, rather than appearing, as in his own case, the representative of a “meaner,” victimized social stratum. The gendered dimension of Matthew Shore's remarks on womankind is the more marked in that his lines are Heywood's rearticulation of Jane Shore's own judgments upon mankind in The True Tragedie of Richard the Third—“all men are vnconstant.”70

Heywood's treatment of Jane leaves the merit of Matthew's denunciation of women ambiguous. Royal will may be resistless, and Jane may protest her continuing love for Matthew (87), but the drama represents "women" explicitly weighing what the men appear unable to articulate—the relative moral costs and social-material profits of infidelity. Jane, protestations aside, exhibits an economic and social agency in her capacity to consider, albeit painfully, upwardly mobile adultery as a possibility open to desire and deliberation:

**JANE**

Here do I live, although in mean estate,
Yet with a conscience free from all debate;
Where higher footing may in time procure
A sudden fall, and mix my sweet with sour.

**MRS. BLAGUE**

True, I confess a private life is good,
Nor would I otherwise be understood.
To be a goldsmith's wife is some content;
But days in court more pleasantly are spent.
A household's government deserves renown,
But what is a companion to a crown?
The name of Mistress is a pretty thing,
But Madam at each word doth glory bring.
Yet I will not be she shall counsel ye:
Good Mistress Shore, do what ye will for me.

**JANE**

Oh, that I knew which were the best of twain,
Which for I do not, I am sick with pain! (76)
The women consider which constitutes the “best” of alternatives, and however passive Jane may elsewhere appear to be, this estimating of the “sweet” of “higher footing”—prompted by Mrs. Blague’s imaginations of “glory” to be gained by rise in social stature—helps to define a condition that is, like Matthew Shore’s own state, far more complicated than simple victimhood in its self-divisions and competitive social orientations. Although Lena Cowen Orlin is surely right that Jane is not primarily defined by ambition, the estate-defined prospect of being something more than a “goldsmith’s wife” appears here dangled before her as if it might be as attractive to Jane as the gender-defined condition of being more than “women” is important to Matthew. In both cases, silence speaks as loudly as words: Heywood renders the self-stifling aspects in Matthew’s bitter resentments of his own ideologically constituted impotence as apparent as the self-serving aspects in Jane’s silent acceptance of Mrs. Blague’s amoral rearticulation of compromised wife as royal “companion.” Her chosen silence here complements her earlier enforced silence, when, like the beggar wife, she defers to Edward’s royal will: “If you enforce me, I have nought to say.” In sum, the identities and relationships of the tragic Jane and Matthew Shore are no more free of socially defined calculations, tensions, and antagonisms than are those of the comic Hobs, tanner of Tamsworth, or of the romantic King Cophetua and his beggar wife.

IV

The clearest representation of similar sociopolitical conflicts within Shakespeare’s play appears in the relationships and contrasts between the York family and the play’s gardener. On the one hand, York functions as a serious choral marker. He observes Richard’s wrongdoing, then Bolingbroke’s wrongful response, evaluating king and usurper by available standards. Paradigmatically, he is left “all at six and seven,” caught like Sophocles’ Antigone or Kyd’s Hieronimo between the demands of conflicting codes:

Th’ one is my sovereign, whom both my oath
And duty bids defend; th’ other again
Is my kinsman, whom the king hath wrong’d,
Whom conscience and my kindred bids to right. (R2 2.2.112-15)
On the other hand, unlike the similarly conflicted Gloucester in *Woodstock* or Kent in Marlowe’s *Edward II*, York’s status as tragic chorus or sufferer appears repeatedly compromised by lapses of decorum and by suggestions of calculation and self-serving in his words and actions.73

The lapses in decorum are perhaps most blatant in the beggar and the king scene where York and his wife seek to outplead one another for and against their son Aumerle. This scene is often omitted in performance and has had a very mixed reception from critics, who frequently dismiss it as farce or antimasque.74 Yet, however extreme this scene appears in relation to surrounding scenes, it merely amounts to a louder version of more muted comic effects and cross-purposes. York’s part is ripe with elements of reduced laughter.75 These elements appear even in his grandest moments as noble counselor to Richard, as embodiment of tragically divided loyalties, and as monitory figure. York’s strongest speeches on behalf of “sequence and succession” are compromised by devices derived from comic dramaturgy: the auditor’s abrupt dismissal of the speaker’s passionate plea or his failure to attend to it in the first place.76 Richard responds to York’s extended eloquence with obvious incomprehension, demanding, “Why, uncle what’s the matter?” (R2 2.1.186), and abruptly dismissing him with “Think what you will” (R2 2.1.209). York’s speeches concerning his tragically self-divided condition betray similarly comic confusion. He misnames his interlocutors—”Come, sister—cousin, I would say, pray pardon me” (R2 2.2.105)—and abruptly changes subjects—“What, are there no posts dispatch’d for Ireland? / How shall we do for money for these wars?” (R2 2.2.103–3).77 The play emphasizes his limitations: his “palsy” (R2 2.3.103), his frustrations arising from boots, horses (R2 5.2.77–87), and doors (R2 5.3.32–44), or the “unruly woman” (R2 5.2.110) who is his wife.78 Just as striking as these compromises of tragic decorum is the inconsistency between his absolutist political discourse and the implied calculations evident in his actions.

Other characters assume a difference between the changeable, calculating self-interest of the “wavering commons” whose “love / Lies in their purses” (R2 2.2.128–29) and the presumed stability of opinion among the nobility. York’s development refutes this social polarization. Ideological principles are prominent in York’s speeches, but their articu-
lation reveals them to be deeply intertwined with self-contradictions or self-qualifications that cast an aura of nearly laughable calculation or temporizing over his utterances. These effects are sometimes relatively subtle, but at other times they approach the grotesque. A brief exchange concerning Bolingbroke’s “right” to challenge Richard’s violation of his inheritance offers a more understated example. York’s lecture to Northumberland for leaving out Richard’s royal title earns him Bolingbroke’s rebuke and occasions a revealingly conflicted exchange:

**Bolingbroke**  Mistake not, uncle, further than you should.

**York**  Take not, good cousin, further than you should,

Lest you mistake: the heavens are o’er our heads. *(R2 3.3.15-17)*

In York’s echoing assessment of how much “further” one may proceed, a notion of political measurement has insinuated itself. He can still proclaim the interest of the “heavens” in state affairs, but his blanket condemnations of Bolingbroke’s faction as “rebels all” *(R2 2.3.136)* have given way to partial reservations. The sequence that initiates these developments is far less subtle about interlacing York’s utterances with suggestions that evoke an almost audible, if reduced, laughter.

At first York earnestly impeaches the insurgents. Yet faced with their obvious strength, he manifests a startling capacity for temporizing with “rebellion”:

Well, well, I see the issue of these arms.  
I cannot mend it, I must needs confess,  
Because my power is weak and all ill left.  
But if I could, by Him that gave me life,  
I would attach you all, and make you stoop  
Unto the sovereign mercy of the king;  
But since I cannot, be it known unto you,  
I do remain as neuter. So, fare you well,  
Unless you please to enter in the castle,  
And there repose you for this night.  
 *(R2 2.3.151-60)*

His pretenses are rendered risible by an offer to accommodate the rebels despite his proclaimed neutrality. The hollowness of his claims to prin-
principle resonates in his next appearance, where he has become so integrated into the rebellion that he literally speaks for Bolingbroke himself:

**BOLINGBROKE** Uncle, you say the queen is at your house;  
For God's sake fairly let her be intreated,  
Tell her I send to her my kind commends;  
Take special care my greetings be delivered.

**YORK** A gentleman of mine I have dispatch'd  
With letters of your love to her at large.

**BOLINGBROKE** Thanks, gentle uncle. (R2 3.1.36-42)

In contrast to his earlier self-silencing in the royal presence (e.g. R2 2.1.3-4, 27-30, 69-70, 141-44), York not only anticipates the new ruler's needs but takes it upon himself to speak on his behalf.

In contrast with such repeated assaults on the noble dignity of "good old York," the play treats the common gardener with strange seriousness. Replaying a comic scenario straight out of Heywood or Deloney and the ballad literature, a ruler surprises a truth telling rustic, but the comic potential of the meeting is qualified by signs of evident hierarchical constraint and by eloquent pathos. Instead of aligning high with low in a vision of utopian communal solidarity or separating high from low with an unmediated opposition in values and expression, the garden scene relativizes high and low characters and their values. The queen appears almost comically ignorant, vituperative, and condescending, while the gardener displays a complex, accurate sense of social forces and political strategies. He knows the news; he knows the players—and unlike Cade or Falstaff, he measures accurately and expresses himself in tones of dignified pathos. His expressions of grief at Richard's downfall valorize and empower his radical act of judging his superiors according to standards produced by his experience as a self-reflexive laborer. Because he sees how things are and yet would not have them so, his informed critiques of royal policies are represented as inescapable products of conditioned necessity rather than as self-interested assertions of will or simple class antagonism. His experience of successful agency as a laborer gives him the tools of analysis, and his tears validate his assessment, making it possible for an Elizabethan audience to credit his political opinion. Be-
hind him one may detect a calculated authorial mixture of assent and ambivalence.

V

The gardener does not laugh or invoke the lower bodily strata, but even if he did, I am not convinced that what Leonard Tennenhouse calls the “robust festivity” of carnival would give us the right terms for analysis. I am reminded of a perennial American problem with pop music. Typical of this speech genre, William Bennett’s complaints about the “vulgar” Nine Inch Nails song “Big Man with a Gun,” are occasioned by elements that might be taken straight from Bakhtin’s lexicon of unreduced carnival—raucous, exaggerated physicality, sex, death and outspoken frankness.79 Like some updated passage from Bakhtin’s carnival Rabelais, the song begins “I am a big man / (Yes I am) / And I have a big gun / Got me a big old dick and I / I like to have fun,” but “robust festivity” rapidly shifts to ugly violence: “Maybe I’ll put a hole in your head / You know, just for the fuck of it / I can reduce you if I want.” The exaggerated masculinity and the analogy between handgun homicide and sexual violence takes aim at the American social-political situation. The song’s ugly laughter is tinged with bitterness and the pathos of commitment; to invoke gay relativity would be to deny its sickening power as an exit wound, an audible trace of a committed intention engaged in a limited and limiting historical struggle. If this account makes a loud popular song sound more like the taut, reduced laughter of Shakespeare’s play than like the Bakhtin’s Rabelais, that is in part my point.

This point is not simply a product of postmodern sensibility speaking itself, despite its similarity to attitudes to be found in critics like Slavoj Žižek.80 A similar argument can be supported with a late sixteenth-century figure who has come to serve as the “prissy” epitome of elite withdrawal, Sir William Cornwallis. In the Essays of 1600, Cornwallis claims to have employed ballads as toilet paper. Sharon Achinstein treats this gesture as exemplifying the rejection of popular culture by early modern cultural elites: “Though both high and low culture did share in the entertainment system that included ballads, as we see in Cornwallis’s essays, the high culture shared in this practice only as it rejected it,
through cultural censure and legal means, in order to keep health in the body social—a social achievement crowned by an aesthetic program.” Yet Cornwallis does not simply reject the ballads that he employs on his lower bodily strata. He offers them in support of his general thesis: “There is not that thing vpon the Earth, that well examined, yeeldes not something worthie of knowledge.” In particular, Cornwallis asserts that ballads are useful because he sees in them “the difference of wits, and positions, the alternations of Arguments pleasing the world, and the change of stiles” (j3r). Even when he dismisses the genre, its authors, and its auditories, Cornwallis finds ballads and their performance laden with moral content, hearing in them “vice rebuked, and to see the power of Vertue that pierceth the head of such a base Historian, and vile Auditory” (j3v). Like his knowledge of “Hawkes, and running Horses,” knowledge of ballads gives him another language, other intelocutors: “I meeete often with people that unnderstand no other language, & then they make me sociable, and not vnpleasing to the company” (j4r–j4v). It is true that he contrasts popular matter like “Arthur of Britaine” and “Huon of Burdeaux” to “Homer, Virgil, and such Poets” as “dregs” to “more noble observations” (j4v), but he happily lumps together popular romances and canonical classics as means wherein “a man may better himselfe” (j3v).

Thus, whatever social distance he keeps between himself and the popular, Cornwallis offers support for an analysis more congenial to Bakhtin (or Žižek) than to other recent alternatives. He may write in the genre of the “paradox,” but, as in his Encomium of Richard III, the genre is flexed by its interlacing of matters serious and paradoxical. Neither fixated on “looking up” toward an elite model to emulate (Stephen Greenblatt), nor down upon a popular culture, either to embrace it (Michael Bristol, Annabel Patterson) or to repudiate it (Richard Helgerson, Sharon Achinstein), Cornwallis “listens around.” He treats classical inheritance and contemporary popular material much as I would argue Shakespeare did—as potentially useful, especially as they might comment upon and interarticulate one another. With two differences in emphasis, what I am arguing for here comes close to the “participation thesis” that Burke offers as an alternative to the great withdrawal. Burke argues that the
elite could participate in both the classical inheritance and the “little tradition” of oral culture, and were as a result “amphibious, bi-cultural, and also bilingual.” I want to emphasize the degree to which classical, moral, religious, political, and popular cultural strands were intertwined with one another. To varying degrees, all these strands were multilingual and multivocal. If given their due, elements now associated with the so-called little tradition could have as many “serious” implications as the great. Conversely, the lesser folk themselves might well appropriate the serious productions of their elite other as “play.”
Abbreviations Used in the Notes


Introduction. Listening Around/Talking Back

1. Habitus and its institutional aspects are ubiquitous in the work of Pierre Bourdieu; see Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (French ed. 1979; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). A succinct definition in Distinction stresses inculcation, continuity, and nonconscious functions: “a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions; it is a general transposable disposition which carries out a systematic universal application—beyond the limits of what has been directly learnt—of the necessity inhering in the learning conditions” (170).

2. “Looking up” and “looking down” come from Michael Bristol, who opposes Bakhtin to foundational versions of new historicism or cultural materialism by virtue of his intense engagement with popular culture. Bristol characterizes Jonathan Dollimore as positing a cultural unity resembling Tillyard’s Elizabethan world picture, seeing Shakespeare’s age experiencing a breakdown of that unity, and concentrating on intellectual history, institutions, and dominant discourses to the “exclusion of popular culture.” Bristol describes Stephen Greenblatt’s work as resting on “a disembodied and abstract conception of the social, in which collective experience is apprehended only through secondary refractions, codes, conventions, ideological formations and images of power. These have a tenuous, alien and sometimes baleful relation to the self, which is consistently presented in the condition of isolation.” In Bristol’s account both movements parallel “traditional literary scholarship” in assuming “authority is divided or allocated between established power and the exceptional subject. The possibility of a further complication in the form of authority invested in productive life or material culture is not considered.” To which, Bristol counters: “The literary subjects in question, however, pro-

3. For a remarkably positive early modern appreciation of linguistic variety in terms of sexual promiscuity, see Richard Carew’s praise for the English disregard (following classical example) for differences “betwene the bed lawfull or vnlawfull” in adopting and adapting foreign words and phrases (Excellency of the English Tongue [1595–96], in G. Gregory Smith, Elizabethan Critical Essays, 3 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904], 2:291).


5. Lars Engle quotes the relevant Bakhtinian passage—“A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary”—and argues relative to agency, “Bakhtin denies the autonomy of individuals with less emphasis on constraint and more on the omnipresence of dialogic encounters” (Shakespearean Pragmatism: Market of His Time [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993], 62).

6. The phrase sociolinguistic interorientation is Vološinov’s (MPL 122). Bakhtin lectured on Shakespeare at Saransk, was a friend of the Shakespeare scholar L. E. Pinsky, reviewed Pinsky’s Shakespeare book (see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984], 326, 411–12), and saw Shakespeare’s important role in the pre-history of the novel and in the development of carnivalized literature during the Renaissance (see PDP 178, and chapter 6 below). An early review of Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky
book by Commissar of Education Lunacharsky represents Shakespeare and Balzac as precursors of Dostoevsky's polyphony. Lunacharsky calls the works of Shakespeare "polyphonic in the extreme" because "untendentious" and filled with characters who are at once highly various and individually filled with "an incredible inner logic in the convictions and acts of each personality" (On Literature and Art, trans. Avril Pyman and Fainina Glagoleva [1965; repr. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973], 79–106; quoted from Bakhtin's versions of Lunacharsky in PDP 33; cf. Ilkka Joki, Mamet, Bakhtin, and the Dramatic: The Demotic as a Variable in Addresivity [Abo: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1993], esp. 58–66). Bakhtin grants measured assent, allowing that "certain elements, embryonic rudiments, early buddings of polyphony can indeed be detected in the dramas of Shakespeare," but he draws distinctions between these rudiments and their Dostoevskyan development on three grounds. First, drama's "very nature" opposes truly polyphonic interaction, since it "cannot contain multiple worlds; it permits only one, and not several, systems of measurement." Secondly, Shakespeare's plays contains "only one fully valid voice, the voice of the hero." And third, Shakespeare's characters are not "ideologists in the full sense of the word" (PDP 34). One wonders if Bakhtin was aware of the dialogical conflicts of social worlds and metaphysical orders in such early modern dramas as Kyd's Spanish Tragedy (see James R. Siemon, "Dialogical Formalism: Word, Object, and Action in The Spanish Tragedy," Medieval and Renaissance Drama in England 5 [1990]: 87–115). Secondly, one might ask whether Hamlet, Macbeth, or Othello has a "fully valid voice." Finally, only a limited notion of "ideology" could deny the role of ideological factors like honor values and culture in the struggles of Hal, Falstaff, and Hotspur in Henry IV, Part One. As Vološinov writes, "Each and every word is ideological and each and every application of language involves ideological change" (MPL 94); cf. Jonathan Dollimore's Althusserian definition of ideology as "the very terms in which we perceive the world, almost—and the Kantian emphasis is important here—the condition and grounds of consciousness itself" (Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], 9).

7. As Tzvetan Todorov observes, "the confrontation we await, between the novel and drama" never really occurs in what we have of Bakhtin's writings (Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle, trans. Wlad Godzich [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984], 90). Whatever its historical dimensions, Bakhtin's relative lack of interest in drama has a basic theoretical justification. Bakhtin and Vološinov's emphasize the multivoicedness of any "single" voice—its continuities with, resistances to, positionings for and against other voices—and drama (as it often appears in Bakhtin's writings) can easily be taken as representing "dialogue" merely as an exchange between individualized speakers, each with a "unitary" point of view. (But see Bakhtin's hesitant formulation concerning authorial voice in drama, which leaves open the possibility of a proportional equivalent for the double-voicedness of novelistic fiction in drama: "The situation is more complex when it comes to the author's voice in drama, where it, to all appearances, is not in the discourse" [SG 111]). In the prefaces to Tolstoy, Bakhtin appears to agree with Tolstoy's attack on Shakespeare, which emphasizes that dramatic form seriously limits the author due to its dependence on "the demands of stageability" (Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges, ed. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989], 228). For a trenchant attack on Bakhtin's antitheatrical bias, see Jennifer Wise, "Marginalizing Drama: Bakhtin's Theory of Drama," Essays in Theater 8 (1989): 15–22; a complication of Bakhtin's argument, employing its own terms to consider drama, appears in Graham Pechey, "On the Borders of Bakhtin: Dialogue, Decolonisation," in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd


9. Talking about language means talking about ideology and history. According to Vološinov, “The word as the ideological phenomenon par excellence exists in continuous generation and change; it sensitively reflects all social shifts and alternations” (MPL 157).

10. One contemporary use makes “Shakespeare” the basis for what Bakhtin might call an oppressive monologist discourse of assumed agreement. As Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor note: “Shakespeare functions, in many quarters, as a kind of cultural Esperanto, a medium through which the differences of material existence—differences of race, gender, class, history, and culture—are supposedly canceled” (Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor [London: Routledge, 1987], 4).


13. This claim remains true even when the value assigned by an individual culture or subculture is negative. The rejection of Shakespearean language in the mockery of fine phrasing or the dismissal of Western art generally recognizes that Shakespeare is important to some powerful populations such as white academics or Europeans. Compare Stephen Greenblatt’s remarks on Shakespearean universality in the introduction to The Norton Shakespeare (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 1, and Michael D. Bristol’s response in “Shakespeare: The Myth” (David Scott Kastan, ed., A Companion to Shakespeare [Oxford: Blackwell, 1999], 489–502).

14. The interesting question is not whether the author called Shakespeare can be labeled socially or politically subversive or repressive, but the degree to which, in Michael Bristol’s terms, both the “culturally normative aesthetic value” and/or the “emancipatory potential” of
Shakespeare's texts and the reproductions of those texts have and continue to encourage and respond to appropriation by groups, causes, and values (Michael Bristol, *Shakespeare's America, America's Shakespeare* [London: Routledge, 1990], 15).


22. Susan Bennett, *Performing Nostalgia: Shifting Shakespeare and the Contemporary Past* (London: Routledge, 1996), 33. The question of genre in Richard II is an old one, reaching back to the discrepancies between the Quarto designations of the play as tragedy and the Folio which includes it among histories. Northrop Frye classed the play with Richard III as "tragedies insofar as they resolve on those defeated kings; they are histories insofar as they resolve on Bolingbroke and Richmond, and the most that one can say is that they lean toward history" (Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), 284).


25. See Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 12. I agree with Todorov’s claim that there is a systematic continuity in Bakhtin’s thinking but a great deal of slippage as terms and ideas acquire new emphases. There is plenty of room for disagreement, as the literature shows.


28. Compare Bakhtin’s account of Dostoevsky’s “polyphonic novel” as a “fundamentally new novelistic genre,” which actualized the notion of universal dialogism: “Dostoevsky could hear dialogic relationships everywhere, in all manifestations of conscious and intelligent human life; where consciousness began, there dialogue began for him as well” (PDP 7, 40). The scope implied by the use of the term in this sense underlies any local and more limited use of “dialogical” or “dialogism” in the writings of the Bakhtin circle. So while David Lodge correctly points out the limitations in Lennard J. Davis’s understanding of the “dialogic” in fiction when Davis takes the term to apply only to quoted verbal speech, Lodge’s response to
Davis remains, by contrast with the broadest Bakhtinian uses, relatively limited: “The dialogic includes, but is not restricted to, the quoted verbal speech of characters. It also includes the relationship between the characters’ discourses and the author’s discourse (if represented in the text) and between all these discourses and other discourses outside the text, which are imitated or evoked or alluded to by means of doubly-oriented speech” (David Lodge, After Bakhtin: Essays on Fiction and Criticism [London: Routledge, 1990], 22). Cf. the discussion of this exchange in the context of an argument concerning subversion and containment within novelistic fiction in Cates Baldridge, The Dialogics of Dissent in the English Novel (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1994), esp. 15–19.

29. Medvedev defines literature and literary study as branches of “the study of ideologies,” but insists on their semi-autonomy: “On the one hand, the unity of all the branches of literary scholarship (theoretical poetics, historical poetics, literary history) is based on the unity of Marxist principles for the understanding of ideological superstructures and their relationship to the base. On the other hand, this unity is based on the specific (also social) characteristics of literature itself” (FM 16). Vološinov writes of the “long, long road,” crossing “a number of qualitatively different domains, each with its own specific set of laws and its own specific characteristics” that must be traversed to get from changes in economy to developments in the work of art (MPL 18). Cf. Pierre Bourdieu’s objections to the Marxist “short-circuit” when specific fields and their logics are too directly linked to the economic base (The Field of Cultural Production [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993], 181).


31. What is here being discussed is a much broader notion of dialogue and dialogical relationships—which are a factor, to different degrees and in different ways, in all sociolinguistic behavior—than is found in the historical accounts of orality and the Reformation in Walter J. Ong, S. J., Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); and Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982). Similarly, the development of Renaissance dialogue literature is a related but different subject area; see Virginia Cox, The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in Its Social and Political Contexts, Castiglione to Galileo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).


33. Thus, Vološinov reads physical hunger according to the model of utterance within socially heteroglot contexts, appearing in different circumstances to socially constituted beings, and bearing different evaluative intonations—for the beggar, a matter of humility, shame, enviousness; for the peasant, resignation, fatalism; for the organized worker, protestation, resistance, etc. (MPL 86–89). Bakhtin notes that bricks share formal properties with verbal utterances and “in the hands of the builder they express something” (SG 5).
34. Vološinov insists, “consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs. The understanding of a sign is, after all, an act of reference between the sign apprehended and other, already known signs; in other words, understanding is a response to a sign with signs” (MPL 11). Any thought arrives “in my consciousness already with an orientation toward an ideological system, and it itself had been engendered by the ideological signs that I had absorbed earlier” (MPL 33). “Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse” (MPL 13). On the role of the addressee in thinking, see MPL 86.

35. The vocabulary of the “concrete” and the “material” is important in Bakhtinian formulations as a counteremphasis to abstraction in neo-Kantian ethics; see Hirschkop and Shepherd, eds., Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, 7n.

36. The role of accent or intonation is so large that Bakhtin maintains we sometimes employ words as the excuse to convey an accent: “we use words whose meaning is unnecessary, or repeat the same word or phrase, just in order to have a material bearer for some necessary intonation” (SG 166); cf. Vološinov’s account of six speakers using the same obscene word to carry on a conversation, the word furnishing “only a vehicle for intonation” (MPL 104).

37. Vološinov claims “any real utterance, in one way or another or to one degree or another, makes a statement of agreement with or a negation of something. Contexts do not stand side by side in a row, as if unaware of one another, but are in a constant tension, or incessant interaction and conflict” (MPL 80). Medvedev poses the hypothetical case of two “inimical social groups” who have at their disposal the same linguistic material, lexicon, and morphological and syntactical possibilities: “if the differences between our two social groups arise from important socioeconomic premises of their existences, the intonation of one and the same word will differ profoundly between groups; within the same grammatical constructions the semantic and stylistic combinations will be profoundly different. One and the same word will occupy a completely different hierarchical place in the utterance as a concrete social act” (FM 123). For a useful analysis of canon and canonicity in relation to Bakhtinian heteroglossia and Pierre Bourdieu’s social capital, see John Guillory, “Canonical and Non-canonical: A Critique of the Current Debate,” ELH 54 (1987): 483–527.

38. Bakhtin distinguishes Dostoevsky’s dialogism from simpler forms of “language differentiation” in “many writer-monolinguists” (among whom he includes Tolstoy and writers of Russian skaz) (PDP 182); cf. Caryl Mandelker, “Introduction” in Bakhtin in Contexts: Across the Disciplines, ed. Amy Mandelker (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 11. Bakhtin stresses that understanding a novel demands attention not only to the “dialogue of languages” as it existed in the author’s era, but also to the social space of ideology and power relations that informs those languages and their users: “in order to understand such dialogue, or even to become aware initially that a dialogue is going on at all, mere knowledge of the linguistic and stylistic profile of the languages involved will be insufficient: what is needed is a profound understanding of each language’s socio-ideological meaning and an exact knowledge of the social distribution and ordering of all the other ideological voices of the era” (DI 417). Even in the matter of accent, the Bakhtinian sense of embeddedness in a larger socio-cultural whole is crucial. Thus, Bakhtin maintains: “the extratextual intonational-evaluative context can be only partially realized in the reading (performance) of a given text, and the largest part of it, especially in its more essential and profound strata, remains outside the given text as the dialogizing background for its perception. To some degree, the problem of the social (extraverbal) conditioning of the work reduces to this” (SG 166). Bakhtin is generally
less interested in sociological analysis than Volosinov, but he admits causal relations between such phenomena as the emergence of novelistic polyphony and the catastrophically sudden urbanization of Russia (PDP 19–20).


40. Michael Holquist’s definition of “dialogism” hits the high points: “Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole—there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. The dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures there can be no actual monologue” (DI 426).


42. Volosinov maintains, “It is not experience that organizes expression, but the other way around—expression organizes experience. Expression is what first gives experience its form and specificity of direction” (MPL 85).

43. As Bakhtin claims, “A single consciousness is *contradictio in adjecto*. Consciousness is in essence multiple. *Pluralia tantum*” (PDP 228). Positively considered, rhetorical tradition followed Isocrates in maintaining the fundamental relationship of speech to thought: “none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom” (“Niccoles or the Cyprians,” trans. George Norlin, Loeb
Classical Library [1927; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969], 81; cf. Arthur Kinney, Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric and Fiction in Sixteenth-Century England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), esp. 161–70; Martin Elsky, Authorizing Words: Speech, Writing, and Print in the English Renaissance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). On “speech . . . the instrument of our understanding & key of conceptions,” see Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1577), ed. R. C. Alston (facs. ed., Menston: Scolar Press, 1971), Aii. The negative version of this insight, however, generates perennial anxieties about the power of paradiastolic redescription to excuse vice by giving it another name. From Thucydides, Plato, and Isocrates through the Renaissance (compare Peacham’s 1593 edition, 168–69) the suspicion is that someone—orators, tyrants, the democratic masses, Machiavelli—may so have corrupted language by calling vices by the name of virtues as to affect the soul and the powers of thought, occasioning doubts “whether any evaluative terms can ever be applied without ambiguity, and whether in consequence any moral arguments can ever be resolved” (Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 161–80; 172). Modern demagoguery has not been reluctant to accuse groups and individuals of similarly strategic linguistic manipulation. For a negative assessment of the social nature of language and its relation to historical change, compare Judith Butler, “not owning of one’s words is there from the start . . . since speaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself, the melancholic reinvention of a language that one never chose” (Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” [New York: Routledge, 1993]), 22; cf. Butler’s related, but less negative generalization: “if one always risks meaning something other than what one thinks one utters, then one is, as it were, vulnerable in a specifically linguistic sense to a social life of language that exceeds the purview of the subject who speaks” (Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative [New York: Routledge, 1997], 87).


46. Wayne A. Rebhorn characterizes an important difference between the order presumed by the Ciceronian original and that presumed in its later appropriations; for the Renaissance “rhetoric does not mean rule in the sense of an entire class of orators competing with one another in the political arena; it means control by one man or one class over all those below it” (The Emperor of Men’s Minds: Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995]), 39).


48. As Vološinov writes, “Each field of ideological creativity has its own kind of orientation toward reality and each refracts reality in its own way. Each field commands its own function within the unity of social life” (*MPL* 10–11).

49. And perhaps vice versa: the translation of economic relations of the theater into cultural relations for sale to the audience is interestingly explored in Kathleen E. McLuskie, “The Shopping Complex: Materiality and the Renaissance Theatre,” in *Textual and Theatrical Shakespeare: Questions of Evidence*, ed. Edward Pechter (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1996), 86–101. And not incidentally, in any case, winning applause: evidence suggests that applauding the actors (or hissing them) for individual speeches was well established by the 1590s. Michael Drayton, writing about 1600 referring to writing plays for Henslowe at the Rose, mentions sitting in the “thronged Theatres” listening to the “Showts and Claps at ev’ry little pawse, / When the proud Round on ev’ry side hath rung” (Michael Drayton, *Idea*, Sonnet 47, in The Works of Michael Drayton, ed. J. William Hebel [Oxford: Shakespeare Head Press, 1961], 2:334). In 1616 William Fennor describes the reception of his play at the Fortune, noting the “Clapping, or hissing” of the “Ignoramus crew” who “oft will hisse without a cause, / And for a bawdy jest will give applause” (William Fennor, *Fennors Descriptions* [London: 1616, STC 10784], B2–B3r). A satirical portrait of “A Common Player” makes clear how staged verbal exchange may differ from face-to-face dialogue: “When he doth hold conference vpon the stage; and should looke directly in his fellows face; hee turns up his voice into the assembly for applause-sake, like a Trumpeter in the fields, that shifts places to get an eccho” (John Stephens, *Essays and Characters Ironical* [London: 1615, STC 23250], 297).

50. The whole transaction is highly dialogical, since Cassius manipulates Brutus into articulating an ideological platitude by posing a rhetorical question to elicit his response (*JC* 1.2.51–68).


52. The complexity is compounded by the relation of tone and content. As Bakhtin (brilliantly) argues for the redemptive role of parody and irony in Dostoevsky, what he says about that irony is serious and intent on being taken as such.

53. On socially focused close reading exercised in nonaesthetic contexts, see chapter 2; cf. Lynne Magnusson’s call for a combination of close reading and social analysis in *Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the relation of close reading skills to Protestant exegesis and the medium of print, see Robert Weimann, “‘Bifold Authority’ in Reformation Discourse: Authoriztion, Representation, and Early Modern ‘Meaning,’” in *Historical Criticism and the Challenge of Theory*, ed. Janet Levarie Smarr (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 167–82; cf. David Cressy, *Literacy and the Social Order: Reading and Writing in Tudor and Stuart England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 5. While *Richard II* may be among the first English dramas to encourage and reward the kind of decoding that we associate with close reading, commercially staged drama was no stranger to intensely interested scrutiny of its language. Wories about being (mis)interpreted are associated preeminently with Ben Jonson, but nervousness about interpretation is widespread. *Summers Last Will and Testament* warns: “Deepe reaching wits, heere is no deepe stream for you to angle in. Moralizers, you that wreset a neuer meant meaning out of evey thing, applying all things to the present time, keepe your attention for the common Stage: for here are no quips in Characters for you to reade. Vayne glozers, gath-
er what you will. Spite, spell backwards what thou canst. As the Parthians fight, flying away, so will wee prate and talke, but stand to nothing that we say" (The Works of Thomas Nashe, ed. Ronald B. McKerrow and F. P. Wilson [1958; repr. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966], 3:235). References to reversing letters and finding quips "in characters" suggest the kind of temporal investment in reading that would be demanded by the twentieth-century criticism industry. Janet Clare's account of an aura of censorship, while occasionally overstated, points to a potential interpretive pressure, sometimes clearly realized in governmental action, that encouraged close attention to language (Janet Clare, "Art made tongue-tied by authority": Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic Censorship [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990]).


55. In a similarly paradoxical sense, Norman Fairclough points out that modern institutional power may be exercised through apparent informality, the "simulated egalitarianism" of speech lacking "surface markers of authority and power" (Language and Power [London: Longman, 1989], 37). The audacity of the Bastard's strategy recalls Hal's affront to degree in championing the "common'st creature" of the stews against all comers (R2 5:3).


57. The stress on variability of circumstance and locution opposes the typical rhetorician's claim to provide a formula for every situation; for one claim to provide something for everyone's use, see Anthony Munday's translation of The Orator (1596) by Alexander van den Busche, as quoted in T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke, 2 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944), 2:45.


59. Compare Puttenham on the auricular "defect" of aposiopesis, "when we begin to speake a thing, and breake of in the middle way" as if "we were ashamed, or afraide to speake it out" (George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker [1936; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], 166). In Puttenham this figure turns out to be more wordy than not (167).

60. Isaac Casaubon mentions that raising the head, a gesture with classical and biblical antecedents, was still used in the early seventeenth century to signal derision; see Dilwyn Knox, Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony (Leiden, U.K.: E. J. Brill, 1989), 63.

61. Volosinov maintains that "a viable value judgment exists wholly without incorporation into the content of discourse and is not derivable therefrom; instead, it determines the very selection of the verbal material and the form of the verbal whole. It finds its purest expression in intonation" (DiL 101–2). On intonations as recognized signals of intended irony in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, see Knox, Ironia, 63–64. Enthymeme is prominent in Aristotle's Rhetoric, which stresses that the syllogistic process underlying rhetorical art involves premises that are often unstated because they are assumed to be shared by the audience. Aristotle's attention to the passions and stress on the role of the enthymeme in arousing them are not shared by Cicero, Quintillian, and their Renaissance followers, who, according to
Quentin Skinner, “treat the art of rhetoric as fundamentally concerned with enabling us to speak and write in an elegant and persuasive style” (Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 36–37). See Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 179–215. For a socially defined enthymeme, see Aristotle’s treatment of a maxim about never teaching children to be too wise, which hinges on an unspoken reason specific to urban citizenry: “For apart from the other idlenesses they have, / They incur hostile jealousy from fellow-citizens” (182); cf. Aristotle’s claims for the superiority of the uneducated mass orators because they simply assume the opinions “held by an identified group” without having to enumerate any irrelevant opinions (187).

62. Of course there is often little evidence to establish an unambiguous sense of a character’s individual emotional state, so one must often rely on the clues provided by social interaction and interindividual dialogue to interpret a character’s utterance. Imagine what it would mean to have more such guidance as we find in Sir John Oldcastle (1600), where the speech of King Henry V ostensibly registers the King’s respect for his clerical councilors by its content (“Let me entreat you to dispense awhile / With your high title of pre-eminence” [part 1, scene 2, 124–25]), but is delivered, according to the printed version, “In scorn” (cited from The Oldcastle Controversy: Sir John Oldcastle, Part I and the Famous Victories of Henry V, ed. Peter Corbin and Douglas Sedge [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991], 51). For an example of the social-multiacentuality in a gesture and its accompanying discourses, see Lori Anne Ferrell, “Kneeling and the Body Politic,” in Religion, Literature, and Politics in Post-Reformation England, 1540–1688, ed. Donna B. Hamilton and Richard Strier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46–69.


64. The title “dame” is up for contemporary social negotiation, since, as Thomas Bilson claims, “Every poor woman that hath either maid, or apprentice is called Dame; and yet Dame is as much as Domina and used to Ladies of greatest account” (The Perpetual Government of Christs Church [1593], 58; cited from Oxford English Dictionary [2d edition; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], “dame” 2a). Cf. 2H6 1.2.39–42 for strategic use of the word in contrary senses.

65. See Barbara A. Mowat’s discussion of the important tension between Leontes as a potentially comic cuckold and the dignity inhering in his regality (The Dramaturgy of Shakespeare’s Romances [Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976], esp. 14–20.)

66. Volosinov observes that monological utterance is merely a kind of abstraction (MPL 72). Ken Hirschkop argues that monological cultural forms are “forms of the dialogical” and that monologism ought to be “recognized as a strategy of response toward another discourse, albeit


69. John Eliot, Ortho-Epia Gallica (1593), A4v. See also chapter 1.

70. Samuel Weber's account of Derridean "iterability" has implications for a study of Voloshinov (Samuel Weber, "It," Glyph 4 (1978): 1–15). For an intelligent use of iterability as developed in "Signature, Event, Context" with implications for the study of theatrical performance, see Tony Bennett, "Text and History" in Re-reading English, ed. Peter Widdowson (London: Methuen, 1982), 223–36; Bennett discusses the text as constituted by the "history of its iterability, of the diverse meanings which it supports and of the plural effects to which it gives rise in the light of the variant contexts within which it is inscribed as it is incessantly re-read and re-written" (227).

71. Contrast Montaigne's despairing observation on time's dispossessive effect upon linguistic creations in a living language (instead of a "stable," classical language): "I write my book for few men and for few years. If it had been durable matter, it would have had to be committed to a more stable language. In view of the continual variation that has prevailed in ours up to now, who can hope that its present form will be in use fifty years from now? It slips out of our hands every day, and has halfway changed since I have been alive." Michel de Montaigne, "Of Vanity," in The Complete Works of Montaigne, ed. Donald M. Frame (1957; repr. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), 751.


73. Contrast this sense of the long-term and plural powers of utterance to affect opinion and behavior (if not to determine them or any single significance for them) with Paul Yachnin's account of the "powerlessness" of the Elizabethan "recreational" theater (Stage-Wrights: Shakespeare, Jonson, Middleton and the Making of Theatrical Value (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).

74. Everard Guilpin describes poets "transformd to Goates lasciuously, / Filthig chast eares with theyr pens Gonorrhey" (Skialethia or A Shadowe of Truth in Certaine Epigrams and Satyres, ed. D. Allen Carroll [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974], 60).

75. Most notoriously, Ovid for the 1590s is: "That lasciuous Poet . . . whome justly we
may terme the foe to woman-kind, [who] hath not only prescribed in his bookes de arte Amandi, a most monstrous Method to all men, whereby they may learne to allure simple women to the fulfilling of their lust, but also hath set downe his bookes de remedio amoris, to restraine their affections from placing their fancies but for a time vpon any Dame" (Robert Greene, The Anatomie of Lovers Flatteries (1593) in The Life and Complete Works in Prose and Verse of Robert Greene, ed. Alexander B. Grosart [New York: Russell and Russell, 1964], 2:254).

For an excellent recent examination of the complex mixture of irony and desire in the Ovidian amator, see Christopher Martin, Policy in Love: Lyric and Public in Ovid, Petrarch, and Shakespeare (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1994).

76. Or cause for jokes in "the subsersive 1960s"; see Is Shakespeare Still Our Contemporary?, ed. John Elsom (London: Routledge, 1989), 79. While the political ideology of the speech, with its intense evocation of Crusading feudalism and protonationalism, is more than obvious, it is worth noting, as Nina S. Levine points out, that Gaunt's speech also manages to mythologize patrilineal succession while depriving women of a role in the process (Women's Matters: Politics, Gender, and Nation in Shakespeare's Early History Plays [Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998], 148).


80. See Patrick Cheyney, Marlowe's Counterfeit Profession: Ovid, Spenser, Counter-nationhood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).


82. This is a point that Queen Isabella makes concerning the wisdom of young Prince Edward in Marlowe's Edward II: "This towardness makes thy mother fear / Thou art not marked to many days on earth" (3.2.79-80). For an example of the sentiment represented as occurring outside an aristocratic context, compare Robert Greene, A Disputation Betweene a Bee Connycatcher, and a Shee Conny-catcher (1592), in The Life and Complete Works, 1038.

83. For the proverb, see Tilley, A Dictionary of Proverbs, I 384. "Too soon wise to live long," Timothie Bright's Treatise of Melancholie (1586; facs. ed. Hardin Craig, New York: Columbia University Press, 1940) observes unusually mature wisdom in certain sick children as the supporting evidence "whereupon I take it the prouerbe ariseth: that they be of short life, who are of wit so pregnant: because their bodies do receaue by nature so speedie a ripeness, as thereby age is hastened" (54). Classical antecedents include Pliny. Historically, witnesses attest that young Edward had a "gentle wit and ripe understanding, far passing the nature of his youth" (Charles Ross, Richard III [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981], 71). Dominic Mancini, who had access to the Prince's physician, John Argentine, writes that "In word and deed he gave so many proofs of his liberal education, of polite, nay rather scholarly,


89. Diana Henderson points out the surprising paradox that the so-called lyrical group of plays among which Richard II is numbered (Love's Labor's Lost, Romeo and Juliet, Midsummer Night's Dream) are some of the most enduringly popular in performance, although their linguistic and dramatic texture often depends on a highly topical "coterie interest in court styles" (Passion Made Public: Elizabethan Lyric, Gender, and Performance [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995], 217). A similarly telling point could be made about the continuing interest in the history plays as well. The issues involved in historical "re-accentuation," that process Bakhtin terms "unavoidable" and by which he understands how an era takes up and re-deploys the images and languages from existing works, are many and complex. On the positive side, re-accentuation constitutes the life of the literary work: "The historical life of classic works is in fact the uninterrupted process of their social and ideological re-accentuation. Thanks to the intentional potential embedded in them, such works have proved capable of uncovering in each era and against ever new dialogizing backgrounds ever newer aspects of meaning; their semantic content literally continues to grow, to further create out of itself" (DI 421). On the other hand, Bakhtin warns against simplification: "Especially dangerous is any vulgarizing that oversimplifies re-accentuation . . . and that turns a two-voiced image into one that is flat, single-voiced—into a stilted heroic image, a Sentimental and pathos-charged one, or (at the other extreme) into a primitives comic one" (DI 420). For one recent account

90. This passage speaks to the scholar-critic’s role in realizing potentials latent in historically distant works: “Shakespeare took advantage of and included in his works immense treasures of potential meaning that could not be fully revealed or recognized in his epoch. The author himself and his contemporaries see, recognize, and evaluate primarily that which is close to their own day. The author is a captive of his epoch, of his own present. Subsequent times liberate him from this captivity, and literary scholarship is called upon to assist in this liberation” (SG 5).

91. So Robert Weimann describes the goal of interpretation: “for the literary historian and critic the question, then, is not whether to accept both worlds as points of reference, but rather how to relate them so as to obtain their maximum dimension . . . to have as much of the historical significance and as much of the contemporary meaning merged into a new unity” (Robert Weimann, *Structure and Society in Literary History: Studies in the History and Theory of Historical Criticism* [expanded ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984], 53). Compare Susan Wells’ dialectical approach to the problem, citing *Richard II* as an example: “If the Elizabethans saw social institutions in terms of personal relationships, we see communal relationships among persons in terms of social institutions. Thus, by a strange spiraling of ideology, the relations between Renaissance sovereign and subject provide us with ideological forms complementary to our own: the gaps and vacancies in our ideology are indicated by what has been made explicit in theirs” (Susan Wells, *The Dialectics of Representation* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985], 38). The social stress of such formulations runs directly counter to the romanticism evident in Eugene Ionesco’s account of *Richard II*: “it is not history after all that Shakespeare is writing, although he makes use of history; it is not History that he shows me, but my story and our story—my truth, which independent of my ‘times’ and in the spectrum of a time that transcends Time, repeats a universal and inexorable truth” (Eugene Ionesco, *Notes and Counter-notes*, trans. Donald Watson [London: John Calder, 1964], 30).

teenth century were being drawn up again as Britain went into hock, selling herself to any and all who had the money to buy a stake in her and fill the coffers of the fortunate few” (Bogdanov and Michael Pennington, The English Shakespeare Company: The Story of “The Wars of the Roses” 1986–1989 [London: N. Hern Books, 1992], 24).

93. On this review of the 1954 NBC production, see Marvin Rosenberg, “Shakespeare on TV: An Optimistic Survey,” in Shakespeare on Television: An Anthology of Essays and Reviews, ed. James C. Bulman and Herbert R. Coursen (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1988), 85–91, esp. 90. Similarly, how many modern audience members would know that the deposition scene resembles an inverted rite of investiture? Even if one were aware of this mimicry, the emotional associations could hardly be the same in a postmonarchical setting that lacks religious convictions about divinely ordained rule. On the deposition and ritual investiture, see Margaret Loftus Ranald, Shakespeare and His Social Contexts: Essays in Osmostic Knowledge and Literary Interpretation (New York: AMS Press, 1987), 192–214.


102. Louis B. Wright, Advice to a Son: Precepts of Lord Burghley, Sir Walter Raleigh and
Francis Osborne (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 12–13; an eighteenth-century transcript of the Precepts spells out the initials as Essex and Raleigh.

103. On the notoriety of Richard II's men, see, for example, Sir Francis Knollys' letter in Thomas Wright, Queen Elizabeth and Her Times (London: Colbarn, 1838), 2:75.

104. See the anonymous Woodstock: A Moral History, ed. A. P. Rossiter (London: Chatto and Windus, 1946), and Manning's introduction to Hayward, The First Part of the Life and Raigne, 23n.


Chapter 1. When Shakespeare Became Shakespeare

1. The chapter title occurs in “Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book” (1961). Bakhtin's Dostoevsky (typically) exemplifies becoming while Shakespeare, here at least, represents a more completed, more limited art: “A transient epoch giving birth to transient values. When Shakespeare became Shakespeare. Dostoevsky has not yet become Dostoevsky, he is still becoming him” (PDP 291). The role of the epoch and its conditions in artistic production is complex and multi-sided. “The epoch itself made the polyphonic novel possible” (PDP 27), but Bakhtin resists “genetic analysis,” maintaining that “A poetics cannot, of course, be divorced from social and historical analyses, but neither can it be dissolved in them” (PDP 35–36).

2. Ladislav Matejka described Bakhtin's reticence about sources in a lecture on “The German Roots of the Bakhtin Circle” to the Boston Semiotics Colloquium, Boston University, December 1988.


6. On decorum in the English Renaissance, see Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and

7. Wayne A. Rebhorn describes the Renaissance identification of rhetoric with mastery: “even though a connection between rhetoric and republicanism may be occasionally acknowl-\nedged, the emphasis really falls on the power that rhetoric gives the orator to control his audi-\ence and that makes him a king, a Caesar—as Cicero appeared to be, even in a free state” (The \nEmperor of Men’s Minds: Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell \nUniversity Press, 1993], 40).


9. Compare Shakespeare’s Plantagenet, who feels compelled to hold his tongue because he \nanticipates a reproof based on social rank, “Lest it be said, ‘Speak, sirrah, when you should; \nI Must your bold verdict enter talk with lords?’” (IHH6 3.1.61–64).


13. See, for example, Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, 780–81. Cf. the discussion of “obscenous” biblical language as “voyd of incivilitie” because it attempts to “open to our eyes the filthiness, and horror of our sinnes” in Sir John Harington, A New Discourse of a Stale Subject, called the Metamorphosis of Ajax, ed. Elizabeth Story Donno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 86.

15. The principal passage raising this issue occurs when Bolingbroke accuses Bushy and Greene of having “made a divorce” between Richard and his queen by breaking “the posses-
sion of a royal bed” and reducing the queen to “tears” (R2 3.1.11–15). Peter Ure notes the lack of precedent in the Chronicles and the contradiction between these claims and Shakespeare’s portrayal of Richard’s marital relationship elsewhere (King Richard II, ed. Peter Ure [London: Methuen, 1961]. The Mirror for Magistrates calls Richard subject to “lust” and charges him with trusting “Flatterers” rather than law and counsel, the curbs of tyranny:

I am a Kyng that ruled all by lust
That forced not of vertue, ryght, or lawe,
But alway put false Flatterers most in trust,
Ensuing such as could my vices clawe:
By faithful counsayle passing not a strawe.

(The Mirror for Magistrates, ed. Lily B. Campbell [1938; repr. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1960], 113.)


17. Of course, the commonplace association of this particular monarch with sexual indul-
gence is a factor; on Henry’s sexuality and state politics, see, for example, Seth Lerer, Courtly Letters in the Age of Henry VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 34–86.


20. On the “rush of translations” in the later sixteenth century and its relation to “the enormous number of foreign words (especially Latin words) coming into English at this time,” see S. S. Hussey, The Literary Language of Shakespeare (second edition; London: Longman, 1992), 14–15. On the much debated status of the vernacular in the sixteenth century, see Richard F. Jones, The Triumph of the English Language (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966). The polyglot atmosphere at the universities was a concern to some who, like Gabriel Harvey at Cambridge, regretted the decline of interest in certain formerly central classical writers and were not at all positive about the influence of foreign vernacular writers on contemporaries: “Tully and Demosthenes nothing so much studied, as they were wont: Litie, and Salut possiblye rather more, than lesse: Lucian neuer so much: Aristotle muche named, but little read . . . . Machiauell a great man: Castilio of no small reputation: Petrarch and Boccace in euery mans mouth . . . . The French and Italian when so highly regarded of Schollers? The Latine and Greeke, when so lightly?” (The Works of Gabriel Harvey, ed. Alexander B. Grosart, 3 vols. [1884–85; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1966], 1:69). Compare Henry Crosse’s complaints about “fine phrases, Inkehorntermes, swelling words, bumbasted out with the flocks of sundry languages” (Vertues Common-wealth: or the High-way to Honour [London, 1603], N4r).

21. Midas is quoted from John Lyly, Gallathea and Midas, ed. Anne Begor Lancashire (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969); line numbers are cited in text. For the hetero-
22. Compare Everard Guilpin’s horrified account in *Skialetheia* (1598) of the black sanctus of linguistic “variety” overheard during a “Citty-walke”:

     Witnes that hotch-potch of so many noyse,
     Black-saunts of so many seuerall voyces,
     That Chaos of rude sounds, that harmony,
     And *Dyapason* of harsh *Barbary*,
     Compos’d of seuerall mouthes, and seuerall cries,
     Which to mens eares turne both their tongs & eies.

(Everard Guilpin, *Satire V in Skialetheia or A Shadowe of Truth in Certaine Epigrams and Satyres*, ed. D. Allen Carroll [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974], 83). Cf. the Dedicatory Epistle to Spenser’s *Shepherdes Calendar*: “so now they have made our English tongue a gallimaufray or hodgepodge of al other speeches” (The Complete Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, ed. R. E. Neil Dodge [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908], 6). By contrast Richard Carew, writing in 1595–96 finds the diversity of foreign terms and usages in contemporary English a virtue: “It may be obiected that such patching maketh Littletons hotchpot of our tongue, and in effect bringes the same rather to a Babellish confusione then any one entyre Language”; but Carew claims that this sort of borrowing has a license “auncient and Vniuersall” from classical examples and leads to the great English virtue of “copiousness,” This virtue is further amplified by the very social and regional diversity of dialects that Puttenham deplores: “the Copiousnes of our Languadge appeareth in the diuersity of our dialectes, for wee haue court, and wee haue countreye Englishe, wee haue Northern and Southerne, grosse and ordinary, which differ ech from other, not only in the terminacions, but alsoe in many wordes, termes, and phrases, and expresse the same thinges in diuers sortes, yeat all right Englishe alike; neither can any tongue (as I am perswaded) deliuer a matter with more varietye then ours, both plainlye and by prouerbes and Metaphors” (“Excellency of the English Tongue,” in *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, ed. G. Gregory Smith, 3 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904, 2:290–92]). On the growth of London’s population during the period, see A. L. Beier and Roger Finlay’s “Introduction” to *London 1500–1700: The Making of the Metropolis* (London: Longman, 1986). For changes in contemporary perceptions of London’s congested urban condition, see Lawrence Manley, “From Matron to Monster: Tudor-Stuart London and the Languages of Urban Description,” in *The Historical Renaissance: New Essays on Tudor and Stuart Literature*, ed. Heather Dubrow and Richard Strier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).


24. As William Dodd puts it, drama of the early modern period saw a fundamental change in representation of characters in that they were not “experienced as good or evil primarily on account of any given qualities, the social and ethical status ascribed to them by their rhetorical style and by the way they were represented (whether by themselves or others). They won, or lost, their colors above all according to the way they engaged dialogically with one another” (“Impossible Worlds: What Happens in *King Lear*, Act 1, Scene 1?” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 50 (1999): 477–507; quotation from 500–501).


28. This sense of Lyly seems to me to concur with Joel B. Altman’s analysis of the centrality of traditional rhetorical structures and issues pursued as “quaestiones copiosae” in Lyly’s dramaturgy; see The Tudor Play of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 196–228.


30. A monoglossic "standard language," Tony Crowly argues, "did not exclude differences but hierarchised them: posited as the central form, it then had ranged around it dialectal, class, gender and race-related differences in an inferior relation to its own powerful status" ("Bakhtin and the History of Language," in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. Ken Hirschkop and David Shepherd [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989], 81). The question of whether or not a heteroglot or monoglot context is more politically liberating is more complex and more historical than Bakhtin's general championing of the heteroglot would make it. See, for example, Antonio Gramsci's arguments for a unitary language to overcome "local particularisms and phenomena of a narrow and provincial mentality" (Selections from Cultural Writings, trans. William Boelhower, ed. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985], 182).


33. On John Rainolds as a source of euhuism for university men, including Lyly, Gosson, and Lodge, see William Ringle, "The Immediate Source of Euhuism," PMLA 53 (1938): 678–86. Lyly himself employs the style and discourse of his aesthetic utterances in practical contexts; see his commendations to George Watson's Hekatompathia (London: 1582). In the early seventeenth century, Thomas Heywood positively evaluated the consolidating effect of public drama on the national idiom: "our English tongue, which hath ben the most harsh, vnmeu, and broken language of the world, part Dutch, part Irish, Saxon, Scotch, Welsh, and indeed a gallimaffry of many, but perfect in none, is now by this secondary means of playing, continually refined, euery writer striuing in hiselve to adde a new florish unto it; so that in procez, from the most rude and vnpolished tongue, it is growne to a most perfect and composed language, and many excellent workes, and elaborate Poems wrat in the same, that many Nations grow inamoerd of our tongue (before despised)." (An Apology for Actors [1612; repr. ed. Arthur Freeman [New York: Garland, 1973], P3. For Lyly's effect on spoken language, see the publisher Blount's remarks in the 1632 edition of Six Court Comedies in Renaissance England: Poetry and Prose, ed. Roy Lamson and Hallet Smith (New York: W. W. Norton, 1942), 206.

34. One of the challenges of such form is to employ the means of verse drama to the disadvantage of a speaker, even a protagonist, whose verse exchanges must register his or her limitations without forfeiting the possibility of aesthetic appeal, obeying the promptings of form and the needs of dramatization. In this regard, one might consider the laments of Isabella in Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy and those of King Richard in Shakespeare's play. See below, chapter five.

35. The casting of the Royal Shakespeare Company's 1963–64 productions of the plays comprising Shakespeare's histories as the Wars of the Roses emphasized relationships between the two kings in that the same actor, David Warner, played both Henry VI and later King Richard II in somewhat similar manner. According to John Russell Brown, in both roles Warner "used nervous smiles and a loose-limbed awkwardness to suggest anxious timidity.
Richard's commands were under-played so that even these gave an impression of weakness" (John Russell Brown, *Shakespeare's Plays in Performance* [1966; repr. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967], 198).


40. See A. J. Hoeneslaars, *Images of Englishmen and Foreigners in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1992), 58–60. For Caius at his most choleric, unwittingly off-color, and foreign, see his confused threats against the Welshman Sir Hugh, whose identity he takes for English: "By gar, den, I have a mush mockvater as de Englishman. Scurvy jack-dog priest! By gar, me vill cut his ears" (*MW* 2.3.56–7).


43. This sense of Shakespeare as employing an accentual range more or less in keeping with that of his audience would parallel claims that Shakespeare's language is generally colloquial in constructions and usage. See, e.g., Hilda M. Hulme, *Explorations in Shakespeare's Language: Some Problems of Word Meaning in the Dramatic Text* (New York: Longman, 1962); N. F. Blake, *Shakespeare's Language: An Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's 1983) and Blake's remarks on the absence of dialect in Shakespeare (*Non-standard Language in English Literature*, 81). In this context, it seems worth reiterating Douglas Bruster's point: most London dramatists during this period came from other regions. Of the sixty-two playwrights listed by J. W. Saunders in *A Biographical Dictionary of Renaissance Poets and Dramatists, 1520–1650* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1983), there are thirty-eight with known birthplaces; of these, eleven (or about 29 percent) were born in London (including Chettle, Dekker, John Heywood, Jonson, Kyd, Middleton, Peele, Shirley, and Webster), leaving about 71 percent who are nonnative (including Beaumont, Fletcher, Chapman, Day, Ford, Thomas Heywood, Lyly, Marston, Marlowe, Massinger, and Shakespeare). Obviously, some degree of regional accent could not have been a major impediment for theatrical labor. See Douglas
Bruster, Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 124n.

44. Compare W. F. Bolton, Shakespeare's English: Language in the History Plays (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992), which offers an energetic attempt to recapture some of the sound effects of Shakespeare's language while being couched in an attitude of skeptical realism about the attempt. Concerning Shakespeare's regionalism, C. T. Onions adduced a list of words that Shakespeare seems to have drawn from Midland dialects, and especially those of Warwickshire (see Onions, preface to A Shakespeare Glossary, 2d ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1919]); but as G. L. Brook points out, “dialect words do not necessarily remain dialectal for the whole of their history,” so it is difficult to assess the dialect status of Shakespeare's vocabulary (The Language of Shakespeare [London: André Deutsch, 1976], 179). Besides, as the case of Sir Walter Raleigh who is supposed to have spoken in “broad Devonshire” but who wrote acceptably urbane English, suggests, the relation of dialectic speech to writing is not a simple one (cf. S. S. Hussey, The Literary Language of Shakespeare [London: Longman, 1982], 18).

45. The exchange is worth quoting:

**ORLANDO**  Your accent is something finer than you could purchase in so removed a dwelling.

**ROSALIND**  I have been told so of many. But indeed an old religious uncle of mine taught me to speak, who was in his youth an inland man, one that knew courtship too well, for there he fell in love. (AYLI 3.2.334–39)

Orlando claims to be “inland bred” and thus capable of “smooth civility” (AYLI 2.7.96), a usage that punningly implies urbanity as Rosalind's suggests courtliness; hence “inland” implies a general civic-courty standard opposed to “outland” or “upland” rusticity.


47. Compare Thomas Elyot (1531) on gender and class-based usage in articulation: children of gentle families should be trained to utter “none englishe but that which is cleane polite, perfectly and articulately pronounced, omittinge no lettre or sillable, as folicisshe women often times do of a wantonnessse, whereby divers noble men and gentilmennes children (as I do at this daye knowe) have attained corrupte and foule pronunciation” (Sir Thomas Elyot, The Boke Named the Governour [Menston: Scolar Press, 1970], fol. 20). Cf. Hamlet's attack on Ophelia for “lis[p]ing” (Ham 3.1.146–47).

48. All linguistic products are collaborative and interlocutory; Hamlet's line prompting the murderer in his play (“Come, the croaking raven doth bellow for revenge”) is a version of lines from The True Tragedie of Richard the Third (London: 1594, STC 21009) which read: “The screeking Rauen sitts croking for reuenge. / Whole herds of beasts comes bellowing for reuenge” (Htv). This may be an allusion, but, at the remove of some six or seven years from the publication of The True Tragedie, it is more likely to have been a dialogical invocation of a discourse, the hackneyed, all-purpose “revenge” that serves early modern drama in place of more complex motivations and articulations. Compare the uses of “revenge” throughout The True Tragedie (e.g., F2v).”

49. Hamlet's bitter criticism of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern for attempting to “play upon” him like a recorder with “eloquent music” mocks high opinions of rhetorical mastery such as Plutarch's praise of Pericles: “rethorike and eloquence (as Plato sayeth) is an arte which
quickenneth mens spirits at her pleasure, and her chiefest skill is, to knowe howe to move passions and affections throughly, which are as stoppes and sounds of the soule, that would be played upon with a fine fingered hande of a conning master” (Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes, trans. Thomas North [London: 1580], 177).


51. The dialectic is neatly encapsulated in Gadshill’s remark, since it learnedly repeats a maxim of William Lily’s standard Grammar exemplifying a “common” noun “as Homo is a common name to all men” (A Short Introduction of Grammar [London: 1590, STC 15622.2], A7v). The paradoxical mixture in such phrasing, where a discourse from a highly specific form of learning is used to make a point ostensibly about common human universality, marks the distance, I believe, between Shakespeare’s practice and Doctor Johnson’s observations on that practice in his Preface to Shakespeare. Johnson, of course, claims that Shakespeare’s characters represent common humanity, whatever the particular role accidentally assigned them in any given Shakespearean playworld; see Rasselas, Poems, and Selected Prose, ed. Bertrand H. Bronson (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 263–65. While Debora K. Shuger expresses some sensible reservations about Johnson’s assumptions, she does seem to me to overstate the case when she argues that Shakespeare’s characters display a “drastic separation of subjectivity from social role” that amounts to a “generic selfhood distinct from one’s public, social identity,” and contrasts Shakespearean drama in this respect with “virtually all pre-modern secular literature” (“Subversive Fathers and Suffering Subjects: Shakespeare and Christianity,” in Religion, Literature, and Politics in Post-Reformation England, 1540–1688, ed. Donna B. Hamilton and Richard Strier [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 46–69; quotation from 58–59). Shakespearean selfhood is a various and complex construct that may include such “human” generality but only in, with, and among factors of limitation and particularity.

52. The direction that such hegemonic thinking might in future take is apparent already in Sir William Cornwallis’s essay “Of Discourse” (1600), which dismisses languages of specific trades and professions as limited and, hence, inferior to the broader scope of usage appropriate to the “Gentleman”: “It is a generall fault among the best professions: For Mercenary, and Mechanicke, it skilles not, It becomes them well to discover themselves by their speech, but a Gentleman should talke like a Gentleman; which is, like a wise man: his knowledge ought to bee generall, it becomes him not to talke of one thing too much, or to be wayed downe with any particular profession. Heerin I admire Plato his Description of Socrates, who though a Souldier, and a Scholler, yet he discoursed still like Wisedome, which commandaus ouer all.” Sir William Cornwallis, Essays (London: 1600, STC 5775), G4t.


54. What I am saying about Shakespeare resembles what Bakhtin said about his favorite dialogical author, Dostoevsky, whose writings exhibit “significantly less language differentiation, that is, fewer language styles, territorial and social dialects, professional jargons and so forth, than in the work of many writer-monologists” (PDP 182).

56. "Style" is a pun here, since it refers both to the titles by which Talbot is "styled" and the manner of the eulogy. For an unambiguous use of "style" as manner, see *AYLI*, 2.1.20.


58. Similarly, although G. L. Brook may claim that Shakespeare's old men characteristically speak "in short, jerky sentences, as though out of breath" (*Language of Shakespeare*, 183), such observations hardly apply to King Lear or John of Gaunt. Shakespeare's portrayal of speakers as prone to failures in timing and delivery despite their social or educational distinction should be contrasted with Thomas Heywood's confident claims for the benefits of rhetorical training as afforded by participation in college plays in *The Apology for Actors*. The argument I am here developing may complicate, but does not invalidate, what I take to be Lynne Magnusson's point concerning one tendency in Shakespearean comedy, which is to reassert "the distinction of ... social superiors by devaluing and rendering foolish the ambitions and speech products of their inferiors" (*Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 121).

59. Compare noble Suffolk's tongue confounded and senses made "rough" by the "princely majesty" of Margaret's beauty (*tH6* 3.70—71); yet, like Cordelia, he has no trouble being articulate, even poetic, in his asides about her inarticulacy. Richard Plantagenet admits to fear of speaking among "lords," although he later becomes Duke of York (*tH6* 3.61—64).

60. Sonnets 80 and 86 locate the cause in rivalry and feelings of poetic inferiority.


62. For "untrimmed" as meaning virginal when used of a bride, see *KJ* 3.1.209.

63. The equation of Romans and Goths in barbarity has become a staple of critical attention. For a very intelligent articulation of the relation of similarity and an analysis linking it to contemporary colonialist experience, see Virginia Mason Vaughan, "The Construction of Barbarism in *Titus Andronicus*," in *Race, Ethnicity and Power in the Renaissance*, ed. Joyce Green MacDonald (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1987), 165—80.


67. On Shakespeare's indebtedness to Eliot, see J. W. Lever, "Shakespeare's French


70. *Canzon* 20 is quoted from The Spenser Society edition of *Zepheria* (Manchester: Charles Simms, 1869), because STC 26124 is damaged and does not contain it.


73. Davies’s *Epigrammes* (written by 1594) include a linguistic face-off between a military man newly returned from the Netherlands and filled with “warlike wordes” and the poem’s speaker, who, like Davies, studies law and who responds “to requisite such gulling termes as these, / With wordes of my profession.” The episode ends, after heated exchanges of mutually incomprehensible professional jargon, without a genuine encounter: “So neyther of us understanding eyther, / We part as wise as when we came together” (*Poems of Sir John Davies*, 139).


75. In *Travels in England* (1599), Thomas Platter describes the contemporary practice, “the nobles and those who have travelled abroad . . . greet each other with bared head and a bow, sometimes gently gripping each other on the outside the knee” (quoted in Guilpin, *Skialeshia*, 211).

76. Cf. Gobbo’s oath (*MV* 2.2.42).

77. Compare Thomas Wilson’s attack on a Lincolnshire man’s attempt to include “ynkepot termes” in his letters (*Arte of Rhetorique*, 327–29).


79. Thus, one might differentiate Eliot’s writing from the speaking mode of Shakespeare’s Pistol, whose utterances otherwise share many formal features with Eliot’s own, particularly in the multiplicity and apparent cross-purposes of semi-quotational phrases; cf. the analysis of Pistol in G. L. Brook, *Language of Shakespeare*, 198–200.

80. The politics of such a style is not easily assessed; Neil Rhodes claims that it is the plain style, as developed by Puritans, and not the exuberant troping of Nashe, Sidney, or Shakespeare, that will be understood as subversive of established political order (*The Power of Eloquence and English Renaissance Literature* [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992], 127).


84. Robert Allot, *England's Parnassus or Flowers of Our Moderne Poets* (1600; facsimile repr. New York: Da Capo, 1970). Nashe is quoted on 397 and 469; Gaunt’s speech is on 348 and is attributed to M.D. (i.e. Michael Drayton).

85. Lorna Hutson, *Thomas Nashe in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 134. One might compare the quotation of Marlowe’s highly ironic epyllion, *Hero and Leander*, by the naively rustic Phoebe, without any sense of irony: “Dead Shepherd, now I find thy saw of might, / ‘Who ever lov’d that lov’d not at first sight?”’ (AYLI 3.5.80–81). See William Keach, *Elizabethan Erotic Narratives: Irony and Pathos in the Ovidian Poetry of Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Their Contemporaries* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 123. Compare such works as Sidney’s *Astrophil and Stella* once printed and available outside its original readership; Arthur F. Marotti argues, without knowledge of “the precise biographical and social matrices that enliven their meaning,” poetic moments of high irony (as for example the renunciation of heroism and learning in Sonnet 64) may be taken for “conventional Petrarchan attitudinizing” (John Donne: *Coterie Poet* [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986], 11). The point applies to the lovers’ verses in *Love’s Labor’s Lost* (4.2.101–117, 4.3.56–69, and 97–116), which are mocked as “only numbers ratified” (4.2.120) or as “pure idolatry” (4.3.71), but are reprinted in *The Passionate Pilgrim* (1599) without disclaimers.

86. See Essex’s letters of October 1591 to Elizabeth quoted by Steven W. May, *The Elizabethan Courtier Poets: The Poems and Their Contexts* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1991), 118. Essex writes: “For the 2 windowes of your privy chamber shalbe the poles of my sphere wher, as long as your Majestie will please to have me, I am fixed and unmoveable: when you thinke thatt heaven to good for me, I will nott fall like a stark, butt be consumed like a vapor by the sun thatt drew me up to such a heighth. While your Majestie geves me leave to say I love you my fortune is as my affection unmatchable. yt ever you deny me thatt liberty, you may end my lyfe, butt never shake my constandy.”


90. See Puttenham, *Arte of English Poesie*, 18, on the identification of the poet with the "light headed or phantasticall man."


92. The version of the Surrey material in Drayton’s *England’s Heroicall Epistles* offers the following account of the poet with no sense of Nashe’s irony:

> When Heav’n would strive to doe the best she can,  
> And put an Angels Spirit into a Man,  
> Then all her power she in that worke doth spend,  
> When she a Poet to the world doth send,  
> The difference rests, betwixt the gods and us,  
> Allowd by them: is but distinguishd thus,  
> They give men breath, men by their power are borne,  
> That life they give, the Poet doth adore,  
> And from the world when they dissolve mans breath,  
> They in the world do give man life in death.

sig. H.4v from Drayton's edition of 1599 or from *England's Parnassus*, 1600; Toft refers to Drayton as "that sweet Muse of his (who not unworthily beareth the name of the chiefeft Archangel) singeth after this Soule-ravishing manner" (Drayton, *Works*, s.131). Drayton gives Surrey lines like "Yet am I one of great Apollo's Heires / The Sacred Muses challenge me for theirs" (ll. 105–6). The tournament for Geraldine's honor shows no hint of irony, and is told from Surrey's point of view. Barbara C. Ewell argues that Surrey has a "stiffly artificial self" and contrasts him with Geraldine as articulated in 1599, but Drayton's Geraldine concurs with Surrey's values: she names him chief of "The Muses traine" and contrasts him as "perfect Gentleman indeed" with "Italionate" travelers who mix styles and clothes of other lands (ll. 119–144); see "Unity and the Transformation of Drayton's Poetics in *Englands Heroicall Epistles*: From Mirrored Ideals to "The Chaos in the Mind," *Modern Language Quarterly* 44 (1983): 231–250, esp. 242.

93. The reference is contemporary. Samuel Daniel's *Complaint of Rosamund* was published in 1592.


96. Thus, although Sir Andrew Aguecheek is being advised to offend his opponent when Sir Toby urges, "if thou thou'st him some thrice, it shall not be amiss" (*TNE* 3.2.50–51), the general rule of using "you" to everyone, regardless of rank, had almost, but not quite, been established by the late sixteenth century; on the complex and confusing usage of these pronouns in Shakespeare and others, see Williams, "*O When Degree is Shak'd,!*" 90–94. Long-standing assumptions about graded usage of pronouns of power and solidarity (Roger Brown and Albert Gilman, "The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity," in *Style in Language*, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960], 253–76 and "Politeness Theory and Shakespeare's Four Major Tragedies," *Language and Society* 18 (1989): 159–212; Magnusson, *Shakespeare and Social Dialogue*, 37) may be complicated by Jonathan Hope's analysis of the complex role of emotion and shifting mood in such usage ("Shakespeare's 'Natiue English,'" in *A Companion to Shakespeare*, ed. David Scott Kastan [Oxford: Blackwell, 1999], 239–55).


100. Holinshed, *Chronicles*, 1:274.

101. Compare the use of "portly" for Romeo in "A bears him like a portly gentleman" ([R] 1.3.67).

102. On the role of monarch as agent, see J. M. R. Margetson, *The Origins of English Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 58. Cf. Vincentio Saviolo, *Vincentio Saviolo His Practice* (London: 1595, STC 21788), who sees agency as defining monarchy, but makes the difference between monarch and subject absolute: "there can be no greater difference, than one to be free, and the other subject: and for that soueraigne Princes are onely truely free, and all the rest in some sorte subject" (Ff 2v).

103. For Theobald's reaction, see Peter Ure's note in the Arden edition to 1.3.271-74.


105. For obvious reasons arising from the close-up potential in the television medium, one twentieth-century production that makes significant use of the movement of glances in the play's first scenes is David Giles's 1978-79 BBC television version; see Margaret Shewring, *King Richard II* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 145.


109. Compare Wright on women's expressions of anger and attempts to appropriate gendered looks and gestures by a "prudent [male] oratour" in "framing his action" (*Passions of the Mind*, 180).


112. Compare Nashe's remarks concerning the role of poets in the "Romaine common-wealths" where it was lawful to criticize "the highest chairs of authoritie . . . alwayes the sacred Maiestie of their Augustus kept inuiolate"; he then universalizes: "Kings are Gods on earth, their actions must not be sounded by their subiects" (*Works*, 1:285-86).

**Chapter 2. "Word Itself against the Word"**

1. For an account of that theory attuned to differences between the micrological reading pioneered by Richards and Empson and the practice of the various New Critics who followed them, see John Paul Russo, *I. A. Richards* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), esp. 540-62. Russo traces American New Criticism to the Fugitives and Agrarians of the


5. Compare Bakhtin on choosing a “language” (DI 295). Robert Young argues that Vološinov resembles Althusser in seeing utterance determined by social relations, but the Althusserian subject is interpolated in the discourse of the other and speaks only from that position, while for Bakhtin and Vološinov, a speaker cannot fail to “accent words and to compete with other accentuations for his or her own purposes.” (Robert Young, “Back to Bakhtin,” *Cultural Critique* 2 (1986): 85). Bakhtin’s thinking resembles certain aspects of Foucault in seeing society as constituted by contradictory and competing discourses, but the stress on reported speech in any discursive practice, Young says, works against the Foucauldian notion of “rival and therefore distinct stratifications of discourses of truth,” so that, “reported speech makes it impossible to maintain distinctions between discourses in the first place; the struggle for power resolves into competing accents attached to individual words” (ibid.).

6. Thinking about relationships of Bakhtinian imperatives to the emphases of New Criticism might begin with the fact that attention to tonality and dramatistic qualities of utterance, to ironies of “sideward glance,” and ambiguities of words “with loopholes,” are approached by the Bakhtin circle as inescapably social and ideological. Of course, close reading dramatic texts, especially the highly unstable, multiply texted plays of a playwright who was also an actor, shareholder, and more collaborator than author—to adopt Stephen Orgel’s distinction—is from the outset to be reading situated and interanimated voicings. See Stephen Orgel, “What is a Text?” *Research Opportunities in Renaissance Drama* 24 (1981): 3–6.

7. Barbara Johnson, *A World of Difference* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 31. The encounter of relatively direct (since all utterance exhibits indirection) with relatively indirect discourses so important to the Bakhtin circle is precisely what the written practice of close reading necessarily enacts, whether consciously or not; see Jon Klancher, “Bakhtin’s Rhetoric,” in *Reclaiming Pedagogy: The Rhetoric of the Classroom*, ed. Ellen Quandahl and Patricia Donahue (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 83–96. As Dominic LaCapra notes, “Through the interaction of perspectives within the same utterance or text, language becomes a site on which contesting and contested discourses of different periods, groups,
or classes engage one another as sociolinguistic forces. Dialogized heteroglossia creates the space for critical and self-critical distance in language use, for it disrupts myth in the sense of an absolute fusion or bonding of a use of words to a concrete ideological meaning" (Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983], 312).  

8. Terry Eagleton, "The Subject of Literature," Cultural Critique 1 (1983): 95–104; 102. The implications of Eagleton's argument—that liberal humanism only values "a sensitivity to nuance and ambiguity, a balanced discrimination, a capacity to entertain imaginatively a variety of view points" in the isolated, freely encountered reading of a "literary" text and not in the social/historical struggles of groups and individuals—should be considered in relation to Bové and Spanos on Richards (see Bové's chapter in Intellectuals and Power, and Spanos, "The Apollonian Investment"). For Bourdieu's use of Vološinov, see "The Economics of Linguistic Exchanges," Social Science Information 16 (1977): 645–68. "Strictly interminable" describes Bourdieu's own analysis, see his Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 20. On the relevance of close textual analysis to modern stage interpretation, particularly via Ian McKellen, who studied English at Cambridge when F. R. Leavis and George Rylands were there, see Margaret Shewring, King Richard II (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 81–82.  


10. Cf. Vološinov on the densely pre-inhabited word confronting the poet (quoted in Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin, 49) and Bakhtin on contending languages and interpretations for prose writers (DI 278).  

11. Multiple meanings are not just a matter of Richard's "weak government" having resulted in "linguistic anarchy" as Peter Smith asserts, since multivalence and heteroglot contention thrive when Bolingbroke governs; "linguistic ambiguity" may just as well serve power as subvert it (Peter Smith, Social Shakespeare: Aspects of Renaissance Dramaturgy and Contemporary Society [London: Macmillan, 1995], 124–25).  


20. SPD, vol. 275, item 251; compare SPD, vol. 274, item 61.


22. SPD, vol. 274, item 61.

23. For an analysis of the discursive treatment of Ireland in Shakespeare’s play, the playwright’s modification of sources in order to render Richard II’s Irish expedition as a folly of character rather than a justified expedition, see Christopher Highley, *Shakespeare, Spenser, and the Crisis in Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 66–68.

24. Hayward’s offending sentence is in fact derived from Henry Savile’s edition of Tacitus, *The Ende of Nero and Beginning of Galba* (Oxford, 1591). Hayward, however, discuss-
es the illusory nature of reliance on "fortes" and "forces" without dynastic security, while Savile's sentence criticizes the affectional ties binding "friends" as being weaker than bonds of blood: "For neither were Legions nor naues so strong defences and rampiers of a Princes estate, as the multitude of children. Friendes with time and fortune, sometimes by vnnaused desires, or ouersights, decrease, fall from vs and fade, whereas a mans owne bloud cleaueh fast" (Ende of Nero, 2d ed. [London: 1598. STC 23643], 165). Cf. Edwin B. Benjamin, "Sir John Hayward and Tacitus," Review of English Studies, n.s., 8 (1957), 275-76. Dowling's account of the Irish situation in "Sir John Hayward's Troubles" is helpful; cf. Hayward's remarks, First Part of the Life and Raigne, 62.

25. SPD, vol. 275, item 251.
27. Hayward, First Part of the Life and Raigne, 62-63.
28. As R. Morgan Griffin observes concerning recent publications on Richard II, nearly every one of the more than one hundred essays mentioned Elizabeth's "distress" in connection with the play and the Essex rebellion, "usually . . . as a means to declare that Richard II is a significant play"; see "The Critical History of Richard II," in Critical Essays on Shakespeare's "Richard II," ed. Kirby Farrell (New York: G. K. Hall, 1999), 23-40; esp. 29.
29. Walter Cohen, "Political Criticism of Shakespeare," in Shakespeare Reproduced: The Text in History and Ideology, ed. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O'Connor (London: Methuen, 1987), 18-46; esp. 35. Cohen's essay is an excellent account of problems haunting early political criticism. It is difficult to find accounts of the political situation of the Elizabethan theater that do not cite Elizabeth's remark to Lambarde as "evidence," and it is equally rare to find readings that cite the full sentence from which it is taken or convey any ambiguities concerning the identification of "this tragedy" with Shakespeare's play. For examples, see Marie Axton, "[Elizabeth's] famous remark 'I am Richard the Second. Know ye not that?' was made to William Lambarde . . . and its context makes clear that both Elizabeth and Lambarde saw the play's relevance to the Earl of Essex's rebellion" (The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession [London: Historical Society, 1977], 2); Stephen Greenblatt, "In Elizabeth's bitter recollection the performance has metastasized: 'This tragedy was played 40 tie times in open streets and houses'" (The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance [Norman, Okla.: Pilgrim Books, 1982], 3); Leah S. Marcus, "In 1601, a sudden rash of performances of Shakespeare's Richard II was taken by Elizabeth and her chief ministers (and without reason) as propaganda for the Essex rebellion" (Puzzling Shakespeare, 27); David Scott Kastan, "Elizabeth bitterly remarked . . . when she was reminded of Essex's use of (what was presumably Shakespeare's) Richard II . . . 'this tragedy'" ("Proud Majesty Made a Subject: Shakespeare and the Spectacle of Rule," Shakespeare Quarterly 37 [1986]: 468); Stephen Orgel, "[Elizabeth] paused at length over the reign of Richard II, and when Lambarde expressed his surprise, she explained, 'I am Richard II, know ye not that?' Lambarde acknowledged that he understood this to be an allusion to the drama of the late Earl of Essex, and the Queen continued, 'He that will forget God will also forget his benefactors; this tragedy was played forty times in open streets and houses.' . . . In her moving and baffling expostulation to Lambarde, she transformed the drama of Richard II into a piece of very dangerous civic pageantry" ("The Spectacles of State," in Persons in Groups, ed. Richard C. Trexler [Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1985], 119). Historians have often treated Elizabeth's remark in similar fashion, see for example, Lacey Baldwin Smith, Treason in Tudor England: Politics and Paranoia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 261-69 and 155n. For a strong counterstatement to such uses of the anecdote, see J. Leeds Barroll, "A New History for Shakespeare and His Time," Shakespeare Quarterly 39 (1988): 441-64. A more


31. British Museum additional ms. 15,664, fol. 226. The version from which most criticism takes the anecdote is John Nichols, *The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth* (1823; repr. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.), 3:552–53. Nichols generally agrees with the British Museum manuscript. The most noteworthy exception is that Nichols makes "benefactor" plural in the sentence concerning "this tragedy." The letter Nichols attributes to Lambarde in adjoining pages is of doubtful authorship.


34. The relevance of antiparisaic polemic to *Richard II* is clear, given York's extended criticism of Richard for vulnerability to flattery (*R2* 2.1.17–28), and Bolingbroke's denunciation of Bushy and Greene for leading Richard from his wife (*R2* 3.1.8–15). However, Mario DiGangi notes that the play does little to dramatize the indulgence of the favorites and that Richard accuses Bolingbroke of the same violation of his royal marriage, thereby suggesting the contrived nature of the charges against Bushy and Greene (*The Homoerotics of Early Modern Drama* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 118–19).


39. Ibid., 2:373.


41. Ibid., 9:201. Essex’s letter, Bacon says, should admit, “I know I ought doubly infinitel-y to be her Majesty’s: both jure creationis, for I am her creature, and jure redemptionis, for I know she hath saved me from overthrow.” For later use of the discourse of religion and gratitude against the court of James I, see R. Malcolm Smuts, Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 34–35.


43. Potentially relevant uses of “tragedy” might include Lambarde’s lament over “what great Tragedies have beene stirred in this Realme by this our naturall inospitalitie and dis-daine of straungers” and his urging solidarity with foreign Protestants as “guestes and strangers in our Countrie.” See William Lambarde, A Perambulation of Kent (1576; repr. London: 1826), 323–24. In 1593 Elizabeth herself translates from Boethius such observations as “What does Tragedies clamour more bewayle, than a man turning happy Raigne by blyn-de fortune’s stroke?” (Queen Elizabeth’s Englishings, ed. Caroline Pemberton [London: K. Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1899], 23). In 1598 Elizabeth also translates Plutarch on the self-destructive nature of curiosity in Oedipus and the fate of “curious man” who “willingly may tragedies new made behold” (ibid., 138, 128).

44. A Declaration Touching Upon the Treasones of the Late Earl of Essex (London: 1601), in Bacon, Works, 9:247–74; subsequent citations appear in the text.


46. Given this theological frame, the pervasive references to Providence in Bacon’s account are not surprising; see e.g., Works, 9:255, 257, 266.

47. British Library, Harleian Manuscript 6854, fol. 178. For Elizabeth’s “grace” expressed
in terms of theological “preventing grace” and another “attribute which is most proper unto God,” see Sir John Croke’s address to Elizabeth of November 30, 1601, in *Elizabeth I: Collected Works*, ed. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 336.


50. Compare Essex’s remark to the Queen in a letter of May 1600, “I am gnawed on & torn by ye vilest and basest creatures upon earth. The prating tavern-haunter speaks of me what he lists: the frantick libeller writes of me what he lists; already they print me, & make speak to ye world, and shortly they will play me in what form they list upon ye stage. The least of these is a thousand tymes worse then deathes” (SPD, vol. 274, item 138). On one engraved image of Essex circulating in 1600, see Richard C. McCoy, *The Rites of Knighthood: The Literature and Politics of Elizabethan Chivalry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 79–102.

51. The story has often been told; for one classic example, see Lyttton Strachey, *Elizabeth and Essex* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1928). Cf. Thomas Wilson’s apparent references to the fate of Essex at the hands of those who “make the Queene looke through a payre of spectacles & make the fault seeme greater than it is, as hath been lately approved in the actions of some of the greatest,” in *The State of England, 1600, Camden Miscellany* 16 (1936), 41. Lord Burghley was Lambarde’s friend and patron (Read, Introduction to *William Lambarde, 11*), and in a letter of 1591, Lambarde dedicated his *Archian* (London: 1635, STC 15143) to Robert Cecil.

52. On this contention, see James, *Society, Politics, and Culture*, 429. For an example, see Lord Burghley’s advice to Robert Cecil on children: “Neither by my consent, shalt thou train them up in wars. For he that sets up his rest to live by that profession can hardly be an honest man or a good Christian” (Joel Hurstfield, *The Queen’s Ward: Wardship and Marriage under Elizabeth I*, 2d ed. [London: Frank Cass, 1973], 257). On such contentsions at court generally, see Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1983).


55. Ibid., 2:488.


58. Ibid., 15.

59. Lambarde was never knighted, so he was marked as socially inferior to many of the

60. Concerning this redefinition, see Arthur B. Ferguson on Sir Thomas Elyot's *Boke Named the Gouernour* (1531) and *A Preservative agaynste Deth* (1545) in *The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England* (Washington: Folger Library, 1986), 59–63. Compare the redefinition of honor in terms of "obedience and duty toward the king his Majesty, his councillours, officers, and administrators, both high and low," in *The Institucion of a Gentleman* (London: 1568, STC 14105); or Lambarde's own version of the ideal justice of the peace as "Valiant," "Learned," and "Good": "under the word Good, it is meant also that hee loue and feare God aright, without which hee cannot bee Good at all" (*Eirenarcha*, 33). Peter Laslett claims that "the term gentleman marked the exact point at which the traditional social system divided up the population into two extremely unequal sections"; see *The World We Have Lost* (New York: Scribner's, 1965), 26. Sir Julius Caesar describes Lambarde in a revealing combination of terms as "a deep and learned scholar, a great common lawyer, and a religious, conscionable, and worthy gentleman," in *Acta Cancellaria*, ed. Cecil Monro (London: W. Benning, 1847), 151n., cited in Read, introduction to *William Lambarde*, 11.


64. Compare Coke on the inflammatory potential in Hayward's terms "associations" and "yearly and double subsidies," (SPD, vol. 274, item 61). For debate concerning royal prerogative in relation to letters patent and enclosure, see D'Ewes, *Journals of All the Parliaments*, 675. One dramatic parliamentary instance of discrepant views of property occurs when laughter greets the claim that "precedent" dictates the Queen's right to all English lands and goods (633).


69. Riots by Londoners impressed for Irish service occurred at the market town of Towcester in 1598; probably the worst disturbances by troops connected with the Irish campaign occurred in Chester and Bristol in 1600. Peter Clark, ed., *The European Crisis of the 1590s: Essays in Comparative History* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 55.

70. In 1598 Elizabeth suggests (through Sir Thomas Egerton) the resemblance of justices of the peace to greedy dogs who bark at loyal subjects rather than at rebels (Neale, *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments*, 2:366). Such opinions were denounced as "slanderous and defamatory" by Sir Francis Hastings in 1601 (ibid., 2:423).

72. Elizabeth's sensitivity to the gesture of kneeling and her pronounced public responsiveness to such shows of respect (including bidding her subjects rise while she spoke and her own bowing back in response to their compliments) are recorded in the account of her November 1601 speech to Parliament; see Elizabeth I: Collected Works, 337–38.

73. And of course, love. Elizabeth's emotional manipulation as a political tool is well described by Christopher Haigh, Elizabeth I (London: Longmann, 1988), 98–102.

Chapter 3. Landlord, Not King


6. In "Broken English and Broken Irish: Nation, Language, and the Optic of Power in Shakespeare's Histories," Shakespeare Quarterly 45 (1994): 1–32, Michael Neill reads garden scenes from Richard II and Henry VI "(together with the plays' insistent horticultural imagery) against the discourse of plantation that licenses Richard II's Irish war as it licensed Elizabeth's" (11). Neill also takes up the description of the state of France in Henry V and hears it "echo[ing] numerous descriptions of Ireland as a fertile earthly paradise turned to wilderness by the barbarity of its own inhabitants" (11–12). Burgundy's references to unkept hedgerows resembling prisoners "may even deliberately recall contemporary illustrations of 'wild Irish'
captive with their notoriously shaggy forelocks” (12n). Neill’s practice of what Edward Said calls a “contrapuntal” analysis locates a field of resonance for horticultural language and practice that includes (largely implicit) reference to the Irish conflicts of the 1590s. Neill’s claims for the garden’s “edenic” nature in Richard II seem overstated, but the emphasis on the heteroglossic context for such scenes is valuable.

7. On the English yeomanry, see Francis Bacon, History of King Henry VII, in Works, ii:42-46; cf. Mildred Campbell, The English Yeoman under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942). On the impact of enclosure on the yeomanry, see R. C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). The 1590s may have been a watershed in the relation of yeomen to gentry and the poor, with a redirection of alliances that brought them into closer accord with the gentry, who were themselves more likely than in earlier periods to join in a consensus with the forces of government. See John Walter, “A ‘Rising of the People’: The Oxfordshire Rising of 1596,” Past and Present 107 (1985): 90-143, esp. 140-41. For the depiction of battlefield mingling that evokes mayhem and bodily confusion, but avoids specific status resonances, compare Talbot’s threats to the French: “Pucelle or pussel, Dauphin or dogfish, / Your hearts I’ll stamp out with my horse’s heels / And make a quagmire of your mingled brains” (1H6 1.4.107–9). Henry V’s praise of yeomen warriors for their “noble luster” and his exhortation of them to show “the mettle of your pasture” is in H5 3.1.25–30; contrast the aristocratic pettiness of Somerset’s and Plantagenet’s factional argument about whether or not his father’s attachment for treasons renders Plantagenet a “crestless yeoman” (1H6 2.4).


17. On periods of dearth and their local conditions, see Andrew B. Appleby, Famine in Tudor and Stuart England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), and John Walter, “The

18. On these conjunctions, see Thirsk, Agrarian History, 226-36.


21. Bodleian Pamphlets, 1648, c.15, 3, Linc., as quoted in Tawney, Agrarian Problem, 149-50; on levelers and hedges, see 338.


27. On these developments, see McRae, God Speed the Plough, 149-50. McRae traces the period development in the term "profit" itself, from its classical antecedent (utilitas) which bears almost no financial connotation, to a more explicit pecuniary sense, so that Thomas Tusser can translate "profit and pleasure" as "treasure and pleasure."


29. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure, 22.

30. On the conflict over enclosure throughout the seventeenth century, see Buchanan
31. Ibid., 23.
35. McRae, God Speed the Plow, 151–52.
37. Ibid., 111. For an excellent discussion of the way Tusser’s work adapts classical agrarian discourse in the interest of the smallholders and their problems of tenancy within the contemporary English system, see Andrew McRae, God Speed the Plough, 146–51. Particularly revealing is the 1573 edition’s revision of the agricultural year in order to make its beginning coincide with the changes of tenure that would occur at Michaelmas as a result of the possible entry of a “new fermer” or of the tenant’s need the “ferme to give over.”
40. For a similarly presumptive positive use of hedges and walls to embody safety in a very different context (i.e., a defense of Ecclesiastical privilege), see Thomas Cooper, An Admonition to the People of England (London: 1589, STC 5682), 242.
41. Iden’s lines commending the country should be compared with Barnabe Googe’s version of Virgil’s Georgics in his translation of Heresbach’s Foure Books of Husbandry:

And though with gorgeous gates the buyldynges hye,
With early greetinges always doo not flowe,
Nor feelyng garnisht gaye with Imagrye,
Nor ritche attyre we see, nor costly showe:
Yet stedfast state and lyfe vnskild of guyl, 
With wealth yenough and pastures wyde at wyll,
And people strong traynede vp to payne and toyle,
And youth with dyet small contented styll,
Where godly zeale and vertues all dyd dwell,
When Iustice last dyd bidde the world farewell.


43. The gardener’s labor in his vocation is emphatically not that of the ploughman of earlier Tudor Protestant complaint. When Hugh Latimer’s sermons upheld the value of labor by claiming that the poorest ploughman “is in Christ equal with the greatest Prince that is,” the effect was to maintain the ploughman’s estate as a position within a manorial structure where his socioeconomic role was, in Andrew McRae’s terms, “defined by labour and deference.” As McRae says of Latimer’s mid-Tudor discourse, “The godly individualist of the seventeenth century has no place within this ideology; rather the only godly labour was perceived to be that which accorded with orthodox notions of degree” (McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 202–3).


47. The term “landlord” functions in interesting ways during the period. While Gaunt clearly means it pejoratively, contemporary usage could and did employ the word in exalted senses. Francis Trigge denounces the use of a biblical discourse of ownership by earthly landlords who in so speaking usurp the rights of the heavenly Landlord: “these Inclosers allledge that saying of the gospell, *Is it not lawfull for me to doe with mine owne as I list?* They must remember, that parable represents unto us that great Landlord of all Landlords, the King of heaven; he may say so only, and none else” (*The Humble Petition of Two Sisters; The Church and the Common-wealth* [London: 1604, STC 24280], C.8a).


tenants increased “four of five fold” from the middle sixteenth to the middle seventeenth century (Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change, 1:89).


51. In the reigns of Edward VI and Henry VIII, according to Manning, “Enclosure riots were merely one species of violence employed by the gentry in pursuing quarrels with rival gentry or enforcing uniformity of agricultural usage upon their tenants” (Village Revolts, 39; also 40, 53). Violence in the 1590s also included, though apparently to a lesser degree, such quarrels among gentry (79–81).


53. One response to the 1986 Royal Shakespeare Company’s production of Richard II notes that the change of rulers in the play was tied to changes in economic attitudes: “The old order, England as Book of Hours, is giving way to the new, England as hours of book-keeping. It is a brilliant and apt image, feudal despot leading to mercantile executive. It is Bolingbroke, not Richard of Bordeaux, who is the landlord” (Giles Gordon, RSC Yearbook, quoted in Shewring, King Richard II, 60–61).

54. Richard II, in Allen and Muir, Shakespeare’s Plays, C4r.


56. Compare Martin’s analysis of absolutism in Feudalism to Capitalism.


60. Thomas Greene’s diary entries concerning Shakespeare and the Welcombe enclosures include this entry for August 14, 1615: “Sept W Shakespeares tellyng J Greene that I was not able to he bear the ensinges of welcombe.” The diary (Stratford-upon-Avon, Miscellaneous Documents, vol. 13 [BRU 15/13]) is reprinted in C. M. Ingleby, Shakespeare and the Enclosure of Common Fields at Welcombe (Birmingham: Robert Birbeck, 1885), 11. Combe’s letter (Stratford-upon-Avon, BRU 15/1, item 107) is reprinted in B. Roland Lewis, The Shakespeare Documents (1941; repr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969), 2:463–64. For a vivid account of Shakespearean records in this and other relevant areas, see Robert Bearman,

62. McRae, God Speed the Plough, 178–79.
64. Stow, Stow’s Survey of London, 381–82.

Chapter 4. “Subjected Thus”

1. Hardin Craig classed the play as the first “tragedy of character” in English drama (An Interpretation of Shakespeare [New York: Dryden Press, 1948], 134). Concerning the theater’s concentration on Richard’s personality, see Margaret Shewring, King Richard II (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 63–90. The Victorians were particularly hard on the character of Richard: see the “heavy disapproval” from reviewers and critics, who faulted the role for insipidity, lack of manliness, and vacillation (Arthur Colby Sprague, Shakespeare’s Histories: Plays for the Stage [London: Society for Theatre Research, 1964], 31–36).


4. The biblical texts are found together in Matthew 19, Mark 10, and Luke 18.

5. Richard’s rhetoric of total collapse—resistance to his rule means “all” belongs to Bolingbroke; “all” kings have been murdered (R2 3.2.144–77)—is intoned in an interestingly different manner from Lear’s totalizing rhetoric of “all.”

6. Franco Moretti, Signs Taken for Wonders (London: NLB, 1983). From halting the combat to surrendering his rule, Richard’s actions suggest Moretti’s claim about the culture of absolutism: “everything hinges on the decision of the monarch.” For a nuanced reading of


9. The substance of Richard's assessment resembles that of Eubulus's own view "Such is in man the greedy mind to reign, / So great is his desire to climb aloft" (1.2.262–63).


11. For a historical account that supports the accuracy of Shakespeare's portrayal, see Nigel Saul, Richard II (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997).


17. William Warner, The Second Part of Albions England (London: 1589, STC 25080): "nor God nor man he feares. / In fewe, Ambition, Avarice, and Counsell lewd had wrought / In him a nature worse than into the world he brought" (125).


19. Important in the construction of Richard's poetic sensibility are C. E. Montague, ("F. R. Benson's Richard II," Manchester Guardian, 4 December 1899); Algernon Charles

Otherwise, the modern critical consensus concerning Shakespeare's Richard may be suggested, if overstated, in John Halverson's assessment: "everyone agrees that he is vain, foolish, posturing, callous, melodramatic, selfish, self-pitying, neurotic, mean-spirited, and untrustworthy, a poor excuse for a king and a poor excuse for a man" ("The Lamentable Comedy of Richard II," *English Literary Renaissance* 24 [1994]: 344). Although they proceed from entirely different premises, Swinburne's account of Richard's poetic effeminacy resonates with Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin's insightful analysis of Richard's "effeminate modernity," his preference for "words over deeds," and his "emotive" nature (*Engendering a Nation: A Feminist Account of Shakespeare's English Histories* [London: Routledge, 1997], 137–59). The tendency to define Richard as a "poet" is so strong that even studies clearly showing the distribution of language features across character lines, such as Dorothy C. Hickey's interesting "A World of Rhetoric in *Richard II*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 15 (1964): 179–91, feel compelled to assert his singularity, in this case as a "poetic visualizer."


21. Ibid., 145.


23. Ibid., 143.

24. Ibid., 149.

Froissart’s *Chronicle* lays squarely upon King Richard, who is said to have been constrained by popular opinion to prove his impartiality by being harsh to Mowbray; see Shakespeare's *Festive Tragedy: The Ritual Foundations of Genre* (London: Routledge, 1995), 62–63.

26. See *Mirror for Magistrates*, 113. The account of the banishment of Mowbray and Bolingbroke that makes the most sense in terms of practical politics is Berners’ translation of Froissart’s *Chronicles*, which has King Richard meeting with the Archbishop of York, the Earls of Salisbury and Huntingdon and “the other knightes of his chambre”—and not with Gaunt—and determining on their advice that the charade of the abortive combat followed by banishment would be the best strategy to disarm the suspicions that are held against Richard by “Londoners and dyvers other noble men and prelates of the realme” who accuse Richard of conniving to destroy his own lineage and realm (see Bullough, *Narrative and Dramatic Sources*, 3:424–45).

27. Compare Harcourt Williams’s conception of Gaunt for the revival of Gielgud’s 1929 Old Vic production. Williams defines the role as manifesting behavior demanded by a certain social (albeit timelessly conceived) position: “the inconsistency that is to be found in all political potentates. He seems to be biding his time in the beginning of the quarrel between his son and Mowbray, and is not greatly moved by the old Duchess of Gloucester’s passionate demand for justice for the murder of her husband. It is only when Bolingbroke is actually banished that he comes out into the open” (quoted in Shewring, *King Richard II*, 78). On the demands of aristocratic honor culture, see Mervyn James, *Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

28. After the initial face to face rhetorical contest, the play tends to cast characters’ encounters not in contests concerning shared values—as Bolingbroke’s honor versus Norfolk’s honor—but in shifting discursive moves that refuse the terms of the interlocutor’s utterance. Robert Ornstein contrasts the play’s powerless rhetoric with the power of words in *King John*, where “rhetoric had the power . . . to turn men and nations about” (*A Kingdom for a Stage* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972], 110). See also Joseph A. Porter’s account of *Richard II* in *The Drama of Speech Acts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).


32. To evaluate the extremity of Gaunt’s formulation, one might contrast the sense of duty, obligation, and limitation that the very popular preacher, Henry Smith, emphasizes in his sermon on the exalted titles given to rulers; see “The Magistrate’s Scripture,” in *The Works of Henry Smith*, ed. Thomas Fuller, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1866), 1:357–70.


35. On the tactic of attacking the royal associates from the time of Edward II to that of the Tudors, see James, *Society, Politics and Culture*, 348. The Privy Council’s letter of 26 June 1585 to London and county officials suppressing *Leicester’s Commonwealth* puts it thus: “knowing it an usual trade of traitorous minds when they would render the prince’s government od-
ous, to detract and bring out of credit the principal persons about them, her Highness, taking the abuse to be offered to her own self” (quoted in Leicester’s Commonwealth, 284). Cf. Philip Sidney’s comment on this tactic of attacking the prince with “vomit... against his counsellors” (The Miscellaneous Works of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. William Gray [1860; repr. New York: AMS Press, 1966], 308). For the generic qualities of ordinary speech, see Bakhtin, SG. The failure to take generic features of speech sufficiently into account can easily lead to overly essentialized notions of “character,” as for example in Lynne Magnusson’s account of Othello’s speech to the Senate, which presumes that his protests of limitation (“Rude am I in my speech, / And little blessed with the soft phrase of peace” [Oth 1.3.83–84]) betoken his “linguistic insecurity” rather than his comfort with the standard form of the early modern disabling speech familiar from parliamentary and other official proceedings (Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 170–71).

36. On central control of the dispensing of honor, see James, Society, Politics and Culture, 442.


38. Lines 129–33 are omitted from the Folio version, but the stress on peace over honor combat remains, even without the specific references to pride and rivalry. On civic humanism’s pressures upon the older forms of honor culture on behalf of moderation and common weal, see Arthur B. Ferguson, The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England (Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1986) and The Indian Summer of English Chivalry (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). For an example of such pressure, see Sir Thomas Elyot’s recommendation that the Christian knight follow virtue “having thereunto for his sword and spear his tongue and pen,” in A Preservative Agayns Deth (London: 1545, STC 7674). Aii–Aiii.

39. This is the condition to which Hotspur is reduced in Henry IV, Part One, but one might compare Claudius’s address to the Danish court, thanking them for counsel and agreement and appropriating the claims of reason and national unity to render Hamlet’s objections merely parochial in their concern with “kin,” selfish in being “particular,” and willful in expressing a “will most incorrect to heaven” (Ham 1.2.87–117).


42. The concentration on crusading and chivalry in this passage is especially pronounced when seen against similar passages in John Eliot’s Ortho-Epia Gallica and Du Bartas’s Deuine Wekes and Works, which praise France and England respectively for other virtues of learning and art in addition to the military (see Peter Ure, King Richard II, 5th ed. [London: Methuen, 1961], 206–7).

43. For a very different reading of the relation between Gaunt and Richard, see H. R.

44. Graham Holderness's analysis in *Shakespeare's History* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1985) is useful on the discourses of feudalism and royal absolutism in lines such as these, although his limited notion of controlling historical "context" tends to simplify his account of how these discourses interact. On feudal limitation, see James, *Society, Politics and Culture*, 357. Compare the near-repetition—a typical feature of this play—in this denunciation to Gaunt's assessment of England "bound in with shame,/With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds," where he uses the chivalric vocabulary of "shame," "blot," and "bond" to denounce Richard for betraying honor values to a legal framework. For a summary of arguments concerning this passage and the models of law and sovereignty it deploys, see Donna B. Hamilton, "The State of Law in Richard II," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 34 (1983): 5–17; esp. 5–6.

45. The term is technically accurate, although morally inaccurate, in describing the operations of flattery because flattery was widely defined in terms of the rhetorically familiar and self-promoting process of redescription by which the most cunning flatterer, according to William Cavendish (following Plutarch), approves someone's vices "by discouraging the contrary virtues, as calling temperance rusticity, and such as live within their estates misers" (cited in Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 170). In Gaunt's case, the contrary virtue would be a quite widely admired ideal of lawful sovereignty, which he redescribes in terms of bondslavery to law.

46. By contrast when Woodstock calls Richard "landlord," he merely joins everyone—living and dead, even Richard himself—in a univocal pronouncement. And when Woodstock maintains that the subject's proper reaction to royal tyranny is sufferance, he does so only after repeated outspoken criticism of specific royal abuses, stopping only at participation in an armed resistance that he refuses to criticize: "I cannot blame them for it" (Woodstock [3.2.82]).

47. Among those who have considered Gaunt's contributions to Richard's mistakes, see Holderness *Shakespeare's History*; see also Allan Bloom, "Richard II" in *Shakespeare as Political Thinker*, ed. John Alvis and Thomas G. West (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), 51–61; and Donald M. Friedman, "John of Gaunt and the Rhetoric of Frustration," *ELH* 43 (1976): 279–99. Gaunt's account of royal sovereignty is extreme in the English context generally as well as in the sixteenth century. For medieval English notions of kingship as resisting continental, theocratic models and as "tilted very ostensibly in favour of the feudal-limited king," see Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics*, 150–92; cf. John Watts's analysis of Henry VI in relation to law-governed authority in *Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16–17. A line of strong opinion holding monarchy to be limited by law runs from Sir John Fortescue at the time of Henry VI (see A Learned Commendation of the Politique Laws of England, trans. Robert Mulcaster [London: 1567], D2v–D3v) to John Poynet at the time of Queen Mary, who cautions against "absolute authority" and its support by "lustie lorde and ladies that will have their lustes a lawe, and their will to be folowed and obeyed of their subjectes as a right in dede" (A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power [n.p., 1556], B4–B6, F5), and to Sir Thomas Smith (De Republica Anglorum [London: 1583] Frv). King James, certainly no opponent of royal prerogative, writes in *The True Law of Free Monarchies*, "the King is aboue the law, as both the gier of strength thereto," but he also says, "a good King, although hee be above the Law, will subject and frame his actions thereto . . . of his owne free-will" (*The Political Works of James I*, ed. C. H. Mcllwain [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918], 63, 46). For argument that royal prerogative is consistently law-governed in English accounts, see G. R. Elton, "The Rule of Law
in Sixteenth-Century England," in Tudor Men and Institutions, ed. Arthur J. Slavin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972). Elton cites legal authorities from William Stauford's treatise on the prerogative (An Exposition of the Kings Prerogative [London: 1567]), which claims "the kings prerogative" originated "by th' order of the common law" (5), through Elizabeth's reign, finding prerogative subject to common law and statute—"Tudor lawyers, therefore, regarded the royal prerogative as a department of the common law, definable but not established by statute" (272). Elton argues that prerogative could be considered absolute only if left dormant, for once put into action any royal power was law-governed. In Henry VI, Part One the universally denounced Suffolk defines himself, although no monarch, according to a version of the tyrant's credo: "I have been a truant in the law / And never yet could frame my will to it, / And therefore frame the law unto my will" (2.4.7–9). As J. P. Sommerville points out, even later absolutists "admitted that kings should ordinarily rule according to law," (Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 [London: Longman, 1986], 36). Sommerville maintains that "the political literature of the early seventeen century reveals a wealth of arguments in favour of limited monarchy on the one hand, and, on the other, in favour of the thesis that in the final analysis the king's powers were not limited by any human law. Yet apologies for active resistance were rare, at least until 1640" (74–75).


49. On the reciprocities of feudal relations, see Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics, 151–54. On the notion of "good lordship" as reciprocal bond, see W. H. Dunham, Lord Hastings' Indentured Retainers (New Haven: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1955), chapter 2; also James, Society, Politics and Culture, 330.

50. Ernest William Talbert argues that although York's terms are set in "a context emphasizing primogeniture," charters and customary rights had connections with property concerns familiar to London audiences of the 1590s (Elizabethan Drama and Shakespeare's Early Plays [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963], 397n.).

51. By the time of Shakespeare's play, Robert Parson's attack on lineal monarchy had gained considerable notoriety. A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland (1594) could be devastating for any naive notion of an untroubled hereditary claim. Among those who wrote to answer Parsons are Peter Wentworth, Sir John Harington, and John Hayward.

52. Ernst Kantorowicz's well-known account of the monarch's "two bodies" comes to mind, but I agree with the criticism that Kantorowicz's formulation is overly polarized and overstated for the English context where it remained controversial; see Marie Axton, The Queen's Two Bodies: Drama and the Elizabethan Succession (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), x; cf. Richard F. Hardin, Civil Idolatry: Desacralizing the Monarchy in Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 24; and Raphael Falco, Charismatic Authority in Early Modern England (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 78.

53. As David Giles notes in his introduction to the 1978 BBC script, York is "the audience part, the one you most easily identify with. He interprets what is happening for you, he makes our mistakes" (quoted in Margaret Shewring, King Richard II, 150).

54. The various articulations present in such passages prevent them from constituting a simple material reduction of all these relations to the economic, although such a reduction was available to Shakespeare in a well known text. Thomas More's History of King Richard III par-
enthetically qualified Edward IV's successes with a striking observation about English subjects and money, "He hadde lefte all gatherynge of money (which is the onelye thyng that withdraweth the heartes of Englishmenne fro the Prynce)." See The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 2, ed. Richard Sylvester (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), 2:5.

55. Interestingly, the play equates the threat of property loss to tragic loss by surrounding it with prophecy and pathos; the agonizing and foresight of these three prepares for the suffering premonitions of the Queen in the next scene.

56. Perry Anderson discusses Renaissance European changes from feudal "conditional private property in land, vested in a class of hereditary nobles" to "absolute private property in land" as the "indispensable preparation for the advent of capitalism" and as signifying "the moment at which Europe left behind all other agrarian systems. In the long transitional epoch in which land remained quantitatively the predominant source of wealth across the continent, the consolidation of an unrestricted and hereditary private property in it was a fundamental step towards the release of the necessary factors of production for the accumulation of capital proper" (Lineages of the Absolutist State [London: New Left Books, 1974], 424–25).

57. The most drastic solution to the problems of consistency posed by York's reversals is perhaps that of Lewis Theobald's eighteenth-century adaptation, which has York commit suicide in response to Richard's death—an ultimate statement of loyalty (Richard II [London: 1719]).


59. In a unanimity reminiscent of Woodstock's use of "landlord," virtually everyone—even Northumberland and Bolingbroke in their unguarded moments—connects the sufferings of Richard with the passion of Christ.

60. See Perez Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers: 1500–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1:70. The situation is reminiscent of "bastard feudalism," which G. R. Elton defines as a "patronage system" that continued "superficially" the form of feudal, personal loyalties, while basing them on "payment," reinforced by "the persistence of personal and family ties" (G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors [London: Methuen, 1974], 3).

61. Speaking of Ian McKellen's 1968 Richard II, Richard Cottrell remarks that this speech was pivotal in conceiving the character's personal progress through the play: "We both saw Richard clearly in terms of a spiritual journey, shallow and heartless at the beginning, then the pivot coming at the 'needs friends' speech—that suddenly came out as a great cry at a rehearsal, it was thrilling. That was the turning-point" (quoted in Joy Leslie Gibson, Ian McKellen [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986], 58).

62. On faction and patronage, see Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, 1:96–97. Compare Robert Naunton on Elizabeth: "She ruled much by faction, and parties which she her selfe both made, upheld, and weakened, as her owne great judgement advised" (Fragmenta Regalia [London: 1641], 4).

63. Robert Ornstein points out that despite the accusations lodged against him, Richard never appears flattered and manipulated on stage, but Ornstein defines Richard as "too self-
absorbed to listen to any words but his own," and thereby misses the extent to which Richard
is shaped within a larger discursive context in which his words are not his "own" but part of
a communal context ( *A Kingdom for a Stage: the Achievement of Shakespeare's History Plays*

64. Given the suggestions of strategic thinking in the play, it is difficult to credit the
decision of the 1973 John Barton Royal Shakespeare Company production to make
Bolingbroke's motivation for pardoning Carlisle a sudden, emotional disgust at the violence
pursued by his men in beheading his opponents. For more on this production, see Barbara
Hodgdon, *The End Crowns All: Closure and Contradiction in Shakespeare's History* (Princeton,

65. The self-interested patronage relations are the more remarkable for their prominence
in place of a whole range of national and civic arguments that might be put in their place (see
Hexter, "Property, Monopoly, and Shakespeare's Richard II").

66. As the author of *Leicester's Commonwealth* observed, citing the example of the Percies
and Bolingbroke to attack Leicester's influence with Elizabeth: “Especially in matters of honor
and authority, it is an infallible rule that one degree desired and not obtained afflicteth
more than five degrees already possessed can give consolation” (135).

67. Building on such references to Northumberland, John Barton's 1973 production of
*Richard II* made him resemble a giant bird of prey on stilts (Cary M. Mazer, "Historicizing
Alan Dessen: Scholarship, Stagecraft, and the 'Shakespeare Revolution,'" in *Shakespeare,

68. Barton's *Richard II* employed staircases to flank the set and a bridge that rose and fell
with the king's fortune, and the Groom who visits Richard is Bolingbroke or an image of him,
suggesting the ubiquity of the phenomena represented by Bolingbroke's rise (Mazer,
"Historicizing Alan Dessen," 158).

69. Certain Sermons or Homilies (1547) and A Homily against Disobedience and Wilful

70. Machiavelli represents ambition as a fact of general human "nature," too, but does not
relate it to urban settings. In the *Discourses* Machiavelli writes, "[W]hen men are no
longer obliged to fight from necessity, they fight from ambition, which passion is so powerful
in the hearts of men that it never leaves them, no matter to what height they may rise. The
reason of this is that nature has created men so that they desire everything, but are unable to
attain it; desire being thus always greater than the faculty of acquiring, discontent with what
they have and dissatisfaction with themselves result from it" (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince


72. Ibid., 85–87.

73. Thomas Nelson, *The Device of the Pageant: Set forth by the Worshipfull Companie of
the Fishmongers* (London: 1590, STC 1842), 6. Besides his role in this pageant, Walworth was
celebrated in the Elizabethan chronicles, in two plays (*The Life and Death of Iacke Strawe and
Richard Johnson's Nine Worshipes of London*), a religious treatise and three poems between 1565
and 1600. See Laura Stevenson O'Connell, "The Elizabethan Bourgeois Hero-Tale: Aspects
of an Adolescent Social Consciousness," in *After the Reformation: Essays in Honor of J. H.

74. Laura Caroline Stevenson, *Praise and Paradox: Merchants and Craftsmen in

76. Ibid.

77. From a very different angle, Derek Traversi notes that for all their “artificiality,” Richard’s words do anticipate events by predicting generalized civil unrest (*Shakespeare from “Richard II” to “Henry V”* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957], 35).


79. Shakespeare’s treatment of this episode as a dialogical exchange is the more remarkable when compared with Samuel Daniel’s *Civil Wars*, which has Henry himself speak of force rather than offering his allegiance to Richard as in Shakespeare’s version.

80. Peter Wentworth cites Bolingbroke’s attempts to pursue the claim of rule by “inheritance” as a byword for political pretence: “So Henrie the fourth did more rest vpon the blind pretence of a claim by Edmond crook-back, then vpon the voice of the Parliament, though it were strengthened with the resignation of Richard the second” (*A Treatise Concerning M. Wentworths Judgement* [London: 1598, STC 25245], 54). This moment illustrates Phyllis Rackin’s observation that the “contested relationship between the power of present possession and the authority of historical entitlement underlies all Shakespeare’s history plays except for *Henry VIII*” (*Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990], 230n.).

Chapter 5. *The Lamentable Tale of Me*


4. Ibid., 7.

5. Analysis of verse, especially the lyrical qualities of verse, while running counter to Bakhtin’s own antilyrical pronouncements, has its place in a study of utterance and has precedent in the Bakhtinian corpus. Not only does Vološinov’s early essay take up “discourse in poetry” on the basis of concrete utterance, but Bakhtin himself writes on Pushkin’s “Parting,” which furnishes him examples of the problems of authorial voice that reappear in the later meditations on the novel (see *Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges*, ed. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1989], 26–29). More positively, Vološinov insists that understanding any literary work demands attention to the wider field of literary production: “the forms of a literary utterance—a literary work of art—can only be understood in the unity of literary life, indissolubly connected with other
kinds of literary forms" (MPL 79). Thus, developments in dramatic form take part of their significance from their interrelation to developments in the novel (Bakhtin’s "novelization"), in lyric, and in other genres.

6. Weeding and trimming is, of course, a commonplace for taking political action against enemies. The medieval Secreta Secretorum advises rulers in just such terms; see Three Prose Versions of the Secreta Secretorum, ed. Robert Steele, Part I, Early English Text Society, extra series 74 (London: Kegan Paul, 1898), 213. For examples of this discourse from learned sources, see William Lambarde’s address to the quarter session of 24 April 1582 in which he compares Queen Elizabeth to a gardener weeding overgrown stalks and trimming branches (Wilbur Dunkel, William Lambarde, Elizabethan Jurist 1536–1601 [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965], 76); for examples from popular sources, see John Phillips’ ballad A Cold Pye for the Papistes (London: 1571?, STC 19863) in which Phillips admonishes Queen Elizabeth to use her sword and “by the Rootes suche weedes” to “bereave.”

7. The vehemence of the Queen’s reaction and the evolving series of responses that the gardener offers to her objections suggest the limitations of Ralph Berry’s account of the scene as a form of Renaissance pastoral that lacks “radical questioning” (Shakespeare and Social Class [Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1988]). The situation of the gardener as unfit to have and express an opinion on affairs of state recalls that of the theater itself, which since Elizabeth’s proclamation of 1559 had, officially at least, been ordered to avoid plays “wherin either matters of religion or of the gouernaunce of the estate of the common weale shalbe handled or treated, beyng no meeete matters to be wrytten or treated vpon, but by menne of aucthoritie, learning and wisedom, nor to be handled before any audience, but of graue and discretee persons” (E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923], 4:263).

8. The reluctance of the principal noble and spiritual counselors to hear any criticism of the king has venerable antecedents. Sir Thomas More, for example, writes to Elizabeth Barton in 1533 urging his reluctance to hear anything “as perteyne to prin[c]e’s affeires, or the state of the realme, but onelye to common and talke with eny person high[e] and low[e], of suche maner things as maye to the soule be profitable for you to shew and for [them to know].” The Correspondence of Sir Thomas More, ed. Elizabeth Frances Rogers (1947; repr. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 466.


10. Ornstein says that the “artificiality of the Gardener’s allegorical sentences” illustrates the play’s relative indifference to individualizing the voices of its characters while using them to embody “the collective consciousness of an age.” See Robert Ornstein, A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare’s History Plays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 102–3.


14. Bakhtin discusses the concept of the “loophole” in many places; see, for example, PDP 201 and 233.

16. Nor do the royal sycophants; Bagot refers slightly to the “wavering commons” whose “love / Lies in their purses” (R2 2.2.128–29).


19. The case of the gardener is revealing when compared with that of the lieutenant in *Henry VI*, Part Two, who captures the villainous Duke of Suffolk and has him killed. The lieutenant knows as much as the gardener about state politics, roundly corrects the illusions of his social superiors, and enthusiastically takes it upon himself to define what is best for England and its monarch, King Henry; but his speeches, unlike those of the gardener, are laced with palpable rancor and resentment at Suffolk's class-oriented insults, and he finishes the scene adopting an imperial style of address that reminds one of a would-be monarch in its demands that things be done insofar as “It is our pleasure” (2H6 4.1.140).

20. Contrast this with the uses of scales elsewhere in Shakespeare: Iago's references to the “beam of our lives” weighing the “scale” of reason and sensuality (Oth 1.3.329–30), or Henry VI’s typically idealistic injunction: “call these foul offenders to their answers, / And poise the cause in Justice’ equal scales, / Whose beam stands sure, whose rightful cause prevails” (2H6 2.1.206–8).

21. The specificity of the gardener’s social analysis directly opposes those developments that Louis Adrian Montrose claims to have characterized Elizabethan courtly appropriations of pastoral discourse that “[transform] what in other contexts was a vehicle of agrarian complaint, rustic celebration, and popular religion into a vehicle of social mystification” (“Eliza, Queene of shepheardes’ and the Pastoral of Power,” *English Literary Renaissance* 10 (1980):153–82; quote is from 172).


23. The English Crown had been claimed historically on the basis of five different legal theories: conquest, divine designation, inheritance, acclamation, or Parliamentary designation; see Jack Beonit Gohn, “Richard II: Shakespeare’s Legal Brief on the Royal Prerogative and the Succession to the Throne,” *The Georgetown Law Journal* 70 (1982): 943–973, 949. The deposing of Edward II was undertaken with attribution of responsibility only to the clergy and the people, not to Parliament itself (ibid., 951). That deposition is described in the Lichfield Chronicle as a disenfranchisement by the unanimous voice of the assembled estates of the realm (sitting not as Parliament, which was technically only a council to the king, but sitting specifically as “the estates”—i.e., the representative of “the populus,” the entire population of the land): “in which council, to the cry of the entire people unanimously persisting in the cry, that King Edward should be deposed . . . thus Walter, archbishop of Canterbury, pronouncing words to that effect, with the assent and consent of all, King Edward was deposed” (Gohn’s translation from the Latin in Maude V. Clarke, “Committees of Estates and the Deposition of Edward II,” in *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, ed. J. G. Edwards, V. H. Galbraith, and E. F. Jacob [Manchester: printed for subscribers, 1933], 27–46: 36n.3). Gohn points out that “although the Commons actually could not decide such matters, they were thus able to legitimize a deposition and usurpation” (“Richard II: Shakespeare’s Legal
Brief,” 951). One of the points made in Robert Parsons’ notorious Conference about the Next Succession (1594) is that in England “the consent and admission of the realme” is more important than “nearness of blood by succession alone” (A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland, facsimile ed. [New York: Da Capo, 1972], 134).


25. For one account of the failure of attempts to limit the flow of such information, see F. J. Levy, “How Information Spread Among the Gentry, 1550–1640,” Journal of British Studies 21 (1982): 24–34. Concerning the rising interest in news during the early 1590s, see G. B. Harrison, “Books and Readers, 1591–4,” The Library, 4th series 8 (1927): 273–302. Harrison maintains “Of the total of some 546 new books entered in the Stationers’ Register during the period 1591–4, 129 items are concerned with current news, of which 79 are prose and 46 verse, mostly ballads” (285–86). Next in bulk to news is theology of all kinds, especially the sermons of Reverend Henry Smith (291). In the dedication of his Second Frutes (1591), Giovanni Florio suggests the ubiquity of interest in the news: “Evere man is busie working to feede his owne fancie: some by delivering to the presse the occurrences & accidents of the world, newes from the marte, or from the mint, and newes are the credite of a travailler, and first question of an Englishman” (Second Frutes [London: 1591, STC 11097], A2). On the ambiguous status of “truth” as a defense against charges of sedition, see Roger B. Manning, “The Origins of the Doctrine of Sedition,” Albion 12 (1980): 99–121.


31. John W. Blanpied puts the case well when he qualifies Lois Potter’s observation on these passages, noting that although the content of Richard’s verses resembles the ideology to be found in speeches concerning England and English by Mowbray, Bolingbroke, and Gaunt, when Richard actually speaks these sentiments he embodies those “other voices perversely, or rather dramatically” (Time and the Artist in Shakespeare’s English Histories [Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983], 125). For a sensitive account of the problem posed by these lines for metadramatic approaches to the play, see Harry Berger, Jr., Imaginary Audition: Shakespeare on Stage and Page (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 84–90.

32. As Paul N. Siegel points out, in such passages the play does not use the notion of sacramental kingship as “simply” as scholarship following Ernst Kantorowicz might suggest, since an odd half-commitment to that tradition contributes to Richard’s downfall while also empowering critique of his failings by believers like Carlisle (Shakespeare’s English and Roman History Plays: A Marxist Approach [Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses, 1986], 61).
33. One might compare these speeches with what the play does with the final speeches of the “caterpillars” who surround King Richard. Instead of reducing them to what Voloshinov would call a supportive chorus, their sentences from the new monarch Henry prompt a dignified and stalwart reproach: “My comfort is, that heaven will take our souls, / And plague injustice with the pains of hell” (R2 3.1.33–34). Contrast this with what happens with the condemned traitors in Henry V, who join the chorus of approbation, even rejoicing in their own discovery.

34. It is important to differentiate my claim concerning the shifting and partial identification of Richard with Christ from two extreme alternatives. It is not true, as John Halverson puts it, that the Christ identification is only one of “Richard’s posturings” or that “it is only Richard who implicitly compares himself to Christ” (“The Lamentable Comedy of Richard II,” English Literary Renaissance 24 [1994]: 343–69, quote is from 352). It is also wrong to take the identification at face value; see J. A. Bryant, Jr. “The Linked Analogies of Richard II,” Sewanee Review 65 (1957): 420–33. Jeremy Irons’s bearded Richard in the 1986 Barry Kyle Royal Shakespeare Company production played the deposition scene in a long white robe that made him look Christlike (see Margaret Shewring, King Richard II [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996], plate 2 and p. 61).

35. His vocabulary of “weeding” is shared with the self-serving political machinations of Shakespeare’s Suffolk (2H6 1.3.99).

36. See Alfred Hart, Shakespeare and the Homilies (1934; repr. New York: Octagon, 1970), 66–67. Cf. Nashe’s stringent standard: “There is nothing is not Ambition, but that which a man woulde not haue, or would not be” (Works, 2:86). Political thinking per se is understood throughout the period to be threatening in and of itself. Writing in 1559 to Nicholas Bacon, Archbishop Parker, for example, imagines that exposure to John Knox’s political theory cannot but threaten the entire social fabric: “If such principles be spread into men’s heads, as now they be framed and referred to the judgment of the subject, of the tenant, and of the servant to discuss what is tyranny and to discern whether his prince, his landlord, his master is a tyrant by his own fancy and collection supposed, what lord of the council shall ride quietly minded in the streets among desperate beasts? What master shall be sure in his bedchamber?” (cited in M. M. Knappen, Tudor Puritanism: A Chapter in the History of Idealism [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939], 172). Compare the 1570 homily “Against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion,” which answers the question of disobedience to evil rulers with the observation: “What a perilous thing were it to commit unto the subjects judgment, which prince is wise and godly . . . and which otherwise” (The Two Books of Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches, ed. John Griffiths [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1859], 555).

37. The sinful nature of political analysis in a monarchical context is conveyed by the associations it is given with prying and treachery in Shakespeare’s earlier play Henry VI, Part Two, when the Duke of York characterizes his own villainy by exhorting himself: “Watch thou and wake when others be asleep/ To pry into the secrets of the state” (2H6 1.1.247–48).

38. The complexity and authority of the gardener’s utterance calls into question Richard Helgerson’s characterization of Shakespeare’s commoners as “bumbling” speakers who exhibit “comic malapropism, . . . confusion, and illogicality” and his opposition of their failings in speech and dignity to the skills of John Foxe’s “articulate” commoners, who respond with informed doctrine and precise formulations to their violent official interlocutors. As Helgerson points out, Foxe’s portrayal of dignified utterance in his martyrs did occasion skepticism from polemicists like Robert Parsons, who, according to Helgerson, shares class attitudes with Shakespeare (Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 265–66 and 346, n. 29); see also my chapter 6. The regi-
cidal judgment of Edmund Spenser’s Elizabeth figure, Mercilla, upon The Fairie Queene’s
Mary Stuart figure, Duessa, comes from a very different social location but contains interest-
ingly related strategies of recuperation. Mercilla’s judgment is represented as compelled by a
recognition of “plaine” truth and accompanied by her tears rather than by any express
demand for “vengeance” (Fairie Queene 5.9.50 in The Works of Edmund Spenser, ed. Edwin
Greenlaw, et al. [Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936]). On the “grave
pathos” of the gardener in productions of Frank Benson and Herbert Beerbohm Tree, see
Arthur Colby Sprague, Shakespeare’s Histories: Plays for the Stage (London: Society for Theatre
Research, 1964), 40–41. A. P. Rossiter praised the scene for “the feeling it gives of being scored
for wood-wind, or a bassoon against the strings, and cunningly placed between the trumpets
and clash which precede and follow it” (Woodstock: A Moral History , ed. A. P. Rossiter

39. In Hall’s version of Carlisle’s speech there is no reference to Golgotha and no refer-
ence to the impending War of the Roses, either. See Edward Hall, Union of the Two Noble and
Ilustre Families, 110.

40. The situation is paralleled in the utterance of Northumberland, who rejects Richard’s
(accurate) prophesies of his future treachery toward King Henry with an echo of the crowd
that calls for crucifixion, “My guilt be on my head” (R2 5.1.69).

41. As has been frequently noted, this abrupt shift of topics upon the death of an adver-
sary resembles the moment when Richard speaks callously about the death of John of Gaunt:
“His time is spent, our pilgrimage must be. / So much for that. Now for our Irish wars” (R2
2.1.154–55).

42. One may be reminded that Bolingbroke left Mowbray with the exhortation to
 cleanse his—hardly “sweet”—soul of treasonous guilt: “Confess thy treason ere thou fly the
realm; / Since thou hast far to go, bear not along / The clogging burden of a guilty soul” (R2
1.3.198–200). Given the frequent proximity of the play’s language to lamenting love lyric, it
appears relevant that poetic uses of “sweet” had already occasioned Sidney’s mockery in
Astrophil and Stella, where sonnet 6 exemplifies the artificiality of love language in the form
of a doubled “sweet” in a single line—”To some a sweetest plaint a sweetest style affords” (Sir
word “sweet” has been utterly compromised by this point in the play in any case. Its repeti-
tion may have served to mark the queen’s intense regard for Richard (“so sweet a guest / As
my sweet Richard” [R2 2.2.8–9]), but subsequently, the term obviously marks cloying flattery
in Northumberland’s attempt to ingratiate himself with Bolingbroke (R2 2.3.2–18). Locating
the dead in Abraham’s bosom is traditional in Tudor elegiac poetry, being a favorite of
Thomas Churchyard, among others (see Dennis Kay, Melodious Tears: The English Funeral
bly avoid a tonal solecism like Bolingbroke’s condescending denomination of the patriarch as
“good old Abraham.” The awkwardness of Bolingbroke’s utterance suggests the tonally infe-
licitous utterance of Richard when he is brought similar news of apparently unexpected death
in act three, scene two. The tonal effects of such moments complicate any judgment on their
content, such as John Palmer’s claim that Bolingbroke’s handling of the accusations in act
four, scene one, represents pure efficiency in contrast with Richard’s ineffectuality in act one,
scene one (Political Characters of Shakespeare [London: Macmillan, 1945], 124).

43. All quartos of Richard II use the word “tragedy” on their title pages. The First Folio
refers to the “Life and Death of Richard II.”


51. Some opposed amorous and tragic verse to one another. Spenser advises Samuel Daniel to leave the “lowly” flight of “loves soft laies and looser thoughts” for “tragick plaints and passionate mischance” (“Colin Clouts Come Home Again,” ll. 423–27 in *Works of Edmund Spenser*). But Lawrence Babb notes, “There is much melancholic misery also in Elizabethan amatory poems written in forms other than the sonnet—in Lodge’s *Glaucus and Silla*, J. C.’s *Alcilia: Philoparthen’s Loving Folly*, Robert Tofte’s *Alba: The Month’s Minde of a Melancholy Lover*, Nicholas Breton’s *The Passionate Shepherd*” (Elizabethan Malady, 158).


55. Less playfully, Sidney once deployed an impresa that commented upon his own disappointed political hope after the birth of his uncle Leicester’s son had deprived him of a potential inheritance. The impresa was the word “speravi” with a line through it. Camden says that the device was “thus dashed through to shew his hope therein was dashed” (in Richard C. McCoy, *The Rites of Knighthood: The Literature and Politics of Elizabethan Chivalry* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989], 63). As Patricia Fumerton puts it, “Sidney’s personal disappointment takes the form of hope crossed out. Disappointment appears only as an invisibility limned by what it is not: a public display of hope” (*Cultural Aesthetics: Renaissance Literature and the Practice of Social Ornament* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991], 100).
56. Compare Brutus on “young ambition’s ladder” (JC 2.1.22).

57. Cornwallis attempts to define a positive value for hope by differentiating its true form as a passive, emotional, last-ditch bulwark against total despair from an evil form, which, if acted upon, might actually enable one to achieve what one hopes for. “To aspire is Ambition, which is hope attempting, heere hope is abused which is giuen to man not to clime with, but to keepe him from falling. It hurts not for all this, if we would allay the vigor, and prepare it as we do Quick siluer, which killing, cures” (Cornwallis, Essays, Gir). In this profoundly conservative vision, hope is really ambition if acted on; hope is hope only if it constitutes a last remedy against despair. One might note the popularity of lyrics written from prison by condemned men such as the fifteenth-century poem of Anthony Woodville, “Sumwhat musying,” and Essex’s “The Passion of Discontented Mind.” In both cases, what was written as a poem in which a courtesan responded to specific negative political conditions would be subsequently (and widely) read as the anonymous lament of a discontented lover (see Arthur F. Marotti, “The Transmission of Lyric Poetry and the Institutionalizing of Literature in the English Renaissance,” in Contending Kingdoms: Historical, Psychological, and Feminist Approaches to the Literature of Sixteenth-Century England and France, ed. Marie-Rose Logan and Peter L. Rudnytsky [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991], 21–41, 29, 39n.).

58. J. W. Lever notes, “During the four years that followed the appearance of Astrophel and Stella in 1591, more sonnets saw the light than in all the decades since Wyatt made his first renderings from Petrarch” (The Elizabethan Love Sonnet [London: Methuen, 1956], 92).

59. Diana Henderson discusses desiring without appearing to desire for oneself in Passion Made Public: Elizabethan Lyric, Gender, and Performance (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1995). The most influential account of the parallels between the place of the lover-poet within the love relationship and within the patronage system is Arthur F. Marotti’s “Love is not love: Elizabethan Sonnet Sequences and the Social Order,” ELH 49 (1982): 396–428.


61. Sonnet 45; Duncan-Jones, Sir Philip Sidney, 170.

62. Compare Anne Ferry’s analysis of the way that “Vertue” in Astrophil and Stella, Sonnet 31, is ironically turned into a synonym for the beloved’s “ungratefulness” to constant lovers, and yet denied to be so (The Inward Language: Sonnets of Wyatt, Sidney, Shakespeare, Donne [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983], 164).

63. Cf. Richard Lanham’s sense of “rhetorical purposes” in Astrophil and Stella and its confusions of will and unwilled (The Motives of Eloquence [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976], 106). Such a reading is congruent with that offered by Thomas P. Roche, Jr., who sees Sidney constructing Astrophil as a “negative example” of one “whose reason gives way to his will and whose hopeful desires finally lead him into despair” (Petrarch and the English Sonnet Sequences [New York: AMS Press, 1989], 195).


65. See Peter Ure’s note to 5.1.54 in King Richard II, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1961).

66. Compare the conjunction of political and erotic vocabularies in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 29, where “hope” and “state” both describe the political misfortunes of the speaker and evoke the compensatory benefits of the personal relation with the beloved. On this sonnet and its political language, see J. Barrell, “Editing Out: The Discourse of Patronage and


68. Anne Ferry points out that the speaker of Sonnet 15 insists on inevitable death and decline in "every thing that growes" but uses commonplace assertions of mutability to argue that his art can defeat the powers he confronts (All in War with Time: Love Poetry of Shakespeare, Donne, Jonson, Marvell [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975], 5). The intensity of Hamlet's individualized commitment to his dead father is represented against Gertrude's commonplace, "All that lives must die," and Hamlet's own sense of universal decay is conveyed in the first soliloquy's "unweeded garden." On time in Richard II, see Robert L. Montgomery, "The Dimension of Time in Richard II," Shakespeare Studies 4 (1969): 73–85.

69. Stanley Wells, "The Lamentable Tale of Richard II," Shakespeare Studies (Japan) 17 (1982): 1–23. The preponderance of lament and of invented opportunities for lamentation that Shakespeare builds into the play have little relation to the story told by Holinshed; thus, my sense of the play runs directly opposite to that of Graham Holderness, who faults Richard II for its "strict adherence to historical sources," allowing only a "few minor exceptions" such as the gardeners' scene (Shakespeare's History [Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1985], 32). Holderness's judgment is limited by its concentration on content at the expense of other qualities of utterance.

70. The play goes so far as to dignify the parting of Bushy, Bagot, and Greene—the "caterpillars" who are said to corrupt Richard—with speeches of pathos that closely parallel lines spoken in Woodstock upon the parting of Richard's uncles. See Ure's note to Richard II, 2.2.141–42.


72. Wolfgang Clemen, English Tragedy Before Shakespeare, 240–41. Clemen follows L. L. Schücking (in Shakespeare und der Tragödienstil seiner Zeit [Bern: Francke, 1947]) to describe the typical attitude toward suffering and sorrow in the earlier drama as expressing an "exaggerated dynamic of the will" that results in a "recurrent phraseology" of malediction and wishes for annihilation (241). Arguing on the basis of charted frequencies of usage, Dolores M. Burton has defined the special treatment of grief in Richard's case when compared with other Shakespearean protagonists: "when [Richard] consciously mentions his inner dispositions, he names feelings of grief, sorrow, and care. Pride, jealousy, anger, ambition—the emotional and moral stuff of Shakespeare's later tragic heroes—are absent. Richard is not so much aware of faults as he is of misery. Even reflections on name and language, which many critics view as central to his tragedy, are subordinated to the emotion of grief" (Shakespeare's Grammatical Style: A Computer Assisted Analysis of "Richard II" and "Antony and Cleopatra" [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973], 176).


76. Compare the reiterated “Are these . . .” “Is this . . .” tropes of Dido in Marlowe's *Dido, Queen of Carthage* (in *The Complete Plays*, ed. J. B. Steane [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1969]), Dido addresses the various accoutrements of Aeneas's ship but then corrects her pathetic fallacy (4.4.147) before taking revenge nevertheless on these inanimate objects like Kyd's distraught Isabella in the garden of Spanish Tragedy (4.2). Faustus's references to his soul sucked from his body by the kiss of the spectral Helen of Troy offer a nightmare version of an Ovidian image that Shakespeare also remembers in *Henry VI, Part Two* when the villainous Suffolk rhapsodizes over the kiss of the unfaithful Queen Margaret: “To have thee with thy lips to stop my mouth. / So shouldst thou either turn my flying soul / Or I should breathe it so into thy body / And then it lived in sweet Elysium” (2H6 3.2.396–99); cf. Ovid, *Tristia*, 3.3.59–62, in *Tristia, Ex Ponto*, trans. Arthur Leslie Wheeler, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

77. Contrast the treatment of the lovers' relationship in Daniel's sonnet “Still in the trace of my tormented thought,” where the speaker maintains, “Thy least regarde too deerely haue I bought,” and concludes by asking for harsh judgment: “Then iudge who sinnes the greater of vs twaine:/ I in my loue, or thou in thy disdaine” (*Delia* [London: 1592, STC 6253.2], Ex2).

78. This combination of pain and self-assertion need not be complex, of course. It reaches something of a low point in Sonnet 44 of Drayton's *Idea*, where the beloved is blamed for destroying the speaker with “coy disdaine,” but his sufferings end up being acclaimed exclusively for their benefits to his own name rather than for the announced purpose of “[eternalizing]” her:

And though in youth, my YOUTH vntimely perish,
To kepe Thee from Obluion and the Graue,
Ensuing Ages yet my Rimes shall cherish,
Where I intomb'd, my better part shall saue;
And though this Earthly Body fade and die,
My Name shall mount vpon Eternitie.


80. According to Götz Schmitz, Drayton's worries about being “brainish” register his uneasiness at the degree of egocentrism in the love complaint (*The Fall of Women in Early English Narrative Verse* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 238).


82. On the Elizabethan career pattern leading from amorous fiction or poetry in youth to more serious, respectable work, see Richard Helgerson, *The Elizabethan Prodigals

83. Compare Daniel’s sonnet speaker imagining himself a “Sacrifice” to Delia and asking the beloved (and the reader) to imagine him both a ruin and a book: “Reade in my face a volume of despayres, / The wayling Iliads of my tragicke wo; / Drawne with my blood, and printed with my cares, / Wrought by her hand that I have honour’d so” (Sonnet 43). For a psychoanalytic approach to the interweaving of identity and melancholy in this tradition, see Enterline, Tears of Narcissus.

84. Not that the theater need make much out of the materials provided. The famous Charles Kean Richard II of 1857 allowed Ellen Tree to appear in the parting scene as “a remarkable instance of feminine devotion,” especially notable for displaying “such an agony of tearful grief, . . . so completely broken up with heartrending sorrow, that, although the pageantry of the play is over, this scene is one of the most effective of the whole performance. When the hapless king has departed she carries out still further her illustration of feeling by rushing towards the parapet, and leaning over it to catch a last glimpse of the beloved object” (The [London] Times 16 March 1857; quoted in Shakespeare and the Victorian Stage, ed. Richard Foulkes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], 53).

85. The magnitude of grief and laments in poetry and drama of this period is the more remarkable for the evidence that cultural attitudes toward grieving were divided and undergoing modification. According to G. W. Pigman, the sixteenth century, and especially the later half, saw remarkable change in attitudes toward grief, including but not limited to grief at the death of a loved one. The dominant attitude shifted from a mixture of total condemnation and grudging allowance to an ideal of moderation. As Pigman writes, “For most of the sixteenth century poets are anxious about the mourning contained in their poems and often express sorrow only to turn upon themselves for indulging in it, but toward the end of the century defensiveness about mourning becomes less pressing and persistent, and this self-abusing reversal ceases to be so common. An ideal of personal expression of grief begins to replace critical self-restraint.” Pigman finds this history not only in poetry but in ordinary practical discourse appearing in letter-writing treatises and moral-theological tracts (Grief and English Renaissance Elegy, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 3).

86. Ambidexter parodies the weeping of the queen in Preston’s Cambyses (scene 10). Sidney’s own pronouncement on the “lamenting Elegiac” praises it for “compassionate accompanying just cause of lamentations,” but he also cautions that it may be used for “painting out how weak be the passions of woefulness” (see Defence in Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, 229).

87. Contrast John Halverson’s assessment, which, while acutely aware of the (potentially laughable) limitations of Richard’s claims to sympathy, does not, I believe, do justice to their power (“Lamentable Comedy of Richard II”). The case is complex. What Bakhtin calls irony’s power to “reaccent” (Di 418–21) is not simply victorious but engaged in continual struggle with an accent or tone that is not easily denied its claims. See below, chapter 6.

88. Shakespeare’s treatment of the exaggerations in Richard’s pose here recalls the handling of the early love rhetoric of Romeo, whose first and most patently affected Petrarchan usage concludes with a similar worry about being laughed at: “This love feel I, that feel no love in this./ Dost thou not laugh?” (R/1.i.182–83). Another similarity between Richard’s and Romeo’s language becomes apparent when Romeo pauses to deliberate about the proper similes in which to imagine Juliet’s eyes and comes up with grotesque elaborations upon elaborations (R/2.2.13–22).

90. And Shakespeare's surprisingly self-ironic textual practice should be contrasted with that of later dramatists like Richard Wroughton, whose early nineteenth-century adaptation for Drury Lane splices in lines for Isabella's grief from Lear's lamentations over Cordelia and even goes so far as to give Bolingbroke a soliloquy in which he promises "with pleasure" to "resign" his crown, "If by the deed I can alleviate/ The bleeding sorrows of the royal pair" (*King Richard the Second* [London, 1815], 66; see act 5, scene 3).

91. On the critical consensus, despite differences of approach, that holds the sonnet to be a form that encourages a particularly active reader, see Wall, The Imprint of Gender, 50–57; on lyric and the slowing of time in order to demand such attention to detail, see Henderson, *Passion Made Public*, 24.

92. This lack of closure is precisely what led George Pierce Baker to denounce the play, reasoning "the great public does not permanently care for story-telling which leaves no clear, final impression" (*The Development of Shakespeare as a Dramatist* [New York: Macmillan, 1907], 148). On audience involvement, compare Phyllis Rackin, "The Role of the Audience in Shakespeare's *Richard II*," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 36 (1985), 262–81.

93. In this context Thomas Heywood's evaluation of the political role of the history play is true but limited. Heywood notes that the commercial history plays offered the common audience orthodox political messages as well as much information from the chronicles and deduces that it could not thus be seen as subversive of official ideology and hierarchy, but he also admits that the plays gave ordinary people new discursive capacities, and these are, I would argue, less certain in effect: "playes haue made the ignorant more apprehensiue, taught the vnlearned the knowledge of many famous histories, instructed such as canot reade in the discouery of all our English Chronicles: & what haue you now of that weake capacity, that cannot discourse of any notable thing recorded euen from William the Conquerour, nay from the landing of Brute, vntill this day, beeing possent of their true vse, For, or because Playes are writ with this ayme, and carried with this methode, to teach the subjects obedience to their King, to shew the people the vntimely ends of such as haue mowed tumults, commotions, and insurrections, to present them with the flourishinge estate of such as liue in obedience, exhorting them to allegiance, dehorting them from all trayterous and felonious stratagemes" (*An Apology for Actors* [1612], repr. ed. Arthur Freeman [New York: Garland, 1973], F3r–F3v).

Chapter 6. "The Shadow of Your . . . Face"

1. Bakhtin writes: "The analysis we have applied to Rabelais would also help us to discover the essential Carnival element in the organization of Shakespeare's drama. This does not merely concern the secondary, clownish motives of his plays. The logic of crowning and uncrowning, in direct or indirect form, organizes the serious elements also. And first of all this 'belief in the possibility of a complete exit from the present order of this life' determines Shakespeare's fearless, sober (yet not cynical) realism and absence of dogmatism. This pathos of radical changes and renewals is the essence of Shakespeare's world consciousness. It made him see the great epoch-making changes taking place around him and yet recognize their limitations. Shakespeare's drama has many outward carnivalesque aspects: images of the material bodily lower stratum, of ambivalent obscenities, and of popular banquet scenes" (*RAHW* 275).

3. Helgerson sees Shakespeare following Marlowe and the university wits in "working to establish" a "new author’s theatre" and thus to divide the more socially homogeneous theatrical reality of the 1580s between elite and popular audiences, authors, and forms. Helgerson proposes that Shakespeare’s theater “participated” in "the general upper-class withdrawal" while rival theaters (such as the Fortune and Red Bull) “came to stand for that coarse, common, and vulgar culture from which the upper classes were withdrawing” (242). For a revisionary account suggesting that the elite and popular companies were separated less completely and more gradually than is often thought, see Andrew Gurr, *The Shakespearian Playing Companies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 299 and 150-57; and Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 270-72.

4. Bakhtin even includes Socratic irony as a form of “reduced carnival laughter” (PDP 132).


7. Burke contests Robert Redfield’s division of elite from popular traditions and his presumption of the “relatively homogeneous” nature of each, claiming that the learned elite, if not the lower orders, were “bi-cultural” and at least in the mode of “play” “participated in the little tradition [of popular culture] as a second culture” (28–29). Burke also recognizes Gramsci’s claim that “The people is not a culturally homogeneous unit, but it is culturally stratified in a complex way” by granting that “There were many popular cultures or many varieties of popular culture” (p. 29). On polarization, one might contrast the work of Keith Wrightson and David Levine on Terling (*Poverty and Piety in an English Village: Terling, 1525–1700* [New York: Academic Press, 1979]) and Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson’s analysis of seventeenth-century “polarisation” (“A Polarised Society?” in *Order and Disorder in Early Modern England*, ed. Anthony J. Fletcher and John Stevenson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985]) with Margaret Spufford’s account of the puritanical leanings of ordinary villagers (“Puritanism and Social Control?” in *Order and Disorder in Early Modern England*, ed. Anthony J. Fletcher and John Stevenson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985], 44–47) and Martin Ingram’s depiction of shared sexual and behavioral values (*Church Courts, Sex and Marriage in England, 1570–1640* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], esp. 118–24). See also Eamon Duffy’s use of Richard Baxter’s description of Kidderminster to show more diversity than polarity (“The Godly and the Multitude,” *Seventeenth Century Journal* 1 [1986]: 31–55).

in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. Barry Reay (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 32. Stuart Hall makes a similar point by citing Vološinov’s analysis of class and semiotically multivalent utterance to argue that “the meaning of a cultural symbol is given in part by the social field into which it is incorporated, the practices with which it articulates and is made to resonate. What matters is not the intrinsic or historically fixed objects of culture, but the state of play in cultural relations: to put it bluntly and in an oversimplified form—what counts is the class struggle in and over culture. Almost every fixed inventory will betray us. Is the novel a ‘bourgeois’ form? The answer can only be historically provisional: when? for whom? under what conditions?” (“Notes on Deconstructing ‘The Popular,'” in People’s History and Socialist Theory, ed. Raphael Samuel [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981], 227–39; quote is from 235).


20. Ronald Knowles, “The Farce of History: Miracle, Combat, and Rebellion in 2 Henry VI,” Yearbook of English Studies 21 (1991), 168–86. It is not simply that Shakespeare’s treatment of Cade’s rebellion, as Alexander Leggatt puts it, exposes “the anarchy that is the
dark side of carnival” but that there are odd mixtures of dark and light in the Cade episodes, and anarchy is only one way to read Cade. There is authoritarianism in him as well as trenchant mockery of abuses by present authorities (Alexander Leggatt, *Shakespeare’s Political Drama: The History Plays and the Roman Plays* [London: Routledge, 1988], 17).

21. For Helgerson on emergence of a gentrified “authors” theater, see *Forms of Nationhood*, 200–245; on Shakespeare’s part in the general elite “withdrawal,” see 242.

22. For an intelligent account of the controversies about carnival and a de-essentialized sense of its variety, see James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), 172–82.


26. In 1604 participants in a riding at Haughley and Wetherden claimed their object to be that “not only the woman which had offended might be shamed for her misdemeanor towards her husband [in beating him] but other women also by her shame might be admonished [not] to offend in like sort” (Ingram, “Ridings, Rough Music and the ‘Reform of Popular Culture’” 93, quoting from London, Public Records Office, STA.C. 8/249/19, m. 18).

27. Ingram, “Ridings, Rough Music, and the ‘Reform of Popular Culture,’” 93. Ingram points out that some of the less obviously penal charivaris asserted dominance of one community or group over another (94–95). Ingram’s sense of the social setting of charivari and associated symbols counters an overemphasis on a cultural split between elite and popular. The customs he analyzes, “so often regarded by modern historians as characteristically plebian, actually bear witness less to cultural conflict than to areas of shared culture. They were relatively immune to attack because in important respects they articulated meanings common to all ranks of society. They thus serve as valuable reminders that throughout the period under
review [sixteenth and seventeenth centuries] there remained important points of cultural contact between rich and poor, rulers and ruled. It is surely necessary to take account of such cultural homogenities before insisting on too pronounced a split between 'popular' and 'elite' culture by about 1700” (112–13).


30. On Rabelais as a model for “a folk culture of humor belonging to other ages,” see *RAHW* 474; on the Renaissance as the period when “a millennium of folk humor broke into . . . literature” and on Shakespeare’s literary participation in this “laughter in its most radical, universal, and at the same time gay form,” see *RAHW* 72.


32. Emerson and Morson’s *Mikhail Bakhtin* offers a useful periodization of Bakhtin’s work and interests.

33. In Renate Lachman’s words, Stalinism produced “a folk culture from which the folk had been banished and replaced by its perverse double: folklore” (“Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture,” *Cultural Critique* 11 [1989]: 115–52; quote is from 118).

34. Bakhtin writes: “The man who is speaking is one with the crowd; he does not present himself as its opponent, nor does he teach, accuse, or intimidate it. He laughs with it. There is not the slightest tone of morose seriousness in his oration, no fear, pity, or humility. This is an absolutely gay and fearless talk, free and frank, which echoes in the festive square beyond all verbal prohibitions, limitations, and conventions” (*RAHW* 167). Cf. Emerson and Morson, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 446–47. Bakhtin does note a heteroglot mockery of ecclesiastical discourses in Rabelais’ prologue, but he rapidly passes over Rabelais’ specific targets to make him a champion of “fearless, free, and gay truth” (*RAHW* 168). For the more local aims and resonances of this prologue, see Jerome Schwartz, *Irony and Ideology in Rabelais: Structures of Subversion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9–16.

35. Bakhtin’s last writings include a passage on Shakespeare in the context of a meditation on tonality that runs directly counter to the carnivalesque emphasis: “The problem of tone in literature (laughter, tears, and their derivatives). . . . The significance of tears and sadness for one’s world view. The tearful aspect of the world. Compassion. The discovery of this aspect in Shakespeare (complex of motifs)” (*SG* 140).


38. The Captain observes,

Rich men look sad, and ruffians dance and leap—
The one in fear to lose what they enjoy,
The other to enjoy by rage and war.
These signs forerun the death or fall of kings. (R2 2.4.12–13)

Helgerson’s remarks on commoners as “victims” of royal power or as instinctive loyalists appear in Forms of Nationhood, 234 and 238.


40. Evidence that even the most hoary commonplace of “popular” discourse may be a response to constraint and calculation is apparent in Hobs’ response to the disguised King Edward and his courtly follower, Sellinger, who demand to know how “the Commons” will take King Henry’s death. Hobs observes what “we say”:

Faith, the Commons will take it as a common thing.
Death’s an honest man; for he spares not the King.
For as one comes, another’s tane away;
And seldom comes the better, that’s all we say. (51)

Hobs employs a proverbial commonplace (see R. W. Dent, Shakespeare’s Proverbial Language [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981], B332) and wins Sellinger’s approval for dodging the dangers inherent in the question itself: “Shrewdly spoken, tanner, by my say!” (51–52). For similar use of the same proverb, see R3 2.3.4.


42. The discourse of “complete exit from the present order” is derived from the nineteenth-century radical critic Nikolai Dobrolyubov, who argued that radical change demanded belief in such a possibility; thus Bakhtin’s own text is riddled with the discourse of approved figures—the equivalent to Stalinesque high culture—employed to sanction antiofficial rituals (see Emerson and Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 447–48).

43. Benson’s 1896 Richard was remarked as “acuteely sensitive,” but also displayed great awkwardness. For example, one review notes that as the newly deposed Richard examines himself in the glass, he “mechanically ascends the steps to the vacant throne. Just as he is about to sit down, he suddenly remembers himself with a short laugh and an apologetic gesture” (W. J. Lawrence The Sketch, 17 March 1897, quoted in Margaret Shewring, King Richard II, 66). The 1995 Deborah Warner / Fiona Shaw National Theatre production was controversial but a great success in Paris and Salzburg. In 2000 Samuel West’s Richard at The Other Place in Stratford-
Upon-Avon avoided the intentional awkwardnesses of Shaw's portrayal, but comic elements were abundant in other characterizations, particularly in the portrayal of young Hotspur.

44. The new king pays respect to the notion of a curse when he reflects on his "unthrifty son": “If any plague hang over us, 'tis he” (R2 5.3.5). One reviewer of Charles Kean's 1857 Richard II emphasized the way that laughter and celebration in Kean's staging of Shakespeare's narrated scene of procession by the new and deposed kings added an ominous irony to the "moral" of the scene: “Here we have chiming bells, flags, music, mountebanks, beggars, grotesque dancers, love making, and all the motley ingredients, pastimes and enjoyments of a tumultuous mob, at once servile and brutal, while, to crown all, we have the triumphant progress of the 'haught insulting Bollingbroke,' bowing to the applauding citizens with that mock humility that Richard, in an omitted scene, so admirably described upon his going into banishment; while, last of all, to add insult to indignity, the deposed monarch follows, to give eclair to his rival's triumph, and expose the unhappy Richard to the detestation and revilings of an infuriate mob. The moral of the picture is perfect” (quoted in Shakespeare and the Victorian Stage, ed. Richard Foulkes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], 51–52).


46. Ibid., 286–94.


48. Sir John Davies offers an account of the ballad's appeal to the "vulgar." Epigram 38 (probably written in 1594) describes one who gathers credit with others as resembling a ballad singer:

   his credite growes,
   As doth the ballade-singers auditorie,
   Which hath at Temple Bar his standing chose,
   And to the vulgar sings an ale-house storie.
   First standes a Porter, then an Oyster wife
   Doth stint her crie and stay her steps to heare him,
   Then comes a cutpurse ready with his Knife,
   And then a cuntrey Client presseth neere him,
   There standes the Cunstable, there standes the whore,
   And harkning to the song mark not ec other.
   There by the Serjeant standes the debtor poore,
   And doth no more mistrust him then his brother:
   Thus Orpheus to such hearers giveth Musique,
   And Philo to such Patients giveth phisicke.


51. Ibid., 81.

52. Ibid. Tristram Potter Coffin argues that the folk song is frequently the oral residue of earlier printed poems or broadsides; see The British Traditional Ballad in North America
Abuse
Reading
their
haps
St.
istic
at
said
Thomas,
Cambridge
reformist”
Hyder
printed
ing.

M.
the

Barnes
Deloney
(East
Philadelphia:
{The
Works
of
Thomas
Nashe: 3:84).
on

63.

Thomas
Lovell,
A
Dialogue
between
Costume
and
Veritie
Concerning
the
Use
and
Abuse
of
Dauung
and
Minstreleie
(London:
1581,
STC
16860),
D5r.
Thomas
Nashe
mocks
Deloney
(“the
Balletting
Silke-weauer”) as
unable
to
pen
“one
merrie
dittie”
while
writing
“The
Thunder-bolt
against
Swearers,
Repent,
England,
repent,
&
The
strange
iudgements
of
God”
(The
Works
of
Thomas
Nashe,
ed.
Ronald
B.
McKerrow
and
F.
P.
Wilson
[1958;
repr.
New
York:
Barnes
and
Noble,
1965],
3:84).

64.
On
Shakespeare’s
favorite
ballad,
see
the
Variorum
Richard
II,
ed.
H.
H.
Furness
(Philadelphia:
Lippincott,
1871),
316.

65.
The
ballad
reads: “The
blinded
boy,
that
shootes
to
trim.”
See
“King
Cophetua
and
the
Beggar-Maid”
in
Reliques
of
Ancient
English
Poetry,
ed.
Thomas
Percy,
2
vols.
(London:
J.
M.
Dent,
1906),
1:187–90.

66.
On
the
ballad’s
and
the
ballad-based
drama’s
“dream
of
commonality,
of
common
interests
and
common
humanity,
between
the
ruler
and
the
ruled,”
see
Helgerson,
Forms
of
Nationhood,
231–32.

67.
On
sixteenth-century
relations
between
cleanliness
and
social
degree,
see
Keith
Thomas,
“Cleanliness
and
Godliness
in
Early
Modern
England,”
in
Religion,
Culture,
and

68. See Peter Lake's discussion of the "providentialized news and crime pamphlets in the period after 1570" ("Popular Form, Puritan Content? Two Puritan Appropriations of the Murder Pamphlet from Mid-Seventeenth-Century London," in Religion, Culture and Society, 313–34; quote is from 314).


70. The True Tragedie of Richard the Third (1594) (London: Shakespeare Society, 1844), 11.

71. As Jesse M. Lander argues, Jane's agency is subtly handled, since "to allow Jane too much agency would turn her into a whore, to allow her too little would turn Edward into a tyrant" ("Faith in Me vnto this Commonwealth: Edward IV and the Civic Nation," Renaissance Drama n.s. 27 (1996): 47–78; quote is from 56. Cf. Palmer, "Edward IV's Secret Familiarities."


73. In Lewis Theobald's eighteenth-century adaptation of the play, problems of decorum prompted him to modify York's part considerably in the direction of seriousness (see Richard II [London, 1719]).


75. My argument here, and throughout this chapter, sometimes approximates that of John Halverson in "The Lamentable Comedy of Richard II," English Literary Renaissance 24 (1994): 343–69. While Halverson seems to me correct in suggesting "the real, radical power of the drama lies primarily in its comic, absurdist perspective, which pervades, sometimes subtly, sometimes egregiously, the whole fabric of the play" (369), his treatment of examples,
including his accounts of such key figures as York and the play’s gardener, seem to me to downplay the extent to which the play’s “absurdist” streak remains integrally interwoven with a manner and content that is decidedly not “risible” (356). The gardener, for example, does not seem to me wrong in his principles, “solemnly pretentious” in manner, nor his utterance likely to seem “a ridiculous way for a gardener to talk” (356) to an Elizabethan theater audience.


77. The humorous potential in York’s misspeaking makes it differ from the heavy-handed treatment of similar mistakes in Edward III (entered Stationers’ Register, December 1595). York calls the queen, who is, in Elizabethan usage, his “cousin” (she is his niece by marriage), his “sister” perhaps because the death of his sister-in-law, the Duchess of Gloucester, is on his mind, since his mistake is followed by his recollection of the obligation to visit her (“I should to Plashy too; / But time will not permit”). In Edward III, King Edward receives a letter from the Emperor, wishing it were from his lover, the countess, and repeatedly responds to queries with remarks that show his preoccupation with her. He sums up his condition:

Thus from the heart’s abundance speaks the tongue
Countess for emperor and indeed why not?
She is as imperator over me and I to her
am as a kneeling vassal, that observes
the pleasure or displeasure of her eye. (2.2.859–63)


78. Comparing a nobleman to “a shooemaker sweating, when he pulls on a shoo” was a notable contemporary insult according to Nashe’s Pierce Penniless (Works, 1:190). York’s struggle with material reality in the boots is proleptic of King Lear’s difficulties on the heath.

79. William Bennett’s reaction to “Big Man with A Gun” is recorded in The New Yorker (12 June 1995): 35–36. This article also provides the relevant lyrics.

80. I think of Žižek’s use of pop culture materials to communicate psychoanalytic and philosophic observations; see for example, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989).


83. Commonplace books, which frequently include transcriptions of printed ballads, confirm that Cornwallis was not alone or merely paradoxical in his interests; Watt argues that “the broadside was familiar amongst the most ‘elite’ groups of sixteenth-century society” (Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 17).


85. Burke discusses the “participation thesis” in Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, 27. In light of their authored status and potentially serious material it is problematic that ballads and broadsides furnish a basis for much of the “little tradition.” Furthermore, Cornwallis, as a representative of the elite, does not treat the popular tradition altogether playfully; nor for that matter do two of the chief exemplars of the popular tradition—the novelist
Bacon, Nicholas, 81, 300
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and new historical study. To this end he reconsiders the social implications of such features as tonality, diction, timing, gesture, and metaphor. His analysis extends not only to Richard II but also to the materials on which historians and new historians have based arguments about the sociopolitical location of the theater, the role of honor culture, the rise of agrarian enclosure, and the cultural polarization of English society.

JAMES R. SIEMON is professor of English at Boston University and author of Shakespearean Iconoclasm.
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